## **Biography**

Jaime Reynolds and Ian Hunter examine the maverick career of the radical Liberal MP, Tom Horabin

## **Liberal Class Warrior**

Thomas Lewis Horabin, 1896–1956, was prominent in the Liberal Party in the 1940s, a dismal and neglected period of its history. As the 'Radical-Liberal' Member of Parliament for North Cornwall, elected at a bitterly contested by-election in July 1939, he was the last parliamentary survivor of West Country Liberalism in the 1940s.' He held his seat in the disastrous 1945 general election and served briefly as Chief Whip before defecting to the Labour Party in 1947.Very little trace of his career survives apart from a slim *Penguin Special* published in 1944 which set out his distinctive and radical political ideas.

Horabin was born in 1896 in Merthyr Tydfil and was educated at Cardiff High School. Traces of his early years in the mining valleys of South Wales can be detected in his left-wing views, his sympathy with the miners, and perhaps in his later ambivalence towards Churchill, who was unpopular in South Wales on account of the Tonypandy incident in 1910. In 1920 he married the daughter of a Dr Cargill Martin. They had a daughter and two sons. During the 1914-18 War Horabin served in the Cameron Highlanders. After demobilisation he worked first as a civil servant and later joined Lacrinoid Ltd, manufacturers of buttons and small artefacts from synthetic materials, rising eventually to become Chairman. He broadened his activity during the 1930s, becoming one of the first people to describe himself as a 'business consultant'.<sup>2</sup>

His political activity in the 1920s and 30s, if any, must have been out of public sight. He did not stand for Parliament and played no significant role in the Liberal Party at national level. In fact the authors have been able to find no evidence of political activity on Horabin's part before 1939, when he suddenly emerged as Liberal candidate for the North Cornwall by-election. The by-election held on 13 July was caused by the death of Sir Francis Acland who had held the seat for the Liberals in 1935 with a majority of 836 (2.6%) in a straight fight with a Conservative. Horabin was a surprising choice to defend one of the Liberals' very few remaining winnable seats. He was little known in the party and had no local links with the constituency. The crucial factor in his selection seems to have been his appeal to non-Liberal voters. Horabin stood as a candidate for the Popular Front and his nomination papers were signed by both Labour members and dissident Conservatives.

Horabin focused his successful by-election campaign mainly on the failure of the appeasement policy of Chamberlain's government. During the by-election he backed Churchill as 'the only possible man for Prime Minister in this hour of danger'. Writing to Churchill he stated that when he made these suggestions to his audiences the suggestion had come as a shock at first, and 'yet it took only about two minutes for the idea to sink in, and then there was an outburst of applause'.3 Churchill wrote back to thank him 'for the favourable view you take of my usefulness. I greatly appreciate your goodwill and confidence'.4 During the campaign the North Cornwall Liberal Association circulated throughout the constituency a petition requesting Chamberlain to resign and asking the King to entrust to Churchill the formation of a Government of National Defence, comprising all parties. Churchill alone, the petition declared, had the 'moral purpose, courage, experience and capacity to save us from these dangers in this hour of peril'. This mutual appreciation was not to last, however.

The other main campaigning theme was the old age pension which was considered 'practically the only domestic question that aroused any interest' in 1939. The Liberals linked the North Cornwall campaign with their national petition on the need to raise pensions.<sup>5</sup> Horabin's election agent told Sinclair that the Liberal stand for larger pensions had been critical to winning the by-election. The Liberal victory subsequently forced the government to hold an inquiry into the subject.

Horabin benefited from the support of many prominent Liberals such as Sinclair, Viscount Samuel and Lloyd George, who came and spoke throughout his campaign, attracting large and often enthusiastic crowds. He secured 17,072 votes to 15,608 for his Conservative opponent, E. R. Whitehouse – an increased majority of 1,464 (4.4%). It was the first



Liberal by-election win since 1934.<sup>6</sup> However, to at least one senior Liberal, the campaign was not a benchmark for campaigning efficiency. Harcourt Johnstone, Chairman of the Liberal Central Association and close friend and adviser to Sinclair, viewed the campaign as having been weak and apathetic, commenting after a visit to the one of the campaign committee rooms that 'I confess I don't think games of pool with the office messenger an adequate substitute for canvassing'.<sup>7</sup>

Whether the successful defence of the North Cornwall constituency by the Liberal Party in 1939 heralded an upturn in party fortunes in the run-up to the general election due in 1940 will remain a moot point. Significantly, Horabin himself did not believe that it did. In correspondence during June 1939 he made it clear that he did not see a possibility for any substantial increase in the number of Liberal MPs at that election,<sup>8</sup> and the perception at Liberal Central<sup>9</sup> (the national headquarters) was that the constituency organisations were in a very weak state with little or no preparation apparent in the vast majority of seats.

