

for leaving the Conservatives for the Liberals at an opportune time, but he stuck to his free trade views subsequently.

Martin Pugh also talked of Churchill's instrumental role in Edwardian state-financed social reform, at least once Churchill discovered an enthusiasm for it. 'He is full of the poor, who he has just discovered,' was how Charles Masterman put it at the time.

He also discovered Germany, urging Britain to learn from its social policies, including expansive state industries. As Pugh pointed out, this enthusiasm for Bismarckianism is not something usually linked to Liberalism, but instead it is more obviously linked to some strands of Conservatism, which saw the state as a positive engine for improving the life of people. 'He was not in any way embarrassed about using the power of the state', said Pugh, but it was using the state for Liberal or Conservative ends and most certainly not to pave the way for socialism.

Turning to Churchill as Home Secretary, Pugh talked of his dislike of jail sentences for petty offences. In particular, he took up the case of a boy of twelve who was jailed for seven years for taking a piece of fish. Churchill got the sentence dismissed. When nominally charged with implementing the Aliens Act of 1905, Churchill largely declined, failing to enforce the provisions that were designed to keep Jews out. Instead, he criticised the police when he felt they were harassing refugees and was outspoken in upholding the place of Britain as the home for economic and political refugees, seeing it as something from which the country greatly benefited as well as being the correct humanitarian course. As a result, Pugh rated Churchill as second only to Roy Jenkins when judging twentieth-century Home Secretaries by their liberal nature.

Although Pugh estimated that Churchill would have been as happy to serve under Asquith as under Lloyd George, it was Asquith who demoted Churchill and later Lloyd George who invited him back into government, making Churchill a de facto supporter of the latter rather than the former. This had the significance of making Churchill a coupon Liberal, willing

Pugh highlighted how uncertain many Conservatives are about him, reminding the audience that Churchill's 1951–5 government, his only peacetime one, was all about upholding the post-war consensus. It is a government skipped when Conservatives look to their past, and helps explain why they do not talk about 'Churchillian Conservatism'.

to serve in coalition with the Conservatives and attracted by the idea of 'fusion' bringing together elements of Liberals, Conservatives and Labour. In the absence of fusion taking place, and irritated by Asquith's willingness to see the first Labour government take office, Churchill drifted further away from the Liberals.

When he joined the Conservatives, he initially took the label 'Constitutionalist' showing, Pugh said, how it was a very individualist move and not one motivated by a simple attraction to Conservatism. Moreover, as Pugh went on to say in the question and answer session at the end, Churchill had a love of new ideas, looking for fresh solutions to problems – which made him always look for a change of course in response to events and saw him taken by one enthusiasm after another. The speed with which he shifted around in these searches often annoyed more conventional, less flexible politicians. It did though provide a certain logic to his wanderings around the political spectrum.

'Every one of us is an individualist for some things. Every one of us is a collectivist for others,' Pugh quoted Churchill saying. He was

not a simple right-winger. Indeed, Pugh added, this made Churchill's move more attractive to Conservative leader Baldwin as it meant Churchill's recruitment fitted with Baldwin's desire to move to the political centre ground.

Churchill's return to the Conservatives was somewhat restrained. In 1940 a free vote of Conservative MPs would almost certainly have seen Halifax, not him, become prime minister and when he did become premier, he did not immediately become leader of the party. Even when he did, he neglected the Conservative Party machine during the war years, and, as Beith also said, after 1945 Churchill showed a generosity towards the Liberal Party, offering a small share of power to Clement Davies.

Churchill did not leave behind a coherent body of thought or a body of followers which, as Pugh concluded, leaves the space for Liberal Democrats to make the most of Churchill's liberalism.

You can watch the fringe meeting at <http://bit.ly/ChurchillFringe>

Mark Pack is a member of the History Group's committee.

REVIEWS


Lloyd George, diplomacy and international affairs

Michael Graham Fry, *And Fortune Fled: David Lloyd George, the First Democratic Statesman, 1916–1922* (Peter Lang, 2011)

Reviewed by **Dr J. Graham Jones**

THE AUTHOR of this truly massive tome, positively crammed with information and references, is Professor Emeritus of International Relations at the University of Southern California. He is also a doctoral graduate of the University of London. This groundbreaking study, which has

taken the author more than thirty years to complete, is a sequel to his previous, well-received work *Lloyd George and Foreign Policy: the Education of a Statesman, 1890–1916* (McGill, 1977), widely regarded as a seminal work which traced Lloyd George's attitudes towards foreign policy from his first election to



parliament until the point at which he first became prime minister on 7 December 1916. The present study continues the theme throughout Lloyd George's premiership until the final fall of the post-war coalition government in October 1922, and it thus covers a relatively brief time span of rather less than six years.

