

# LLOYD GEORGE'S COALITION AND PRE-WAR

'England does not love coalitions'. Disraeli's famous comment on the 1852 Aberdeen Coalition was not one of his most perceptive. It is more accurate to say that many politicians do not love coalitions but that many voters do appreciate attempts by the parties to settle major issues by agreement and compromise. At all events, since 1852 Britain has had twelve coalition governments, not to mention several abortive attempts at coalition conducted through private negotiations and inter-party conferences.<sup>1</sup> **Martin Pugh** examines Lloyd George's coalition proposal of 1910.



# COALITION PROPOSAL OF 1910 FOR LIBERALISM

**T**HERE HAVE ALSO been periods of close understanding between two parties, such as between Gladstone and the Irish in 1886 and the Liberals and Labour in 1906–14, that fell short of coalition. To this extent coalitionism has been a formative element in British political history, though national mythology has it that, unlike the Italians and the Germans, we don't really do coalitions.

In this context the initiative taken by Lloyd George to launch a coalition in the summer and autumn of 1910 was not as eccentric as it appears at first sight. The previous coalition had ended as recently as 1905 and the next one was to begin in 1915. Yet it has always seemed an odd episode both for Lloyd George himself and for the Edwardian Liberal Party. As a result of the controversy generated by Lloyd George's 'People's Budget' of 1909 and the early general election fought in January 1910 to overrule the peers' rejection of it, politics had become unusually polarised and party passions were inflamed to such an extent that the prospect of the leaders getting together looked highly improbable at least to those outside the Westminster elite. Some of the leading politicians genuinely held each other in contempt; even in the crisis of wartime Walter Long commented: 'I loathe the very idea of our good fellows sitting with these double-dyed traitors [the Liberals]'.<sup>2</sup>

However, even at the height of the controversies others felt the attraction of collaboration, including Lloyd George,

Churchill and even the Chief Whip, Alexander Murray, among the Liberals, partly due to their more detached view of their own colleagues. Privately Lloyd George complained about the 'glorified grocers' on the Liberal benches as much as the 'backwoodsmen' among the Tories.<sup>3</sup> And leading Edwardian Unionists such as F. E. Smith, Austen Chamberlain and even the party leader, Arthur Balfour, felt content to collaborate with their opponents if the terms were right. Contemporaries noticed that personal relations between the controversialists were surprisingly warm. 'On the whole the Opposition are very fond of [Lloyd] George', commented Lucy Masterman. 'He amuses Arthur Balfour by his quickness and acuteness'. But she also described Lloyd George as 'absolutely hypnotised by Arthur Balfour, by his charm, his quickness, and his undeniably very clever intellect'.<sup>4</sup>

However, the personalities were only part of the explanation. The attempts at coalition in 1910 can be understood at two levels: short-term manoeuvring for advantage in the aftermath of the January election, and the underlying critique about the failure of British government and party politics to arrest national decline. The events of 1910 only make sense when placed in the context of the debates that had preceded them around the turn of the century and what followed during the First World War.

The immediate context for the initiatives of 1910 lay in the deadlock that developed in the

aftermath of the election in January. Among Liberals it had been widely assumed that if they won the election not only would the Budget – rejected by the peers by 350 votes to 75 – be passed, but the Cabinet would also proceed with legislation to curtail the powers of the House of Lords; Asquith had declared he would not hold office without 'safeguards' to ensure the passage of legislation. However, it transpired that this was not quite true for the King, Edward VII, was reluctant to create the five hundred new Liberal peers required to force a House of Lords reform bill through parliament without a second general election. Though ready to accept the advice of his elected government, he was well aware that the Liberals had emerged from the election with just 275 seats to 272 for the Conservatives, so that a working majority rested on the 40 Labour and 82 Irish members, the latter being distinctly unreliable. As a result the government did not enjoy a very emphatic mandate.

In any case the Cabinet had not actually decided what precisely to do by way of reforming the upper chamber, whether to reduce its powers, change its composition, impose joint sittings or even opt for abolition. The vague references in the King's Speech in February exposed this embarrassing situation. In April the government reached agreement with the Irish to ensure the passage of the Budget and passed resolutions dealing with restrictions on the peers' powers over money bills and ordinary

Left:  
Lloyd George  
and Winston  
Churchill in 1910

legislation; attention then focused on the constitutional issue. It was in these circumstances that politicians began casting around for ways out of the impasse.

