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

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

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

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Liberal Democrat History Group

The Liberal Democrat History Group promotes the discussion and research of topics relating to the histories of the Liberal Democrats, Liberal Party, and SDP, and of Liberalism. The Group organises discussion meetings and produces the *Journal of Liberal History* and other occasional publications.

For more information, including historical commentaries, details of publications, back issues of the *Journal*, and archive and other research sources, see our website at: **www.liberalhistory.org.uk**.

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LIBERAL HISTORY NEWS WINTER 2013–14

The Jews and Liberalism

To mark Holocaust Memorial Day (27 January), we reprint here a pamphlet published by the Liberal Party Organisation in 1928.

British Jews, of course, did not face the horrors unleashed on their counterparts in Germany, but they were nevertheless subject to many forms of discrimination, which in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Liberal Party was instrumental in removing.

This Pamphlet is of importance to every Jewish Elector

Throughout history, the Jews have suffered in all countries because the rights of citizenship have been denied to them. In this country today, however, the Jew is absolutely free. Jews practise their religion and keep their customs without hindrance; they have full citizenship, and every walk of life is open to them. *These benefits are almost entirely the result of Liberal legislation passed during the last hundred years.*

The first principle of Liberalism is individual freedom. Liberals have constantly fought for religious liberty, political liberty and economic liberty. They believe that all men and women should be free to pursue their own lives in peace, and should have a fair and equal chance to shape a successful career. *The Liberal Party have fought the democratic battle for all classes and needs alike, and in that struggle they have gained Equality for the Jews.*

The Liberals have secured for the Jews reforms in religious toleration, in education, in the franchise, in municipal politics, and in admission to Parliament, and as the result Jews have occupied the highest positions in the land, and have had many distinguished honours conferred upon them, On the other hand, the Liberal Party has received invaluable help from practically every Jew who has become famous in the political history of the country.★

Jewish Disabilities

A hundred years ago, the Jews were almost excluded from the professions ; they were unable to engage in retail trade in the City of London, and it was questionable whether they had the right to hold land. They were legally prohibited from entering Parliament, from holding high rank in the Army or Navy, from membership of Oxford University, and from taking any degrees or emoluments at Cambridge University. They could even, at the discretion of the Returning Officer, be prevented from voting at an election.

With the advance of Liberalism in the eighteen-thirties, many reforms were quickly carried out. In 1831, London admitted Jewish traders, and in 1833, the first Jew was called to the Bar.

The entrance of Jews to municipal politics was achieved soon afterwards. In 1835, David Salomons was elected as Sheriff of London and Middlesex. Objection was raised to his serving as he did not take the Christian oath, and *the great Liberal leader, Lord John Russell, immediately introduced a Bill into Parliament to overcome the difficulty.* Thereupon, Salomons served his year of office; and two years later he was succeeded as Sheriff by Moses Montefiore.

The Fight for Parliament

The struggle for Parliamentary emancipation was much more arduous, and is one of the most interesting chapters in modern political history; there is, however, but space to recall the bare outline here.

First, in the year 1835, the Liberals passed *an Act finally securing for Jews the right to vote.* Until that time, they could be prevented from doing so by being asked to take an oath, but this practice was now finally abolished.

It took another twenty years of Liberal effort, however, before Jews were admitted to Parliament. The first step was taken in the year 1830, when the Liberal Member for Inverness, Sir Robert Grant, introduced a Bill to remove all disqualifications which prevented Jews from holding various 'civil rights, franchises and privileges' and holding various 'offices, places, employments, trusts and confidences'. The Bill vas strongly supported by Lord John Russell, Macaulay, Lord Holland (the nephew and disciple of Charles James Fox) and other prominent Liberals, but was defeated. A General Election was held in 1831, and returned *a strongly Liberal House of Commons; and when the Emancipation Bill was re-introduced in* 1833, it *was carried.*

The Bill was, however, thrown out by the Lords. The same thing happened in 1834. In 1836, the Bill was again introduced, no longer as a Private Member's Bill, but this time in charge of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in a Liberal Government. It was again rejected by the House of Lords.

First Jewish Parliamentary Candidates

Efforts were then made to assist progress through the constituencies. The first Jew to be a Parliamentary candidate was Alderman Sir David Salomons, who has already been mentioned as the first Jewish Sheriff, and who was also the first Jewish Alderman and Lord Mayor of London. He was selected as a candidate by the Liberals at Shoreham in 1837, at Maidstone in 1841, and at Greenwich in 1847, but was defeated on each occasion.

Salomon's attacks had all been made upon Tory strongholds, and it was now decided to nominate a Jew as the Liberal candidate in a constituency in which there were good chances of success. Accordingly, in

1847, Baron Lionel de Rothschild, the leader of the Anglo-Jewish community, and Lord John Russell, the Liberal Prime Minister, were nominated as candidates for the City of London, and they were both elected. Baron Rothschild was, however, refused permission to take his seat because he was unable to take the oath 'on the true faith of a Christian'.

Lord John Russell immediately introduced a Bill to admit Jews to Parliament, which received the support of the Conservative leader, Lord George Bentinck, and passed all stages in the House of Commons. The Bill was rejected by the House of Lords; and in consequence of his action, Bentinck was worried by the Conservatives into resigning the leadership of that Party. A similar Bill met with the same fate the next year. Rothschild thereupon resigned his seat to test the feeling of his constituency, and was at once re-elected.

Emancipation Won

In 1851, another Emancipation Bill was introduced, and on the day after its rejection by the Lords, another Jewish Member was returned to Parliament, in the person of Sir David Salomons, who had now successfully contested Greenwich as a Liberal.

In all, eight Bills to admit Jews to Parliament were thrown out by the House of Lords, but at last, in 1858, they grudgingly gave way to the extent of accepting a compromise which left the question to be settled by each House for itself by Resolution.

On July 26, 1858, Baron Rothschild took his seat in the House of Commons, after being returned as a Liberal Member five times, and being compelled to sit 'outside the bar' of the House for eleven years.

In 1860, the Liberals converted the Resolution of the House into a permanent Standing Order.

Removal of Oaths

The Jews suffered many disabilities owing to the necessity in many connections of taking an oath 'as a Christian'.

As already stated, in 1835 the Liberals secured for the Jews the right to vote by abolishing the provision that an elector might be required to take the oath. In the same year, they took the first step towards opening all municipal offices to Jews by abolishing the necessity for taking the oath on becoming a Sheriff.

In 1838, the Liberals passed an Act to enable Jews to take the oath in their own way in a Court of Law. Previously they had actually been tried for perjury because they had sworn on the Old Testament.

The position of Jewish Members of Parliament was finally secured in 1866, when the Liberals passed an Act replacing the existing oaths by one that contained no phrase to which a Jew could object. Thenceforth, Jews could enter either House of Parliament without any Resolution. Under it, Lord Rothschild, a son of Baron Lionel, was raised to the peerage, and duly took his seat in the House of Lords (during Gladstone's administration in 1886).

In 1871, the Liberals passed the Promissory Oaths Act, which removed the last barrier and entitled the Jews to hold every possible position.

In 1909, the Liberals passed another Oaths Act, which removed an objectionable form of oath sometimes administered to Jews.

Religious Freedom

In 1846, the Liberals passed a most important Act affecting the Jews in this country. It granted religious freedom to the Jews by placing them on an equality with Nonconformist Protestants. It gave the Jews the right to hold property

Lloyd George's Tada

– the one father he never knew!

by Peter Rowland

A biography of William George (1821–64), schoolteacher extraordinaire, is provisionally scheduled for publication by the autumn of 2014, to coincide with the 150th anniversary of William's death.

It will run to almost 85,000 words.

If interested in learning more, please either email lloyd.georges.tada@gmail.com or contact the author via www.peterrowland.org.uk

On This Day …

Every day the Liberal Democrat History Group's website, Facebook page and Twitter feed carry an item of Liberal history news from the past. Below we reprint three of them. To see them regularly, look at **www.liberalhistory.org.uk** or **www.facebook.com/LibDemHistoryGroup** or follow us at: **LibHistoryToday**.

December

5 December 1916: Herbert Asquith resigns as Prime Minister. The crisis that led to the Prime Minister's resignation had been building for over a month. Concern at the military weakness in the British army at the Battle of the Somme led Lloyd George to call for a restructuring of the War Council with himself as chairman. Although not completely opposed to Lloyd George's proposals, Asquith could not accept that the Prime Minister would not chair the Council not continue to be a member of it. Protracted negotiations ensued until Lloyd George forced the issue by tendering his resignation. The Unionist ministers sided with Lloyd George and indicated there preparedness to serve in a government headed by Lloyd George. This was the last straw for Asquith and at 7pm he saw King George V to offer his resignation.

January

29 January 1855: Lord Aberdeen's Whig-Peelite Coalition, in office since 1852, is forced to resign following a significant Parliamentary majority (by 305 votes to 148) in favour of a select committee to inquire into what is widely felt to be the government's incompetent handling of the Crimean War. Aberdeen felt obliged to regard this as a vote of no confidence in his administration. In tendering his resignation to Queen Victoria, Aberdeen told her, perhaps foreshadowing current arrangements (or not), that in all other political matters 'it must be acknowledged that the experiment of a coalition had succeeded admirably'. He then virtually retired from public life, speaking in the Lords for the last time in 1858 before his death in 1860.

February

20 February 1977: Death of Elliot Dodds, journalist and Liberal thinker. Dodds was sometime private secretary to Liberal leader Herbert Samuel and was President of the Liberal Party in 1948. By profession a journalist, Dodds was a great writer and thinker for the party, a Chairman for the Unservile State Group and was particularly closely associated with the policies on profit sharing and industrial democracy.

necessary for their worship, education, and charitable purposes, and protected Jewish ministers and synagogues from molestation. It also repealed an old law under which Jews could be compelled to wear badges.

This Act meant a great deal to Jews, for until then, although the laws in existence had not been enforced for some time, it was illegal to hold religious services anywhere else than in the churches, and people could be punished for attending any other places of worship.

The privileges secured by the Act of 1846 were extended by two more Liberal measures passed in 1855. These secured the liberty of Religious Worship, and made it possible for synagogues to be registered. By means of registration, a synagogue is freed from payment of rates, it may receive legacies and gifts, it can enforce contracts for payment of seats, and people who disturb the services can be punished.

The Marriage Laws

A Liberal Government in 1836 passed a Marriage Act, which allowed Jews to marry according to their own laws. In the same year the Government passed an Act which permitted Jews to have their own Marriage Registrars. Another important Act was passed by the Liberals in 1847, which removed doubts by declaring the legality of all Jewish marriages solemnised before 1837.

Another Liberal Government in 1856 passed an amending Marriage and Registration Act, and in this, Jews were given the permission to marry by licence.

When in 1906, a Liberal Government passed the Marriage with Foreigners Act, making it necessary for foreigners to obtain certificates from their own countries before they can be married here, a Clause was inserted leaving Jews out. The Liberal Government was satisfied that all necessary inquiries are made by the Jewish authorities to obtain the particulars which other people had to obtain from abroad.

Education

The Liberal Government which came into power at the end of 1868 passed, in its first three years of office, three important measures which threw open to Jews all grades of schools, from the public elementary schools to the Universities, without any religious tests or impositions.

These measures were the Endowed Schools Act, 1869; the Elementary Education Act, 1870; and the Universities Tests Act, 1871.

Under these Acts Jews cannot be given any religious teaching against their will, nor can Jews be kept out of any of the schools or Universities. Moreover, Jewish schools are placed on an equality with other schools.

Right to Hold Land

The right of the Jews in England to become property owners was in doubt in the minds of eminent lawyers and other authorities, but all doubts were removed by the Liberal Act of 1846 to which reference has been made.

Aliens can now hold land under the Liberal Naturalisation Act of 1870.

Voting on Saturday

To enable Jews to vote when polling takes place on a Saturday, the Liberal Government inserted a special clause in the Ballot Act of 1872. All that a Jew need do when a poll takes place on a Saturday, and he wishes to vote, is to inform the Presiding Officer at the Polling Station that he is a Jew, and the Officer will then mark the ballot paper for him according to his instructions, Thus the Liberals safeguarded the great privilege of the vote to the Jews without Sabbath desecration.

Naturalisation

Naturalisation is the means by which an alien obtains all the rights of the natural-born British citizen. Jews who have been born in other countries and have settled here have always been eager to become citizens. It is important that they should. The Naturalisation Certificate confers all rights and removes the disabilities imposed on aliens by the Aliens Act. The Naturalisation Act of 1870 was passed by a Liberal Government.

Thus the Liberals have secured to Jews the right to vote and made it easier for them to obtain all the other privileges of citizenship.

Titles and Honours

The first Jewish Knight was created by a Liberal Government, the honour being conferred on the famous philanthropist, Moses Montefiore, in 1837.

The first Jewish Baronetcy was conferred by the Liberals on Isaac Lyon Goldsmid, in 1841.

The first Jew to be raised to the Peerage, was, as, already stated, Lord Rothschild.

The first Jew to hold office in a Government was Sir George Jessel, who was appointed Solicitor-General by Mr. Gladstone in 1871.

The first Jew to be admitted to the Privy Council was Sir George Jessel, in 1873, thanks to the Liberals.

The first Jew to be made a judge was Sir George Jessel, who was raised to the position of Master of the Rolls in 1873.

The first Jew to become a Member of the Cabinet was Sir (then Mr.) Herbert Samuel, in the Liberal Government of 1909.

Lord Reading (who as Sir Rufus Isaacs was the first Jew to be made Attorney-General, 1910) was appointed by Mr. Asquith in 1913 to be Lord Chief Justice.

Many other public distinctions (such as Q.C., Recorder, Stipendiary Magistrate) were first conferred upon Jews by the Liberal Party.

The Right Honourable Sir Herbert Samuel is now Chairman of the Liberal Party organisation, and this pamphlet cannot conclude without a reference to the splendid pioneer work done by Sir Herbert Samuel in Palestine, when he was the first High Commissioner (1920–1925).

The Appeal of Liberalism

The present day appeal of Liberalism to the Jews is at least as great as ever it was. Liberalism is still the only real safeguard of individual liberty, and the Liberal Party stands foremost as the guardian of religious toleration, personal freedom, and equality of opportunity for all. Liberalism resists all tyranny and oppression in every form, whether from Conservatism, which believes in aristocratic rule, or from Socialism, which advocates the ever-widening extension of State interference. Nationalisation and Government control must be resisted, and efforts concentrated upon reforms in towns and country alike which will enlarge the scope of individual opportunity, and bring greater individual happiness and prosperity.

Liberalism stands for the ideal of partnership in industry, and the fairer distribution of wealth. Liberalism also strives for friendship in international relations, and its first watchword – Peace – is also the greatest ideal of the Jews, for upon it alone can be based justice and well-being for all the peoples of the earth.

* *The Earl of Beaconsfield is scarcely to be regarded as an exception, for though Disraeli was born a Jew he was baptised at the age of twelve.*

LIBERAL HISTORY QUIZ 2013

The 2013 Liberal history quiz was a feature of the History Group's exhibition stand at the Liberal Democrat conference in Glasgow last September. The winner was Michael Mullaney, with 18½ marks out of 20. Below we reprint the questions – the answers are on page 25.