The underlying research is certainly mind-bogglingly complete, indeed wholly exhaustive. As the author tells us, Lloyd George's two premierships have 'left behind lava flows of archival material, private and official, manuscript and published' (p. x). Indeed, the very clear, well-divided bibliography (pp. 849–63) reveals the extent of the disparate sources fully quarried over the years. They include the personal papers of an array of politicians, many within the United Kingdom, some much further afield. Professor Fry has travelled far and wide in his quest for all kinds of relevant source materials. It can truly be said that the author has left no stone unturned in his hunt for source materials and information.

The author makes especially effective use of the diaries of Lloyd George's associates who kept a detailed account at this crucial

time, among them Fisher, Hankey, Thomas Jones and Riddell. Their well-informed words largely compensated for Lloyd George's own failure to keep a diary and his reluctance to write letters. The diaries of Frances Stevenson, with their more personal dimension, have been well thumbed too. It was she who apparently coined the well-worn description of Lloyd George as 'Dictator of Europe' (the title of chapter 8 in this volume). The Lloyd George Papers at the Parliamentary Archive, which include many important official and Cabinet documents cheekily squirreled away by Lloyd George, have been heavily and effectively quarried too.

The present reviewer was gratified to see some use made of the archives of Welsh Liberal politicians in the custody of the National Library of Wales, among them Beriah Gwynfe Evans, Ellis Jones Ellis-Griffith, E. T. John and Sir J. Herbert Lewis. All were closely associated with Lloyd George. The copious footnote references, which themselves occupy pages 674–847, are crammed packed with lists of sources and references, eloquent testimony to the extent of Professor Fry's reading and research. They also include extra snippets of useful information and sometimes parallel arguments.

It is difficult to do justice to the richness of the work in a short review. To the author, the First World War of 1914–18 was 'the defining event of the twentieth century' and the Paris Peace Conference which ensued in 1919 was 'the most important such conference' (back cover). Throughout the period under consideration, Lloyd George was in a wholly pivotal position, dominating the diplomacy of the second half of the war years and subsequent international affairs to 1922. This study examines the nature of the changes instituted by the new prime minister after his succession, notably the nature of the famous 'Garden Suburb' established at 10 Downing Street in 1916–17, and the far-reaching changes instituted in British diplomacy. Throughout his wartime premiership Lloyd George was determined to avoid a premature peace settlement with Germany – a fight to the finish was, in his view, essential, an attitude potently reminiscent of Churchill's standpoint

between 1940 and 1945. Consequently, his main diplomatic policy was to attempt to detach Germany's three allies – Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria.

There is a most detailed examination of the conduct of the Paris Peace Conference, and much space is devoted to a lengthy analysis of the diplomatic relationship between Great Britain and the USA. The author suggests that the 'coupon' general election of December 1918 may have been an unnecessary and premature distraction, undermining the crucial preparations for the Paris Peace Conference. Lloyd George had apparently called for such an election even before the end of hostilities. Subsequent chapters present a searching dissection of the Cannes Conference and the Genoa Conference, the latter possibly the overture to a further general election for which the prime minister was at the time yearning. The focus is also placed on 'the chaos in the Near East' (p. 521) and its threat to stability and peace. The final full chapter examines the complexities of the infamous Chanak crisis which led in part to the collapse of the post-war coalition government. Many believed that the beleaguered premier was exploiting national security simply for the sake of political and personal advantage. A short concluding section follows which effectively pulls together the key themes and conclusions of the preceding chapters.