In his maiden speech Horabin spoke of the 'infirmity of purpose that many people in this country and many people in neutral and allied countries, and certainly, I believe, the leaders of the Axis powers, saw in the British Government'.<sup>10</sup> He argued that Chamberlain had done more harm to the world than Hitler, on the grounds that the man who lets the mad bull out of the field to run amok is more responsible than the bull for the damage done.

After war was declared in September 1939 Horabin continued his criticism of Chamberlain's conduct of the war. Despite his admiration for Churchill's qualities as a national leader, especially during the darkest days of the war during 1940-41, he was also sharply critical of Churchill's general political outlook, and from 1941 he became an outspoken member of the small band of dissident MPs who formed an unofficial opposition to the Churchill coalition. In January 1942 he caused a stir by claiming that 'Churchill might go down in history as the man who destroyed the British Empire'.<sup>11</sup> Shortly before that, he had joined Clement Davies and forty Labour members in voting for an amendment to the Manpower Bill demanding the nationalisation of vital industries in return for conscription'.12

Horabin became alienated from the Liberal leadership which was supporting and participating in the Churchill coalition. Several senior Liberals, including Sinclair, Harcourt Johnstone and Lady Violet Bonham Carter, were personal friends of Churchill. They did not hold Horabin in high regard.Violet Bonham Carter wrote in her diary in February 1944 that she did not feel exhilarated by the prospect of accepting the role of party President as 'there are too many lunatics and pathological cases in the party - Clem Davies & Horabin - also rather small people bulking larger than they deserve because of the size of the party. We badly need an infusion of new blood'.13 With Clement Davies and Sir Richard Acland, the semi-detached Liberal MP for Barnstaple who shortly afterwards departed to form the Common Wealth Party,14 Horabin was one of the leading Liberals associated with the ginger group Radical Action (formed as Liberal Action Group in 1941) which campaigned for profound reorganisation of the structure and decision-making bodies of the party as an essential precondition for any electoral revival. Radical Action was also very critical of the electoral truce which existed between the three main parties during the coalition government.

Horabin admired Lloyd George very much and approached his private secretary, A. J. Sylvester, in July 1942 to gain funding for Radical Action. Horabin claimed that Radical Action intended to run a hundred candidates and had successfully collected  $f_{10,000}$  from the City. He feared that lack of money would force a reunion with the Liberal Nationals and that without a radical centre the Liberal Party would die. He urged Sylvester to tell Lloyd George that Radical Action would deliver local deals with Labour (based on the model in the North Cornwall constituency) and that this course of action would see at least fifty Liberal MPs elected who could hold the balance of power and force fundamental change.<sup>15</sup> However, Horabin seems to have avoided openly supporting members of Radical Action who contested wartime by-elections as independents and who almost pulled off stunning victories at Darwen and at Chippenham.16

By summer 1942 he was in open conflict with the Liberal leadership whom he, Wilfred Roberts MP and others were pressing to accept radical resolutions for the coming party conference. Horabin's proposals were regarded by the leadership as getting 'very close to full-blooded socialism'.<sup>17</sup> In February 1943 he joined a broaderbased rebellion by nine Liberal MPs who voted against the government in a protest over its lukewarm response to the Beveridge Report.

