

THE 'LAND AND

Dr J. Graham Jones examines the formulation of the highly contentious Liberal policy document which became known as 'the Green Book', and its impact upon Liberal-held constituencies in rural Wales. Unlike the better-known and politically more attractive proposals of the 'Yellow Book', it appears as though Liberal candidates in Welsh constituencies in 1929 found their campaign hampered by the stigma of 'the Green Book' proposals from which the party leadership was by then most anxious to extricate itself.



D THE NATION' AND WALES

HISTORIANS HAVE ALWAYS devoted much more attention to the land campaign inaugurated by the Liberal Party in the Edwardian period rather than to their land campaign of the mid-1920s.¹ In the context of the 1920s, far more historical attention has been lavished on the Liberal Party's feud-wracked leadership, especially the clash between Asquith and Lloyd George, the high-profile split over the general strike of May 1926, and the ambitious programme focused on 'We Can Conquer Unemployment' on which the party fought the general election of 30 May 1929. But the deep-rooted dissension over the party's land policy, above all the furore evoked by the publication in October 1925 of the highly contentious policy document *The Land and the Nation*, soon to be dubbed 'the Green Book', are certainly worthy of closer examination.

Throughout the lengthy, quite unique political career of David Lloyd George, the land question was a predominant theme which came to the foreground of political life at three crucial periods: in the celebrated land taxes inaugurated in the famous 1909 'People's Budget'; in the land enquiry and subsequent land campaign of 1912–14 initiated with great gusto by Lloyd George as the long-serving Chancellor of the Exchequer under Asquith, and intended by him to constitute an especial strand in the Liberal campaign for the next general election

Lloyd George at Bron-y-De, Churt, in the 1930s

which was then widely anticipated in 1915, while the Liberal policy of Land Value Taxation (LVT) had proved highly popular and alluring in both urban and rural constituencies in a succession of by-elections held during 1912 and 1913; and the land campaign of 1925–29 intended by Lloyd George to revitalise his party's dwindling fortunes following its nationwide electoral debacle in October 1924. In a Welsh context the new land campaign of the mid-1920s appeared especially pertinent. Lloyd George had after all spent the whole of his youth and early manhood at rural Llanystumdwy and neighbouring Cricieth in Caernarfonshire with their distinctive, highly individualistic political culture focused on the campaigns against brewer, landed squire and parson, and nourished by vivid folk memories of the general election campaigns of 1859 and 1868. Following these elections significant numbers of tenant farmers had been ruthlessly evicted from their holdings for voting for the Liberal candidate contrary to the expressed wishes of their Conservative landlords. Two years after Lloyd George had first entered parliament following a fiercely contested by-election campaign in the Carnarvon Boroughs constituency in April 1890, pressure from Welsh Liberal MPs had coerced the ageing W. E. Gladstone at the outset of his fourth and last administration to yield a prestigious royal commission (rather than a much more

humdrum select committee) to examine the manifold complexities of the land question in Wales. By the time it had reported in 1896, however, a Tory government was in office, and the return of a relative opulence to the Welsh countryside meant that the far-reaching recommendations of the commissioners were destined to remain largely unenforced. Fully three decades later, in the mid-1920s, there prevailed enduring resentment in rural Wales at the conspicuous lack of governmental legislation relating to land issues.² It was widely felt that the relatively small size of most Welsh holdings, often less than fifty acres apiece, gave its own dimension to the land question in Wales. Another factor by the mid-1920s was the recent dramatic upsurge in the proportion of Welsh agricultural land which was farmed by its owners, a rather higher proportion than in contemporary England.

But Lloyd George's personal position had changed markedly by this period. In 1909 and again in 1912–14, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer in a strong Liberal administration, he was at the heart of government, largely directing governmental policy under Asquith. By 1925, however, the Liberals had been reduced to the status of very much a third party in the state with just forty MPs in the House of Commons, the party's standing and status blighted beyond measure by the Asquith–Lloyd George fissure in December 1916,

the genesis of a more deep-rooted split later on, and the dramatic outcome of the 'coupon' general election two years later. Lloyd George was not even the official Liberal Party leader at this point. But, as on previous occasions, he turned once more to the land question in a rather desperate attempt to revive the fortunes of his ailing party. As a result the primary emphasis on rural land reform was the outcome of a growing conviction that Liberal Party electoral fortunes could best be revived in the agricultural divisions, where the Labour Party remained relatively weak (including in most of mid and north Wales), rather than in the towns and cities where the Labour Party had already made substantial inroads, now most difficult to reverse. As Lloyd George was to tell his secretary and mistress Frances Stevenson in August 1925, shortly before the publication in the autumn of the twin reports *The Land and the Nation* and *Towns and the Land*, his real purpose in establishing the committees was 'to strengthen our grasp on the rural districts and the capture of a few towns where Liberalism is still a force'.³ Although there had been some drop in the number of agricultural constituencies in Britain, they still amounted to some 141 electoral divisions, representing one-quarter of the total seats in parliament, many of which were especially electorally volatile. Another factor of importance was the increase in the proportion of agricultural labourers (and indeed their wives) in the electorate as a result of the far-reaching provisions of the reform acts of 1884 and 1918.⁴ Thus pandering to the needs of this particular class also made electoral sense.

Thus it was that Lloyd George, largely on his own initiative, and originally on a non-party platform, set up independent rural and urban land committees in 1923. The former met on innumerable occasions between June 1923 and February 1925 to thrash out a new policy and comprised a number of leading agricultural experts and several Liberal politicians of whom Francis Acland, Ernest Brown, C. F. G. Masterman and Ramsay Muir were the most prominent. Only in March 1925 was it resolved, rather against the inclination of the agriculturalists on the committee, that

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the final policy document should be published under the auspices of the Liberal Party. For the Liberal Party nationally, this was a period of reform and reinvigoration. An overambitious Liberal Million Fighting Fund had been set up to raise funds and embark on a programme of Liberal education. There was a general feeling that people in the 1920s had no appreciation of traditional Liberal principles like free trade, local option, land reform and the position of the House of Lords. At Liberal Party headquarters at Parliament Street, London, a 'Roll of Honour' was established to record the names of all donors to party funds as such a move was considered a psychological boost to the membership. The setting up of numerous committees of enquiry was an essential element in the process of party rehabilitation. March 1924 had seen the appointment of an autonomous policy committee to inquire into the long-term crisis in the British coal industry. Within four short months it had published its report under the title *Coal and Power*, significantly under the name of Lloyd George alone. But its contents were not really contentious and its publication caused but little stir.

