


LIBERALISM AND N THE VICTORIAN

‘The Liberal Party is a house of many mansions’, Sir William Harcourt once observed. At the time it was not altogether a compliment. From the perspective of late-Victorian party management, the sheer variety of Liberalism in social and intellectual terms added considerably to the complications of keeping a parliamentary majority intact during what was notionally a seven-year term. On the other hand, as the foundation for building a coherent and inclusive sense of national identity Liberalism looked a much more serviceable vehicle. By **Martin Pugh.**



IN ITS HEYDAY from the 1850s to 1914 the Liberal Party enjoyed significant support in England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland; it included High Anglicans, Nonconformists, secular Radicals and Jews; it mobilised agricultural labourers and aristocratic landowners, trade unionists and major employers, monarchists and Republicans, dedicated teetotallers and successful brewers. This rainbow coalition not only reflected British society in all its inconsistency and exuberance, it also proved to be instrumental

in integrating the various elements into the system and giving them a sense of Britishness that seems increasingly elusive today.

This was no small achievement, for at the start of the nineteenth century Britain was a society experiencing great social and economic upheaval while being run by a largely closed aristocratic elite comprising just a few hundred families. As John Vincent observed some years ago, the Liberal Party offered an answer to the question of who was to govern the nation

NATIONAL IDENTITY ACHIEVEMENT

after the landed aristocracy ceased to be able to do so by themselves.¹ In effect the solution lay in gradually curtailing, though not overthrowing, aristocratic rule and supplementing it by drawing in talent from outside its ranks and eventually engaging comparatively poor and powerless people in the political process.

To this end, nineteenth-century Liberals developed what today would be called a *narrative* designed to explain the nation's past and its present. At the constitutional level this drew on the notion of a rough-and-ready democracy dating back to Anglo-Saxon England that had been subverted by the Norman Conquest; in this analysis, parliamentary reform could be seen as patriotic and British. In time the British had overthrown the absolutism of the Stuart Kings, replacing it with a parliamentary monarchy and a balanced system of government in which three institutions, King, Lords and Commons, checked each other's exercise of power. The Liberal philosopher, John Locke, argued that men placed themselves under society on the basis that the state guaranteed to safeguard their lives and property, with the clear implication that failure to do so gave them a legitimate reason for rebellion against authority.

In this way emerged the characteristic liberal belief that liberty was integral to Britishness and Britain the most free society on earth, a view widely endorsed by Continental observers by the nineteenth century. Among other things this

involved never imprisoning men without bringing them to trial, not levying taxes without parliamentary approval, and maintaining a free press and freedom to criticise the highest in the land. Although the basis for this system was far from democratic – only 2.6 per cent of the population enjoyed a vote before the 1832 Reform Act – Liberals believed they had found the means of steadily extending popular participation without recourse to the violence and revolutionary upheaval experienced by Continental Europe in 1789–1815, in 1830, in 1848, in 1870 and at intervals in Tsarist Russia. By contrast the British had a genius for step-by-step reform. Although the 'Whig' interpretation of gradual, managed political change tends to be disparaged more than respected today, it exercised a powerful influence on British thinking and on British politicians right up to the time of Clement Attlee.

The role of Victorian Liberals in building a coherent idea of Britishness is the more obvious by comparison with their Conservative rivals. No doubt Conservatism also mobilised a wide range of support when forced to do so by the expansion of the electorate. Later in the century, under Disraeli and Salisbury, it promoted its claim as the patriotic, imperial and monarchist party as a challenge to Liberalism as the national party; but in the process Conservatism confirmed itself as a much more exclusive force, reliant on exploiting fears and antagonisms about external factors. For much of the century Conservatism

was a narrow movement too closely linked to the Anglican establishment and the maintenance of privilege generally. The 1846 split over the repeal of the Corn Laws left the party more dependent on its rural and landed interests and reluctant to adjust to industrial-urban Britain. After the expansion of the electorate in 1867 and 1885 it retained very little representation in Wales, and not much more in Scotland until the Liberal split over home rule in 1886 boosted the party with Liberal Unionist recruits. Above all, Conservatives were alienated from the Irish by virtue of their links with the Anglo-Irish landowners and the maintenance of the Anglican establishment over a Catholic population. Defence of the Union with Ireland made the Conservative appeal more negative and divisive than ever. In a reactionary speech in 1886, Lord Salisbury deliberately polarised opinion by disparaging the Irish for being as unsuited to self-government as the Hottentots; he advised them to emigrate to Manitoba, a suggestion almost as insulting to the Canadians as it was to the Irish!² The most the Conservatives achieved was to win sixteen to seventeen seats in Ulster, in the context of a hundred for Ireland as a whole, by exploiting the fears of the Protestant minority.