In October 1944 Horabin published a book in the *Penguin Special* series, entitled *Politics Made Plain: What the next general election will really be about,* which set out his political philosophy and reasons for opposing the government and the Liberal leadership. This book was the only political polemic produced by a Liberal MP in the run-up to the 1945 general election which was published in a very large popular edition, and its attitude to the Liberal Party and liberalism generally can only be described as ambivalent.<sup>18</sup>

The striking feature of the book is its semi-revolutionary rhetoric and visceral hostility to the Tory Party, who, according to Horabin, 'believe in two fundamental principles – inequality and that wealth has privileges transcending the rights of the individual'. He argued that the Tories had been able to establish a dictatorship between 1919 and 1944 by ruthlessly exploiting the division of the progressive forces between the Labour and Liberal Parties. The urgent task was to form an electoral arrangement of the progressive parties (Labour, Liberal, Common Wealth) in order to capitalise on the radical mood of the electorate and finally destroy the Tory Party and all that it stood for. This would then open the way for the people to 'seize the real power and property of the State from the vested interests'.<sup>19</sup>

Horabin underpinned this strategy with a class-based economic and social theory. The 'competitive free enterprise capitalism' of the nineteenth century, a period of 'great prizes for the few, and a steadily improving standard of living for the many', had gradually been transformed into 'monopoly capitalism' which, through the growth of cartels and unions, had restricted production, leading to the recession and mass unemployment of the 1920s and '30s. In Horabin's view, governments should have responded by breaking up the cartels, instituting sweeping social reform and high wage policies as the only alternative to 'a planned economy based on democratic socialism'. Instead the Tories had allowed big business, represented by a decadent and selfish ruling class, to dominate government and reinforce the monopolistic capitalist structure.

Horabin appeared to have only one objection to the Labour Party: the domination of the party leadership by the trade union bureaucracy which inclined towards a 'Big-Business-Trade-Union-Front'. He argued that 'the relations between the Trade Union bureaucracy and big business are close and confidential. It favours a syndicalist organisation of industry whereby capital and organised labour would divide monopoly profits between them at the expense of the community'.20 Horabin had no argument with the trade union rank-and-file which he saw as a healthy force. He supported the wartime miners' wildcat strikes.

His allegiance to the Liberal Party was heavily qualified. The party had 'fought a consistent battle to preserve individual freedom, as well as offering a courageous front against Chamberlain's disastrous foreign policy, but it has, because of the fundamental divergence between the Whigs and the Radicals, failed to establish itself'. He identified within the party 'a strong element which combines with traditional free trade ideas a vested interest in unrestricted capitalism, as well as those radical elements that are prepared to accept a large measure of collectivisation'. He warned that local constituency arrangements would be necessary between radicals in the Labour and Liberal parties if their leaderships failed to support a united front.<sup>21</sup>

More generally, Tom Horabin's ideas sit uneasily within the traditional parameters of Liberalism. In some respects he can be seen as a Lloyd George radical,<sup>22</sup> with few scruples about accepting extensive state intervention and collectivism and significant curbing of individual freedom in the interests of greater economic efficiency and the destruction of class privilege. He argued that:

a policy of full employment means using the power of the state to control finance and industry. It does not mean the end of private enterprise. It means the definition of the boundaries between state and private enterprise so that each can function effectively within its own sphere ... it means opening up a new era of prosperity for private enterprise in those fields ... it means, however, interference with the privileges of wealth, with the freedom of sectional interests to protect themselves at the expense of the community, and it means redistribution of national income.<sup>23</sup>

But it is far from clear where, if at all, he drew the line between Liberalism and Socialism. He was in favour of state control and planning and extensive nationalisation, including the nationalisation of power, transport, land, mines, railways, the Bank of England and 'probably' the joint-stock banks. With his collectivist egalitarian outlook he was ready to excuse the defects of Soviet communism.24 His uncritical acceptance of the economic and social superiority of the Soviet system contrasts sharply with his hostility to the USA which he argued would be 'ruthlessly aggressive in the postwar world in defence of the privileges of wealth'. In his view an Anglo-Soviet postwar alliance was the only basis for an enduring peace. Even allowing for the adulation of the USSR then

prevalent as a result of its victories over Nazi Germany in 1944–45, and the leftwing consensus of the time, Horabin's views placed him on the extreme left of the Liberal Party and before long on the far left of the Labour Party.

Horabin was one of the few Liberal MPs to hold his seat in the 1945 Labour landslide (when both the Leader and the Chief Whip lost their seats). He held on in the face of the incoming Labour electoral tide - or rather benefited from it by securing Labour support. An independent Labour candidate did contest the seat but was publicly disowned by the local Labour Party and won only 1.8% of the vote compared to Horabin's 53.8%. He polled 18,836 votes and increased his majority from 1,464 (4.4%) in 1939 to 2,665 (7.4%) in 1945. Horabin was one of only twelve Liberal MPs to be returned. Tom Horabin regarded the result as a vindication of the Radical Action goal of a broad anti-Tory electoral front, although it fell far short of his target of electing fifty radical Liberal MPs through local deals with Labour. With its huge majority the Labour Party also had no interest in working with the Liberals.