1. Which former Liberal prime ministers are buried in Scotland?
2. A Liberal MP who later became a Conservative leader held a Scottish seat during the Great War. Which MP and which seat?
3. Who, at the 1992 election, made history by holding his seat with just 26% of the vote, the lowest percentage ever for a winning candidate?
4. Who was Liberal MP for Orkney & Shetland from 1922 to 1935?
5. What is the full name of Danny Alexander's constituency?
6. Which Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote to which Liberal Secretary of State for War: 'Scotland is a far cry, but then as a compensation it occupies more than half the government, and till we get Home Rule for Scotland it is almost inevitable that Ministers should be occasionally in London'?
7. Who was the leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats from 2005 to 2008?
8. Whom did a former Liberal leader's wife hope to succeed as a Scottish MP in 1970?
9. In which year did the last Leader of the SDP become an MP, and for which party?
10. In which year did H. H. Asquith return to the House of Commons by winning a by-election, and for which seat?
11. What did Liberal Prime Minister Lord Rosebery share with Harry Potter?
12. Which former Liberal (later Liberal Democrat) MP was the first person to take the oath in Gaelic upon entering the House of Lords in 2001?
13. What was the title of the memoirs published by Judy Steel in 2010?
14. What post did Sir Archibald Sinclair hold in Churchill's wartime coalition government from 1940 to 1945?
15. Augustine Birrell once said: 'What a grateful thought that there is not an acre in this vast and varied landscape that is not represented at Westminster by a London barrister.' In which Scottish county was he standing?
16. Russell Johnston once described his political mentor as 'a Scot of untidy kindness' who once said to him: 'I really don't understand why everyone isn't a Liberal'. Who was he?
17. Which former Liberal Prime Minister died in Downing Street a few days after resigning?
18. A former Lord Provost of Edinburgh, he served as Liberal MP for the city from 1865 to 1881 and was known by the nickname of 'The Member for Scotland'. Who was he?
19. Alexander William Charles Oliphant Murray, Liberal MP from 1900 to 1912, serving as Chief Whip under Asquith, was better known by which courtesy title for most of his political career?
20. Which famous Liverpudlian, of Scottish descent, won an Edinburghshire seat the year after an enormously popular oratorical campaign – and in which year?

GLADSTON GREAT IRIS

William Ewart Gladstone's Irish policy as Prime Minister has received a great deal of historical attention, but aspects of his earlier engagement with Ireland remain less well known. In particular, Gladstone's response to the defining social and economic crisis of modern Irish history – the Great Famine of 1845–52 – has attracted only cursory attention. In this article, **Douglas Kanter** explores Gladstone's reaction to the Great Famine, some two decades before his first premiership.



IE AND THE SH FAMINE

If, as George Boyce remarked not long ago, the words 'Gladstone and Ireland' resonate to this day,[1] the same cannot be said for the phrase 'Gladstone and the Great Irish Famine'. William Gladstone's response to the defining social and economic crisis of modern Irish history, in fact, has attracted only cursory attention. Historians of the famine have generally neglected Gladstone's opinion of that tragic event, while his biographers have typically made only passing mention of it, in order to explain his support for the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. The reasons for such inattention are not difficult to discern. Having resigned from Sir Robert Peel's Conservative government in January 1845 as a result of the Prime Minister's decision to augment and render permanent the grant to the Catholic seminary at Maynooth, Gladstone was out of office when the extent of the potato blight first became apparent in October 1845. Although he returned to the Cabinet in December of that year, his endorsement of Corn Law repeal over the objections of his patron, the Duke of Newcastle, resulted in the loss of his seat at Newark, and he did not return to parliament until November 1847. Despite, rather anomalously, serving as Colonial Secretary for several months during his involuntary absence from the House of Commons, Gladstone made no significant impact on relief policy in these critical years, when deaths from starvation and disease mounted and the basic structures of government assistance were established. His contribution to policy formulation remained slight after his return to parliament as a member of the Opposition in the autumn of 1847, notwithstanding the recurrence of the famine and the revival of contentious debates concerning Irish land law and the financing of relief. Nevertheless, in light of Gladstone's subsequent significance to the Anglo-Irish relationship, his reaction to the Irish Famine merits a closer examination. Gladstone's understanding of the crisis in Ireland was informed by his deeply held religious convictions, and the famine provided the occasion for his earliest foray into Irish land legislation, with important, albeit unanticipated, consequences for the future.

Gladstone was on the Continent, addressing a family emergency, in mid-October 1845, when ministers received confirmation of the impending potato failure, and after his return to England he spent little time in London until the second half of December. His protracted removal from the metropolis helped to ensure that, by his own account, he remained unaware of the magnitude of the approaching catastrophe.[2] Perhaps as a result, Gladstone was at first more preoccupied by the political implications of the crisis than by its potential human cost. Initially anticipating no more than a 'temporary' suspension of the Corn Laws, he was 'rather puzzled' by the Peel ministry's ultimately abortive resignation in early December 1845, and 'dismayed and amazed' by the evident willingness of the Peelites to support the abolition of the Corn Laws out of office.[3] Even after Gladstone's perusal of the government's 'Scarcity & Crisis papers' in late December had convinced him to join the reconstructed Conservative ministry and assist Peel in the repeal of the Corn Laws, he continued for some time to regard the famine primarily as a problem of policy.[4] As late as April 1846 he portrayed it, in essentially secular language, as 'an unforeseen emergency' and 'a great public calamity'.[5] Within several months, however, he had concluded that the famine was an act of God.

Gladstone's perception of the famine began to change in the autumn of 1846, after the Peel ministry had resigned from office. When, in November, the reappearance of the blight prompted

William Ewart Gladstone (1809–98)

Lord John Russell's Whig government to approve a national day of humiliation in Ireland, Gladstone privately regretted that ministers had not appointed a fast day in Britain as well.[6] By January 1847, he had discerned 'the hand of providence' in the famine, and by March he had become convinced that it was 'a calamity most legibly divine'.[7] Gladstone's profoundly religious temperament doubtless encouraged such a providential interpretation of events, particularly in the context of the deepening subsistence crisis in Ireland. But his views also reflected a developing consensus in Britain concerning the divine origins of the famine, which was fostered by the Whig government and the established church.[8]

Gladstone offered his lengthiest and most detailed analysis of the famine in three sermons that he composed and delivered to his household in March 1847, in preparation for a national day of humiliation held throughout the United Kingdom on 24 March. These famine sermons were hardly unique – Gladstone completed almost 200 sermons between 1840 and 1866 – but they were unusual in explicitly addressing a contemporary event.[9] In the first sermon in the series, Gladstone situated the Irish Famine within a framework of sin and retribution provided by the Old Testament. Passages from the books of Isaiah, Numbers and 2 Kings revealed that God, 'in divers times & places[,] sent forth the Angels of destruction to punish the sins of particular periods and nations. … Sometimes by pestilence … Sometimes by the Sword [and] … Sometimes also by Famine'. Although some commentators had 'foolishly or impiously' suggested that the potato blight in Ireland was the result of 'natural causes', Gladstone was certain that 'we should divine in it the hand of God conveying to us especial tokens of His displeasure'. 'We are', he admonished his family and servants, '… to plant deep in our minds the lively conviction that the famine which now afflicts Ireland and begins to press even upon England is a judgment of God sent upon the land for our sins'. He advised the members of his household that they might help to mitigate 'the horrors' of the famine in three ways. They could, in the first place, contribute money for the relief of distress, and to facilitate such Christian charity Gladstone placed a collection box in the hallway of his London home. (He also, according to his account book, subscribed £50 for famine relief, and if this sum represented a small percentage of the £562 he contributed to religious and charitable objects in 1847, it also constituted the second largest donation he made to any philanthropic cause in that year.[10]) Members of his household could, in the second place, economise 'the consumption of food'. Finally, and most importantly, they could humble themselves before God. Only through 'a true repentance', Gladstone insisted, would God 'find His scourge has done its work & … in His great mercy withhold it'.[11] In his subsequent famine sermons, Gladstone returned to the theme of atonement, warning his auditors that they might avert a similar infliction upon England only through genuine penitence and a sincere abhorrence of sin.[12]

If Gladstone's famine sermons reflected the religious tenor of early Victorian society, they were also shaped by the distinctive contours of his faith, and particularly by his profound sense of sin and personal unworthiness in the eyes of God. Many early Victorians, particularly Whigs and Liberals, embraced an optimistic version of providentialism during the famine. God had sent the blight, they believed, to correct the moral failings of the Irish people, and to reconstruct Irish society. While the famine, unfortunately, entailed some necessary suffering, in the long run it would demonstrate God's benevolence by effecting the permanent improvement of Ireland. This anodyne view often distanced the government officials and opinion-makers who subscribed to it from the human cost of the famine.[13]

Gladstone's providentialism, in contrast, emphasised the retributive relationship between God and man. This left him uncertain about the ultimate beneficence of the divine visitation. The famine was 'without doubt' evidence of God's 'wrath', but only 'perhaps' a sign of 'His farseeing love'. The connection Gladstone discerned between sin and suffering encouraged him to acknowledge the famine's cruel toll. 'Many thousands of the people', he recognised, 'have in the last few months died … the dead are buried in trenches as in the time of plague, sometimes without coffins, there seem even to have been cases in which their bodies have remained exposed'. 'Looking to the future', he lamented, 'we have to expect a great increase it may be feared in the number of deaths'.[14] Because Gladstone regarded sin as intrinsic to the human condition, moreover, he rejected explanations of the blight that ascribed it to the excessive immorality of the Irish people. Instead, in his third famine sermon he recalled Jesus's message to the Jews, as recorded in Luke 8:

> There were present at the season some that told him of the Galileans, whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices. And Jesus answering said unto them, Suppose ye that these Galileans were sinners above all the Galileans, because they suffered such things? I tell you, Nay: but except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish.

Lest his household misunderstand the message, Gladstone drew the moral explicitly. 'What the Jews thought of the Galileans slain by Pilate', he explained, 'we perhaps are tempted to think of our fellow countrymen in Ireland. Law & order[,] care & thrift are highly prized among us, whereas we hear of them as wild and unruly, setting too little value on human life and caring too little for the future'. 'Do not', he exhorted his listeners, 'let *us* assume that the blow has descended upon Ireland and not upon us because God is better pleased with us: for we have seen that He sometimes visits earlier where He means to chastise more lightly'.[15] By 1847, therefore, Gladstone had come to interpret the famine as both a divine judgment upon Ireland and as a providential admonition to Britain. The continuance of the famine in 1848 served to confirm this belief, as he discerned God's 'judgments … again going abroad' in the recurrence of the blight.[16] Gladstone's tendency to descry the hand of God at work in Anglo-Irish relations, so evident during the famine, provided an important point of continuity between the youthful Peelite of the 1840s and the Liberal statesman of the late Victorian age.

By 1847, Gladstone had come to interpret the famine as both a divine judgment upon Ireland and as a providential admonition to Britain.

Famine distress: Mullin and his family in their cabin at Scull (Mary Evans Picture Library)

But if the responsibility of the individual was clear, what was the duty of the state? On this subject, Gladstone remained, throughout the famine, politically cautious and fiscally conservative. As late as 16 December 1845, only six days before accepting office, he expressed guarded and contingent support for the maintenance of the Corn Law of 1842.[17] With the bruises over his support for the increased Maynooth grant in the most recent parliamentary session still tender, Gladstone was reluctant to risk the further alienation of the Conservative Party or its supporters.[18] Although 'the special facts of the Irish case' ultimately convinced Gladstone to re-join the Peel ministry, he favoured a more measured approach to Corn Law repeal than the Prime Minister adopted.[19] Peel proposed the imposition of a reduced sliding scale on foreign grains, to be replaced after three years by a 'nominal' duty of 1*s.* on all imports. In the meantime, colonial grains, as well as foreign and colonial maize, would be subject to a fixed duty of 1*s.* to assist famine relief efforts.[20] Gladstone, in contrast, 'should have preferred' the maintenance of 'a low fixed duty of 4/ or 5/ per quarter … for a greater number of years'.[21]

When it became clear, in 1847, that the continuance of the famine would necessitate considerable central government expenditure, Gladstone repeatedly expressed concern over the cost of relief. Though 'the question of money in its incidence upon the people of England' was, he conceded, only one of the 'secondary aspects' of the famine, it was also 'a very important one'.[22] Lord George Bentinck's proposal for an advance of £16 million for Irish railway construction he deemed 'shallow and bad', while he similarly deprecated the government's decision to raise a loan of £8 million as 'bad in principle, and bad in policy' because it entailed 'a burden on posterity'.[23] Gladstone's cheeseparing instincts did not prevent him from supporting emergency relief expenditure, such as the modest but controversial grant of £50,000 to distressed Poor Law unions in Connaught during 1849.[24] But the absence of adverse comment indicates that he was generally content with the Russell ministry's commitment to the manifestly inadequate amended Irish Poor Law of 1847, which sought to enforce a workhouse test of destitution and to insulate British taxpayers from the cost of assistance, as the primary mechanism of relief.

Gladstone's famine sermons, delivered to a household consisting, in his view, of subjects rather than citizens – including dependent adult males, women and children – were frustratingly opaque on the subject of government policy. Yet they suggested a degree of fatalism in the face of God's anger. 'Millions of money', he observed, 'have been poured forth from the treasury of this country: hundreds of thousands have been publicly and privately contributed by individuals: from all parts of the earth large quantities of food have been obtained & sent to Ireland[;] but even large quantities have failed to supply a void which is far larger still'.[25] Indeed, the famine helped to confirm Gladstone's bias against extensive state intervention in the economy. The British relief effort, he instructed the corporation of Manchester in 1864, some thirteen years after the famine had ended, provided an example of 'enormous waste' and 'lamentable failure'. 'There was', he recalled, 'an immense amount of devoted labour, and of most intelligent, as well as magnificent liberality, on the part of the country'. 'But still', he tellingly concluded, 'it was Government machinery, and I want you to see the infinite superiority of voluntary action in every such case'.[26] Thus, while Gladstone did not share the optimism of many Whigs and Liberals about the transformative capacity of the famine, his own more pessimistic providentialism pointed to a similar policy of limited intervention. Men must, it seemed, be left to work out their own salvation, temporal as well as spiritual.

This did not mean that the state had no social or economic role to play: it might establish the conditions in which self-help was possible. Government had an obligation, in Gladstone's view, to ensure political stability and to protect property. Accordingly, he expressed no objection to Peel's Protection of Life Bill in 1846, the rejection of which resulted in the resignation of the Conservative ministry. Some two years later, he divided in favour of the Whigs' Crown and Government Security Bill, which sought to render the conviction of Young Ireland agitators more certain by reducing the penalty for treason, under specified circumstances, from capital punishment to transportation.[27] He endorsed the suspension of habeas corpus in Ireland a few months later, approving what he termed Russell's 'statesmanlike' speech on the

SEARCHING FOR POTATOES IN A STUBBLE FIELD.

A young girl and boy dig for potatoes; the fields have already been harvested so the children are gleaning any chance leftovers. (© Illustrated London News Ltd/Mary Evans)

introduction of the measure, and assessing the overwhelming parliamentary support for suspension as 'satisfactory'.[28] Though the Young Ireland rebellion of 1848 proved abortive, and no serious revolutionary threat succeeded it, Gladstone voted in favour of the continued suspension of habeas corpus the following year.[29] His record on Irish coercion during the famine was consistently supportive.