Then in May the King suddenly died, thereby thrusting his successor, George V, into a major political crisis. Several initiatives quickly emerged. Lord Curzon had already floated the idea of a two-party conference under the Speaker's chairmanship. Another, inspired by J. L. Garvin, editor of the *Observer*, and his circle, took the form of an appeal for a 'Truce of God', in effect a meeting of the party leaders with a view to defusing the crisis. But Murray, the Liberal Chief Whip, also argued that politicians should avoid putting pressure on the new King by devising a compromise among themselves. As a result a five-month political truce began during which a constitutional conference took place including Asquith, Lloyd George, Lord Crewe and Augustine Birrell for the Liberals, and Balfour, Chamberlain, Lord Lansdowne and Lord Cawdor for the Unionists. At the meetings Lloyd George apparently acted as the guardian of party interests, adopting the aggressive approach that was his trademark, so much so that he nearly broke up the conference by the end of July.<sup>5</sup>

In fact the twenty-one meetings simply left him frustrated and bored. As a result, by August his fertile mind was casting around for an alternative means of bypassing the deadlock. He had earlier spoken to some colleagues about an alliance of Radical Liberals, Labour and the Irish, and to others about a government of progressive businessmen. At home in North Wales he composed the 'Criccieth memorandum', a more sweeping proposal designed not to resolve the controversy over the House of Lords but to create a coalition government as a way of circumventing the party controversies that were holding things up. Consequently, the summer of 1910 saw two related but separate developments: formal negotiations about the House of Lords issue and informal talks about a wider agenda to be implemented by a coalition.

It was thus not entirely clear what was going on. As both party leaders felt apprehensive about the reactions of their followers they

kept the talks as private as possible. The Irish were less than happy about the conference because they believed that they – and thus home rule – were being sidelined at a moment when they held the balance of power in parliament. Many leading Liberals found their reliance on Irish votes an irritation, and saw that the removal of the peers' veto would force home rule to the top of the agenda once again. Lloyd George himself was lukewarm about home rule in that, though sympathetic in principle, he did not regard it as a priority, rather as a complication for other Liberal reforms. By promoting a coalition he implicitly sought to evade the commitment so that the Irish could be 'left to stew in their own juice'. Certainly, if the Tory leaders were to be recruited to his scheme they had to have some reassurance about Ireland. Under a coalition home rule might be embodied in a wider reorganisation of the empire, much favoured by some Tory imperialists, and gain a parliament along with Scotland and Wales, a solution widely known as 'home rule all round'. Privately the Tory leaders recognised that the Union was a lost cause and were therefore ready to cooperate with the government 'if they [are] prepared to defy the Irish and their own extremists'.<sup>6</sup>

However, Birrell, the Liberal Chief Secretary for Ireland, reassured the Irish MPs that he 'attaches no importance to the conference. It will be informal and above all not binding'.<sup>7</sup> This is corroborated by Asquith's view of the situation. A secret Cabinet memorandum referring to 'the most cogent of all reasons' explained that the Liberals needed time before facing another general election.<sup>8</sup> Asquith accepted that he could not reasonably demand guarantees from the King in the current parliament. Moreover, by postponing the decision for a time the government would be seen to be magnanimous in sparing an inexperienced King from a major controversy. As for Balfour, he had already taken risks by trying to persuade the old King to defy his Liberal ministers and appoint them to office, a dangerously unconstitutional idea that would have thrust the monarchy into party controversy. For both sides it was wiser to pull back from the brink.

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Such were the immediate motives and calculations. But much of the momentum behind the talks during the summer and autumn of 1910 reflected a more profound reaction against party government that had been brewing since the 1890s and had reached a climax during the South African War in 1899–1902. The impact of the military disasters had been complemented by revelations about the poor health and education of the men who had volunteered and led to a wider critique of British parliamentary government. Critics argued that the Salisbury Cabinet was stuffed with the Prime Minister's relatives; parliament attracted nimble speakers and skilled tacticians who were incompetent in matters of administration; at both national and local level the demands of party politics marginalised the experts and professionals in favour of amateurs and wirepullers. From these complaints there emerged a demand for promoting 'National Efficiency'. This involved increasing the role of experts, bringing successful businessmen into government and dispensing with narrow party rule in favour of some form of national government drawn from the best men in all parties and in none. In the crisis of the Boer War it seemed briefly possible that such an administration might emerge led, perhaps, by Lord Rosebery, a former Liberal Prime Minister but one whose support for imperial expansion and scepticism about home rule made him appealing to some Tories.