But inevitably there was much greater interest in the proceedings and eventual report of the committees of enquiry into the use and ownership of land. When the Welsh National Liberal Federation met at Shrewsbury at the end of July, with Carmarthen Liberal John Hinds in the chair, Ernest Brown, the former Liberal MP for Rugby, gave a foretaste of the contents of the report expected in October – 'Justice would be done so the landowners, and the cultivator would be given absolute security of tenure subject to one test only – that he proved himself an efficient cultivator of the soil, and he would have to get from the competent authority a certificate of good cultivation'. Brown (who was later to hold a succession of Cabinet offices during the National Government and the Second World War and was eventually to succeed Sir John Simon as the leader of the National Liberal group in 1940), insisted that their purpose in undertaking the research was 'to retain those who were on the land and add to their number. ... They were recommending not

a niggardly, finicky, petty policy; but a bold and drastic change'.⁵ By this time, as the eagerly anticipated land report approached completion, Lloyd George's excitement grew. He 'could talk of nothing but this Land scheme'.⁶ But the ominous inevitable backlash at the nature and extent of the anticipated proposals was also gathering momentum. Loud warnings were already reaching Asquith's ears.⁷ In his committees of enquiry, lavishly funded by the replete coffers of the Lloyd George Political Fund, Lloyd George, always a respecter of expert opinion, had made the fullest use of the services of the leading economists of the 1920s, men like J. M. Keynes, Sir William Beveridge, Walter Layton and H. D. Henderson, all of whom had responded with enthusiasm. It was a dead cert that the published reports would at once become the focus of considerable public attention and debate.⁸

Party leader Asquith, whose earldom had already been gazetted in the previous February, had commented in some detail in July on a draft of the final report, and in early August it was discussed at length by the Liberal Shadow Cabinet (as this body still rather pretentiously called itself). With publication in imminent prospect, Lloyd George delivered a long, impressive peroration at Killerton Park, Devon – as a kind of policy launch. It is of some significance that this high-profile meeting was convened on the estate of F. D. (later Sir Francis) Acland, who had been one of the most prominent Asquithian Liberal MPs during the period of the post-war coalition government. Here Lloyd George actually spoke from the terrace of Acland's palatial home. This was perhaps one indication both of Lloyd George's desire to carry with him former political enemies in his new campaign and of his deep-rooted respect for the expert.⁹ At Killerton Park, Lloyd George described the very system of landlordism as inherently obsolete and inefficient and insisted that the state needed to 'resume' possession of the land. Stopping studiously short of advocating the wholesale 'nationalization' of agricultural land in Britain, the old rabble-rouser advocated state ownership 'for the purpose of giving the necessary security to the cultivator of the soil that, if and

so long as he cultivates it, he and his children shall reap the full harvest of their own labour and enterprise'.¹⁰ Certain key functions like drainage, afforestation and reclamation could, he insisted, be undertaken efficiently only by the state. Land reform was consequently a social necessity which offered the prospect of fresh employment on a substantial scale. Social harmony then would follow as tillers of their own land had no interest in revolution. Although it rained steadily throughout the afternoon, Lloyd George's impassioned peroration kept entranced for a full ninety minutes an audience exceeding 25,000. Not a single one of them, it was reported, was tempted to leave.¹¹ The expansive speech was broadcast to several points within Killerton Park and certainly whetted the public appetite for the publication of the rural land committee report which was due to appear three weeks later.

Throughout the lengthy period during which the committee had undertaken its deliberations, agriculture was a subject of some debate in political circles. The Conservative Party under Baldwin had recently announced a fairly modest proposal for governmental assistance to enable the agricultural labourer to own his cottage and garden. The Independent Labour Party had recently published a pamphlet entitled *A Socialist Policy for Agriculture*, but this had not been adopted by the Labour Party as party policy. Quite independently, the Labour Party had its own advisory committee on agriculture which, it was rumoured in political circles, had prepared its own report, while the TUC, too, had established a committee on similar lines. It was anticipated that a national Labour Party conference would be convened at some point during the spring of 1926 to consider the various reports and thrash out a party policy on agriculture. From the vantage point of the autumn of 1925, it was considered that agriculture would be one of the burning political issues for discussion during the forthcoming winter. It was known that a general election was most unlikely at least until the spring of 1929; agriculture was viewed as an important subject on all sides; and it was hoped that it was a topic likely to be shorn of

avid political point-scoring.¹² Then the whole subject was thrown into high relief on 9 October 1925 with the publication of *The Land and the Nation* which at once became popularly known as 'the Green Book'.

A substantial publication running to no fewer than 570 pages, its first half was devoted to a presentation of detailed comparative statistics on current land tenure and the productivity of agriculture, the second half proposing drastic solutions, beginning with the crucial statement, '... The State shall be deemed to have resumed possession of all land in the United Kingdom which at that date is used for or capable of use for the production of foodstuffs, timber or other natural products'.¹³ The core recommendation of the detailed report was the implementation of a novel system of 'cultivating tenure' whereby each farmer should become the tenant of a new County Agricultural Authority, thus enjoying complete security on condition that he continued to farm his land efficiently. Rentals were to be fixed and the supervision strict. According to the report, the farmer would in consequence enjoy 'the legitimate rights of ownership without its risks, and the advantages of yearly tenancy without its insecurity'.¹⁴ This proposal amounted almost to the nationalisation of agricultural land. Compensation would be paid to the landlords, while the farmer would enjoy relative security of tenure on condition that he farmed properly, as judged by the new agricultural committees which would assume responsibility for the allocation of allotments, larger gardens, smallholdings and very small farms of new creation. Full compensation would be paid to a farmer who lost some or all of his land to the new holdings.

The rural land report immediately grabbed the headlines with a predictable vengeance. Whereas the publication of the proposals of *Coal and Power* the previous year had been considered 'a national service' unlikely to provoke controversy, *The Land and the Nation*, although not at the time Liberal Party official policy, was immediately viewed as a concerted attempt to reap a party-political advantage in the form of future electoral successes. The publication was at once commended by unbiased observers

for the thoroughness of its background research extending back over two and a half years to the spring of 1923, for the 'encyclopaedic array of facts and figures' available in the text and numerous expansive appendices, and for its commendable 'full view of conditions at home and abroad'. On these grounds the report was widely hailed as 'a priceless addition to popular literature on the subject'.¹⁵ But inevitably the critics weighed in too. It was immediately pointed out that implementation of such a far-reaching scheme, closely akin to the imposition of socialistic principles, 'would involve the drawbacks of nationalization at least as much as the gains'. Indeed 'agriculture' was highly likely to be 'suffocated by bureaucracy, by which enterprise would only be restrained'.¹⁶ Even before the report had actually seen the light of day, rumours that it was to advocate the setting up of county agricultural committees charged to assess the competence of farmers led to much doubt and questioning. As *The Times* put it, 'Who is to judge whether Blackacre or Whiteacre is well or ill cultivated?'.¹⁷ The very prospect of a veritable army of qualified civil servants constituting a nationwide network of county agricultural committees, some extending to more than one hundred individuals, provoked widespread dissension, even uproar. Outraged landlords, facing the prospect of summary confiscation of their landed estates, instinctively protested virulently, but so did many others, both within the Liberal Party and outside, appalled at the perceived threat to so many traditional aspects of rural life in Britain.¹⁸