Gladstone's interest in inducing the Irish to help themselves, however, also assumed a more positive form. Many observers identified a dysfunctional agrarian social structure as a remote cause of the famine. Neither undercapitalised landlords nor rack-rented peasants had the requisite means for material or moral improvement. Under these circumstances, government intervention was justified, if only to facilitate the establishment of a reconstructed Irish society in which further state interference would prove unnecessary.[30] It was possible to derive multiple policy prescriptions from this analysis. Ulster Liberals and Irish nationalists endorsed the legal recognition of tenant right as the basis for social transformation, as did many British Radicals.[31] Despite his advocacy of Ulster custom some twenty years later, Gladstone evinced no interest in tenant right during the famine. He did not vote, for example, in the crucial division on William Sharman Crawford's failed bill of 1848, which proposed to provide compensation for improvements made to the land by outgoing tenants.[32]

A different approach, which received the approbation of a broad spectrum of British public opinion, traced its genealogy back to the Devon Commission Report, issued on the eve of the famine in 1845. The commissioners, appointed by the Peel ministry to inquire into the relations between Irish landlords and tenants in response to Daniel O'Connell's agitation for the repeal of the Act of Union, had studiously refrained from supporting the more advanced demands of the advocates for tenant right. But they had recommended a relaxation of the restrictions upon the sale of land, and they had expressed the hope that small allotments might be sold to resident farmers, in order to create a class of Irish yeoman.[33] During the famine, free trade in land and peasant proprietorship were favourably re-evaluated by prominent political economists and self-appointed Irish 'experts'. Proponents lauded small farms as not only economically efficient, but also as conducive to peasant morality, because landownership was believed to incentivise such virtues as work, discipline and prudence.[34] With the famine at its lethal zenith in 1847 and 1848, Gladstone read widely – though not, by his standards, voraciously – on the subject of peasant proprietorship, consulting works by George Poulett Scrope, William Thomas Thornton, Jonathan Pim and Aubrey de Vere, which recommended an expansion of small owner-occupied farms in Ireland.[35]

A group of enterprising Irish landlords, meanwhile, had organised a Farmers' Estate Society, in

order to purchase encumbered Irish estates, divide them into plots of twenty acres, and resell them to resident farmers for a modest profit. The object of this initiative, according to Lord Devon, who lent his assistance to the endeavour, was social and moral rather than financial. The experience of the famine, he believed, confirmed the findings of the Devon Commission Report, which had concluded that the extension of peasant proprietorship would increase the 'proportion of the population … interested in the preservation of peace and good order; and the prospect of gaining admission into this class of small landowners would often stimulate the renting farmer to increased exertion and persevering industry'.[36] To capitalise the venture and render it a going concern, the society required parliamentary permission to incorporate, and in the summer of 1848 its projectors applied for an act to do so. After receiving its first reading, the Farmers' Estate Society Bill was referred to a select committee, which Gladstone was appointed to chair. Although the committee altered some of the bill's details – most notably by increasing the minimum prospective size of an allotment from twenty to thirty acres – Gladstone was favourably impressed by the measure, recommending the recommittal of the bill to the whole house 'on account of the important considerations of public policy' that it involved.[37] He personally introduced the bill on its second reading, approvingly explaining that its object was 'to create a body of independent yeomanry in Ireland'.[38] The Farmers' Estate Society Act passed with little adverse comment though, as one leading Irish Tory predicted, it proved inoperative.[39]

Inoperative, but not, in the longer term, insignificant. For if Gladstone's providential interpretation of the Great Irish Famine was relatively conventional, and if his policy preferences were inadequate to relieve suffering and starvation, his endorsement of peasant proprietorship in Ireland was fraught with consequence for the future. When Gladstone informed John Bright, during their preliminary discussions of his first Irish Land Bill some twenty years later, that 'a native and a small proprietary … would be attended with great social and political advantages, and would be a very Conservative measure', he was not merely attempting to placate an occasionally obstreperous colleague with kind words.[40] On the contrary, though the elimination of the landlords as a class was never Gladstone's preferred method of resolving the problem of social order in Ireland, and financial considerations ensured his aversion to extensive schemes of state-sponsored land purchase in the absence of home rule, the encouragement of owner-occupied farms was a persistent feature of his mature Irish legislation, from the purchase clauses of his Disestablishment Act of 1869 through the abortive Land Bill of 1886.[41] Gladstone's later policy initiatives were, of course, powerfully conditioned by the exigencies of the moment, but he was receptive to programmes of land purchase from the famine to the end of his career. Given that Gladstone's move in the direction of peasant proprietorship encouraged the more ambitious and successful land purchase bills of his Conservative and Unionist opponents,[42] culminating in the Wyndham Land Act of 1903, it is perhaps not too bold to suggest, by way of conclusion, that the social revolution of twentieth-century Ireland had its origins in the social catastrophe of the nineteenth century.

If Gladstone's providential interpretation of the Great Irish Famine was relatively conventional, and if his policy preferences were inadequate to relieve suffering and starvation, his endorsement of peasant proprietorship in Ireland was fraught with consequence for the future.

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12 'The Public Fast', 23 Mar. 1847, 'The Gospel for the day of solemn & public humiliation', 24 Mar. 1847 (ibid., ff. 189–92, 193–97).
13 Gray, *Famine*, pp. 231–35, 337–38.
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LETTERS

Party agents

David Steel's story (in *Journal of Liberal History* 80, autumn 2013) about Jo Grimond asking a Lerwick solicitor, Mr Goodlad, to be his agent in 1945 and receiving his assent before he asked of Jo's party, no doubt raised a chuckle. But was it more normal than we might suppose?

I raise the question because my solicitor grandfather, F. A. Cloke, was in the 1920s variously clerk to the Eastry District Council and to its Poor Law Union, plus secretary of the East Kent Joint Town Planning Committee – as well as agent for the Conservative MP for Dover.

He was, I believe, a Conservative in his politics – though his oldest daughter, a flapper voter in 1929, stuck up a Liberal poster in her bedroom window facing a main street in Sandwich. But I have understood that, as a solicitor, he performed an essentially legal and clerical role for the MP rather than a political one, and so could combine it with his non-political roles in local government.

Does any reader know whether this is correct? If so, maybe Mr Goodlad was behaving professionally rather than whimsically.

Michael Steed

Jo Grimond

I very much enjoyed reading the various articles about Jo Grimond in the Autumn 2013 edition (*Journal of Liberal History* 80). I twice chaired meetings with audiences of over a hundred in North East Fife in support of Menzies Campbell when Jo was guest speaker. One of my best memories was at a packed meeting in the Corn Exchange in Cupar, when Jo talked at length and in detail for over 45 minutes. He had one scrap of paper with his notes containing three words: 'farming, fishing, forestry'.

Your readers may be interested to know that, in addition to David Steel's Grimond memorial lecture, a second such lecture has been held in Jo's birthplace, St Andrews in North East Fife, organised by Lord Steel's brother, Professor Michael Steel. Jo wrote a short, attractive book about his birthplace: *The St Andrews of Jo Grimond*.

The well-attended lecture, on 15 November 2013, was jointly hosted by the University of St Andrews and North East and Central Fife Liberal Democrats, with financial support from the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, of which Jo was a director for many years. The lecture was delivered by Dr Ian Bradley, the Principal of St Mary's College, the Divinity College, in St Andrews University, and chaired by the Chancellor of the University, local MP Sir Menzies Campbell (see photo, right). Six members of the Grimond family were present as invited guests.

Dr Bradley knew Jo well, particularly in the period before he changed careers from journalism to the academic life. Dr Bradley wrote the entry about Jo Grimond in the *Dictionary of National Biography* and also the obituary which appeared in *The Times,* along with many articles about Jo and interviews with him..

Dr Bradley was attracted to the Liberal Party, like so many of my generation, by Jo and indeed was himself a Liberal candidate in the two general elections of 1974. He is currently an active supporter of the 'Better Together' campaign seeking a 'No' vote in the September 2014 referendum on Scottish Independence.

Derek Barrie

Jesse Collings (1)

With reference to David Boyle's interesting article on Jesse Collings (*Journal of Liberal History* 80), may I add some other facts about Collings' political career and its more general impact?

As an associate of Joseph Chamberlain, having been Mayor of Birmingham in 1878–79, he was originally elected as a Liberal in the two-member constituency of Ipswich in 1880. He did indeed move the successful amendment (carried by 331 votes to 252) to the Conservatives' Address in Reply to the Queen's Speech on 25 January 1886 which resulted in the resignation of the minority Conservative government on 29 January and the formation of Gladstone's third Liberal administration.

However, although Collings' amendment was of an agrarian nature, the division on 25 January was in reality a precursor of the Liberal split on Irish Home Rule a few months later. Seventeen Liberals and one Independent Liberal, including two former Liberal Cabinet Ministers (George Goschen and the Marquis of Hartington) and Sir Henry James (a former Liberal Attorney-General) voted with the Conservatives. Some seventy other Liberal MPs, including two other former Liberal Cabinet Ministers (John Bright and C.P Villiers), were absent or abstained.

Although Collings accepted office in the new Liberal administration as Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Government Board, he resigned when Joseph Chamberlain and George Otto Trevelyan left the Cabinet in opposition to Irish Home Rule. However,

Grimond lecture, St Andrews, 15 November 2013 – Professor Louise Richardson (Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of St Andrews), Dr Ian Bradley and Sir Menzies Campbell

along with the other Liberal MP for Ipswich re-elected at the 1885 general election, he was then unseated on petition. At the resulting by-election on 14 April two Conservatives were elected. Thus Collings did indeed follow Chamberlain into Liberal Unionism, and was elected as a Liberal Unionist at the July 1886 general election, for Birmingham Bordesley, which he continued to represent until 1918. He supported Chamberlain's tariff reform/protectionist initiative from 1903 onwards.

Although out of Parliament during the debates on the Government of Ireland Bill, Collings may have indeed been 'outraged that so much urgent radical legislation was being postponed' for the Irish Bill during Gladstone's tenure as Prime Minister from February 1886 until the defeat of the Second Reading of the Bill on 8 June. However, before Trevelyan's resignation as Secretary for Scotland, he had moved the Second Reading of the Crofters' Holdings (Scotland) Bill in the Commons on 25 February. The Bill was then re-introduced in the Lords by his successor as Secretary for Scotland, the 13th (Scottish) Earl of Dalhousie, with the Second Reading therein on 20 May. The Bill was soon enacted with the new Crofting Commissioners being sworn in at the Court of Session in Edinburgh on 20 July.

The 1886 Act gave crofters the right to a fair rent, the right not to be evicted if they paid their rent and, on giving up their tenure, the right to compensation for any improvements they had made. Such backing for the crofting community was thereafter of much significance for Liberal support in the Highlands and Islands. Given Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's commitment to land reform as from his 1868 election campaigns in Stirling Burghs, similar Bills followed from 1906 for the Scottish Lowlands, culminating in the passage of the Small Landholders (Scotland) Act in 1911.

Dr Sandy S. Waugh

Jesse Collings (2)

It's interesting that the article in September's journal on Jesse Collings (*Journal of Liberal History* 80) coincided with the opening of the fourth manifestation of Birmingham's Central Library. Many readers will be familiar with the demolition of the second, and the architectural controversy of the third, but the first building was actually destroyed in a fire.

Jesse Collings, who was Lord Mayor at the time, personally saved part of the valuable and valued Shakespeare collection, apparently at some risk to himself. This risk may have been increased by his enormous side whiskers!

Roger Jenking

James Bryce and secondary education

The fine tribute to James Bryce (*Journal of Liberal History* 80) omitted reference to his important contribution to discussions of education policy when he was Chairman of the Liberal Government's Commission on Secondary Education, 1894–95.

The Bryce report made timely proposals. Unfortunately for the UK, they were largely ignored during the ten years of Conservative rule which followed in 1895–1905 – in particular by the 1902 Conservative Education Act and 1904 Regulations. It was the latter legislation which effectively created an inflexible basis for British secondary education for much of the twentieth century, thus impairing the development needed to make maximum use of native talents in combating growing international competition.

The Bryce report had argued that the previous classifications of schools in terms of leaving age and gradations of society were no longer appropriate in a rapidly developing society. At a time when most children were leaving school at 12 to 14 years of age or earlier, it proposed that all children should remain at school until at least 15 or 16 years of age, with many continuing to 17 or 18 years.

The Bryce report argued that this dramatic leaving age extension was essential in order to achieve a significant improvement of the curriculum, particularly to cover technical and scientific subjects. It was felt that the country's progress would be severely restricted if the nineteenth-century growth of special and technical studies in schools did not continue. How right they proved to be!

Equally significant was the Bryce commission's prescience in its conclusions for a working definition of general education. The report argued that a redefinition had become urgent although difficult. It noted that many witnesses had testified to the growing danger of too early specialisation in education, a tendency which had been intensified by the use of scholarships, i.e. selection by examination.

Bryce did not have all the answers, but some of us might argue that after more than a century, Britain still suffers from being too slow to understand or accept key recommendations of his 1895 report.

Brian Cane

THE MYTH OF 'N

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN

The concept of 'New Liberalism' has played an important part in historical debate about the political health of the Liberal Party before the First World War and the inevitability or otherwise of its subsequent decline. **Iain Sharpe** argues that in reality it is hard to detect any clear transition from Old to New Liberalism. The Liberals continued to base their appeal on being a moderate, patriotic and pragmatic party of the political centre, capable of governing effectively and responding sympathetically to social problems, but avoiding class rhetoric.

EW LIBERALISM'
LIBERAL POLITICS 1889–1914

The focus on the contribution of New Liberalism to the success of the Liberal Party is particularly a result of the seminal works by Peter Clarke and Michael Freeden.[1] Clarke's argument that, by adopting 'New Liberalism', the party had by 1914 adapted itself to class-based politics and was in a strong position to repel any challenge from the Labour Party, remains controversial. Nonetheless, references to New Liberalism as an organising principle of the welfare and social reforms of the Asquith government have become commonplace in the work of historians discussing this period.[2]

The impression conveyed can be that New Liberalism was an identified and recognisable intellectual and political movement that was responsible for repositioning the Liberal Party away from 'Manchester School' economics, individualism and constitutional reform towards giving priority to social and welfare measures. This article questions such an understanding of the pre-First World War Liberal Party and the extent to which it embraced a new approach to politics. It highlights the paucity of contemporary references to New Liberalism in party propaganda, political speeches and press reporting of the party's campaigns, and argues that the concept was not really part of the contemporary political language of Liberalism. It suggests that the continuities within Liberal politics are more striking than any 'New Liberal' departure.

At first sight this may seem tangential to the reasons for the decline of the Liberal Party and the rise of Labour. However, it tells us something about the party's political outlook and appeal to the electorate. While the Asquith government introduced significant welfare reforms, such as old age pensions, national insurance and greater employment rights, the Liberal Party never became defined by its commitment to such causes, nor did it abandon the identification with political reform that had been an essential element of Liberal politics through much of the nineteenth century. Liberal leaders saw social and welfare questions as deserving to be addressed, and treated them with a mixture of principle and pragmatism: a combination of genuine belief and a perceived need to compete with the Unionists. However, social reform was a secondary component of the party's political mission, not its raison d'être. This was a source of strength as long as the Liberal Party remained in a position to compete for power, but it left the party in a weak position to combat Labour if social reform and welfare politics became dominating issues.

The meanings of 'New Liberalism'

A stereotypical outline of Liberal attitudes towards state action on social reform might see the party as having been dominated for much of the late nineteenth century by a commitment to laissez-faire 'Manchester School' economics and a belief in individual responsibility, its chief causes being, as one historian has put it: 'free trade, sound finance, religious toleration and a pacific foreign policy'.[3] However, Jonathan Parry has questioned how far such attitudes really did dominate Victorian Liberalism, highlighting the importance Liberals placed on the moral improvement of society and the state's role in promoting this. He describes the legislation of Gladstone's first administration in the fields of education, public health and other matters as 'part of a general burst of activity for social and moral improvement against vice, crime, ignorance and pauperism'.[4] Parry concludes by arguing that:

> Increasing interest in communal social action prefigured the so-called New Liberalism of the twentieth century, which only appears as a sharp break from nineteenth-century practice if nineteenth-century practice is misconceived as dominated by principles of laissez-faire rather than constitutional inclusiveness.[5]

Parry's argument suggests a need to rethink not only the nature of Victorian Liberalism, but also how far Liberals in the Edwardian period saw themselves as engaged in a significant departure from the work of their predecessors.