Although the mood soon gave way to normal party warfare, especially the controversies over the 1902 Education Bill and free trade versus tariff reform, the idea of National Efficiency proved to be potent and, indeed, has resurfaced periodically in British politics ever since. In particular, the attainment of National Efficiency through a coalition was promoted by J. L. Garvin and a circle of acolytes including Lord Milner, F. S. Oliver and L. S. Amery. Inspired by the ideas of Joseph Chamberlain, they sought some form of imperial federation backed by a tariff and a coherent defence policy; they accepted the need for state intervention in social affairs; and they saw the resolution of the Irish Question in a home-rule-all-round strategy.

However, as Rosebery was by now a marginal figure, an alternative Liberal exponent of National Efficiency seemed essential. Lloyd George was the outstanding candidate. His term at the Board of Trade (1905–08) had surprised and impressed his political opponents for his ability to ‘command the confidence of men of business’ and to draw vested interests into compromises.<sup>9</sup> Though they recognised that Lloyd George was publicly committed to free trade, they interpreted his actions in safeguarding British commercial interests as those of a protectionist. Nor did they see him as anti-imperial or anti-military despite his record during the Boer War. He had objected to that particular war, but, in the words of Lord Esher, ‘he is plucky and an imperialist at heart, if he is anything’.<sup>10</sup> This seemed to be corroborated by his record at the Exchequer where, despite some stiff arguments with successive First Lords of the Admiralty about the cost of building Dreadnoughts, he ‘does not care a bit for economy’ and invariably found the money required for naval building. In effect the Conservatives increasingly believed that in Lloyd George they had found a second Joseph Chamberlain, a politician who started as a partisan radical nonconformist Liberal who would evolve into a national statesman, promoting imperial development and class collaboration. For his part Lloyd George evidently believed that the situation in 1910 was similar to that prevailing during the Boer War. He contemplated an alternative government incorporating such figures as Alfred Mond and Sir Christopher Furness, who were Liberal MPs and successful entrepreneurs.<sup>11</sup> He himself would fill the Chamberlain/Rosebery role by leading the national administration.

Many historians, while recognising Lloyd George’s detachment from regular party politics, have considered the interpretation of him as a social imperialist as an exaggeration or even misrepresentation. Yet the expectations of the Edwardian National Efficiency advocates were not entirely lacking an empirical basis. As a young man in the 1880s Lloyd George had felt the attraction of Chamberlain’s politics: a combination of domestic radicalism and a

patriotic-imperialist external strategy; but his position in Wales, one of the most Gladstonian parts of Britain, had helped him to resist the temptation to join Chamberlain and later the Liberal Unionists.

It is possible to infer a good deal about Lloyd George’s motives and intentions from the memorandum he produced, dated 17 August 1910, which spelt out a programme for a coalition government, and from the way he handled it. Initially he told Churchill, a natural enthusiast for coalition, and Murray, who was sympathetic, but kept Asquith in the dark until October when Crewe, Birrell, Sir Edward Grey and Richard Haldane were also informed. Among the Tories he first invited F. E. Smith to talk it over at Downing Street before holding a private dinner with Balfour whom he assured that their meeting would be confidential: ‘The servants are Welsh and could not follow the conversation’.<sup>12</sup> By agreement Balfour then consulted his three colleagues who sat on the conference as well as Andrew Bonar Law with whom Lloyd George had enjoyed a good relationship since his time at the Board of Trade. Meanwhile Garvin agreed to give the idea favourable publicity in the newspapers.