Indeed reactions on the whole were questioning and frosty. 'The land policy is not going strong', wrote the influential and perceptive Liberal Party organiser R. Humphrey Davies in early November, 'I hope L.G. is not being misled by his entourage'.¹⁹ The term 'nationalisation' was widely used by critics – 'there is no evidence in the country of any volume of opinion in favour of confiscation' of agricultural land, a move which was considered to be wholly unfair to the landowning class. C. S. Orwin, the Director of the prestigious Institute for Research in Agricultural Economics at the University of Oxford, and

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the co-author, with W. R. Peel, of the recent highly acclaimed monograph *The Tenure of Agricultural Land*,²⁰ summarised the nub of the opposition to 'the Green Book' proposals from the standpoint of the farming communities:

It is common knowledge amongst those familiar with farming conditions that farmers undertake the functions of the landlord with the greatest reluctance. They have not been trained in the job; they have no knowledge of the planning and construction of buildings, of surveying and levelling for land drainage, of schemes for water supply, of the principles of forestry &c.; all these matters belong properly to a separate profession, that of the land agent, and it is impossible that the farmer should double successfully the parts. The Committee contemplate supervision and pressure by the County Agricultural Authority to secure the maintenance of the permanent equipment of the land in a state of efficiency. But what degree of effective supervision can be exercised by a Committee, and what degree of pressure is likely to be applied by a body composed, as it must be, mainly of 'cultivating tenants'? The application of the scheme would result, in some cases, in well-intentioned but inefficient attempts at the maintenance of holdings, and in others in the deliberate intention to annex the difference between the old rent, as paid to the present landlords, and the fair net rent payable to the State.²¹

Further criticism focused on the realisation that the novel 'cultivating tenure' proposal advocated as the key policy of *The Land and the Nation* would 'tie' farmers 'to their holdings'. Governmental legislation, it was argued, had already provided a much-improved 'security of tenure' for farmers, 'but freedom to go is almost as important to them as the freedom to remain'. Finally, it was maintained, the necessary development of agricultural land would not follow.²² Before the end of November the second land report, entitled *Towns and the Land*, soon to be dubbed 'the

Brown Book', had also seen the light of day. This was devoted to town planning on regional lines, embodying the principles of site-value taxation and reform of the leasehold system, and was much less controversial than its predecessor. It was envisaged from the outset that 'the Brown Book' proposals would readily be adopted as Liberal Party official policy with but little dispute. Published on 24 November 1925, *Towns and the Land* was officially launched as a conference at the Kingsway Hall, London, just three days later. As the background to the new reforms, the chronic overcrowding and congestion, still so prevalent in many British towns and cities in the 1920s, were underlined cogently by Lloyd George. In the evening session of the conference, C. F. G. Masterman, who pithily described himself as 'neither a Lloyd-Georgian nor an anti-Lloyd-Georgian', moved a resolution pressing for a wide-ranging measure of leasehold reform, the grant of power to local authorities to acquire land at a fair price in anticipation of future needs, and the rating of site values. Masterman continued, 'When he saw a man who was willing to carry through the things he longed for, he was with him. The Liberal party could carry these reforms if it avoided a semi-Tory combination'. The resolution was unanimously adopted, and reactions in the country were generally favourable.²³

But the furore over the proposals contained in *The Land and the Nation* certainly showed no sign of abating. The merits and demerits of the scheme were intensely debated alongside the allegedly discreditable means by which Lloyd George was attempting to foist it upon a reluctant Liberal Party, and the ongoing thorny question of party finance. Early in 1925 the party's new creation the Administrative Committee, basically Asquithian in character, had launched an appeal throughout the constituencies to raise £1,000,000 for the Liberal cause – the Million Fighting Fund. This had floundered badly, largely because of a nationwide awareness of the existence of the Lloyd George Political Fund, and LG's marked reluctance to make full use of it for the good of the party nationally. It was known, too, that large inroads into the

extensive Fund had already been made to finance the various committees of enquiry, while the Liberal Party nationally languished close to bankruptcy. Tensions grew as, swift on the heels of the publication of *The Land and the Nation* in October, Lloyd George brazenly proceeded to establish his own independent propaganda body, to be called 'The Land and Nation League', with himself as its president, to campaign up and down the country in favour of 'cultivating tenure' and the other reforms. Indeed in mid-November Lloyd George told his old ally C. P. Scott of the *Manchester Guardian* that it was his intention 'to put his whole strength into the movement', secure in the knowledge that 'he had money enough to carry it on for 4 or 5 years'. He gleefully anticipated that 'there would be meetings at every town and village in England and he was starting at once'.²⁴ Days later, H. H. Asquith, still party leader, and by no means overtly antagonistic to the proceedings and report of the rural land committee ('I expressed warm admiration for the thoroughness and ability with which they had conducted their inquiry'), now felt obliged to warn Lloyd George that the recent setting up of 'a new organisation' had immediately led to 'much concern' and was thus likely to impede the 'full and free discussion' now sorely required on the proposed reforms. Asquith drew Lloyd George's attention to the 'frequent, almost daily communications from stalwart and hard-working members' of the Liberal Party voicing 'their own doubts and difficulties and deprecating at this stage anything in the nature of propaganda, either on the one side or the other'. He insisted that it would be 'a very curious matter' if there should be 'any conflict, or appearance of conflict, between the National Liberal Federation and the new organisation [the Land and Nation League] proposed for promoting the views of the Land Enquiry Committee'.²⁵

Indeed reactions to 'the Green Book' proposals were becoming coloured by general disapproval of the existence and use of the Lloyd George Political Fund. At the end of November, veteran Welsh Liberal Judge John Bryn Roberts, a traditional Gladstonian loyalist who had represented

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Caernarvonshire South (the Eifion constituency) in parliament from 1885 until 1906, and was certainly no friend of Lloyd George, wrote sourly: 'Lloyd George's Land Policy stunt seems to me to hang fire, and kept alive only by the large political fund which he has seized. It would be interesting to know the sources of these funds. I suspect most came out of the secret service votes when he was P.M. & from the sales of Honours. The land scheme seems to me to be the wildest ever suggested by any responsible statesman, and more like the offspring of a mentality like that of the Clydesdale section of the Labour Party. ... Our national and local experiment in that direction have not been successful'. Commenting on the 'cultivating tenure' proposals, Judge Bryn Roberts went on:

... This to be secured by an army of Inspectors to keep the tenants up to the mark seems to me to be a short cut to national ruin. The Inspectors will be appointed out of a horde of applicants, mostly out of work or agricultural failures or under the late war regime. The main qualifications being capacity for wire-pulling and exercising political & private favouritism. The whole thing would in my opinion lead to appalling corruption, and mis-government to avoid trouble and disputes with tenants; all losses, as in case of war, falling on the State. ... The present scheme does not spring from any public demand, or out-cry, a fatal defect. It is simply a desperate stunt by Lloyd George to recover political influence and leadership.²⁶

Bryn Roberts was certainly not alone in his views and opinions. On 1 November senior Liberal Party organiser R. Humphrey Davies wrote from the Liberal Central Association at London:

What you say about the Land Policy is very interesting. In a nutshell the position is this:- Our funds are well nigh exhausted. L.G. apparently has ample funds. The essential work of the party machine is being crippled for lack of funds, while L.G. can spend a very large sum of money in developing his

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land policy. If his Land Policy is rooted in Liberalism, nothing on earth will prevent the party as represented by the Liberal Associations from adopting it, and adopting it gladly. On the other hand, if it is not genuine Liberalism, no amount of expenditure on his part will constrain the party to adopt that policy.