The first use of the term 'New Liberalism' in the context of social reform has been identified in an

Architects of the New Liberalism? – David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill as Liberal ministers

article by the radical Liberal MP L. A. Atherley-Jones in the August 1889 edition of *Nineteenth Century* magazine.[6] Atherley-Jones argued that 'The battle of the middle class has been fought and won' and that 'the reforms of the future menace, or appear to menace the interests of the middle class'. He concluded that the Liberal Party should embrace a 'new Liberalism' that addressed itself specifically to the material needs of the working classes. However, Atherley-Jones' argument was not quite the ideological shift or articulation of a new political strategy that it might at first sight seem. The bulk of his article is concerned with questioning (with good reason, as things turned out) whether Irish home rule would prove an electorally successful cause for the party. His discussion of the social questions that he believed the Liberals should embrace appears almost an afterthought, taking up just two paragraphs. In addition, his argument that social reform would not only achieve 'a wider diffusion of physical comfort' but also a 'loftier standard of national morality', was very much an echo of the mid-nineteenth century Liberal moralism that Parry describes.

The article provoked two immediate responses in *Nineteenth Century*. The first was from former Liberal MP, G. W. E. Russell, who endorsed Atherley-Jones' arguments about social reform and saw hopeful signs in the programme of the Progressive group on the newly established London County Council, of which he was a member. His article included a thinly veiled appeal to Lord Rosebery to lead the Liberal Party in the direction of social reform.[7] The second was from the Nonconformist divine. J. Guinness Rogers, who argued the orthodox Gladstonian case that the Liberals needed to retain middle-class support and to deal with the Irish question before they could successfully tackle other reforms.[8]

However, there the debate about 'New Liberalism' ended for the time being. The expression does not appear to have become widely used in the sense that Atherley-Jones coined it. Indeed, one of the curiosities of studying the career of New Liberalism before the First World War is the paucity of references to the phrase in contemporary writing. It was also not necessarily used in the context of social reform. James Douglas Holms' article in the *Westminster Review* of July 1890 asking 'Is there a new Liberalism?' was a reaction to Joseph Chamberlain's use of the term to describe the post-1886, home-rule-supporting Liberal Party, which he considered 'cannot claim the inheritance of the great party from whose principles they have so widely departed'.[9] The purpose of Holms' article was to rebut the suggestion that support for Irish home rule represented a 'new Liberal' departure from the party's traditional principles. Over subsequent years, the phrase occurs in similar contexts as a term of disparagement for the Gladstonian, home-rule-supporting Liberal Party. For example, the Unionist Duke of Argyll denounced Gladstonian sympathy for Scottish disestablishment as 'new Liberalism', while *The Times* criticised the Liberal minister Earl Spencer's support for the Liberal government's Evicted Tenants Bill, as 'an illustration of the depths to which the new Liberalism may bring a politician who was once a respectable Whig'.[10]

The expression did occur occasionally in the context of social reform. For example, Liberal MPs R. B. Haldane and R. Wallace put forward alternative views on the subject in the first edition of the *Progressive Review* in 1896. Their exchange, however, illustrates once again that this was a more nuanced debate than it might at first sight appear. In describing New Liberals as 'those who esteem a progressive policy in social matters more highly than anything else at present in Liberalism', Haldane was trying to move the party away from the faddism of the 1891 Newcastle programme, which he believed had burdened it with a set of unachievable and electorally unpopular policy commitments. By contrast Wallace pointed out that legislation had been passed over many decades on issues from education to factory hours to municipal reform and that 'the "New" Liberalism is not new. It is simply a continuation of what had been well begun before. A continuation is not a novelty.' Wallace criticised the '*de haut en bas* attitude' of Haldane's version of New Liberalism, arguing that the party must stand for democratic as well as social reform.[11] Similarly, in 1898 there was a discussion in the *Daily News'* correspondence columns about whether 'New' and 'Old' Liberalism were compatible, with the newspaper's editorial concluding, in conciliatory manner:

> Liberalism, whether 'old' or 'new', 'individualist' or 'collectivist' aims at substituting for class interests and class privileges the social good of the whole community.[12]

In general, however, throughout this period, debate about New Liberalism in terms of the emphasis on social and welfare issues is rare.[13] Even Michael Freeden's bibliography in his study *The New Liberalism: an ideology of social reform* only identifies eight articles and one book published before 1914 that incorporate the phrase in their title.[14]

One of the curiosities of studying the career of New Liberalism before the First World War is the paucity of references to the phrase in contemporary writing.

Liberal continuities

In practice, well before the post-1909 New Liberal heyday, Liberal leaders were neither strongly attached to individualism nor resistant to demands for social reform. Although the 1892–1895 Liberal government lacked an outright majority and spent much time on doomed attempts to legislate for Irish Home Rule, temperance and Welsh disestablishment, it could point to some achievements in terms of wealth redistribution and social reforming legislation. This included Harcourt's 1894 budget, which provided for graduated income tax, the Railway Servants Act (1893), the Factories and Workshops Act (1895) and the Local Government Act (1894) which not only created parish councils but gave them compulsory purchase powers to enable them to create smallholdings. There were also constructive administrative measures, such as Asquith's strengthening the factory inspectorate and Mundella creating a separate Labour department at the Board of Trade. The government also unsuccessfully attempted to legislate for employers' liability to compensate workmen injured in industrial accidents. Liberals were adapting themselves to evolving political circumstances without identifying this as a change

of political direction. At the 1895 general election, while social and welfare issues other than temperance were only a secondary feature of Liberal candidates' election addresses, nonetheless half of them mentioned the need for employers' liability legislation and just under a third referred to old age pensions.[15] Such issues were not in the forefront of the Liberal Party's appeal to the electorate, but enough candidates mentioned them to suggest they were hardly heterodox.

Likewise, the rhetoric of Liberal leaders embraced social reforming goals, albeit in ambiguous language that avoided committing the party to specific measures. In his first major speech after the Liberals' 1895 general election defeat, the party leader, Lord Rosebery, told an audience at Scarborough that while the Liberals had previously emphasised enfranchisement and removal of constitutional disabilities, this 'noble, though negative period has passed away and we are face to face with an era of constructive legislation'.[16] Such sentiments were common in the speeches of other leading Liberal politicians. Asquith told an audience at Morley, shortly after Rosebery's speech, that although he believed the state should not interfere in matters that could be best settled by individual or voluntary effort,

> … he did hold most strongly that, where there were social wants that only the community could meet, then the community – by which, after all, he meant merely the concerted and organised action of individuals, with a right of recourse, if need be, to compulsion – had … not only a title but a duty to interfere.[17]

He cited the problems of 'undrained towns', 'insanitary and overcrowed factories', child labour, terms and conditions of employment, and the need for provision of a pure water supply, lighting, baths, libraries and open space, as matters that the state should address.

At successive annual meetings of the National Liberal Federation (NLF), the main democratic body for the party's grassroots, speeches by leading Liberals often preached the need for more state action to tackle social problems. Herbert Samuel, at this time secretary of the Home Counties Liberal Federation, told the NLF annual meeting in 1896 that 'the main purpose and object of Liberalism in this day [is] to carry out such wise legislative proposals as would enable the powers of the State to be used to improve the condition of the masses of the population', a statement which met with approval from the assembled delegates.[18] Although Rosebery's successor as party leader, Sir William Harcourt, was temperamentally inclined to pure opposition rather than positive policy ideas (other than on his own pet cause of temperance reform), he criticised the Unionist government on the basis that its social legislation benefited the rich not the poor.[19] Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in his first address to an NLF conference as party leader in March 1899, attacked the government for failing to introduce old age pensions after making them a key part of the 1895 general election campaign, and specifically supported the principle of help for the 'elderly poor'. He urged this as one of three key social questions that the state needed to address, along with 'housing of the very poor' and temperance reform.[20]

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In his election address to his constituents at the 1900 general election, which was inevitably dominated by discussion of the war in South Africa, Campbell-Bannerman reiterated his support for government action on these three social questions, attacking the Unionists for having spent public funds on the war that could have been devoted to social reform.[21] Such sentiments were echoed, rather surprisingly, by Harcourt, campaigning in his West Monmouthshire constituency. He argued for the need to improve workers' health through regulation and shortening working hours. However, he warned that 'Social reforms for the good of the people cannot be carried out without large funds, and the resources available … have already been mortgaged' [by the costs of the war].[22] Asquith, who was arguably the second most senior member of the Liberal front bench after Campbell-Bannerman, also took the Unionists to task for having evaded 'their social and political duties' and promised that a Liberal government would tackle such problems as 'intemperance, overcrowding, industrial risks of danger, the relations of labour and capital', along with education and land reform.[23] The official manifesto of the NLF mentioned the need for land, housing and temperance reforms.[24] Leaflets issued by the Liberal Publication Department strongly attacked the Unionist government's failure to legislate on social questions, particularly old age pensions. These stopped short of pledging the Liberal Party to specific measures, but they were implicitly supportive of social legislation.[25] Yet they did not refer to this as a new form of Liberalism.

Such references formed at most a minor part in the Liberals' electoral appeal. They put forward no specific legislative programme of social reform. Indeed there was a strong sense shared by leading frontbenchers that detailed programmes were an electoral liability rather than an asset. In particular, they felt that NLF's Newcastle programme, agreed in 1891 and endorsed by William Gladstone as party leader, had been a double disadvantage to the party by provoking the hostility of those opposed to any single measure in the programme, while disappointing party supporters when the government failed to achieve its proposed reforms.[26]

'Piecing together Gladstonian rags'?

By 1900, therefore, the Liberals could hardly be regarded as a party wedded to individualism. Of course, there were some frontbenchers, such as John Morley and the Liberal imperialist H. H. Fowler, who were less than sympathetic to the emerging social reform agenda. Indeed Morley had lost his seat at Newcastle in 1895 over his opposition to miners' eight-hour legislation.[27] There was a tendency for those who were impatient for social reform to see the Liberals as stuck in such a Gladstonian rut. Sidney Webb's famous 1901 article in *Nineteenth Century*, 'Lord Rosebery's escape from Houndsditch' portrayed the party in this light, claiming that:

> With amused dismay the new generation of Progressives have lately witnessed Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman piecing

> together the Gladstonian rags and remnants, with Sir William Harcourt holding the scissors, and Mr John Morley unctuously waxing the thread.[28]

Ironically, given the former prime minister's later hostility to much of the 1906–1915 Liberal government's welfare agenda, Webb regarded Rosebery as the one person who could lead the Liberal Party from a laissez-faire past to a collectivist future.

The future Cabinet member and party leader Herbert Samuel, in his book *Liberalism*, published in 1902, emphasised the need for the party to embrace a more active role for the state.[29] Such sentiments were also articulated by another future Cabinet minister, C. F. G. Masterman, who stood for parliament for the first time in 1903. Masterman's widow later wrote of this period that: 'in internal politics *laissez-faire* had both parties in its grip', something she portrayed Masterman as seeking to change.[30] Had this genuinely been the case, the Liberal Party would have been unlikely to promote the candidature of someone like Masterman who was passionate about state action to ameliorate the condition of the poor. In reality, although Masterman was a sensitive and difficult character, the chief whip Herbert Gladstone recognised his abilities and went to great lengths to arrange his candidature in the winnable seat of West Ham North, for which he was elected in 1906.[31] In December 1904 Gladstone visited the constituency to speak for Masterman and was confronted by a deputation of unemployed men demanding to know what a Liberal government would do to enable them to find work. There was much heckling on the subject during the meeting. Gladstone responded by writing and circulating a memorandum to members of the Liberal front bench setting out proposals for providing relief to the unemployed. He argued that: 'There are great works which can be started by the Govt which cannot be considered by individuals & companies, but which in time would repay their cost'. This included: 'reclamations on the coast & inland, harbours, docks, waterways, afforestments'. He entered the caveat that such work should not compete with other industries, although wages should be fair and 'not demoralisingly low'.[32] This produced a mixed response from his front-bench colleagues. Asquith, Bryce and Lord Spencer agreed that Gladstone's proposals had merit. Jack Sinclair, H. H. Fowler and Morley were less sympathetic.[33] However, Campbell-Bannerman was clearly convinced: he devoted part of his next major speech, at Limehouse, to advocating measures along the lines set out by Gladstone.[34]

The need to compete with the Unionists was indeed a further reason for supporting social and welfare legislation.

Both José Harris and H. W. Emy have highlighted this as an episode that showed the Liberals' lukewarm attitude towards welfare reform, the former arguing, for example, that this 'did not really signify a redirection of Liberal unemployment policy'.[35] There is some truth in this, and as Harris points out, Campbell-Bannerman's speech was partly a response to Joseph Chamberlain's comments about tariff reform and unemployment in a speech the previous week, also at Limehouse. The Liberals did not make unemployment a significant campaigning theme through 1905. They supported the Unionist government's Unemployed Workmen Bill, which provided for some outdoor relief for unemployed workers, without making any more far-reaching proposals of their own.[36] While the Liberal leadership was willing to support state action to tackle pressing social questions, this was primarily a tactical response to political events.

The need to compete with the Unionists was indeed a further reason for supporting social and welfare legislation. While Liberals were critical of the gap between Unionist promises and performance in office on issues such as old age pensions, the Unionists could claim some past successes such as free elementary education (1891), the Workmen's Compensation Act (1897) and various factory acts. More pressingly, Chamberlain's tariff reform campaign, launched in 1903, was aimed at winning the support of working-class voters through the promise of welfare reform and guaranteed employment. Herbert Gladstone recognised the need for the Liberal Party to counter this, pressing Campbell-Bannerman to put forward more constructive policies:

> … if everyone dives into fiscal statistics there will be a feeling that it is with the object of hiding nakedness … It is all right to knock Chamberlain out but that doesn't tell the country what a Liberal Govt. wd. do if & when it comes in.[37]

Gladstone was clear that the party would have to defend free trade on practical rather than ideological grounds, writing to one of his party officials: 'Interests and not theories are going to settle this business'.[38]

Protecting the poor

In his study of free trade, Anthony Howe has pointed out that Liberal opposition to tariff reform was not based on doctrinaire laissez-faire attitudes, but rather on a wide-ranging appeal that included; 'a theory of international trade, a doctrine of empire, a prescription for revenue and welfare, together with a concept of the Liberal democratic state'.[39] Similarly, Frank Trentmann points out how the defence of free trade used innovative campaigning techniques, with the loaf of bread as an emotive symbol of the practical importance of free trade to people's ordinary lives.[40] By contrast, other historians have seen the Liberal campaign in defence of free trade as essentially negative. David Dutton considers that in the approach to the 1906 general election 'Much of the Liberal campaign looked back to the nineteenth century, rather than forward into the twentieth.' G. R. Searle describes free trade as a setback for Liberal social reformers since it enabled the party to win without putting forward a social welfare programme.[41] However, the Liberal campaign, which stressed opposition to taxes on the food of the working classes, was compatible with support for constructive measures to help the poor and certainly not a display of doctrinaire laissez-faire economics. In a leaflet issued in 1904 the Liberal Publication Department sought to highlight the increased taxes paid by the poor under the Unionist government, which Liberals would seek to remedy through:

> A peaceful government
> An economical War Office
> A smaller national expenditure, and

> A reform of our system of taxation so that the burdens shall be lighter on the poor and heavier on those who are better able to bear them.[42]

Therefore, the Liberal government that assumed office in 1905 was sympathetic to social and welfare reform and the need to improve the condition of the poor, without having an agreed legislative programme to achieve such ends. Soon after becoming prime minister, Campbell-Bannerman received a deputation of the unemployed at Downing Street, and devoted a portion of his first major speech in office, at the Albert Hall on 21 December, to social reform proposals, including land reform, the creation of a Royal Commission on canals and waterways, the need for Poor Law reform and mitigating the 'evils of non-employment'. He claimed that such ideas were 'a reiteration of things which I have been saying up and down the country for the last three or four years'.[43] In the 1906 general election campaign more than two-thirds of Liberal candidates mentioned the need for Poor Law reform and old age pensions in their election addresses, although there were six other issues more frequently mentioned.[44] A similarly high proportion mentioned land reform. Just under half discussed the need for action to tackle unemployment, while just over a third referred to housing reform.