The second half of the memorandum was devoted to proposals blatantly designed to tempt the Conservatives. He dropped a broad hint about a compromise on free trade, to be attained through an enquiry guided by ‘intelligent and judicial impartiality’. He made a bid for the imperial federationist support by advocating uniting the empire by ‘concentrating its resources for defence as for commerce’. And he appealed to those Tories who favoured state interventionism by suggesting raising the school-leaving age to enable Britain’s labour force to compete with Germany and the United States and promoting more efficient large-scale farming with state subsidies. All these questions, Lloyd George claimed, could be resolved much more easily by a non-party approach which would carry greater weight than any normal government. Similarly, the Irish question would be susceptible to non-party treatment, as the government could deal with it ‘without being subject to the

embarrassing dictation of extreme partisans, whether from Nationalists or Orangemen’.<sup>13</sup> Perhaps most surprisingly he offered a more efficient policy for national defence through the adoption of compulsory military training designed to raise an extra 500,000 men to support the regular army. There is no doubt that the Conservatives were surprised, even shocked, by these suggestions. ‘We were astonished at George’s concessions’, admitted Chamberlain. ‘What will his people say of him?’<sup>14</sup> But the memorandum gained credibility in their eyes because it went a long way to confirming the impression some of them had already formed of about his politics.

On the other hand, in the first half of the memorandum Lloyd George set out the ideas more likely to attract Liberals. ‘It is a clever document but a strange one’, Crewe told the Prime Minister.<sup>15</sup> It included improved housing, tackling the problem of alcoholic drink, introducing insurance against ill-health and unemployment and reforming the Poor Law. It is this list that throws most light on Lloyd George’s constructive approach to politics. Though not an intellectual, he was always attracted by novel ideas, as was Churchill, and almost invariably became impatient about finding immediate solutions to pressing problems. This attitude was reflected in his unorthodox working methods, his refusal to be restrained by civil service caution, his fondness for talking through policies and schemes with friends, his habit of bypassing official channels and seeking his own sources of information and ideas. In 1910 the problem that had begun to absorb him was the preparation of a compulsory scheme of national insurance for both health – or infirmity as it was then known – and unemployment. This topic occupied more space than any other in his memorandum and it seems probable that in composing his coalition proposals it was the resolution of national insurance reform that most moved him. For the attempt to legislate for the introduction of insurance stirred up angry nests of vested interests, notably the medical profession, the private insurance companies, and the trade unions who resented the imposition of extra compulsory contributions

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on their members. Conscious that it was comparatively easy to enact such a reform in Germany, he complained: 'but here one would have to encounter the bitter hostility of powerful organisations like the Prudential, the Liver, the Royal Victoria, the Pearl, and similar organisations, with an army numbering scores, if not hundreds of thousands, of agents and collectors who make a living out of collecting a few pence a week from millions of households'.<sup>16</sup>

He felt strongly that the current system of private insurance 'ought to be terminated at the earliest possible moment'. The costs of administration of the private schemes absorbed half of the total receipts; some companies were so badly run that they faced bankruptcy; the agents sometimes sold their books to make a profit for themselves at the expense of the contributors; and the typical 'death benefit' was of little help to the widows and children left behind by the loss of their breadwinner. Lloyd George here articulated the modern Liberal view that the state could perform such essential functions more efficiently and effectively than a multitude of private, profit-making bodies. But he anticipated that such legislation was likely to be a major electoral liability because of the reactions of the vested interests, especially the collectors who visited homes on a weekly basis. After a meeting with the representatives of the insurance companies in August he felt convinced that their hostility would prove fatal. In this context national insurance epitomised the case for coalition government as a means of circumventing and defeating the sectional interests that so often frustrated reforms that were necessary in the national interest.

By October, with the constitutional conference reaching deadlock, Lloyd George pushed hard for the coalition alternative by talking separately to the two sides. While the Conservatives were intrigued and excited, the Liberals required more reassurance which he provided by extemporising; to Crewe, for example, he explained that Liberal nonconformists would have to have guarantees on education and church disestablishment – topics that had not actually been mentioned in the memorandum. He even composed a second

memorandum towards the end of October designed to be seen by Liberals only.<sup>17</sup> In fact, several senior Liberals, including Grey and Crewe who were rather defeatist and lacked the impetus to tackle radical reforms at this stage, seem to have welcomed the prospect of a deal with their opponents.<sup>18</sup> However, this is not true of Asquith who was an altogether tougher politician. It seems almost certain that Asquith never realised how far Lloyd George was going in his talks with the Tories, sketching out the membership of a coalition, suggesting Balfour as Leader of the Commons, elevating himself as Prime Minister – and despatching Asquith to the House of Lords.