After Reunion we really tried to play the game here, but when your partner does not play it, what are you to do? L.G. is not an outsider who can pursue any fad he likes. He is leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Commons, and the fundamental policy he is pursuing is not such as any leader has played before. To attach conditions to party contributions is an unheard-of thing, and it is asking for trouble. The pity of it is that the rank and file in many parts of England are working splendidly, and what they want is encouragement and not discouragement. L.G. was urged not to attach conditions, but nothing would move him. This for your *own* information.²⁷

The Liberal land campaign was certainly dominating the British political landscape. On 5 December Lloyd George addressed a Liberal demonstration at the Drill Hall, Coventry where the audience totalled nigh on 5,000 individuals, while a substantial crowd had also assembled outside to hear the speech. LG urged his listeners to lend vigorous support to the new land policy: 'Do not let us waste our strength on petty bickerings. They are unworthy of the dignity of a grand cause (Cheers)'. He underlined the growing problem of rural depopulation, a factor which was brought home to him every time he returned to the village of Llanystumdwy where he had grown up.²⁸ Just a week later, accompanied by Dame Margaret, Major Gwilym and Miss Megan Lloyd George, he spoke equally passionately at the Coliseum, Leeds, and a few days later at the Capitol Theatre, Haymarket in London. As Lloyd George spoke at London, a huge screen behind him on the platform bore an inscription which was a quotation from a speech delivered by the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at

the capital's Albert Hall on the eve of the party's landslide victory in the general election of January 1906 – 'We wish to make the land less a pleasure-ground for the rich and more a treasure-house for the nation'.²⁹ Observers were reminded of the tremendous fervour of the venerable Gladstone's great Midlothian campaign of the 1870s.

Meanwhile during the same month the Liberal and Radical Candidates' Association, a new creation, met at the National Liberal Club in London to discuss 'the Green Book' proposals at some length. Some two-thirds of Liberal Party candidates were present at the meeting. The outcome was that a 'modified policy ... partial and gradual' in its essence, was endorsed rather than the 'universal and simultaneous' application which had been the essence of the 'original policy'. The keynote of the revised policy thrashed out by this association on 8 December was to be 'gradualism', the new county agricultural authorities were to assume control of agricultural land only 'in certain circumstances': when such land was up for sale, there was a vacancy on a farm, an estate was being 'badly administered' or a farm 'badly cultivated'. Four different kinds of tenure were then outlined. Lloyd George readily declared his support for the amended policy – 'We have in this country a landless peasantry such as exists nowhere else in the world. The object of those who support the recommendation is to give to these men land at a fair rent. There is no suggestion of confiscation'. It was also emphasised that the new land policy did not apply to Scotland where independent committees were to discuss the matter further.³⁰

Lloyd George was undoubtedly much relieved that the Liberal and Radical Candidates' Association had not disowned, but simply amended, the new policy.³¹ He had resolved, in the interests of Liberal Party unity, to accept, albeit with some reluctance, the revised land policy which had been rather acrimoniously thrashed out at meetings of the Candidates' Association. To his mind, the compromise policy was 'not wholly satisfactory', but he remained convinced that the original 'Green Book' proposals as unveiled the previous October 'had

destroyed the Labour propaganda in the rural areas', a vital breakthrough for the struggling Liberal Party of the mid-1920s. Lloyd George emphasised that it was essential to push the watered-down policy as still a radical initiative. Party leader H. H. Asquith had 'entirely agreed' and had stressed his personal conviction that the agricultural labouring classes 'must be shown that this is their new charter'.³²

The depth of the furore occasioned by the publication of *The Land and the Nation*, with its core 'cultivating tenure' proposal, was wholly predictable. The programme was especially unpopular because during the period immediately following the First World War, the years of the so-called 'Green Revolution' of 1918–22, agricultural land had been sold on a massive scale in consequence of the break-up, or the near break-up, of many of the great landed estates. About a quarter of the agricultural land in England and Wales had changed hands in four years. Many farmer labourers had now become small-scale tenant farmers. Those who rented had seen their rent levels reduced as a result of the agricultural depression. In Wales predictably the response was especially vehement. Here the scale of the transfer of agricultural land owned by the occupier increased from 10.2 per cent in 1909 to 39 per cent in 1941–43, most of this dramatic increase having occurred prior to 1922.³³ Generally, it would seem, Welsh landowners were more anxious to sell and the Welsh tenantry more inclined to purchase than were their English counterparts.³⁴

By the period of the Second World War, while fully 39 per cent of the acreage of Wales as an entity was owner-occupied, the comparative figure for England was only 33 per cent. During the very years that this massive change in the pattern of Welsh landownership was taking place, Lloyd George was Prime Minister of the post-war, Tory dominated coalition government and seemed to be travelling ever further from both his Liberal past and his Welsh roots. By the mid-1920s, his closest advisers and political confidants were almost all Englishmen, and the radical policy documents which poured

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forth from the presses – from *Coal and Power* (1924) to *We Can Conquer Unemployment* (1929) – contained little, if any, Welsh dimension. *The Land and the Nation* was certainly no exception. Its detailed index contained just three specific references to Wales, and there was no explicit policy initiative tailored to the demands of the principality. This glaring omission was possibly an implicit recognition on Lloyd George's part that Wales and England shared common agricultural problems in the wake of the depression and should thus be dealt with as a single entity. But most contemporaries saw this as a defect and a clear indication of how far Lloyd George had travelled from his Welsh roots and his once proverbial concern for Welsh issues.