Horabin was appointed Liberal Chief Whip in the new Parliament.<sup>25</sup>There are some indications that he may have influenced Clement Davies to try a strategy of outflanking the new Labour government on the left.<sup>26</sup> However, he soon became disenchanted with what he perceived as the party's rightward drift under Clement Davies' leadership. He resigned as ChiefWhip in March 1946. He wrote to Davies that he wished to relinquish the position of Chief Whip because 'the position occasionally inhibits [the Chief Whip from] addressing the house. A Whip is expected to be seen and not heard, and that is not in accordance with my temperament'.27

Horabin had followed an increasingly independent line since the 1945 election and had alienated many senior Liberals through various comments to the press and in the House of Commons that many felt were far from the spirit of Liberalism. Indeed, Lady Rhys-Williams was so upset by Horabin's increasingly left-wing pronouncements that she resigned from the position of head of the Liberal Party's Publications and Publicity Committee rather than continue working with him.  $^{\scriptscriptstyle 28}$ 

In October 1946 he announced in a letter to Davies that he was leaving the Liberal Party and would continue to sit in the Commons as an Independent Liberal. Horabin argued that there was nothing in the Labour government's programme with which the Liberals could quarrel. He saw the government as the personification of the radical administration for which he had always yearned and believed that it was entitled to the fullest possible support from the Liberal Party. But the Liberal Party organisation, he felt, was 'all too quickly ridding itself of its radical associations and seems to think that by preaching a merely negative anti-socialist crusade and avoiding any positive expression of policies it can secure more tactical advantage'.29 Clement Davies replied that 'the Liberal MPs have supported the Government whenever they were satisfied that the proposals brought forward ... gave the best service combining efficiency with justice.'30

However, Horabin waited nearly a year, until November 1947, before making the final break with Liberalism. He wrote to the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, requesting the Labour Whip and expressing his concern that the electoral recovery by the Tory Party threatened the task of rebuilding postwar Britain. He stated that 'there was no place in this country for any party standing between the Labour Party on the one hand and the Tory Party on the other'.<sup>31</sup>

Despite the request of the North Cornwall Liberals that he resign his seat he declined to do so and sat as Labour member for the constituency for the duration of the parliament through to 1950.32 His response to letters in the press from the President of the North Liberal Cornwall Association (J. H. Hallett) was that he would not resign his seat because the Liberal Party had moved away from the principles on which he had fought the 1945 election. 'While there is, therefore, rupture between myself and the Liberal Party, there is no rupture between me and my constituents', Horabin claimed.33 He was the only leading Liberal advocate of progressive unity with Labour (in order to fight the radical cause against the Conservatives) who crossed to the Labour benches without first losing his or her seat when standing as a Liberal. The others, Dingle Foot, Sir Geoffrey Mander, Wilfred Roberts, Megan Lloyd George and Edgar Granville, all lost their seats before making their conversion.

Horabin soon gravitated to the left of the Labour Party, joining the Keep Left group gathered around Michael Foot, Richard Crossman and Ian Mikardo. When the group split in 1949 over its attitude to the deepening Cold War, Horabin sided with the neutralist group which continued to seek a middle way between the Western and Soviet alliances. He was one of the twelve signatories of the Keeping Left pamphlet published in January 1950. It is unclear what influence he had in the drafting of this document but its emphasis on the radical tradition of social and economic justice rather than socialist planning and public ownership may be significant.34

During the later 1940s and early 1950s, his business interests were focused on promoting trade with Tito's Yugoslavia which fitted well with his left-wing socialist and neutralist political stance.