The Liberal government's attitude towards social reform was in line with the attitude the party had taken in opposition. It recognised that these were issues that it needed to tackle, although its flagship bills on education, licensing and plural voting were more traditional Liberal fare. While these were being blocked by the Unionist dominated House of Lords, the government brought in free school meals, increased trade union rights through the 1906 Trade Disputes Act, a Workmen's Compensation Act that increased the scope of the Unionists' 1897 Act, a Smallholdings Act and prison reform in 1907, the Children's Act and the Old Age Pensions Act in 1908. All this took place before the 1909 'People's Budget', which is often seen as initiating the era of 'New Liberal' legislation.

Problems with New Liberalism

This did not stop those who wished to push Liberalism in a more overtly collectivist direction from identifying a clear distinction between Liberalism before and after 1909. As the battle over the budget was in full swing, J. A. Hobson, one of the leading thinkers associated with 'New Liberalism', published his book *The Crisis of Liberalism*. Although he acknowledged that 'the Liberals of this country as a party never committed themselves either to the theory or the policy of this narrow laissez-faire individualism', he claimed that over the previous quarter century 'old laissez-faire individualism' had been 'too dominant' among Liberal leaders and that as a result the party had 'wandered in this valley of indecision'. Hobson was keen to stress the newness of 'New Liberalism'.[45] He saw the 1909 crisis as involving 'the substitution of an organic for an opportunist policy, the adoption of a vigorous, definite, positive policy of social reconstruction'. By this he seems to have meant that such measures should become fundamental to the Liberals' political mission, rather than a tactical response to events and external pressure.

However, even within key New Liberal texts, there is an ambivalence about how far the Liberal Party was heading in a new direction, reflected in a lack of references to the term 'New Liberalism'. In L. T. Hobhouse's classic work, *Liberalism*, the expression only occurs once, in a reference to John Stuart Mill.[46] Likewise, in the collection of Winston Churchill's speeches published in 1909 as *Liberalism and the Social Question*, at least half the text is devoted to matters other than social reform. The expression 'New Liberalism' is not mentioned in Churchill's text, although it is used twice by H. W. Massingham in his introduction to the volume.[47] The expression is equally absent from Charles Masterman's *The Condition of England* which, along with Churchill's book, is one of the texts most often cited as showing the engagement of active politicians with New Liberalism.[48]

Even for Hobson and Hobhouse, traditional Liberal concerns could conflict with their desire for social reform. They each combined support for degrees of collectivism with opposition to imperialism. The politician whom Hobhouse particularly venerated and hoped would assume the Liberal leadership was John Morley, who had opposed the South African war, but who was more hostile than other leading Liberals to social and welfare reform. Yet this does not seem to have tempered Hobhouse's admiration for him.[49] Equally, Hobson's hostility to jingoism led him to censure all Liberal imperialists who supported the South African war, even though some of them, such as Herbert Samuel and R. B. Haldane, were sympathetic to collectivism.[50] In other words, even Hobson's and Hobhouse's collectivist views were trumped by their support for a traditional, Gladstonian imperial policy.

Even for Hobson and Hobhouse, traditional Liberal concerns could conflict with their desire for social reform. They each combined support for degrees of collectivism with opposition to imperialism.

The Liberal leaders did not appear to recognise any change of direction after 1909, introducing welfare reforms but not putting these at the heart of the party's popular appeal. For example, although Asquith devoted substantial portions of his first NLF conference speech as prime minister to social questions, he did not suggest that this marked a new direction for the Liberal Party. He stated that 'the aims which for the last three years we have followed … continue to be the purposes and the inspiration of our policy'. Somewhat defensively he cited the Liberals' record of social legislation as evidence to rebut Unionist accusations that 'when the Liberal Party is in power it devotes all the time and energy of Parliament to tinkering with constitutional changes to the sacrifice … of social reform'. He claimed that the Liberals were enacting measures that the Unionists had merely talked about. In doing so he was arguing that the Liberals were a more effective vehicle their Unionist opponents for achieving social reform. This did not mean, however, that he was trying to cast social reform as the new dividing line between the parties.[51] Even Lloyd George, in his famous and inflammatory address at Limehouse in July 1909, justified the taxes proposed in the budget by the need for both greater spending on defence and old age pensions, but did not suggest that this was a new departure for the Liberal Party.[52]

In December 1909, when Asquith opened the Liberal Party's

general election campaign with a speech at the Albert Hall, he referred to social legislation as 'the greatest' of all outstanding questions facing the country and to old age pensions as 'the first chapter in a new volume of social legislation'. Yet this was relegated to a short section close to the end of his speech. Although old age pensions and social reform generally were the fourth and fifth most popular topics in Liberal candidates' election addresses in the January 1910 general election (behind the House of Lords, tariff reform/free trade, and the budget), no candidate ranked these issues first. The proportion of Liberal candidates mentioning them actually declined at the December 1910 general election.[53] Although Peter Clarke has described this as a period when 'the apostles of the new Liberalism were triumphant',[54] the continuities are more evident than the changes in Liberal campaigning themes.

When Asquith addressed a dinner in his honour in March 1912 to celebrate the passage of the Parliament Act, he described the Act as a 'means to other ends'. However, the 'ends' he cited were largely the unfinished 'old Liberal' business of Irish home rule, Welsh disestablishment and licensing. He referred to the government's social legislation in extravagant terms as an achievement that would 'be found in the long run the greatest boon ever conferred upon the working people of the country'. But this was a short section of a long speech that was largely devoted to explaining why the National Insurance Act was leading to government by-election defeats.[55] Even where Liberals did acknowledge new political directions, it was more in the context of changes in society rather than a conscious political strategy or philosophy. Addressing a meeting in Manchester in 1913, Haldane, the Lord Chancellor, said:

> The democracy are awake. Between the rich and the poor there was a great gap – a gap which is being more and more realised as education and enlightenment spread, and the justice of which is being challenged, and rightly challenged.[56]

Liberals were also keen to place their welfare legislation within a patriotic context. Party leaflets gave increased spending on defence and social reform as justifications for increased taxation, appealing to patriotic as much as class sentiment. Whereas Hobhouse and Hobson viewed social reform and imperialism as contrary impulses, Lloyd George was keen to argue for welfare reform as strengthening the Empire. For example, speaking at Aberdeen in November 1912, he told his audience:

> Now we have got a great Empire for the first time walking the hospitals, visiting the sick, inquiring how the infirm are getting on, helping them to mend, and curing and assisting them. It is a new dignity and glory added to the British Empire.[57]

The Liberal Publication Department produced more leaflets in 1910 on free trade and constitutional reform (mostly the power of the House of Lords) than on welfare, land or employment issues.[58] Similarly, the leaflets and pamphlets it issued between 1911 and 1914 reflected continuity of purpose rather than an attempt to rebrand the party as 'New Liberal'. The party was keen to win the centre ground and rebut charges that it had drifted to the left. Among the leaflets issued in 1911 was one entitled 'What the government has done for the middle classes'. Another defended the government against the charge of extravagance by pointing out that money has been needed for a strong navy, as well as old age pensions.[59] The leaflet 'What has Liberalism done for Labour?', which was updated and reprinted several times over the years, highlighted not just recent reforms since 1906, but went back as far as the 1833 Factory Act, and referred to the legislation of successive nineteenth-century Liberal governments on education reform, trade union reform and measures to limit working hours.[60] Rather than trying to suggest that the party had changed direction and adopted new objectives, party propagandists were seeking to emphasise a continuing tradition of Liberal measures to benefit working people.

The Liberals continued to try to straddle class divisions. For example, in May 1911 the *Liberal Magazine*, an official journal for party workers, quoted Keir Hardie as saying he 'feared the Liberals, with their social reform, much more than he did the Tories' and it added the comment: 'We can well believe it. For Social Reform as put into practice by the Liberal Party since 1906 is the true barrier against Socialism.'[61] On the question of land reform, which has been seen as the key to the continued success of Liberal social reform, the party was keen to mollify rather than antagonise farmers and landowners.[62] Similarly, a Liberal leaflet on the National Insurance Act sought to reassure doctors, whose professional body had opposed the Act, that they had nothing to fear from the measure.[63] In both official printed propaganda and platform rhetoric leaders, there is no indication of the Liberal Party trying to rebrand itself as a party whose core purpose was social and welfare reform – it had simply absorbed these issues into its agenda alongside more traditional concerns.

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Conclusion

In his classic work *Lancashire and the New Liberalism*, Peter Clarke concluded that the Liberal Party had made a crucial transition to a new form of politics, arguing that 'The Liberals were by 1910 the party of social reform, and it was upon this that electoral cleavages were based'. In his view, by the time of the January 1910 general election, 'the change to class politics was substantially complete'.[64] Clarke's view remains contentious, and there has been much debate about how far New Liberalism permeated the Liberal Party or was responsible for its electoral success.[65] Yet the assumption has become commonplace that New Liberalism was a significant element of pre-First-World-War Liberal Party's electoral appeal.

In reality it is hard to detect any clear transition from Old to New Liberalism. The Liberals continued to base their appeal on being a moderate, patriotic and pragmatic party of the political centre, capable of governing effectively and responding sympathetically to social problems, but avoiding class rhetoric. The term 'New Liberalism' itself appears to have been at best marginal to political debate. If anything, it was a construct of

intellectuals such as Hobson and Hobhouse, who were not in the front line of party politics, rather than part of the language of Liberal politicians. There was certainly no attempt by the Liberal Party to rebrand or reposition itself as New Liberal or as a party primarily committed to social and welfare legislation. Such issues were absorbed by the Liberal Party as it reacted to changing political circumstances and sought to compete with the Unionists as the most effective vehicle for improving the condition of the working classes. In offering this conclusion, it is important to state that this study is limited and tentative. There is much scope for further exploration of party rhetoric, propaganda and internal debates to shed further light on how Liberals, from party leaders to local activists, saw the evolution of party ideology and how far this involved a 'New Liberalism'.

The suggestion that the Liberal Party had not become 'New' by 1914 does not mean that it was poorly prepared for the political future or that it could not have enjoyed continuing electoral success. As Ian Packer has argued,

> The 'old' Liberalism was far from dead or irrelevant in 1905–15. When the Liberal government finally ended in May 1915 … it was not because its ideology had been unable to withstand the challenges of early twentieth-century politics.[66]

E. H. H Green has suggested that the Conservatives were in greater danger than the Liberals before the outbreak of the First World War, pointing out that to a great extent 'the Liberal governments' innovative but careful and wide-ranging policy priorities satisfied the bulk of their own and their allies' supporters'.[67] The Liberal Party had constructed a coalition of support, encompassing Labour, Irish Nationalists and its own traditional voters that was sufficient to keep it in power, provided that no external factor disrupted the political system. But of course the outbreak of war provided just such a disruption. After the First World War, a divided Liberal Party found itself in competition with a collectivist and overtly class-based Labour Party. Once overtaken by Labour, the Liberal Party could no longer claim to be the most effective vehicle for social and welfare reform. Instead it retreated into a rhetoric of 'retrenchment' and 'economy'.[68] Whether or not, in Winston Churchill's expression, war was fatal to Liberalism, certainly the Liberal Party was not prepared for the kind of politics that the war brought about, based on new dividing lines between political parties, defined by social class and collectivism.

Whether or not, in Winston Churchill's expression, war was fatal to Liberalism, certainly the Liberal Party was not prepared for the kind of politics that the war brought about, based on new dividing lines between political parties, defined by social class and collectivism.

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Iain Sharpe completed a University of London PhD thesis in 2011 on 'Herbert Gladstone and Liberal Party Revival 1899–1905'. He is a Liberal Democrat councillor in Watford.

1 P. F. Clarke, *Lancashire and the New Liberalism* (London, 1971); *Liberals and Social Democrats* (Cambridge, 1978); Michael Freeden, *The New Liberalism: An ideology of social reform* (Oxford, 1978).
2 For example, see Stephen Koss, *Asquith* (London, 1976), Chapter 5, 'From the Old Liberalism to the New'; Martin Pugh, *The Making of Modern British Politics 1867–1945* (Oxford, 2002), originally published 1982, pp. 107–15; Alan Sykes, *The Rise and Fall of British Liberalism 1776–1988* (Harlow, 1997) pp. 173–175; G. R. Searle, *A New England? Peace and War, 1886–1918* (Oxford, 2004) pp. 212–13, 394–95; David Dutton, *A History of the Liberal Party* (Basingstoke, 2004, pp.12–13).
3 Dutton, *Liberal Party*, p. 6.
4 Jonathan Parry, *The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and Europe, 1830–1886* (Cambridge, 2006) p. 109.
5 Ibid. p. 396.
6 Duncan Brack, 'New Liberalism', in Duncan Brack and Ed Randall (eds.), *Dictionary of Liberal Thought* (London, 2007) pp. 300–04; L. A. Atherley-Jones, 'The New Liberalism', *Nineteenth Century*, vol. 26, no. 150, Aug. 1889, pp. 186–93.
7 George W. E. Russell, 'The New Liberalism: a response', *Nineteenth Century*, vol. 26, no. 151, Sept. 1889, p. 492. On Rosebery: 'I do not see a heaven-born leader for the movement; but sometimes, Radical as I am, I fancy that he may be found in the House of Lords.' Rosebery was also the founding chairman of the London County Council.
8 J. Guinness Rogers, 'The Middle Class and the New Liberalism', *Nineteenth Century*, vol. 26, no. 152, Oct. 1889, pp. 710–20.
9 James Douglas Holms, 'Is there "A New Liberalism?"', *Westminster Review*, vol. 134, no. 1, July 1890, pp. 134–47; Joseph Chamberlain speaking at the opening of a Liberal Unionist Club in Birmingham, reported in *The Times*, 11 Apr. 1890.
10 *The Times*, 31 Aug. 1893 (Argyll letter), and 14 Aug. 1894 (editorial on Spencer).
11 R. B. Haldane, 'The New Liberalism', and R. Wallace 'The New Liberalism', *Progressive Review*, vol. 1, 1896, pp. 133–37.
12 *Daily News*, 10, 11, 13 Jan. 1898.
13 An electronic search of the Manchester Guardian archive at http://archive.guardian.co.uk/ reveals sixty-five references to 'New Liberalism' during this period, while a similar exercise on *The Times* digital archive at http://0-infotrac.galegroup.com.catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk/ revealed just fifty-one for the same period. While allowance has to be made for fallibilities in the search engines and variations in wording, mentions of 'New Liberalism' are relatively few and far between given the importance that has been attributed to it. Both accessed 31 Mar. 2011.
14 Freeden, *New Liberalism*, pp. 261–79. Those not cited elsewhere in this article are: E. T. Cook, 'Ruskin and the New Liberalism', *New Liberal Review*, no. 1, 1901, pp. 18–25; H. Crossfield, 'The Ethical Movement and the New Liberalism', *South Place Magazine*, no. 7, 1902, pp. 181–85. The only book published during the period that incorporated the phrase was David Lloyd George, *The New Liberalism: Speeches* (London, 1909).
15 Paul A. Readman, 'The 1895 General Election and Political Change in Late Victorian Britain', *Historical Journal*, vol. 42, no. 2, June 1999, pp. 467–93.
16 Speech at Scarborough Liberal Club, *The Times*, 19 Oct. 1895.
17 *The Times*, 17 Oct. 1895.
18 NLF meeting at Huddersfield, *Leeds Mercury*, 28 Mar. 1896.
19 Harcourt's speech to NLF conference at Norwich, *Daily News*, 18 Mar. 1897.
20 Speech to NLF conference at Hull,

The Times, 9 Mar. 1899.
21 *Glasgow Herald*, 22 Sept. 1900.
22 *Daily News*, 22 Sept. 1900.
23 *The Times*, 29 Sept. 1900.
24 *Leeds Mercury*, 26 Sept. 1900.
25 Liberal Publication Department (LPD), *Pamphlets and leaflets 1900* (London, 1901). For example: leaflet nos. 1824 on child labour; 1825 on old age pensions, 1827 on Liberal support for extending the Unionist government's 1897 Workmen's Compensation Act to include seamen, and 1832, showing a cartoon of Lord Salisbury writing 'Nonsense' over a poster of Chamberlain's social programme.
26 See the speeches of Lord Rosebery and Herbert Gladstone at the 1896 NLF conference, *Leeds Mercury*, 27 and 28 Mar. 1896. For Liberal dissatisfaction with programme politics see D. A. Hamer, *Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery* (Oxford, 1972), pp. 211–13, 257–59, 280–81.
27 For Morley's views on welfare reform, see D. A. Hamer, *John Morley: Liberal intellectual in politics* (Oxford, 1968), pp. 353–55.
28 Sidney Webb, 'Lord Rosebery's Escape from Houndsditch', *Nineteenth Century and After*, vol. 50, no. 295, Sept. 1901, pp. 366–86.
29 Herbert Samuel, *Liberalism: An attempt to state the principles and proposals of contemporary Liberalism in England* (London, 1902), pp. 20–21.
30 Lucy Masterman, *C. F. G. Masterman* (London, 1939) p. 47.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other information — or if you know anyone who can — please pass on details to them. Details of other research projects in progress should be sent to the Editor (see page 3) for inclusion here.