In effect Conservatism became the *English* party, as it is today, rather than the British party. Conservatives even struggled to come to terms with provincial England and its leaders, apart from the Glaswegian Andrew Bonar Law, were essentially English. Admittedly

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Arthur Balfour had a home in the Scottish Borders but his mental outlook was entirely dominated by metropolitan society, London clubland and Hertfordshire. Visits to the provinces left Balfour feeling queasy. 'Public meetings in great towns have attendant horrors in the way of subsidiary luncheons and dinner', he complained to Lord Salisbury, 'which are fatal to one's temper at the moment and to one's digestion afterwards.'³ He was not altogether sorry to be defeated at Manchester East in 1906!

Today, with British national identity unravelling fast, the apparently secure Britishness of Victorian society seems remarkable, rooted as it was in pride in economic success, parliamentary government, imperial expansion and popular monarchism, not least because Britain comprised four distinct nationalities and suffered from divisions of all kinds. Religion, for example, generated political controversy right up to 1914. But while Conservatism increasingly took its stand on defence of the Anglican establishment, Liberalism managed to be more inclusive. This was symbolised by W. E. Gladstone, who was a staunch Anglican so immersed in Christian theology that he might have made a career as a bishop, but also enjoyed huge credibility as the exponent of what came to be called the 'Nonconformist Conscience' in late-Victorian Britain. In effect the role of Liberalism lay in curtailment of some of the least defensible advantages of Anglicanism and incorporating non-Anglicans into the system. This was essential because although the Church of England enjoyed the legal status of an established church, it fell well short of being an effective national church. By 1800 it claimed only 46 per cent of active church-goers compared with 43 per cent for the Nonconformist churches and 10 per cent for the Catholics. Although the Liberal Party included many Anglicans in its parliamentary leadership, it harnessed the support of the Nonconformists, by tackling the disabilities that had excluded them from participation in national life, so effectively that in the 1906 parliament 177 Nonconformists sat as Liberal MPs. It ended the church monopoly on marriage through the introduction of civil marriage in 1838, and

excluded the church courts from the process of divorce in 1857.⁴ It was also responsible for disestablishing the church in Ireland in 1869 and in Wales in 1920. In 1858 Liberals helped remove the disability that excluded Jews as non-Christians from sitting as MPs. These reforms would have attracted condemnation from the *Daily Mail* as being anti-Christian, politically correct and multicultural, though fortunately it did not come into existence until the end of the century. Even so, reforms of this kind were not achieved without some political cost, though they gradually had the effect of fostering the inclusive society of the pre-1914 era.

Rather less complicated, though even more efficacious, was the association of Victorian Liberalism with the British success story in the shape of Britain's role as a pre-eminent manufacturing and commercial power. Mid-Victorian Liberals were imbued with an optimistic belief in the inevitability of progress that distinguishes their society from ours. The mood was typically expressed by the historian, H. T. Buckle, in his *History of Civilisation in England* (1857–61) – like other contemporaries he was inclined to equate civilisation with England! In his explanation for national characteristics and successes, Buckle put much of the emphasis on material factors such as the gloomy climate and Britain's island position. He thought that freedom from invasion had resulted in the English being especially attached to liberty and less willing to accept authoritarian rule than the peoples of Continental Europe.

Such sentiments were robustly voiced by Lord Palmerston, who enjoyed a strong, and typically Liberal, sense of the superiority of the English government and constitution. As foreign secretary, Palmerston welcomed the growing ascendancy of Liberal principles in Europe and cheerfully associated himself with reform movements even when, as in 1848, they took the form of revolutions; he argued with some reason that this reflected public opinion. Thus, when accused of promoting and aiding rebellion by sanctioning the dispatch of arms to the Sicilians in the 1840s, he brushed aside his critics. Arguably Palmerston's foreign policy proved to be a more formative contribution

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to the emergence of the Liberal Party in the mid-Victorian period than his more equivocal views on domestic reform, for he was instrumental in popularising a Liberal narrative based on the steady promotion of reform and self-determination against autocracy and the abuse of power by emperors and Catholic regimes all over the Continent.