The negotiations reached a climax on 2 November, when Balfour and Lloyd George met privately. At that stage the Tory leader understood that he was being asked to concede home rule all round in return for a measure of tariff reform, compulsory military service and naval expansion; but he felt unable to accept and the effort was abandoned. Balfour was doubtless influenced by the lack of progress made at the constitutional conference which also collapsed a few days later, though this was not made known until 10 November.

Why did the initiative to form a coalition fail? With hindsight it is tempting to assume that Lloyd George's proposals for a coalition programme were simply unrealistic because he had incorporated so many major measures into his document. On the other hand, there was some logic in this. Deadlock between the parties was sometimes resolved by being ambitious rather than cautious. In 1884–85, for example, the Liberals' limited proposals to extend the vote had been blocked by the peers but were later enacted when they agreed to include a scheme to redistribute the constituencies; the same thing occurred in 1917–18 with even more comprehensive proposals to reform the male and female franchise, redraw constituency boundaries and make many other changes to the electoral system. When the parties disagreed it proved easier to go for a sweeping measure of reform in which everyone gained something they wanted and consequently swallowed things they disliked.

The obvious explanation for failure is that Lloyd George evidently thought it feasible to use the methods he had employed successfully at the Board of Trade in talking separately to the two sides with a view to finding the common ground. But in 1910 the participants were more sceptical. And rightly so because he was telling a different story to the two parties. If the parties had been able to resolve their differences over House of Lords reform there would have been some logic in going on to the coalition as the threat of an election would have been lifted, but Lloyd George had nothing new to offer on that subject, only a plea to circumvent it altogether.

For his part Asquith seems to have regarded the whole coalition proposal with detachment, even amusement, from the outset. A more orthodox party politician, he appreciated the damage to Liberal morale that would result from reneging on traditional commitments on free trade and voluntary recruitment; this view was corroborated from the other side by F. E. Smith, who believed a coalition agreement would have smashed the Liberal organisation for a decade. In any case, any deal that compromised home rule threatened to disrupt the electoral alliance with the Irish and even Labour that had sustained the Liberals through elections in 1906 and January 1910; this was indeed to be the eventual result of the formation of the wartime coalition with the Conservatives in 1915. Asquith's main object in talking to the opposition had always been to buy some time and to show George V that he had done his best to find a way out of the Lords' controversy; once this was seen to have failed the King was left with little option but to acquiesce in his government's desire for the creation of new peers. By the autumn the party was preparing for a further battle with the Tories and to back down unexpectedly would have been very damaging to morale.

The other key reason for failure lay in Lloyd George's inability to win the complete confidence and cooperation of Balfour. With hindsight Lloyd George claimed that he had enjoyed the support of the leading Conservatives in 1910 but was thwarted by the reactionaries such as Lord Londonderry and

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'the less capable and therefore more narrowly partisan members of his party'.<sup>19</sup> However, these remarks reflected his post-war experience in being rejected by rank-and-file Tories in 1922 while retaining the backing of Smith, Balfour and Chamberlain. In 1910 only a handful of Conservatives were actually consulted and Balfour was suspicious because Lloyd George used F. E. Smith, a highly opportunistic, freewheeling figure, as his intermediary. Nor did Balfour appreciate until later in October how many concessions Lloyd George required from the Tories. Moreover, although Balfour's attitude towards his own party was lordly and detached, he could not take liberties with his followers on such issues as Ireland. 'I cannot become another Robert Peel in my party', he explained.<sup>20</sup> As a result of the controversy over tariff reform launched in 1903 by Joseph Chamberlain the Conservatives had become very divided and neither faction regarded Balfour as reliable. He had been promptly denounced by Leo Maxse of the *National Review* for even talking to the Liberals: 'Those who begin negotiating with Mr Asquith will find themselves sold to the Molly Maguires before the end of the chapter.'<sup>21</sup> Admittedly Lloyd George hoped to bring Balfour round on Ireland by offering a federal or home-rule-all-round solution. But Garvin failed to convince the Tory leader that this could be done without splitting the party, and the federalists had not thought through such a major scheme sufficiently. In effect, while Lloyd George wanted the Tories to accept the idea of coalition and sort out the details later, Balfour preferred to have the details first.