The political repercussions were far-reaching, not least in the Liberal heartland of rural Wales. The most dramatic upshot occurred in Carmarthenshire where the sitting Liberal MP Sir Alfred Mond had actually served as a member of the Liberal Land Committee. After the committee had met at Lloyd George's home Bron-y-de near Churt in Surrey in August 1924, one of its members the Oxford academic and Liberal politician H. A. L. Fisher recorded that Mond was 'very doubtful' about the wisdom of the evolving land policy.³⁵ It was also widely known that he disapproved strongly of the administration and use of the Lloyd George Political Fund. His disenchantment and opposition only grew, to such an extent that, as the contents of *The Land and the Nation* were finalised, he felt impelled to send a memorandum to Asquith deploring 'the entire and fundamental change' implicit in the new policy, so much so, he insisted, that it demanded 'the closest investigation and criticism before the party should be asked to adopt it'. Mond's experience both as a practising landowner and a Liberal MP had led him to conclude, 'I do not find myself able to accept the reasoning on which the scheme is based'.³⁶

Mond's annoyance increased still further as a result of the propaganda methods employed by the Land and Nation League, and indeed he was still in the forefront of the ever-mounting chorus of opposition to the original 'Green Book' proposals. Although

it was clear by December 1925 that Lloyd George fully intended to amend substantially the original plans, Mond doubted his sincerity, and a strong personal element crept into his criticism. The rebel MP received the ready backing of his constituency association in Carmarthenshire which denounced the new land proposals as 'semi-nationalisation', potentially detrimental to the continuation of the freehold system in Britain.³⁷ Shortly afterwards, on 19 January 1926, Sir Alfred Mond formally defected to the Conservative Party. Lloyd George's response was bitter. He declared that he was 'not in the least surprised' at the precipitate action taken by his old ally whom he had long sensed to be 'obviously making tracks for the Tory party'. In Lloyd George's view, dissatisfaction with the proposals of *The Land and the Nation* was 'only an excuse' to justify his dramatic defection to the Conservatives: 'His action is nothing to do with the land, or he would have gone to the Liberal convention to present his case. If the decision had gone against him, he could then have acted. The real reason is given in that part of the letter where he reveals his conviction that the Liberal Party offers poor prospects for ambitious men'.³⁸ Mond then helped to ensure that the Liberal nomination in Carmarthenshire went to Colonel W. N. Jones (described as 'a man after his own heart, a right-winger and a virulent anti-Socialist "business-man's Liberal"')³⁹, another diehard critic of 'the Green Book' reforms which were discussed at length in Carmarthenshire right through until the by-election of June 1928 and indeed during the general election campaign of May 1929.

In Montgomeryshire, too, there were equally dramatic repercussions. Here the long-serving Liberal MP, a veteran of 1906, was David Davies of Llandinam, the heir to the multi-million pound fortune of his namesake grandfather 'Top Sawyer', and a headstrong, opinionated individual. 'DD' had been recalled from active service at the front in France, where he had commanded a battalion with distinction, in June 1916 to become Lloyd George's parliamentary private secretary. An initially close rapport between the two men crumbled quickly as Davies dispatched to the

Prime Minister a formidable barrage of letters sharply critical of the allied war effort and reporting conversations, highly critical of Lloyd George, which he had heard in the clubs and tea rooms of Westminster. His immediate dismissal followed and created a gulf between the two men which was never to be healed. In Montgomeryshire, Davies's personal and political position was immensely strong as was reflected in unopposed returns to parliament in the general elections of 1918, 1922 and 1923. But Davies's inclination to continue his political career steadily weakened as he became ever more absorbed in an array of philanthropic initiatives and in his avid support for the work of the League of Nations and similar bodies in the 1920s. Predictably, Davies disapproved strongly of the proposals unveiled in *The Land and the Nation* in October 1925 and then looked aghast at the divided Liberal reactions to the general strike in May 1926. By July he had resolved to retire from parliament at the next general election. As he told the chairman of his county Liberal Association, in his view the 'Green Book' proposals would simply 'create a new host of officials' and 'give a stimulus to farming from Whitehall'. Moreover he felt convinced that their implementation would inevitably 'add an additional burden to the already over-weighted finances of the county without any corresponding advantage'. These proposals, coupled with the Liberal Party's split reaction to the general strike, felt Davies 'made it almost impossible for anyone to advocate sincerely the return of the party to power'.⁴⁰ Months later, still unimpressed by the 'amended and truncated form' of the much revised proposals, he condemned them as designed 'to initiate the policy of land nationalisation under the cloak of Liberal reform'. At the same time he took advantage of the same opportunity to take a swipe at the infamous Lloyd George Political Fund which, he felt certain, had been 'accumulated by doubtful and dubious means in the days of the Coalition Government'. In consequence, he insisted, there was a very real danger that the organisation of the Liberal Party might well degenerate into 'the appendage of a private endowment'.⁴¹ The affair dragged on for several months in

Montgomeryshire, but the attempts to persuade David Davies to continue in parliament proved futile.

When his successor as the Liberal candidate for Montgomeryshire was chosen during 1927, attitudes towards 'the Green Book' weighed heavily. The chosen candidate, E. Clement Davies, a native of Llanfyllin, was quizzed relentlessly on his attitudes. Although admitting his general support for Lloyd George and his policies, he asserted his determination to refuse the financial assistance of the notorious Lloyd George Fund – 'I would prefer to stand upon my own two feet, even if I had to mortgage all I have. ... I am not an out-and-out supporter of anybody'.⁴² During the ensuing general election campaign in May 1929, cross-examined intensively by the farmers of Welshpool, he was compelled to reassure his inquisitors that he would certainly vote against a bill to nationalise agricultural land introduced by any future Liberal government – 'I believe in the freedom of the individual, and that is why I quarrel with Socialism'.⁴³

In Cardiganshire, too, where recent years had witnessed profound dissension and indeed acrimony in the ranks of the county Liberal Party, the 'Green Book' proposals were, predictably, suspiciously scrutinised and generally badly received. At a public meeting at Cardigan some two weeks before the publication of *The Land and the Nation*, the highly principled conviction Liberal MP for the county Rhys Hopkin Morris shared a platform with his political near-neighbour Sir Alfred Mond. Mond went on the attack at once – 'He would never agree to any freeholding farmer being interfered with as far as his land was concerned'. Hopkin Morris took much the same tack, questioning rigorously many aspects of the 'Green Book' proposals and expressing his concern at the proposed inspection of farming standards: 'The test to be applied was the test of good farming, and who was to determine what constituted good farming? Was it a tribunal and if so, how was the tribunal to be constituted and how was that tribunal to bring about more efficient farming?'. Weeks later Morris publicly reiterated his belief in the concept of peasant proprietorship and his firm opposition to

the appointment of 'a new host of bureaucratic officials' rendered necessary by implementing the new proposals.⁴⁴ Three delegates from the county were duly nominated to attend the revising convention to be held at the Kingsway Hall, London in mid-February. Once news of the shock defection of Sir Alfred Mond hit Cardiganshire, there was immediate conjecture that Hopkin Morris might well be inclined to 'follow suit' in the near future, in reality an unlikely scenario.⁴⁵

Within the county Liberal Association there had emerged something of a rift between Hopkin Morris and his supporters, virulently hostile to the 'Green Book' reforms, and local Liberals led by the law Professor T. A. Levi who saw at least some virtue in the audacious proposals. Indeed Levi endorsed the idea of 'cultivating tenure' as essentially 'a fair and equitable scheme, without an atom of confiscation. ... They need have no fear as to the result'.⁴⁶ But even the revised proposals did not in the least impress Hopkin Morris whose displeasure increased still further as he viewed the ever escalating activities of The Land and Nation League which, he knew full well, were being financed by the replete coffers of the Lloyd George Political Fund whose role he heartily despised: 'Accept the creed [of the Land and Nation League], and you get the money; your principles can be purchased for the price of your election expenses'.⁴⁷ Joseph Parry, one of the three delegates from Cardiganshire present at the February convention, did not mince his words in the least, 'The least said and done in the matter will be best for the Liberal cause in the county of Cardigan'.⁴⁸ As attitudes hardened, Hopkin Morris continued to assail the 'mercenary army' which, in his view, now constituted the Liberal Party's organisation, and the 'fancy policies' recently advocated.