Throughout it is clear that Professor Fry is a fervent Lloyd George devotee. In the preface to his study, he describes his hero when he first became prime minister on 7 December 1916 as 'on trial, expendable, not preordained to survive'. In his view, although Lloyd George's government had been brought down by a Conservative grass-roots rebellion on 19 October 1922, Lloyd George had become by the time of his fall 'the nation's pre-eminent and most controversial politician. Unmatched in experience and accomplishment, he was Europe's elder statesman and most prominent public figure' (p. ix). In his concluding section, he refers to Lloyd George as a 'reluctant warrior in 1914 but unflinching after that, absolutely correct to uphold the principle of civilian control whatever the cost to civil-military relations, was the

prototypical democratic leader. He was, like Churchill in the Second World War, unwilling to settle for peace without victory, a dangerous, premature and unworthy outcome' (p. 643). Equally apparent is the author's distaste for Lord Curzon whose uneasy relationship with Lloyd George is always pointed up in the text. Much attention is also paid to the unfailingly fractious relationship between LG and the French premier Georges Clemenceau. It is also Fry's view that diplomatic historians in the past have emphasised unduly the tense negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference and the ensuing Treaty of Versailles – to the neglect of other themes.

The book is not an easy read; it pre-supposes a detailed background knowledge and the writer pens his work in a ponderous style, with an abundance of subordinate clauses. But it will certainly repay detailed

study. It may best be used alongside John Grigg's seminal *Lloyd George: War Leader* (Allen Lane, 2002), and Kenneth O. Morgan's equally authoritative *Consensus and Disunity: the Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918–22* (Clarendon Press, 1979), which suggests that foreign policy issues rather than domestic unrest were responsible for bringing down the coalition government. The book is certainly the last word on this vital theme. One wonders whether Professor Fry may now be tempted to pen a further volume on Lloyd George's attitude towards diplomacy and foreign affairs after his fall from power in October 1922 until his death in March 1945. It would constitute an equally engrossing read.

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philosophical milieu. Therefore, chapters on 'Money', 'Labour' and 'Gold' sit alongside ones on 'Ethics', 'Knowledge', 'Politics', 'War and peace' and 'Art'. There are also two 'interludes' – one on Keynes's membership of the Bloomsbury group and of the Apostles (an elite Cambridge student society), the other on the political history of Great Britain during his lifetime.

The book – by Gilles Dostaler, a distinguished economist who sadly died recently – serves as a useful, highly readable and thoroughly researched introduction to Keynes. For those already familiar with Keynes's life there will not be any dramatic surprises, but the thematic arrangement makes for a consistently thought-provoking treatment. Dostaler makes a strong case for the relevance of Keynes's broader worldview to his economics. Whereas some might be tempted to dismiss Keynes's patronage of theatre and painting and his key role in the creation of the Arts Council as mere extracurricular activities, this does not do justice to their importance:

Keynes's vision is fundamentally anti-utilitarian, anti-materialist and anti-economicist. Man has been sent briefly to earth to enjoy beauty, knowledge, friendship and

Keynes' world-view

Gilles Dostaler, *Keynes and His Battles* (Edward Elgar, 2007)

Reviewed by **Richard Toye**

JOHAN MAYNARD Keynes (1883–1946) was arguably the most influential figure in twentieth-century British Liberalism, politically as well as intellectually. This might seem like an odd claim to make. After all, he was not an active politician in the conventional sense (although he did become a member of the House of Lords towards the end of his life). Moreover, during the interwar years he seemed doomed to make warnings – about the Versailles Treaty, the return to the Gold Standard, and the causes of unemployment – that were ignored by policymakers. He himself described a 1931 volume of his own essays as 'the croakings of a Cassandra who could never influence the course of events in time' (p. 3). However, during the Second World War, he held a position in the Treasury that helped him shape post-war policy both domestically and internationally. And although he is generally considered to have 'gone out of fashion' as a result of the New Right backlash of the 1970s and 1980s, he never did

so to the point that he dropped out of the discussion. Tony Blair and Gordon Brown felt compelled to at least pay lip service to him in the 1990s, and the recent financial crisis has led to a new surge of interest. Whereas discussions of Asquith, Lloyd George or even Beveridge today have a generally rather academic flavour, to invoke the name of Keynes is to walk into current controversy.

Yet 'Keynesian economics' is too often treated as an abstraction, or caricature, far removed from the views that were actually held by 'the historical Keynes' (to use Peter Clarke's term). Scholars have been trying to right the balance for many years. The book under review – which is a revised and expanded version of a volume first published in French – provides a fresh and interesting approach to the man and his thinking. It is not a conventional biography; nor is it (for the most part) a treatise on economics. Rather, it is an attempt to illustrate Keynes's world-view by locating him within his social and