Letters of Richard Cobden (1804–65)

Knowledge of the whereabouts of any letters written by Cobden in private hands, autograph collections, and obscure locations in the UK and abroad for a complete edition of his letters. (For further details of the Cobden Letters Project, please see www.uea.ac.uk/his/research/cobdenproject). *Dr Anthony Howe, School of History, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ; a.c.howe@uea.ac.uk.*

Dadabhai Naoroji

Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917) was an Indian nationalist and Liberal member for Central Finsbury, 1892–95 – the first Asian to be elected to the House of Commons. This research for a PhD at Harvard aims to produce both a biography of Naoroji and a volume of his selected correspondence, to be published by OUP India in 2013. The current phase concentrates on Naoroji's links with a range of British progressive organisations and individuals, particularly in his later career. Suggestions for archival sources very welcome. *Dinyar Patel; dinyar.patel@gmail.com or 07775 753 724.*

The political career of Edward Strutt, 1st Baron Belper

Strutt was Whig/Liberal MP for Derby (1830-49), later Arundel and Nottingham; in 1856 he was created Lord Belper and built Kingston Hall (1842-46) in the village of Kingston-on-Soar, Notts. He was a friend of Jeremy Bentham and a supporter of free trade and reform, and held government office as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Commissioner of Railways. Any information, location of papers or references welcome. *Brian Smith; brian63@inbox.com.*

The emergence of the 'public service ethos'

Aims to analyse how self-interest and patronage was challenged by the advent of impartial inspectorates, public servants and local authorities in provincial Britain in the mid 19th century. Much work has been done on the emergence of a 'liberal culture' in the central civil service in Whitehall, but much work needs to be done on the motives, behaviour and mentalities of the newly reformed guardians of the poor, sanitary inspectors, factory and mines inspectors, education authorities, prison warders and the police. *Ian Cawood, Newman University Colllege, Birmingham; i.cawood@newman.ac.uk.*

The life of Professor Reginald W Revans, 1907–2003

Any information anyone has on Revans' Liberal Party involvement would be most welcome. We are particularly keen to know when he joined the party and any involvement he may have had in campaigning issues. We know he was very interested in pacifism. Any information, oral history submissions, location of papers or references most welcome. *Dr Yury Boshyk, yury@gel-net.com; or Dr Cheryl Brook, cheryl.brook@port.ac.uk.*

Recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative Party, 1906–1935

Aims to suggest reasons for defections of individuals and develop an understanding of changes in electoral alignment. Sources include personal papers and newspapers; suggestions about how to get hold of the papers of more obscure Liberal defectors welcome. *Cllr Nick Cott, 1a Henry Street, Gosforth, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, NE3 1DQ; N.M.Cott@ncl.ac.uk.*

Four nations history of the Irish Home Rule crisis

A four nations history of the Irish Home Rule crisis, attempting to rebalance the existing Anglo-centric focus. Considering Scottish and Welsh reactions and the development of parallel Home Rule movements, along with how the crisis impacted on political parties across the UK. Sources include newspapers, private papers, *Hansard. Naomi Lloyd-Jones; naomi.n.lloyd-jones@kcl.ac.uk.*

Beyond Westminster: Grassroots Liberalism 1910–1929

A study of the Liberal Party at its grassroots during the period in which it went from being the party of government to the third party of politics. This research will use a wide range of sources, including surviving Liberal Party constituency minute books and local press to contextualise the national decline of the party with the reality of the situation on the ground. The thesis will focus on three geographic regions (Home Counties, Midlands and the North West) in order to explore the situation the Liberals found themselves in nationally. Research for University of Leicester. Supervisor: Dr Stuart Ball. *Gavin Freeman ; gjf6@le.ac.uk.*

The Liberal Party's political communication, 1945–2002

Research on the Liberal party and Lib Dems' political communication. Any information welcome (including testimonies) about electoral campaigns and strategies. *Cynthia Boyer, CUFR Champollion, Place de Verdun, 81 000 Albi, France; +33 5 63 48 19 77; cynthia.boyer@univ-jfc.fr.*

The Liberal Party in Wales, 1966–1988

Aims to follow the development of the party from the general election of 1966 to the time of the merger with the SDP. PhD research at Cardiff University. *Nick Alderton; nickalito@hotmail.com.*

Policy position and leadership strategy within the Liberal Democrats

This thesis will be a study of the political positioning and leadership strategy of the Liberal Democrats. Consideration of the role of equidistance; development of policy from the point of merger; the influence and leadership strategies of each leader from Ashdown to Clegg; and electoral strategy from 1988 to 2015 will form the basis of the work. Any material relating to leadership election campaigns, election campaigns, internal party groups (for example the Social Liberal Forum) or policy documents from 1987 and merger talks onwards would be greatly welcomed. Personal insights and recollections also sought. *Samuel Barratt; pt10seb@leeds.ac.uk.*

LIBERAL HISTORY QUIZ 2013

Answers to the questions set out on page 7.

1. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at Meigle; Lord Rosebery at Dalmeny
2. Winston Churchill; Dundee
3. Russell Johnston
4. Sir Robert William Hamilton
5. Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch & Strathspey
6. Sir William Harcourt to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, in 1894
7. Nicol Stephen
8. James Davidson (Aberdeen West)
9. 1966; Labour (Robert Maclennan)
10. 1920; Paisley
11. A scar on the forehead
12. Ray Michie
13. Tales from the Tap End
14. Secretary of State for Air
15. Fife
16. John Bannerman
17. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in 1908
18. Duncan McLaren
19. The Master of Elibank
20. W. E. Gladstone; 1880, Midlothian

31 See, for example, Herbert Gladstone diary, 17 Mar. 1903, 19 July 1905. British Library, Herbert Gladstone papers (henceforward HGP), Add. Mss. 46,484 f. 32 and 46,485 f. 35; Masterman–Gladstone, 16 Dec. 1904, HGP 46,062 ff. 53–54; 30 Aug. 1905, HGP 46,063 ff. 60–61.

32 Herbert Gladstone memorandum, HGP 46,110 ff. 143–45.

33 Bryce–Gladstone, 14 Dec. 1904, HGP 46,019 ff. 84–85; Campbell-Bannerman–Spencer, 13 Dec. 1904, British Library, Spencer papers, Add. Ms. 76874; Asquith–Campbell-Bannerman, 1 Jan. 1905, British Library, Campbell-Bannerman papers (henceforward HCBP), Add. Ms. 41,210 ff. 241–42; Spencer–Campbell-Bannerman, 16 Dec. 1904, HCBP 41,229 ff. 286–90; Sinclair-Campbell-Bannerman, 30 Jan. 1905, HCBP 41,230 ff. 76–78; Morley–Campbell-Bannerman, 5 Jan. 1905, HCBP 41,223 f. 135; Buxton–Campbell-Bannerman, 16 Jan. 1905, HCBP 41,238 ff. 8–11; Fowler–Campbell-Bannerman, 26 Dec. 1904, HCBP 41,214 ff. 258–59; Gladstone–Fowler (copy) 1 Jan. 1905, HGP 46,062 ff. 67–69.

34 *The Times*, 21 Dec. 1904.

35 José Harris, *Unemployment and Politics: A study in English social policy 1886–1914* (Oxford, 1972) pp. 219–25; H. V. Emy, *Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics 1892–1914,* (Cambridge, 1973) p. 140.

36 See debate on second reading of the bill, *Hansard* (series 4), vol. 147, cols. 1174–1203 (20 June 1905).

37 Gladstone–Campbell-Bannerman, 12 Oct. 1903, HCBP 41,217 ff. 22–23.

38 Gladstone–Robert Hudson, 20 Sept. 1903, HGP 46,021 ff. 18–19.

39 Anthony Howe, *Free Trade and Liberal England, 1846–1946* (Oxford, 1997) p. 251.

40 Frank Trentmann, *Free Trade Nation* (Oxford, 2008), Chapter 2, 'Bread and circuses'.

41 Dutton, *Liberal Party*, p. 17; G. R. Searle, *The Liberal Party: Triumph and disintegration 1886–1929* (Basingstoke and London, 1992) p. 60.

42 LPD, *Pamphlets and leaflets 1903* (London, 1904), leaflet no. 2009.

43 *The Times*, 14 Dec. 1905; *Liberal Magazine*, Jan. 1906, pp. 711–12.

44 These were free trade, education, Ireland, licensing, Chinese labour and the Unionists' misuse of their 1900 mandate: A. K. Russell, *Liberal Landslide: The general election of 1906* (Newton Abbot, 1973) p. 65.

45 J. A. Hobson, *The Crisis of Liberalism* (London, 1909), pp. vii–viii, 92.

46 L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism* (London, 1909), reprinted in James Meadowcroft (ed.), *Hobhouse: Liberalism and Other Writings* (Cambridge, 1994).

47 Winston Churchill, *Liberalism and the Social Problem* (London, 1909); for Massingham references see pp. xix and xxi. Online (and thus searchable) edition available at www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18419. Accessed 31 Mar. 2011.

48 Charles F. G. Masterman, *The Condition of England* (London, 1909). Online at www.theconditionofengland.com/england_original.txt. Accessed 31 Mar. 2011.

49 For Hobhouse on Morley, see Stefan Collini, *Liberalism and Sociology: L. T. Hobhouse and political argument in England 1880–1914* (Cambridge, 1979) pp. 85–87.

50 Hobson, *Crisis of Liberalism*, p. viii.

51 Asquith speech to NLF conference in Birmingham, *The Times*, 20 June 1908.

52 *The Times*, 31 July 1909.

53 Neal Blewett, *The Peers, the Parties and the People: The general elections of 1910* (London and Basingstoke, 1972) pp. 317 and 326.

54 Peter Clarke, *Liberals and Social Democrats*, p. 118.

55 *The Times*, 9 Mar. 1912.

56 Haldane speech at Manchester, 10 Jan. 1913, LPD, *Pamphlets and leaflets 1913* (London, 1914), pamphlet no. 5.

57 Quoted in LPD, *Pamphlets and leaflets 1913*, pamphlet no. 3, p. 7.

58 By this author's calculation, there were thirty-two leaflets or pamphlets primarily about free trade, forty-four about constitutional matters and twenty about labour, land and welfare issues. See LPD, *Pamphlets and leaflets 1910* (London, 1911).

59 LPD, *Pamphlets and leaflets 1911* (London, 1912), leaflet nos. 2372 and 2391. The latter leaflet, 'Has the Liberal Government been "Extravagant?"' was repeated in updated form in 1913 (leaflet no. 2459) and 1914 (leaflet no. 2511).

60 LPD, *Pamphlets and leaflets 1912* (London, 1913), leaflet no. 2429.

61 *Liberal Magazine*, May 1911, p. 264.

62 LPD, *Pamphlets and Leaflets 1913*, leaflet no. 2481, 'The Nation's Treasure House: How it is to be Opened?'.

63 LPD, *Pamphlets and leaflets 1912*, leaflet no. 2422.

64 Clarke, *Lancashire and the New Liberalism*, pp. 398 and 407.

65 For an overview of this debate, from a viewpoint broadly sympathetic to Labour, see Keith Laybourn, 'The Rise of Labour and the Decline of Liberalism: The state of the debate', *History*, vol. 80, no. 259, 1995, pp. 207–26.

66 Ian Packer, *Liberal Government and Politics, 1905–15* (Basingstoke, 2006) p. 6.

67 E. H. H. Green, *The Crisis of Conservatism 1886–1914* (London & New York, 1995) p. 310.

68 Dutton, *Liberal Party*, pp. 82–84.

THE 'LAND AN

Dr J. Graham Jones examines the formulation of the highly contentious Liberal policy document which became known as 'the Green Book', and its impact upon Liberal-held constituencies in rural Wales. Unlike the better-known and politically more attractive proposals of the 'Yellow Book', it appears as though Liberal candidates in Welsh constituencies in 1929 found their campaign hampered by the stigma of 'the Green Book' proposals from which the party leadership was by then most anxious to extricate itself.

D THE NATION' AND WALES

Historians have always devoted much more attention to the land campaign inaugurated by the Liberal Party in the Edwardian period rather than to their land campaign of the mid-1920s.[1] In the context of the 1920s, far more historical attention has been lavished on the Liberal Party's feud-wracked leadership, especially the clash between Asquith and Lloyd George, the high-profile split over the general strike of May 1926, and the ambitious programme focused on 'We Can Conquer Unemployment' on which the party fought the general election of 30 May 1929. But the deep-rooted dissension over the party's land policy, above all the furore evoked by the publication in October 1925 of the highly contentious policy document *The Land and the Nation,* soon to be dubbed 'the Green Book', are certainly worthy of closer examination.