Horabin did not contest North Cornwall in the 1950 election, claiming that to do so he would have had to fight against men who had previously fought for him.35 Perhaps equally significant was the fact that he had been seriously injured in an aircraft accident near Folkestone in January 1947. He was on a B.O.A.C. flight from London to Bordeaux when it developed engine trouble and crashed, killing six passengers and crew and seriously injuring ten other people.<sup>36</sup> He was in hospital for eight weeks and was lucky to have survived. He was still convalescing in 1949 and might have found an election campaign in a scattered rural constituency too great a strain. Tom Horabin must also have known that, with the local Liberal association determined to run the experienced former MP Dingle Foot37 against him, his chances of holding the seat against a strong Conservative challenge were bleak. Instead he fought the Tory seat of Exeter for Labour, losing by some 3,000 votes.

His political activity seems to have ceased after this and he turned to other pursuits, both in business and to his long-standing hobby of painting. His last recorded publication was a book he co-wrote in 1953 on oil painting, which ran into several editions. He died on 26 April 1956.

Tom Horabin's parliamentary career should be seen against the background of the fluid party politics of the war years. He was one of a number of maverick MPs elected between 1938 and 1945 on an essentially anti-Tory platform. Most of the others were elected as independents or for the Common Wealth Party. The majority ended up in the Labour Party as two-party politics stabilised after 1945. He was a consistent Popular Fronter, more committed to a broad progressive alliance against the Tories than to Liberal Party values and always more sensitive to the faults of opponents on the right than of allies on the left. His brand of radicalism offered no escape from the political impasse in which the Liberal Party found itself in the 1940s because it offered no substantive critique of socialism, whether of the democratic or indeed the undemocratic variety. In many ways Tom Horabin's defection to Labour was the least surprising aspect of his career as a Liberal MP.

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- Not counting Frank Byers, MP for North Dorset until 1950, there were no Liberal MPs for Cornwall or Devon after Horabin's defection until Mark Bonham Carter won Torrington in 1958.
- 2 Dodd's Parliamentary Companion 1940, The Times 'obituary', 30 April 1956.
- 3 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Volume 5, 1922–1939, p. 1050
- 4 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Volume 5, 1922–1939, p. 1050
- 5 Thurso Papers, 11/65/5, Harcourt Johnston to Sir Archibald Sinclair, quoted in G.H. Tregidga, The Liberal Party in South-West England, 1929-59, PhD, Exeter University 1995, p. 186.
- 6 When Dr George Morrison held the Combined Scottish Universities seat in March 1934.
- 7 Harcourt Johnstone to Horabin, 4 July 1939 quoted in Baines, *The survival of the British Liberal Party, 1932-1959*, University of Oxford, D.Phil, 1989, p. 45.
- 8 Horabin to Graham White, 7 June 1939 quoted

in Baines, *The survival of the British Liberal Party, 1932-1959*, University of Oxford, D.Phil, 1989, p. 46.

- 'Liberal Central' is the term often used in party publications during the period to refer to the National Headquarters organisation in London.
- 10 Quoted in R.A.C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*, p. 269
- 11 G.H. Tregidga, The Liberal Party in South-West England, 1929-59, Ph.D, Exeter University 1995,p. 188. Horabin acknowledged that 'we owe Churchill a debt of gratitude that nothing can repay ... he had no hesitation in sinking his class interests in the national interest at the most critical turning-point of the war'. On the other hand Churchill's stand against appeasement was 'for one reason and one reason only. He realised the threat implicit to the British Empire implicit in Hitler's rise. He was not fundamentally opposed to fascism. Indeed his hatred was reserved for communism and for those who ... sought to interfere with the privileges of birth and wealth.' Politics Made Plain, Penguin Books 1944, pp. 84-86
- 12 Leo Amery Diaries, *The Empire at Bay*, p. 752. Doubtless this was not intended as a compliment, although Horabin favoured the transformation of the Empire into a worldwide federation based on self-determination, Politics ...ibid p. 121.
- 13 Mark Pottle (ed), Champion Redoubtable, Violet Bonham Carter Diaries and Letters, p. 294
- 14 Horabin's close political relationship with Acland is evident but the details are obscure. In all probability Acland, as the leading Liberal campaigner in the West Country, played a part in the selection of Horabin, a fellow left-wing Popular Fronter, to fight his father's old seat in the 1939 by-election. Both men were involved with Radical Action and both joined the Labour Party after 1945. Horabin finally joined Labour in November 1947 at exactly the same time as Acland re-entered the Commons for Labour at a by-election. They were both in the Keep Left Group and authors of the 1950 Keeping Left pamphlet. However Horabin did not follow Acland into the Common Wealth and there is no indication that he shared Acland's Christian Socialism and idealistic enthusiasm for common ownership.
- 15 'Lobby report 29 July 1942', *Lloyd George Papers*, quoted in Baines op. cit.
- D Johnson, *Bars and Barricades* (1952) pp. 217-8. The authors are grateful to Robert Ingham for his help in assessing Horabin's involvement with Radical Action.
- 17 Lord Meston, 'letter to Marigold Sinclair, 17.8.42', quoted in G De Groot *Liberal Crusader* p. 210.
- 18 Sir William Beveridge, a Liberal MP from 1944, published prolifically on his Plan for the welfare state, and also produced a pamphlet *Why I Am a Liberal*.
- 19 *Politics Made Plain*, op. cit, Preface and Postscript
- 20 Ibid p. 100
- 21 Ibid pp. 124 and 128
- 22 Lloyd George 'an outstanding fighter' was the one politician who seems to have received Horabin's unqualified approval, both for his radical record in the Liberal Government after 1906 and for his attacks on Chamberlain's appeasement policy before the war.
- 23 Ibid p. 112
- 24 There is much that can be criticised in the Soviet set-up and the way in which it was