Yet although it proved to be a failure the coalition initiative of 1910 was not without some significance. Among Liberal opinion the demise of the conference came as a relief. 'There are people who talk glibly of the existing parties having done their work and seen their day, and dream of a great "national party"', scoffed the [Liberal] *Westminster Gazette*. 'This idea will never prevail as long as there is life and strength in parliamentary institutions and a wholesome interest in public affairs among the mass of the people.'<sup>22</sup> The immediate consequences were that the Liberal

Party remained united, a second general election became inevitable and Asquith played his ace: the royal guarantee of new peers. The victory in December's poll resulted in the enactment of the Parliament Act in 1911 and the lasting curtailment of the House of Lords' role in government and in British politics generally.

Lloyd George promptly reverted to type by throwing himself into the election, which became almost a referendum on the upper chamber; he mocked the peers as descendants of 'French filibusters' and 'the ennobled indiscretions of kings'. But he found himself forced back into the trying negotiations over the National Insurance Bill. Although it was passed in 1911 he was frustrated by not being able to include widows' pensions as he had intended. As he had foreseen, the Bill offered easy targets for the Tories and as a result several Liberal seats were lost in by-elections during 1912-13. But the episode also damaged him in the wider party as reports of his scheme leaked out, leaving him a more isolated figure by 1914; his natural allies in the Cabinet had already concluded that he had crossed sides on defence and foreign policy.

On the other hand, Balfour, who had kept his party firmly in mind in backing away from coalition, earned himself little gratitude. Supporters of coalition saw his conduct as typically indecisive. But critics from the 'Radical Right' like Leo Maxse also condemned him for engaging in talks as proof that he could not be relied on to uphold Tory principles. When he lost the December election, his third consecutive defeat, the critics launched a vituperative 'Balfour Must Go' campaign which resulted in his resignation in 1911.

The 1910 negotiations also had considerable longer-term significance in that for Lloyd George they provided a virtual dress rehearsal for his wartime government. Despite his failure in 1910 he saw that the leading Conservatives took his ideas seriously and, given the right circumstances, would be prepared to take risks with the party. Of course his path was made easier by Asquith's decision to form a coalition in 1915. But the Lloyd George coalition that followed it in December 1916 was qualitatively different

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in translating into concrete form the ideas of the National Efficiency school. It diluted the party element in government by incorporating businessmen and experts, sidelined the old Cabinet by a five-man War Cabinet, instituted a cabinet secretariat to promote efficiency, and employed the Milnerites in the Prime Minister's personal secretariat. Even in the reaction against Lloyd George's style of government in the 1920s some of this apparatus survived, and the ideal of a non-party or national government continued to resurface at intervals in British politics.

Lloyd George may have been the first 'Presidential' Prime Minister but he was not the last. Churchill carried forward both the ideas of the Edwardian era and a marked habit for working with more than one party. Mrs Thatcher, who frankly admitted she would have preferred to be president, was very sceptical about many members of her own party and attracted by outsiders with business experience. Tony Blair, equally detached from his own party, was positively Lloyd Georgean in his habit for appointing men from outside the party to provide alternative advice to that offered by his official ministers.

*Martin Pugh's latest book, Britain: Unification and Disintegration, is available from Authors-OnLine and through Amazon in paperback and as an e-book. See [www.martinpughhistorian.com](http://www.martinpughhistorian.com).*

- 1 Admittedly there is some room for argument about how, say, the National Government is counted, but by my count there were coalitions in 1852-55; 1855-58; 1859-65; 1895-1905, 1915-16; 1916-18; 1918-22; 1931-35; 1935-37; 1937-40; 1940-45; 2010-.
- 2 Walter Long to Edward Carson, 25 May 1915, quoted in Ian Colvin, *The Life of Lord Carson* (1936), vol III, pp. 50-51.
- 3 Lucy Masterman, C. F. G. *Masterman: A Biography* (1939), p. 200.
- 4 *Ibid.*, pp.142, 164.
- 5 John D. Fair, *British Interparty Conferences* (1980), pp. 88-89.
- 6 A.J.Balfour to Austen Chamberlain, 24 October 1910, Balfour papers Add. Mss. 49736.
- 7 Denis Gwynne, *The Life of John Redmond* (1932), pp. 179-80.