Throughout the lengthy, quite unique political career of David Lloyd George, the land question was a predominant theme which came to the foreground of political life at three crucial periods: in the celebrated land taxes inaugurated in the famous 1909 'People's Budget'; in the land enquiry and subsequent land campaign of 1912–14 initiated with great gusto by Lloyd George as the long-serving Chancellor of the Exchequer under Asquith, and intended by him to constitute an especial strand in the Liberal campaign for the next general election which was then widely anticipated in 1915, while the Liberal policy of Land Value Taxation (LVT) had proved highly popular and alluring in both urban and rural constituencies in a succession of by-elections held during 1912 and 1913; and the land campaign of 1925–29 intended by Lloyd George to revitalise his party's dwindling fortunes following its nationwide electoral debacle in October 1924. In a Welsh context the new land campaign of the mid-1920s appeared especially pertinent. Lloyd George had after all spent the whole of his youth and early manhood at rural Llanystumdwy and neighbouring Criccieth in Caernarfonshire with their distinctive, highly individualistic political culture focused on the campaigns against brewer, landed squire and parson, and nourished by vivid folk memories of the general election campaigns of 1859 and 1868. Following these elections significant numbers of tenant farmers had been ruthlessly evicted from their holdings for voting for the Liberal candidate contrary to the expressed wishes of their Conservative landlords. Two years after Lloyd George had first entered parliament following a fiercely contested by-election campaign in the Carnarvon Boroughs constituency in April 1890, pressure from Welsh Liberal MPs had coerced the ageing W. E. Gladstone at the outset of his fourth and last administration to yield a prestigious royal commission (rather than a much more humdrum select committee) to examine the manifold complexities of the land question in Wales. By the time it had reported in 1896, however, a Tory government was in office, and the return of a relative opulence to the Welsh countryside meant that the far-reaching recommendations of the commissioners were destined to remain largely unenforced. Fully three decades later, in the mid-1920s, there prevailed enduring resentment in rural Wales at the conspicuous lack of governmental legislation relating to land issues.[2] It was widely felt that the relatively small size of most Welsh holdings, often less than fifty acres apiece, gave its own dimension to the land question in Wales. Another factor by the mid-1920s was the recent dramatic upsurge in the proportion of Welsh agricultural land which was farmed by its owners, a rather higher proportion than in contemporary England.

But Lloyd George's personal position had changed markedly by this period. In 1909 and again in 1912–14, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer in a strong Liberal administration, he was at the heart of government, largely directing governmental policy under Asquith. By 1925, however, the Liberals had been reduced to the status of very much a third party in the state with just forty MPs in the House of Commons, the party's standing and status blighted beyond measure by the Asquith–Lloyd George fissure in December 1916,

Lloyd George at Bron-y-De, Churt, in the 1930s

the genesis of a more deep-rooted split later on, and the dramatic outcome of the 'coupon' general election two years later. Lloyd George was not even the official Liberal Party leader at this point. But, as on previous occasions, he turned once more to the land question in a rather desperate attempt to revive the fortunes of his ailing party. As a result the primary emphasis on rural land reform was the outcome of a growing conviction that Liberal Party electoral fortunes could best be revived in the agricultural divisions, where the Labour Party remained relatively weak (including in most of mid and north Wales), rather than in the towns and cities where the Labour Party had already made substantial inroads, now most difficult to reverse. As Lloyd George was to tell his secretary and mistress Frances Stevenson in August 1925, shortly before the publication in the autumn of the twin reports *The Land and the Nation* and *Towns and the Land*, his real purpose in establishing the committees was 'to strengthen our grasp on the rural districts and the capture of a few towns where Liberalism is still a force'.[3] Although there had been some drop in the number of agricultural constituencies in Britain, they still amounted to some 141 electoral divisions, representing one-quarter of the total seats in parliament, many of which were especially electorally volatile. Another factor of importance was the increase in the proportion of agricultural labourers (and indeed their wives) in the electorate as a result of the far-reaching provisions of the reform acts of 1884 and 1918.[4] Thus pandering to the needs of this particular class also made electoral sense.

Thus it was that Lloyd George, largely on his own initiative, and originally on a non-party platform, set up independent rural and urban land committees in 1923. The former met on innumerable occasions between June 1923 and February 1925 to thrash out a new policy and comprised a number of leading agricultural experts and several Liberal politicians of whom Francis Acland, Ernest Brown, C. F. G. Masterman and Ramsay Muir were the most prominent. Only in March 1925 was it resolved, rather against the inclination of the agriculturalists on the committee, that

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the final policy document should be published under the auspices of the Liberal Party. For the Liberal Party nationally, this was a period of reform and reinvigoration. An overambitious Liberal Million Fighting Fund had been set up to raise funds and embark on a programme of Liberal education. There was a general feeling that people in the 1920s had no appreciation of traditional Liberal principles like free trade, local option, land reform and the position of the House of Lords. At Liberal Party headquarters at Parliament Street, London, a 'Roll of Honour' was established to record the names of all donors to party funds as such a move was considered a psychological boost to the membership. The setting up of numerous committees of enquiry was an essential element in the process of party rehabilitation. March 1924 had seen the appointment of an autonomous policy committee to inquire into the long-term crisis in the British coal industry. Within four short months it had published its report under the title *Coal and Power*, significantly under the name of Lloyd George alone. But its contents were not really contentious and its publication caused but little stir.

But inevitably there was much greater interest in the proceedings and eventual report of the committees of enquiry into the use and ownership of land. When the Welsh National Liberal Federation met at Shrewsbury at the end of July, with Carmarthen Liberal John Hinds in the chair, Ernest Brown, the former Liberal MP for Rugby, gave a foretaste of the contents of the report expected in October – 'Justice would be done so the landowners, and the cultivator would be given absolute security of tenure subject to one test only – that he proved himself an efficient cultivator of the soil, and he would have to get from the competent authority a certificate of good cultivation'. Brown (who was later to hold a succession of Cabinet offices during the National Government and the Second World War and was eventually to succeed Sir John Simon as the leader of the National Liberal group in 1940), insisted that their purpose in undertaking the research was 'to retain those who were on the land and add to their number. … They were recommending not a niggardly, finicky, petty policy; but a bold and drastic change'.[5] By this time, as the eagerly anticipated land report approached completion, Lloyd George's excitement grew. He 'could talk of nothing but this Land scheme'.[6] But the ominous inevitable backlash at the nature and extent of the anticipated proposals was also gathering momentum. Loud warnings were already reaching Asquith's ears.[7] In his committees of enquiry, lavishly funded by the replete coffers of the Lloyd George Political Fund, Lloyd George, always a respecter of expert opinion, had made the fullest use of the services of the leading economists of the 1920s, men like J. M. Keynes, Sir William Beveridge, Walter Layton and H. D. Henderson, all of whom had responded with enthusiasm. It was a dead cert that the published reports would at once become the focus of considerable public attention and debate.[8]

Party leader Asquith, whose earldom had already been gazetted in the previous February, had commented in some detail in July on a draft of the final report, and in early August it was discussed at length by the Liberal Shadow Cabinet (as this body still rather pretentiously called itself). With publication in imminent prospect, Lloyd George delivered a long, impressive peroration at Killerton Park, Devon – as a kind of policy launch. It is of some significance that this high-profile meeting was convened on the estate of F. D. (later Sir Francis) Acland, who had been one of the most prominent Asquithian Liberal MPs during the period of the post-war coalition government. Here Lloyd George actually spoke from the terrace of Acland's palatial home. This was perhaps one indication both of Lloyd George's desire to carry with him former political enemies in his new campaign and of his deep-rooted respect for the expert.[9] At Killerton Park, Lloyd George described the very system of landlordism as inherently obsolete and inefficient and insisted that the state needed to 'resume' possession of the land. Stopping studiously short of advocating the wholesale 'nationalization' of agricultural land in Britain, the old rabble-rouser advocated state ownership 'for the purpose of giving the necessary security to the cultivator of the soil that, if and

so long as he cultivates it, he and his children shall reap the full harvest of their own labour and enterprise'.[10] Certain key functions like drainage, afforestation and reclamation could, he insisted, be undertaken efficiently only by the state. Land reform was consequently a social necessity which offered the prospect of fresh employment on a substantial scale. Social harmony then would follow as tillers of their own land had no interest in revolution. Although it rained steadily throughout the afternoon, Lloyd George's impassioned peroration kept entranced for a full ninety minutes an audience exceeding 25,000. Not a single one of them, it was reported, was tempted to leave.[11] The expansive speech was broadcast to several points within Killerton Park and certainly whetted the public appetite for the publication of the rural land committee report which was due to appear three weeks later.

Throughout the lengthy period during which the committee had undertaken its deliberations, agriculture was a subject of some debate in political circles. The Conservative Party under Baldwin had recently announced a fairly modest proposal for governmental assistance to enable the agricultural labourer to own his cottage and garden. The Independent Labour Party had recently published a pamphlet entitled *A Socialist Policy for Agriculture*, but this had not been adopted by the Labour Party as party policy. Quite independently, the Labour Party had its own advisory committee on agriculture which, it was rumoured in political circles, had prepared its own report, while the TUC, too, had established a committee on similar lines. It was anticipated that a national Labour Party conference would be convened at some point during the spring of 1926 to consider the various reports and thrash out a party policy on agriculture. From the vantage point of the autumn of 1925, it was considered that agriculture would be one of the burning political issues for discussion during the forthcoming winter. It was known that a general election was most unlikely at least until the spring of 1929; agriculture was viewed as an important subject on all sides; and it was hoped that it was a topic likely to be shorn of avid political point-scoring.[12] Then the whole subject was thrown into high relief on 9 October 1925 with the publication of *The Land and the Nation* which at once became popularly known as 'the Green Book'.

A substantial publication running to no fewer than 570 pages, its first half was devoted to a presentation of detailed comparative statistics on current land tenure and the productivity of agriculture, the second half proposing drastic solutions, beginning with the crucial statement, '… The State shall be deemed to have resumed possession of all land in the United Kingdom which at that date is used for or capable of use for the production of foodstuffs, timber or other natural products'.[13] The core recommendation of the detailed report was the implementation of a novel system of 'cultivating tenure' whereby each farmer should become the tenant of a new County Agricultural Authority, thus enjoying complete security on condition that he continued to farm his land efficiently. Rentals were to be fixed and the supervision strict. According to the report, the farmer would in consequence enjoy 'the legitimate rights of ownership without its risks, and the advantages of yearly tenancy without its insecurity'.[14] This proposal amounted almost to the nationalisation of agricultural land. Compensation would be paid to the landlords, while the farmer would enjoy relative security of tenure on condition that he farmed properly, as judged by the new agricultural committees which would assume responsibility for the allocation of allotments, larger gardens, smallholdings and very small farms of new creation. Full compensation would be paid to a farmer who lost some or all of his land to the new holdings.

The rural land report immediately grabbed the headlines with a predictable vengeance. Whereas the publication of the proposals of *Coal and Power* the previous year had been considered 'a national service' unlikely to provoke controversy, *The Land and the Nation*, although not at the time Liberal Party official policy, was immediately viewed as a concerted attempt to reap a party-political advantage in the form of future electoral successes. The publication was at once commended by unbiased observers for the thoroughness of its background research extending back over two and a half years to the spring of 1923, for the 'encyclopaedic array of facts and figures' available in the text and numerous expansive appendices, and for its commendable 'full view of conditions at home and abroad'. On these grounds the report was widely hailed as 'a priceless addition to popular literature on the subject'.[15] But inevitably the critics weighed in too. It was immediately pointed out that implementation of such a far-reaching scheme, closely akin to the imposition of socialistic principles, 'would involve the drawbacks of nationalization at least as much as the gains'. Indeed 'agriculture' was highly likely to be 'suffocated by bureaucracy, by which enterprise would only be restrained'.[16] Even before the report had actually seen the light of day, rumours that it was to advocate the setting up of county agricultural committees charged to assess the competence of farmers led to much doubt and questioning. As *The Times* put it, 'Who is to judge whether Blackacre or Whiteacre is well or ill cultivated?'.[17] The very prospect of a veritable army of qualified civil servants constituting a nationwide network of county agricultural committees, some extending to more than one hundred individuals, provoked widespread dissension, even uproar. Outraged landlords, facing the prospect of summary confiscation of their landed estates, instinctively protested virulently, but so did many others, both within the Liberal Party and outside, appalled at the perceived threat to so many traditional aspects of rural life in Britain.[18]

Indeed reactions on the whole were questioning and frosty. 'The land policy is not going strong', wrote the influential and perceptive Liberal Party organiser R. Humphrey Davies in early November, 'I hope L.G. is not being misled by his entourage'.[19] The term 'nationalisation' was widely used by critics – 'there is no evidence in the country of any volume of opinion in favour of confiscation' of agricultural land, a move which was considered to be wholly unfair to the landowning class. C. S. Orwin, the Director of the prestigious Institute for Research in Agricultural Economics at the University of Oxford, and

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the co-author, with W. R. Peel, of the recent highly acclaimed monograph *The Tenure of Agricultural Land*, [20] summarised the nub of the opposition to 'the Green Book' proposals from the standpoint of the farming communities:

> It is common knowledge amongst those familiar with farming conditions that farmers undertake the functions of the landlord with the greatest reluctance. They have not been trained in the job; they have no knowledge of the planning and construction of buildings, of surveying and levelling for land drainage, of schemes for water supply, of the principles of forestry &c.; all these matters belong properly to a separate profession, that of the land agent, and it is impossible that the farmer should double successfully the parts. The Committee contemplate supervision and pressure by the County Agricultural Authority to secure the maintenance of the permanent equipment of the land in a state of efficiency. But what degree of effective supervision can be exercised by a Committee, and what degree of pressure is likely to be applied by a body composed, as it must be, mainly of 'cultivating tenants'? The application of the scheme would result, in some cases, in well-intentioned but inefficient attempts at the maintenance of holdings, and in others in the deliberate intention to annex the difference between the old rent, as paid to the present landlords, and the fair net rent payable to the State.[21]

Further criticism focused on the realisation that the novel 'cultivating tenure' proposal advocated as the key policy of *The Land and the Nation* would 'tie' farmers 'to their holdings'. Governmental legislation, it was argued, had already provided a much-improved 'security of tenure' for farmers, 'but freedom to go is almost as important to them as the freedom to remain'. Finally, it was maintained, the necessary development of agricultural land would not follow.[22] Before the end of November the second land report, entitled *Towns and the Land*, soon to be dubbed 'the Brown Book', had also seen the light of day. This was devoted to town planning on regional lines, embodying the principles of site-value taxation and reform of the leasehold system, and was much less controversial than its predecessor. It was envisaged from the outset that 'the Brown Book' proposals would readily be adopted as Liberal Party official policy with but little dispute. Published on 24 November 1925, *Towns and the Land* was officially launched as a conference at the Kingsway Hall, London, just three days later. As the background to the new reforms, the chronic overcrowding and congestion, still so prevalent in many British towns and cities in the 1920s, were underlined cogently by Lloyd George. In the evening session of the conference, C. F. G. Masterman, who pithily described himself as 'neither a Lloyd-Georgian nor an anti-Lloyd-Georgian', moved a resolution pressing for a wide-ranging measure of leasehold reform, the grant of power to local authorities to acquire land at a fair price in anticipation of future needs, and the rating of site values. Masterman continued, 'When he saw a man who was willing to carry through the things he longed for, he was with him. The Liberal party could carry these reforms if it avoided a semi-Tory combination'. The resolution was unanimously adopted, and reactions in the country were generally favourable.[23]

But the furore over the proposals contained in *The Land and the Nation* certainly showed no sign of abating. The merits and demerits of the scheme were intensely debated alongside the allegedly discreditable means by which Lloyd George was attempting to foist it upon a reluctant Liberal Party, and the ongoing thorny question of party finance. Early in 1925 the party's new creation the Administrative Committee, basically Asquithian in character, had launched an appeal throughout the constituencies to raise £1,000,000 for the Liberal cause – the Million Fighting Fund. This had floundered badly, largely because of a nationwide awareness of the existence of the Lloyd George Political Fund, and LG's marked reluctance to make full use of it for the good of the party nationally. It was known, too, that large inroads into the extensive Fund had already been made to finance the various committees of enquiry, while the Liberal Party nationally languished close to bankruptcy. Tensions grew as, swift on the heels of the publication of *The Land and the Nation* in October, Lloyd George brazenly proceeded to establish his own independent propaganda body, to be called 'The Land and Nation League', with himself as its president, to campaign up and down the country in favour of 'cultivating tenure' and the other reforms. Indeed in mid-November Lloyd George told his old ally C. P. Scott of the *Manchester Guardian* that it was his intention 'to put his whole strength into the movement', secure in the knowledge that 'he had money enough to carry it on for 4 or 5 years'. He gleefully anticipated that 'there would be meetings at every town and village in England and he was starting at once'.[24] Days later, H. H. Asquith, still party leader, and by no means overtly antagonistic to the proceedings and report of the rural land committee ('I expressed warm admiration for the thoroughness and ability with which they had conducted their inquiry'), now felt obliged to warn Lloyd George that the recent setting up of 'a new organisation' had immediately led to 'much concern' and was thus likely to impede the 'full and free discussion' now sorely required on the proposed reforms. Asquith drew Lloyd George's attention to the 'frequent, almost daily communications from stalwart and hard-working members' of the Liberal Party voicing 'their own doubts and difficulties and deprecating at this stage anything in the nature of propaganda, either on the one side or the other'. He insisted that it would be 'a very curious matter' if there should be 'any conflict, or appearance of conflict, between the National Liberal Federation and the new organisation [the Land and Nation League] proposed for promoting the views of the Land Enquiry Committee'.[25]

Reactions to 'the Green Book' proposals were becoming coloured by general disapproval of the existence and use of the Lloyd George Political Fund.