For Liberals this cause went hand in hand with the other key vehicle of progress: the implementation and extension of free trade. The rationale was both material and moral. Free trade raised the living standards of the growing urban population, kept down the costs of the manufacturers and boosted both direct exports and indirect earnings from investment, shipping and insurance. Free trade created the confidence that an ever-expanding industry would eventually create work for everyone who was capable and thereby eliminate poverty from British society. But Liberals also invested free trade with moral implications in that by drawing other countries into a system of economic cooperation and interdependence they felt it would inexorably erode the causes of war.

One by-product of this confidence in material progress was to make the British, though robustly patriotic, more relaxed about expressing their nationalism than other peoples. As British national identity could virtually be taken for granted there seemed less need to assert it. Consequently the British neglected some of the obvious expressions of national identity used in other countries. For example they had no day of national celebration until Lord Meath dreamed up the idea of 'Empire Day'. Significantly, no one was very interested, and when the House of Commons debated Empire Day in 1908 members rejected the idea by a majority of sixty-eight. Eventually Empire Day was adopted in 1916, a sign that British self-confidence was now slipping.

Empire provoked a good deal of controversy between the two parties, especially later in the century, which may appear to signify their different approach to this element in national identity. However, the differences were less than they appeared. Both Liberal and Conservative administrations

presided over dramatic extensions of colonial territory; yet this was rarely the result of a deliberate policy, rather the consequence of initiatives taken locally by ambitious governors general and military commanders in defiance of London. Home governments frequently despaired about being dragged into costly new campaigns designed to rescue British colonists from conflicts with native peoples. For example, the reckless seizure of several princely states by Dalhousie helped to provoke the Indian revolt of 1857. Gladstone notoriously became entangled in 1880 when General Gordon, who had been sent to withdraw troops from the Sudan, flagrantly disobeyed orders and was killed by the rebels as a result. Despite the controversy over Gordon, imperial policy was usually bi-partisan. Several forward moves by the post-1874 Conservative government were actually continuations of policies initiated by the previous Liberal administration.

On the other hand, by the late-Victorian period the two parties did increasingly diverge over imperial questions partly because Disraeli, who had previously disparaged colonies as 'millstones around our neck', accused Gladstone of wanting to dismember the empire following his withdrawal of troops from New Zealand. In the Midlothian campaigns of 1878–80 Gladstone famously attacked Disraeli for reckless aggrandisement over the wars in Afghanistan and South Africa, though as usual they were largely the result of local initiatives. Liberals also criticised Disraeli for his decision to make Queen Victoria Empress of India, which seemed alien to the British tradition: imperial titles smacked of the Continental autocracies of Russia, Austria and Germany.

Moreover, by the 1880s many Liberals saw the empire as a moral issue; they argued that colonial rule was justified in so far as it enabled Britain to extend the advantages of efficient government and economic development to less developed societies. As the territories of white settlement were now becoming self-governing Dominions they envisaged that other parts of the empire would eventually join them. India posed the most embarrassing challenge to liberal principles.

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Yet, though ostensibly the Raj offered a system of alien, autocratic rule much appreciated by Lord Salisbury and those Tories who disliked the trend towards participatory democracy at home, India was never the unqualified autocracy it appeared to be. Liberal Viceroy like Lord Ripon took pains to maintain a free press in India, in the face of Tory opposition, thereby keeping open the door for Indian participation in public debate. Gradually a university system was created, in the process fostering a class of Indians familiar with Western liberal ideas about law and government. It is usually forgotten that the Indian Civil Service was also open, via the examination system, and although only a handful of Indians had joined the I.C.S. by 1900, the numbers steadily grew – for example, by the 1930s half the officers in the Bombay Presidency were Indians. Although these policies were disparaged by Conservatives as subversive, for Liberals they gave tangible form to the belief that the ultimate justification for British rule lay in leading Indians towards self-government. In this sense Liberalism incorporated its thinking about empire into its wider view of Britishness.