There is evidence, too, of the impact of *The Land and the Nation* on the political life of Denbighshire where the sitting Liberal MP Ellis W. Davies, although estranged from Lloyd George, was himself a member of the rural land committee and, recorded his co-member H. A. L. Fisher, was clearly 'very keen on the LG policy and thinks we shall sweep

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the country with it'.⁴⁹ When the next general election ensued in the autumn of 1924, Ellis Davies vocally sang the praises of the evolving radical land policies in relation to the tenant farmer and the farm labourer. But he made conspicuously little impression in the county as his majority fell drastically from 6,978 votes to just 1,411. Davies's predecessor as the Liberal MP for Denbighshire, J. C. Davies, wrote shortly afterwards of 'the intensity of the feeling' against Ellis Davies. In consequence, 'some of the most stalwart Liberals' at Llanrwst, traditionally staunchly Liberal, had 'worked hard and openly' for the Conservative candidate 'because of their dissatisfaction with Ellis Davies and his policy, especially his land policy'. Towns such as Colwyn Bay, Ruthin and Llangollen had recorded 'a decisive majority against him. ... He is a dull personality, but what ruined him was his silly flirtation with Labour'.⁵⁰ Ellis Davies continued to display much greater interest in the land question than in any other political issue, constantly pointing up the problems faced by the relatively small size – less than fifty acres in many cases – of the majority of Welsh farmsteads, and the need for legislation to enable Welsh farmers to purchase and improve their holdings.⁵¹ Throughout the county there was much interest in the 'Green Book' proposals which Ellis Davies tended to support, especially in their amended form.⁵² But there were profound misgivings locally as the Liberal 'land van', the vehicle of the Land and Nation League, was seen regularly in the county proclaiming the message of *The Land and the Nation* and not infrequent political meetings were held in the towns and villages.⁵³

Almost as soon as the radical proposals of the 'Green Book' had seen the light of day, the frenzied furor of opposition made it clear that substantial modifications were inevitable. There was genuine fear within the Liberal Party at the likely long-term electoral implications of adopting such a socialistic policy initiative and alarm that other Liberal MPs might well follow the example of Sir Alfred Mond and jump ship. 'Will others follow?' asked Walter Runciman,

the Liberal MP for Swansea West and the chairman of the influential Radical Group of Liberal MPs, at a dinner of the Eighty Club held at the National Liberal Club on 26 January 1926. Runciman urged his fellow Liberals to press their views whilst remaining within the party's ranks, while politicians within the other political parties, gleefully viewing the intense internal disputes among the Liberals, hailed them as clear evidence of 'the crumbling condition of the Liberals' in the words of ILP activist J. R. Clynes. Clynes eagerly anticipated that defections to the Tories would soon be counterbalanced by 'the march of many Liberals to the ranks of Labour'.⁵⁴

At the Kingsway Hall convention in mid-February the proposed amendments to *The Land and the Nation* were duly approved with but little ado. Fundamentally, the principle of the universality of application of the original proposals was now unceremoniously jettisoned. The proposed County Agricultural Authority was to remain, but it should assume control of the agricultural land only as it became vacant, and not always then. It should take control of land that was 'badly managed or badly farmed', was required for smallholdings, or was surrendered voluntarily, for instance in lieu of death duties. The highly inflammatory concept of 'cultivating tenure' should be adopted only as one means of landholding amongst many – 'Land should be held under a variety of tenures to meet different local conditions'.⁵⁵ The much vaunted Land Value Taxation (LVT) was accepted as a major policy in the urban policy adopted, but had no place in the rural policy. Lloyd George soon won the commendation of many of his fellow Liberals for his apparent readiness to compromise and his flexible approach, and his 'unvarying attitude of reason and conciliation' as the *Liberal Magazine* neatly put it.⁵⁶ LG was indeed most anxious to get his revised policy approved and then speedily adopted as Liberal Party official policy. In this aim he enjoyed complete success; both the revised 'Green Book' and the original 'Brown Book' proposals were approved, Asquith rejoicing in the introduction of the new elements of 'graduality and elasticity' considered essential

by so many within the rural land proposals.⁵⁷

On the very day following the high-profile Kingsway Hall convention, a leader writer in the *Manchester Guardian* claimed, 'Mr Lloyd George has conceded much, very much, in the interest of party unity'.⁵⁸ To some extent the dissension which had wracked his party during recent months, focused mainly on the 'cultivating tenure' policy, generally subsided. It began increasingly to seem that no real electoral dividends were going to be reaped from an emphasis on radical land policies, urban or rural. Limited public interest was aroused by the high-profile activities and propaganda of the Land and Nation League and the thousands of public meetings held. Lloyd George, although heavily criticised for the 'Green Book' proposals, had gained some respect for his apparent readiness to compromise and revise his rural land policies, and for his evident aptitude to draft radical new policies so sorely needed by his party. But the role of the Land and Nation League, which Lloyd George had supported at its establishment to the tune of some £80,000 (so readily donated from his personal war chest the Lloyd George Political Fund), still rankled. Over the next few years it was estimated that no less than £240,000 was made freely available to support the activities of the League in this way. Many Liberals looked askance; they disliked the new policies and they firmly believed that the resources of the fund should be in the hands of the party as a whole.