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## REVIEWS

Although the ex-Prime Minister's influence is difficult to assess, this study shows that Lloyd George's support for Hitler's disregard for existing agreements did nothing to halt the Fuhrer's progress or reduce the likelihood of war. Lloyd George was an appeaser, not because he was compelled by Britain's dwindling resources combined with the multitude of threats facing the British Empire, but through a misplaced faith in German intentions, whoever held power in Berlin. While some of

Rudman's conclusions may be challenged, her thought-provoking study identifies more motives for appeasement and is a welcome addition to the historiography.

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- 26 Lord Riddell's *War Diary*, p. 135 (5 Nov. 1915).
- 27 Keith Middlemas (ed.), *Thomas Jones: Whitehall Diary*, Vol. I (Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 203 (13 June 1922); Lloyd George, *War Memoirs*, Vol. 2, pp. 2014–15.
- 28 Keith Middlemas (ed.), *Thomas Jones: Whitehall Diary*, Vol. III (Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 60 (27 April 1921).
- 29 Merrill D. Peterson, *Lincoln in American Memory* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1994), pp. 178–80. For Wilson, see David W. Blight, *Race and Reunion: the Civil War in American Memory* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1994), pp. 11–14.
- 30 David Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (Gollancz, 1938), Vol. 1, p. 232.
- 31 Ibid.
- 32 Lord Riddell, *Intimate Diary*, p. 226 (24 July 1920).
- 33 William D. Jones, *Wales in America* (University of Wales Press, 1976), pp. 184ff. There is a file on this visit in the Lloyd George of Dwyfor Papers (Parliamentary Archives, House of Lords, G/165).
- 34 Text of speech, Lloyd George of Dwyford Papers, G/165.
- 35 *The Times*, 31 Oct. 1923.
- 36 Text of speech in Lloyd George of Dwyfor Papers, G/165.
- 37 Drinkwater's play 'Abraham Lincoln' was first performed in 1918. He followed it up with a book, *Lincoln: the World Emancipator* (Houghton, Mifflin, Boston and New York, 1920).
- 38 Kenneth O. Morgan, *Michael Foot: the Life* (HarperCollins, London, 2007), p. 9.
- 39 John Vincent, *The Formation of the Liberal Party* (Constable, London, 1966), p. 211 on these themes.

### Lloyd George's Coalition Proposal of 1910

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- 8 'Cabinet Memorandum: secret', 31 May 1910, Asquith papers, 23.
- 9 *The Times*, 13 April 1908.
- 10 M. V. Brett, *Journal and Letters of Reginald Viscount Esher*, vol. II (1934) p. 370.
- 11 Masterman, C. F. G. *Masterman*, p. 160.
- 12 Lloyd George to Balfour, 11 October 1910, Balfour papers Add Mss. 49692.
- 13 'The Criccieth Memorandum', 17 August 1910, in K. O. Morgan, *The Age of Lloyd George* (1971), pp. 150–55.
- 14 Austen Chamberlain, *Politics from Inside* (1936), p. 293.
- 15 Crewe to Asquith, 22 October

### David Lloyd George, Nonconformity and Radicalism

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- 9 Ffion Hague, *The Pain and the Privilege: the women in Lloyd George's life* (London, 2008), p. 31.
- 10 Lady Olwen Carey Evans, *Lloyd George was my Father* (Llandysul, 1985), pp. 70–71. Cf. F. Owen, *Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George, his life and times* (London, 1954), pp. 30–31.
- 11 Richard, Second Earl Lloyd-George, *My Father, Lloyd George* (London, 1960), pp. 20–21.
- 12 *Baptist Times*, 24 May 1945, p. 10.
- 13 J. Grigg, *Lloyd George, the people's champion, 1902–11* (London, 1978), p. 71.
- 14 Lloyd George to his wife, 21 Apr. 1911; K. O. Morgan, ed., *Lloyd George Family Letters, 1885–1936* (Cardiff and London, 1973), p. 155, including footnote 4.
- 15 Ffion Hague, op.cit., 104–06.
- 16 Ibid., p. 106.
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