Indeed, Victorian Liberal attitudes towards empire and free trade were characterised by a combination of idealism and hard-headedness. One consequence was what, by today's standards, was a remarkably relaxed view of the free trade in *people*. Until interrupted by war in 1914 Britain routinely experienced massive emigration, immigration and internal migration. By far the majority of internal migrants were the Irish, forced out initially by the famine in the 1840s. Seen from the perspective of an inclusive national identity, the Irish presented challenges similar to those thought to be posed by Catholics during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and by Muslims in the late twentieth. That is to say they were widely demonised as a subversive element, lacking loyalty to Britain and outside the values and institutions of the host country. In reality things were more complicated, for while the late-Victorian Irish nationalists sponsored a terrorist campaign in the countryside they also maintained a respectable parliamentary

party. On the mainland Irish communities remained distinctive but were steadily absorbed into the political and social mainstream. They were mobilised by political parties, joined trade unions, and gave a welcome boost to the Catholic Church and Catholic schools.

Despite the popular prejudice against the Irish for causing pressure on housing, employment and the poor law, for Liberal Britain it remained a matter of pride and patriotism to admit both economic migrants and those fleeing political persecution abroad. Challenged by a deputation of trade unionists in 1895 complaining about immigrants, the Home Secretary, H. H. Asquith, simply rebuked them: 'who has gained most among the nations of the world from the free circulation and competition of labour? ... who would suffer most from the exclusion of foreign labour? Again, the English.'⁵ In fact, by the 1850s it had become essential to the British self-image as a nation of liberty-lovers to offer refuge to anyone, but especially to those oppressed by Catholic regimes and by authoritarian governments in Italy, France, Russia and Germany. As a result London became notorious as the centre for violent opponents of Continental regimes, who usually went unpunished for their activities.

Liberal attitudes towards immigration were tested by the new influx of Jewish refugees in the 1890s mostly fleeing persecution under the Tsarist regime. By 1900 around 160,000 Jews lived in Britain and by 1914 around 300,000. The new arrivals seemed to pose a challenge to Britishness because they followed a different religion, many spoke no English and they were regarded as a burden. The Conservatives exploited popular anti-Semitism in the East End, where they won several seats, and passed the Aliens Restriction Act in 1905 with a view to checking Jewish immigration. In fact the 1905 Act had little effect, perhaps because after 1906 it was implemented by Liberal Home Secretaries. Winston Churchill, who occupied the Home Office in 1910–11, robustly defended 'the old tolerant practice of free entry and asylum to which this country has so long adhered and from which it has so greatly benefited.'⁶ The remarks of Churchill and Asquith remind us

that the inclusive Liberal version of Britishness in this period was effectively underpinned by confidence in material success; conversely it was to be undermined in the decades after 1918 by economic decline.

Moreover, the stance towards Jews adopted by Liberals in the late-Victorian period built on an existing policy developed in the context of the smaller but long-standing community. As early as 1847 Lionel Rothschild had been elected to parliament as a Liberal but was prevented from taking his seat by the requirement to take the oath as a Christian; this was lifted in 1858. Nathan Rothschild eventually became the first Jew to receive a peerage after the recommendation of Gladstone who earned warm praise in the Jewish community for helping Jews to participate in mainstream British life.⁷ By 1900, nine Jews sat as MPs – mostly Liberals – and three rose through the party hierarchy to ministerial posts after 1906: Rufus Isaacs, Herbert Samuel and Edwin Montagu. It was noticeable that whereas before 1900 Jews had usually represented East End seats where they were presumed to enjoy an advantage, the Edwardian candidates ventured further afield, Isaacs to Reading, Samuel to Cleveland and Montagu to Cambridgeshire. This pattern of formal assimilation was complemented by the leaders of the Jewish community who went out of their way to express their loyalty, especially during the Boer War and the First World War, on the basis that Britain had treated them fairly and that Jews must reciprocate.⁸ In effect the Jewish community had maintained its own culture and traditions in the context of what would now be called a multicultural society while enthusiastically embracing British values, causes and institutions.

But it was arguably in managing Britain as a multinational state that nineteenth-century Liberals made their most signal contribution to national identity. There was nothing inevitable about this achievement. The original Union of England with Wales, Scotland and Ireland owed a good deal to bullying by the dominant power at best and to sheer military conquest at worst; and while it worked well for Scotland and Wales, Ireland was never effectively assimilated. After the 1707 Union with Scotland, much of

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the eighteenth century was marred by outbreaks of virulent Scottophobia among the English, symbolised by some of the words in the national anthem – ‘rebellious Scots to crush’ – which reflected contemporary fears about repeated Jacobite revolts. For their part the Scots remained sensitive to symptoms of metropolitan arrogance well into the nineteenth century. When Palmerston visited Glasgow in 1853 he was corrected by the locals for repeatedly referring to ‘England’ and ‘the English’ when he meant Britain. On a subsequent visit he took care to avoid giving offence.⁹