The rift grew deeper still. Interest in the land question was stimulated throughout the summer by the ongoing propaganda of the Land and Nation League. Six 'land vans' toured many of the rural areas, including one which travelled through north Wales. Handbills and literature were distributed in abundance. In October 1926 the first number of *Land News*, the official monthly publication of the Land and Nation League, was circulated and proved highly popular, demand soon apparently exceeding supply by some 50,000. It was thus agreed to print 250,000 copies of the November issue. From the beginning of 1927 it was distributed in Cardiganshire attached to the

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first number of the *Cambrian News*, widely read throughout the county, to be published each month. Soon a carefully prepared Welsh language version entitled *Ein Tir* was available too and, it would seem, avidly read. Local folk, much impressed, eagerly shared copies with their neighbours. Public meetings increased and were generally well attended.⁵⁹

Welsh unity was the theme of the proceedings at the annual meetings of the Welsh National Liberal Foundation in July when Lloyd George spoke powerfully. By the end of the year no fewer than twenty-one 'land vans' under the auspices of the Land and Nation League were operational, and there were some 7,000 speakers being briefed to expound the new land proposals. The vans were often the vocal point of open-air meetings held in numerous villages and towns some of which had witnessed no major Liberal speech since before the Great War. Most of these vans were equipped with loudspeakers and magic lanterns. Indeed the propaganda activities of the burgeoning Land and Nation League appear to have played a key role in several crucial by-elections at this time: Southwark North (March 1927), Bosworth (May 1927), Lancaster (February 1928) and St Ives (March 1928) – all striking gains for the Liberal Party. *Land News*, it was claimed, now had a circulation in excess of 250,000 copies and was widely appreciated.

But successive issues of *Land News* clearly reflected the diminishing significance which Lloyd George attached to the land question as a political issue. From its first number, which was published in October 1926, its primary emphasis was firmly on the exposition of the new Liberal land policies. But from January 1928 onwards it appeared under the control of the Liberal Campaign Committee, and from the beginning of March it was printed in three separate editions, *Mining News*, *Industrial News* and *Land News*, with the last-named devoted solely to the rural divisions. By the autumn it was stated that the specific purpose even of *Land News* was to disseminate Liberal policies more generally rather than to publicise the rural land policies specifically. In its last issues, which saw the light of day

It was clear by the end of 1928 that the land campaigns of 1925–26 had very largely run out of steam, to be supplanted by the campaigns to stimulate industrial recovery and tackle the menacing scourge of unemployment. These achieved a newfound centrality through the publication of the so-called 'Yellow Book', *Britain's Industrial Future*, in February 1928.

during the spring of 1929 (as the general election fast approached), it gave pride of place to the new dramatic Liberal plans for unemployment and agricultural issues were sidelined.⁶⁰

Certainly it was very clear by the end of 1928 that the land campaigns of 1925–26 had very largely run out of steam, to be supplanted by the campaigns to stimulate industrial recovery and tackle the menacing scourge of unemployment. These achieved a newfound centrality through the publication of the so-called 'Yellow Book', *Britain's Industrial Future*, in February 1928. Unemployment was by then the political issue which cried out to be tackled – if any electoral success, however modest, might ensue. Certainly, no such rewards were going to be reaped from the 'Green Book' proposals, amended and truncated or not. But it gave the candidates of the other political parties a barbed stick with which to beat the Liberal Party in their election addresses and campaign speeches. As one Conservative candidate in Wales put it, 'Your farm will be nationalized if you vote for a Liberal. Inspectors can turn you off your farm if Liberals get power. Under the Liberal Land Scheme you will be no longer a man, but a cog in a wheel. The Conservatives have given the farmer what he asked for – freedom to run his own farm and entire relief from rates.'⁶¹ His colleague for Monmouthshire, Sir Leoline Forestier-Walker, derided the new Liberal agricultural policies as 'simply Socialism decorated up a bit', while at Carmarthen John Coventry dismissed them as 'semi-nationalization'.⁶² In some constituencies careful plans were laid for awkward questions to be asked at Liberal political meetings on their land policy – deliberately to embarrass the candidates.⁶³ The Liberal Party simply could not extricate itself from an unpopular policy statement which it had substantially amended and watered down more than three years earlier. As a result, as might be predicted after the tenor of the Carmarthen by-election of June 1928, it would seem likely that some Liberal candidates in the Welsh constituencies in April and May 1929 found their campaign hampered and harmed by the persistent stigma of 'the Green Book' proposals from which the

party leadership was by then most anxious to extricate itself and move on to more promising territory and, it fervently hoped, more beneficial results.

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- 1 See especially, Ian Packer, *Lloyd George, Liberalism and the Land: the Land Issue and Party Politics in England, 1906–14* (Boydell Press, 2001).
- 2 Ellis W. Davies, 'Cwestiwn y tir: agweddu gwahanol y Sais a'r phrynu', *Baner ac Amserau Cymru*, 26 Mawrth 1925.
- 3 Lloyd George to Frances Stevenson, 20 Aug. 1925, as cited in A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), *My Darling Puss: the Letters of Lloyd George and Frances Stevenson, 1913–41* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975), pp. 97–98.
- 4 Michael Kinnear, *The British Voter: an Atlas and Survey since 1885*, 2nd ed. (Batsford, 1981), pp. 119–20; Michael Dawson, 'The Liberal land policy, 1924–29: electoral strategy and internal division', *20th Century British History* 2, no. 3 (1991), pp. 273–74.
- 5 *Cambrian News*, 24 July 1925. John Hinds (1862–1928) was the former Liberal MP for Carmarthen West from 1910 until 1918 and for Carmarthen from 1918 to 1922. He was also the Lord Lieutenant for Carmarthen from 1917 until his death on 23 July 1928.
- 6 Trevor Wilson (ed.), *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911–1928* (Collins, 1970), p. 481, diary entry for 1 July 1925.
- 7 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Lord Oxford and Asquith Papers file 134/199–279.
- 8 See Roy Douglas, *Land, People & Politics: a History of the Land Question in the United Kingdom* (Allison & Busby, 1976), p. 190.
- 9 *Ibid.*
- 10 David Lloyd George, speech at Killerton Park, Devon, 17 Sept. 1925; *The Times*, 18 Sept. 1925, and the *Manchester Guardian*, 18 Sept. 1925.
- 11 See the report in *The Nation*, 26 Sept. 1925.
- 12 See the editorial column 'The Land Report', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 Oct. 1925.
- 13 *The Land and the Nation: Rural Report of the Liberal Land Committee, 1923–25* (London, 1925), p. 299.