achieved. Although when one considers realistically the difficulties by which we are faced, even in Britain with its system of parliamentary democracy in bringing about the transfer of power from the sectional interests to the people, it is obvious that Lenin and his collaborators would have been defeated unless they had ruthlessly liquidated the Russian vested interests ... Political freedom, as we understand it, is largely absent from the Soviet set-up. But when all possible criticisms are made, this fact remains: in the Soviet Union they have discovered a way of identifying the selfish interests of the individual with the interests of the community ... Within five years the standard of living in Russia will be higher than ... in Britain. Within ten years it must exceed the standard of living in the United States.' Ibid p. 120

- 25 Why was Horabin chosen as Chief Whip? A major factor was the lack of alternatives in the parliamentary party. With Davies as chairman and Gwilym Lloyd George en route to the Tories, there were ten MPs to chose from. Four were first-time MPs with insufficient experience. Megan Lloyd George, seen as too disorganised, Rhys Hopkin Morris, seen as too pure and unbending in his free trade views, and Professor W J Gruffydd, seen as too preoccupied with his academic duties, did not fit the part. Edgar Granville had only very recently rejoined the party and was, like Davies, an ex-National Liberal. Having ex-Simonites as chairman and chief whip would have raised eyebrows. That left only Horabin, energetic and businesslike, and Wilfred Roberts. Davies evidently preferred Horabin, his close sidekick in the wartime opposition. He may have also calculated that making him Chief Whip would help to keep him in the party.
- 26 See R Ingham, 'Clement Davies: a brief reply' Journal of Liberal Democrat History, 26, Spring 2000. Davies's reply to the Queen's speech in 1945 welcomed the end of Tory reaction and challenged the Labour government to take a radical and determined road. We are grateful to Robert Ingham for drawing our attention to this reference.
- 27 Quoted in The Times, 21 March 1946, p. 4.
- 28 The Times, 21 March 1946, p. 4.
- 29 Quoted in The Times, 22 October 1946, p. 4.
- 30 Quoted in *The Times*, 22 October 1946, p. 4.
- 31 The Times, 19 November, 1947, p. 2.
- 32 This was the only occasion that North Cornwall has had a Labour Member of Parliament. The seat returned a Conservative in 1950 and remained with the Tories until John Pardoe won the seat back for the Liberals in 1966. It is currently held by Liberal Democrat Chief Whip PaulTyler.
- 33 The Times, 28 November 1947, p. 6.
- 34 *Keeping Left* (New Statesman Pamphlet 1950). According to Barbara Castle (*Fighting All the Way* (1993) p. 179) another signatory, Michael Foot, was responsible for the references to the Radical tradition. However as Foot did not sign *Keeping Left*, because he could not accept its neutralist line, this seems doubtful. Sir Richard Acland and Woodrow Wyatt, already an opponent of further nationalisation, also signatories, may well have had a significant influence. See G Foote, *The Labour Party's Political Thought–a History* (1987) pp. 271-2.
- 35 The Times, 30 April 1956.
- 36 The Times, 13 January 1947, p. 2
- 37 MP for Dundee 1929–45.