However, after 1800 Scottophobia became increasingly anachronistic as Scots enjoyed the economic benefits of Union and became drawn into the political mainstream. They took advantage of access to the large English market, employment opportunities in the expanding empire, and imports of cheap food and raw materials under the free trade system. By this stage the Scottish aristocracy had built London homes, played the English marriage market, sat in Cabinets and administered imperial territories. In the process they demonstrated that to embrace Britain involved no surrender of Scottish nationality. The Gordons of Aberdeenshire are a good example of how such families advanced through Liberal politics. In 1852 the fourth Earl of Aberdeen led the Whig–Liberal–Peelite coalition that formed the basis of the Victorian Liberal Party. In 1898 Gladstone appointed the seventh Earl governor general of Canada and first Marquess of Aberdeen. Perhaps the most iconic Anglo-Scots figure was Lord Rosebery. A popular Scottish landowner who acted as Gladstone’s impresario in the Midlothian campaigns, Rosebery occupied several pivotal roles British including president of the Imperial Federation League, the first chairman of the London County Council and briefly prime minister. In this way he epitomised the compatibility of British greatness with Scottish national pride.

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Ireland he symbolised the role of Liberalism as the link between the diverse elements in Victorian society. ‘English policy has achieved no triumph so great as the Union between England and Scotland’, he claimed. In view of Gladstone’s absorption with Ireland it is easily forgotten how important he was in recognising the distinctiveness of Welsh cultural and political views. As a result, under Liberalism Wales won its first specifically Welsh legislation in the shape of the Sunday Closing Act; in 1872 a college was established at Aberystwyth that evolved into the University of Wales in 1893; the National Library of Wales was founded in 1905; and a Welsh Department to promote the Welsh language was set up in 1907.

This record looks rather like a successful example of Victorian multiculturalism, for Wales became fully absorbed into the British mainstream. By 1880 no fewer than twenty-nine of the thirty-three Welsh constituencies returned Liberal MPs. Liberals were only a little less dominant in the seventy-two Scottish seats following the extension of the electorate in 1885. Whereas previously ambitious Scots had often come south to find a parliamentary seat, by the late-Victorian and Edwardian period English Liberal carpetbaggers happily ventured north: Gladstone to Midlothian, Asquith to East Fife, Augustine Birrell to East Lothian, John Morley to Montrose, and Winston Churchill who represented Dundee as a Liberal from 1908 to 1922.

Nor was Scotland merely a convenience for Liberal politicians. Given their sympathy for Greeks and Italians struggling to win national self-determination they were naturally sympathetic to Scottish pressure, which was greatly stimulated by the campaign for Irish home rule, leading to the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association in 1886. But unlike the Conservatives, Liberals did not see this as a threat. In 1885 they created the Scottish Office with its own secretary of state. By 1906 there was a Liberal–Labour parliamentary majority in favour of establishing a Scottish parliament as part of a wider scheme for home-rule-all-round. Had this movement not been disrupted by the outbreak of war in 1914 with its concomitant

political changes it would have put multinational Britain onto a more secure base for the twentieth century.

Of course, this Liberal achievement must be heavily qualified by the failure in Ireland, which ultimately resulted in the partition of 1921. Yet this outcome was not inevitable. Victorian Liberals inherited a highly dysfunctional system for governing Ireland through a viceroy, a chief secretary and the hundred Irish MPs. Initially Gladstone underestimated the depth of Irish grievances in that his first land reform and his disestablishment of the Church failed to check the nationalist tide. A crucial step in the breakdown of the Union came at the election of 1874 when the Home Rule Party won fifty-seven constituencies, largely displacing Liberals in the process. Gladstone then went much further in tackling the social problem with the 1880 Land Act, an astonishingly interventionist measure at the time that effectively curtailed the rights of private property owners through rent tribunals. During the 1870s and 1880s Liberals also made efforts to tackle the economic grievances of the rural population in Ulster with a view to reconciling the Protestant and Catholic communities and thereby consolidating their loyalty to the Union. For some years the parliamentary leadership in London strove to integrate the Ulster tenant farmers into the British mainstream.¹⁰