- 14 Ibid., p. 460.
- 15 See the editorial column 'Life and land: the great problem: the new policy', *The Observer*, 11 Oct. 1925, published just two days after the appearance in print of *The Land and the Nation*.
- 16 John Campbell, *Lloyd George: the Goat in the Wilderness, 1922–1931* (Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1977), p. 123.
- 17 *The Times*, 18 Sept. 1925.
- 18 See Campbell, *Lloyd George*, p. 123.
- 19 National Library of Wales (hereafter NLW), E. Morgan Humphreys Papers A/513, R. Humphrey Davies to Humphreys, 8 Nov. 1925.
- 20 C. S. Orwin and W. R. Peel, *The Tenure of Agricultural Land* (Cambridge University Press, 1925), 35 6d.
- 21 C. S. Orwin, 'A critic of the land scheme; objections stated; the farmer's new duties', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 Nov. 1925.
- 22 Ibid. For a contrary view, a spirited defence of the 'Green Book' proposals, see the article by F. S. Acland in the *Manchester Guardian*, 12 Nov. 1925. Acland's views were considered especially important as he was the representative of a famous Liberal county family, was himself the owner of the extensive Killerton Park estate in Devon, and was the chairman of the influential Agricultural Organisation Society. Moreover he had served throughout its existence as a key member of the Liberal Land Committee and had personally drafted several sections of the report. Another long-term member of the committee, C. F. G. Masterman, also readily weighed in to defend the 'Green Book' proposals – 'Here is at least a courageous and practicable scheme for the redemption of rural England with the assistance of the whole nation. In the lack of any more practical recommendations it holds the field'. (*Manchester Guardian*, 17 Nov. 1925). Interestingly, both Acland and Masterman were traditionally political enemies of Lloyd George, as indeed was Ellis W. Davies, the Liberal MP for Denbighshire since 1923. (See J. Graham Jones, 'Ellis W. Davies MP and Denbighshire politics, 1923–9', *Denbighshire Historical Society Transactions* 59 (2011), pp. 207–41). Lloyd George's conscious decision to include old political adversaries on his land committee is interesting. (See Campbell, *Lloyd George*, p. 99).
- 23 *Manchester Guardian*, 29 Nov. 1925.
- 24 British Museum, London, C. P. Scott Papers 50,907/171–82, diary entry for 13 Nov. 1925.
- 25 Asquith to Lloyd George, 21 Nov. 1925, cited in Trevor Wilson, *The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914–35* (Fontana paperback edition, 1966), pp. 351–52.
- 26 NLW, E. Morgan Humphreys Papers A/3022, J. Bryn Roberts to Humphreys, 27 Nov. 1925 ('Private'). There is also a draft of this letter, dated 26 Nov. 1925, in NLW, J. Bryn Roberts Papers 630.
- 27 NLW, E. Morgan Humphreys Papers A/514, R. Humphrey Davies to Humphreys, 1 Dec. 1925 ('Confidential').
- 28 Lloyd George, speech at the Drill Hall, Coventry, 5 Dec. 1925: *Manchester Guardian*, 7 Dec. 1925.
- 29 Lloyd George, speech at the Coliseum, Leeds, 12 Dec. 1925: *Manchester Guardian*, 14 Dec. 1925; Lloyd George, speech at the Capitol Theatre, Haymarket, London, 16 Dec. 1925: *Manchester Guardian*, 18 Dec. 1925.
- 30 *The Times*, 9 Dec. 1925, p. 8, col. g.
- 31 See Dawson, 'The Liberal land policy, 1924–29', p. 278.
- 32 Reform Club, London, W. Mc Eager Papers 5, note of meeting on negotiations, 2 Dec. 1925. Eager was the secretary to the Liberal Land Enquiry. A breakdown of the extended negotiations is also available in the Parliamentary Archive, House of Lords, London, Lloyd George Papers G/30/4/54, Harcourt Johnstone to Lloyd George, 1 Dec. 1925.
- 33 John Davies, 'The end of the great estates and the rise of freehold farming in Wales', *Welsh History Review*, vol. 7, no. 2 (Dec. 1974), pp. 193–94.
- 34 See the detailed statistics presented *ibid.*, p. 212.
- 35 Bodleian Library, Oxford, H. A. L. Fisher Papers, Fisher's diary entry for 24 Aug. 1925.
- 36 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Asquith Papers, vol. 34, ff. 210–14, memorandum by Sir Alfred Mond, 8 Aug. 1925, 'Some notes on the proposed new land policy of Mr. Lloyd George'. See also Hector Bolitho, *Sir Alfred Mond: first Lord Melchett* (Secker, 1930), pp. 258–64.
- 37 *Carmarthen Journal*, 11 Jan. 1926.
- 38 *Daily Telegraph*, 26 Jan. 1926.
- 39 D. M. Harries, 'Carmarthen Politics: the struggle between Liberals and Labour, 1918–60', unpublished University of Wales M.A. thesis (1980), pp. 31–32.
- 40 NLW, Lord Davies of Llandinam Papers file A1/6, David Davies to Richard Jones, 14 July 1926 (copy).
- 41 Ibid., Davies to Jones, 15 Nov. 1926 (copy).
- 42 *Montgomeryshire Express*, 22 Nov. 1927.
- 43 *Manchester Guardian*, 29 May 1929.
- 44 *Cambrian News*, 2 Oct. 1925; *Cardigan and Tivy-side Advertiser*, 27 Nov. 1925.
- 45 Ibid., 29 Jan. 1925.
- 46 *Cambrian News*, 29 Jan. 1926.
- 47 Cited in R. Hopkin Morris's obituary in *The Times*, 23 Nov. 1956, p. 13, cols. c–d.
- 48 NLW, Cardiganshire Liberal Association Records, no. 1, minute book, 1923–50, AGM minutes, 10 June 1926; *Cambrian News*, 18 June 1926; *Welsh Gazette*, 17 June 1926.
- 49 Bodleian Library, Oxford, H. A. L. Fisher Papers, Fisher's diary entry for 26 Aug. 1924.
- 50 NLW, Henry Haydn Jones Papers 175, J. C. Davies to Jones, 12 Nov. 1924 ('Private & confidential').
- 51 *Baner ac Amserau Cymru*, 26 Mawrth 1925.
- 52 *North Wales Weekly News*, 28 Jan. 1926; *Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury*, 26 Feb. 1926.
- 53 Denbighshire County Record Office, Ruthin, Denbighshire Conservative Association Records, minute book, minutes of meetings, 30 Sept. and 20 Dec. 1927.
- 54 Walter Runciman, speech to the Eighty Club dinner at the National Liberal Club, London, 26 Jan. 1926, and J. R. Clynes, speech at York, 26 Jan. 1926: *The Times*, 27 Jan. 1926, p. 9, col. d.
- 55 *Liberal Magazine*, Jan. 1926.
- 56 *Liberal Magazine*, March 1926.
- 57 Newcastle-upon-Tyne University Library, Walter Runciman Papers 204, H. H. Asquith to Runciman, 20 Feb. 1926, as cited in Campbell, *Lloyd George*, p. 128.
- 58 *Manchester Guardian*, 20 Feb. 1926.
- 59 *Cambrian News*, 22 Oct. 1926.
- 60 See Dawson, 'The Liberal land policy, 1924–29', p. 280.
- 61 Election address of Captain Alan Graham, Conservative candidate for Denbighshire, May 1929.
- 62 L. Forestier-Walker, speech at Abergavenny, 29 May 1929: *Western Mail*, 30 May 1929; John Coventry, speech at Talley, Carmarthenshire, 14 May 1929: *Carmarthen Journal*, 17 May 1929.
- 63 See J. Graham Jones, *David Lloyd George and Welsh Liberalism* (National Library of Wales, 2010), p. 278.