Ultimately, however, this strategy failed as opinion polarised between a radical Irish nationalism and a reactionary Ulster Unionism encouraged by the English Tories. However, Gladstone's first Home Rule Bill represented a realistic attempt to solve the problem. His draft measure was based on a 'Proposed Constitution for Ireland' prepared by Parnell and handed to Gladstone in November 1886.¹¹ The bill satisfied Irish aspirations by creating a parliament in Dublin but also maintained the Union by retaining control over defence and foreign policy at Westminster. 'What fools we were not to have accepted Gladstone's Home Rule bill', King George V, who favoured a general policy of devolution, told Ramsay MacDonald in 1930.¹² The rejection of the legislation 1886, when ninety-three

Liberal Unionists rebelled against Gladstone, inflicted serious damage on the role of Liberalism as the effective British national party and enabled the Tories to undermine the party's standing and its electoral base.

On the other hand, the Irish national movement retained its central place in British politics, thereby keeping alive the prospect of resolving the Irish Question by parliamentary means. While the Home Rule Party retained over eighty of the hundred Irish members right up to 1914, in the English urban constituencies Irish voters were effectively organised with a view to sustaining the majorities of Liberal candidates. More widely the movement for home rule had a radicalising effect on Liberal politics, not simply by promoting constitutional reform but by advancing the idea of state intervention in the sphere of private property, an idea capable of extension to the mainland. When the Irish held the balance of power after 1910 they forced the issue back onto the agenda and the passage of a Home Rule Bill under the Parliament Act prior to the outbreak of war in 1914. Ultimately the parliamentary strategy for satisfying Irish ambitions within the Union was not decisively derailed until 1915 when the Irish leader, John Redmond, unwisely declined Asquith's invitation to participate in his new coalition government. Thereby he allowed the Unionists to occupy positions of power, and by 1918 the Liberal-Irish alliance had been fatally undermined by reactions to the Easter Rebellion and the emergence of Sinn Féin. Both parties suffered heavily in the election of 1918.

This represented the one great failure of Liberalism in its work of sustaining the viability of the British state. It is no accident that the long-term decline of the Union and of Liberalism coincided. After 1918 the rationale for the wider Union was gradually undermined though this was not obvious for many years. In Scotland and Wales the Liberals gave way to the two rigidly pro-Unionist parties, and the idea of devolution largely disappeared from politics. But as early as the 1920s long-term economic decline set in among the manufacturing and extractive industries of Scotland and Wales, admittedly

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interrupted by the Second World War, with the result that Westminster lost its claims to competence and the rationale for the four-country Union began the long process of unravelling.

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- 1 J. R. Vincent, *The Formation of the Liberal Party 1857–1868* (Constable, 1966), pp. 12–13.
- 2 Speech to the National Union of Conservative Associations, 15 May 1886; the idea was to make it impossible for Lord Hartington to form a consensual government and resolve the home rule issue. See A. B. Cooke and J. R. Vincent, *The Governing Passion: Cabinet Government and Party Politics in Britain, 1885–86* (Branch Line, 1974), pp. 80–1, 422.
- 3 A. J. Balfour to Lord Salisbury, 29 Sept. 1880, in Robin Harcourt Williams (ed.), *The Salisbury–Balfour Correspondence 1869–92* (Hertfordshire Record Society, 1988).
- 4 In the debate on the matrimonial causes bill, 7 Aug. 1857, Gladstone was the only member to argue that women should enjoy the same privileges as men. The bill allowed husbands to divorce their wives for adultery alone whereas a wife was obliged to prove adultery plus one other offence.
- 5 *Jewish Chronicle*, 18 Jan. 1895.
- 6 Quoted in Paul Addison, *Churchill on the Home Front 1900–1955* (Jonathan Cape Ltd, 1992), pp. 42–4.
- 7 *Jewish Chronicle*, 26 Jan. 1885.
- 8 *Jewish Chronicle*, 2 Jan. 1885; 13 Mar. 1885; 6 Nov. 1885; 5 and 12 Jan. 1900; 7 Aug. 1914.
- 9 David Brown, *Palmerston: A Biography* (Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 353, 471–2.
- 10 See Graham Greenlee, 'Land, reform and community: the Liberal Party in Ulster 1868–1885', in Eugenio Biagini (ed.), *Citizenship and Community: Liberals, radicals and collective identities in the British Isles 1865–1931* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 253–75.
- 11 Eugenio Biagini, *British Democracy and Irish Nationalism 1876–1906* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 8.
- 12 Harold Nicholson, *King George The Fifth: His Life and Reign* (Constable, 1952), pp. 222–3.