Indeed reactions to 'the Green Book' proposals were becoming coloured by general disapproval of the existence and use of the Lloyd George Political Fund. At the end of November, veteran Welsh Liberal Judge John Bryn Roberts, a traditional Gladstonian loyalist who had represented

Caernarvonshire South (the Eifion constituency) in parliament from 1885 until 1906, and was certainly no friend of Lloyd George, wrote sourly: 'Lloyd George's Land Policy stunt seems to me to hang fire, and kept alive only by the large political fund which he has seized. It would be interesting to know the sources of these funds. I suspect most came out of the secret service votes when he was P.M. & from the sales of Honours. The land scheme seems to me to be the wildest ever suggested by any responsible statesman, and more like the offspring of a mentality like that of the Clydesdale section of the Labour Party. … Our national and local experiment in that direction have not been successful'. Commenting on the 'cultivating tenure' proposals, Judge Bryn Roberts went on:

> … This to be secured by an army of Inspectors to keep the tenants up to the mark seems to me to be a short cut to national ruin. The Inspectors will be appointed out of a horde of applicants, mostly out of work or agricultural failures or under the late war regime. The main qualifications being capacity for wire-pulling and exercising political & private favouritism. The whole thing would in my opinion lead to appalling corruption, and mis-government to avoid trouble and disputes with tenants; all losses, as in case of war, falling on the State. … The present scheme does not spring from any public demand, or out-cry, a fatal defect. It is simply a desperate stunt by Lloyd George to recover political influence and leadership.[26]

Bryn Roberts was certainly not alone in his views and opinions. On 1 November senior Liberal Party organiser R. Humphrey Davies wrote from the Liberal Central Association at London:

> What you say about the Land Policy is very interesting.
> In a nutshell the position is this:- Our funds are well nigh exhausted. Ll.G. apparently has ample funds. The essential work of the party machine is being crippled for lack of funds, while Ll.G. can spend a very large sum of money in developing his land policy. If his Land Policy is rooted in Liberalism, nothing on earth will prevent the party as represented by the Liberal Associations from adopting it, and adopting it gladly. On the other hand, if it is not genuine Liberalism, no amount of expenditure on his part will constrain the party to adopt that policy.
>
> After Reunion we really tried to play the game here, but when your partner does not play it, what are you to do? Ll.G. is not an outsider who can pursue any fad he likes. He is leader of the Liberal Party in the House of Commons, and the fundamental policy he is pursuing is not such as any leader has played before. To attach conditions to party contributions is an unheard-of thing, and it is asking for trouble. The pity of it is that the rank and file in many parts of England are working splendidly, and what they want is encouragement and not discouragement. Ll.G. was urged not to attach conditions, but nothing would move him. This for your *own* information.[27]

'We have in this country a landless peasantry such as exists nowhere else in the world. The object of those who support the recommendation is to give to these men land at a fair rent. There is no suggestion of confiscation.'

The Liberal land campaign was certainly dominating the British political landscape. On 5 December Lloyd George addressed a Liberal demonstration at the Drill Hall, Coventry where the audience totalled nigh on 5,000 individuals, while a substantial crowd had also assembled outside to hear the speech. LG urged his listeners to lend vigorous support to the new land policy: 'Do not let us waste our strength on petty bickerings. They are unworthy of the dignity of a grand cause (Cheers)'. He underlined the growing problem of rural depopulation, a factor which was brought home to him every time he returned to the village of Llanystumdwy where he had grown up.[28] Just a week later, accompanied by Dame Margaret, Major Gwilym and Miss Megan Lloyd George, he spoke equally passionately at the Coliseum, Leeds, and a few days later at the Capitol Theatre, Haymarket in London. As Lloyd George spoke at London, a huge screen behind him on the platform bore an inscription which was a quotation from a speech delivered by the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman at the capital's Albert Hall on the eve of the party's landslide victory in the general election of January 1906 – 'We wish to make the land less a pleasure-ground for the rich and more a treasure-house for the nation'.[29] Observers were reminded of the tremendous fervour of the venerable Gladstone's great Midlothian campaign of the 1870s.

Meanwhile during the same month the Liberal and Radical Candidates' Association, a new creation, met at the National Liberal Club in London to discuss 'the Green Book' proposals at some length. Some two-thirds of Liberal Party candidates were present at the meeting. The outcome was that a 'modified policy … partial and gradual' in its essence, was endorsed rather than the 'universal and simultaneous' application which had been the essence of the 'original policy'. The keynote of the revised policy thrashed out by this association on 8 December was to be 'gradualism', the new county agricultural authorities were to assume control of agricultural land only 'in certain circumstances': when such land was up for sale, there was a vacancy on a farm, an estate was being 'badly administered' or a farm 'badly cultivated'. Four different kinds of tenure were then outlined. Lloyd George readily declared his support for the amended policy – 'We have in this country a landless peasantry such as exists nowhere else in the world. The object of those who support the recommendation is to give to these men land at a fair rent. There is no suggestion of confiscation'. It was also emphasised that the new land policy did not apply to Scotland where independent committees were to discuss the matter further.[30]

Lloyd George was undoubtedly much relieved that the Liberal and Radical Candidates' Association had not disowned, but simply amended, the new policy.[31] He had resolved, in the interests of Liberal Party unity, to accept, albeit with some reluctance, the revised land policy which had been rather acrimoniously thrashed out at meetings of the Candidates' Association. To his mind, the compromise policy was 'not wholly satisfactory', but he remained convinced that the original 'Green Book' proposals as unveiled the previous October 'had

destroyed the Labour propaganda in the rural areas', a vital breakthrough for the struggling Liberal Party of the mid-1920s. Lloyd George emphasised that it was essential to push the watered-down policy as still a radical initiative. Party leader H. H. Asquith had 'entirely agreed' and had stressed his personal conviction that the agricultural labouring classes 'must be shown that this is their new charter'.[32]

The depth of the furore occasioned by the publication of *The Land and the Nation*, with its core 'cultivating tenure' proposal, was wholly predictable. The programme was especially unpopular because during the period immediately following the First World War, the years of the so-called 'Green Revolution' of 1918–22, agricultural land had been sold on a massive scale in consequence of the break-up, or the near break-up, of many of the great landed estates. About a quarter of the agricultural land in England and Wales had changed hands in four years. Many farmer labourers had now become small-scale tenant farmers. Those who rented had seen their rent levels reduced as a result of the agricultural depression. In Wales predictably the response was especially vehement. Here the scale of the transfer of agricultural land owned by the occupier increased from 10.2 per cent in 1909 to 39 per cent in 1941–43, most of this dramatic increase having occurred prior to 1922.[33] Generally, it would seem, Welsh landowners were more anxious to sell and the Welsh tenantry more inclined to purchase than were their English counterparts.[34]

By the period of the Second World War, while fully 39 per cent of the acreage of Wales as an entity was owner-occupied, the comparative figure for England was only 33 per cent. During the very years that this massive change in the pattern of Welsh landownership was taking place, Lloyd George was Prime Minister of the post-war, Tory dominated coalition government and seemed to be travelling ever further from both his Liberal past and his Welsh roots. By the mid-1920s, his closest advisers and political confidants were almost all Englishmen, and the radical policy documents which poured

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forth from the presses – from *Coal and Power* (1924) to *We Can Conquer Unemployment* (1929) – contained little, if any, Welsh dimension. *The Land and the Nation* was certainly no exception. Its detailed index contained just three specific references to Wales, and there was no explicit policy initiative tailored to the demands of the principality. This glaring omission was possibly an implicit recognition on Lloyd George's part that Wales and England shared common agricultural problems in the wake of the depression and should thus be dealt with as a single entity. But most contemporaries saw this as a defect and a clear indication of how far Lloyd George had travelled from his Welsh roots and his once proverbial concern for Welsh issues.

The political repercussions were far-reaching, not least in the Liberal heartland of rural Wales. The most dramatic upshot occurred in Carmarthenshire where the sitting Liberal MP Sir Alfred Mond had actually served as a member of the Liberal Land Committee. After the committee had met at Lloyd George's home Bron-y-de near Churt in Surrey in August 1924, one of its members the Oxford academic and Liberal politician H. A. L. Fisher recorded that Mond was 'very doubtful' about the wisdom of the evolving land policy.[35] It was also widely known that he disapproved strongly of the administration and use of the Lloyd George Political Fund. His disenchantment and opposition only grew, to such as extent that, as the contents of *The Land and the Nation* were finalised, he felt impelled to send a memorandum to Asquith deploring 'the entire and fundamental change' implicit in the new policy, so much so, he insisted, that it demanded 'the closest investigation and criticism before the party should be asked to adopt it'. Mond's experience both as a practising landowner and a Liberal MP had led him to conclude, 'I do not find myself able to accept the reasoning on which the scheme is based'.[36]

Mond's annoyance increased still further as a result of the propaganda methods employed by the Land and Nation League, and indeed he was still in the forefront of the ever-mounting chorus of opposition to the original 'Green Book' proposals. Although it was clear by December 1925 that Lloyd George fully intended to amend substantially the original plans, Mond doubted his sincerity, and a strong personal element crept into his criticism. The rebel MP received the ready backing of his constituency association in Carmarthenshire which denounced the new land proposals as 'semi-nationalisation', potentially detrimental to the continuation of the freehold system in Britain.[37] Shortly afterwards, on 19 January 1926, Sir Alfred Mond formally defected to the Conservative Party. Lloyd George's response was bitter. He declared that he was 'not in the least surprised' at the precipitate action taken by his old ally whom he had long sensed to be 'obviously making tracks for the Tory party'. In Lloyd George's view, dissatisfaction with the proposals of *The Land and the Nation* was 'only an excuse' to justify his dramatic defection to the Conservatives: 'His action is nothing to do with the land, or he would have gone to the Liberal convention to present his case. If the decision had gone against him, he could then have acted. The real reason is given in that part of the letter where he reveals his conviction that the Liberal Party offers poor prospects for ambitious men'.[38] Mond then helped to ensure that the Liberal nomination in Carmarthenshire went to Colonel W. N. Jones (described as 'a man after his own heart, a right-winger and a virulent anti-Socialist "business-man's Liberal" '[39]), another diehard critic of 'the Green Book' reforms which were discussed at length in Carmarthenshire right through until the by-election of June 1928 and indeed during the general election campaign of May 1929.

In Montgomeryshire, too, there were equally dramatic repercussions. Here the long-serving Liberal MP, a veteran of 1906, was David Davies of Llandinam, the heir to the multi-million pound fortune of his namesake grandfather 'Top Sawyer', and a headstrong, opinionated individual. 'DD' had been recalled from active service at the front in France, where he had commanded a battalion with distinction, in June 1916 to become Lloyd George's parliamentary private secretary. An initially close rapport between the two men crumbled quickly as Davies dispatched to the

Prime Minister a formidable barrage of letters sharply critical of the allied war effort and reporting conversations, highly critical of Lloyd George, which he had heard in the clubs and tea rooms of Westminster. His immediate dismissal followed and created a gulf between the two men which was never to be healed. In Montgomeryshire, Davies's personal and political position was immensely strong as was reflected in unopposed returns to parliament in the general elections of 1918, 1922 and 1923. But Davies's inclination to continue his political career steadily weakened as he became ever more absorbed in an array of philanthropic initiatives and in his avid support for the work of the League of Nations and similar bodies in the 1920s. Predictably, Davies disapproved strongly of the proposals unveiled in *The Land and the Nation* in October 1925 and then looked aghast at the divided Liberal reactions to the general strike in May 1926. By July he had resolved to retire from parliament at the next general election. As he told the chairman of his county Liberal Association, in his view the 'Green Book' proposals would simply 'create a new host of officials' and 'give a stimulus to farming from Whitehall'. Moreover he felt convinced that their implementation would inevitably 'add an additional burden to the already over-weighted finances of the county without any corresponding advantage'. These proposals, coupled with the Liberal Party's split reaction to the general strike, felt Davies 'made it almost impossible for anyone to advocate sincerely the return of the party to power'.[40] Months later, still unimpressed by the 'amended and truncated form' of the much revised proposals, he condemned them as designed 'to initiate the policy of land nationalisation under the cloak of Liberal reform'. At the same time he took advantage of the same opportunity to take a swipe at the infamous Lloyd George Political Fund which, he felt certain, had been 'accumulated by doubtful and dubious means in the days of the Coalition Government'. In consequence, he insisted, there was a very real danger that the organisation of the Liberal Party might well degenerate into 'the appendage of a private endowment'.[41] The affair dragged on for several months in Montgomeryshire, but the attempts to persuade David Davies to continue in parliament proved futile.

When his successor as the Liberal candidate for Montgomeryshire was chosen during 1927, attitudes towards 'the Green Book' weighed heavily. The chosen candidate, E. Clement Davies, a native of Llanfyllin, was quizzed relentlessly on his attitudes. Although admitting his general support for Lloyd George and his policies, he asserted his determination to refuse the financial assistance of the notorious Lloyd George Fund – 'I would prefer to stand upon my own two feet, even if I had to mortgage all I have. … I am not an out-and-out supporter of anybody'.[42] During the ensuing general election campaign in May 1929, cross-examined intensively by the farmers of Welshpool, he was compelled to reassure his inquisitors that he would certainly vote against a bill to nationalise agricultural land introduced by any future Liberal government – 'I believe in the freedom of the individual, and that is why I quarrel with Socialism'.[43]

In Cardiganshire, too, where recent years had witnessed profound dissension and indeed acrimony in the ranks of the county Liberal Party, the 'Green Book' proposals were, predictably, suspiciously scrutinised and generally badly received. At a public meeting at Cardigan some two weeks before the publication of *The Land and the Nation*, the highly principled conviction Liberal MP for the county Rhys Hopkin Morris shared a platform with his political near-neighbour Sir Alfred Mond. Mond went on the attack at once – 'He would never agree to any freeholding farmer being interfered with as far as his land was concerned'. Hopkin Morris took much the same tack, questioning rigorously many aspects of the 'Green Book' proposals and expressing his concern at the proposed inspection of farming standards: 'The test to be applied was the test of good farming, and who was to determine what constituted good farming? Was it a tribunal and if so, how was the tribunal to be constituted and how was that tribunal to bring about more efficient farming?'. Weeks later Morris publicly reiterated his belief in the concept of peasant proprietorship and his firm opposition to the appointment of 'a new host of bureaucratic officials' rendered necessary by implementing the new proposals.[44] Three delegates from the county were duly nominated to attend the revising convention to be held at the Kingsway Hall, London in mid-February. Once news of the shock defection of Sir Alfred Mond hit Cardiganshire, there was immediate conjecture that Hopkin Morris might well be inclined to 'follow suit' in the near future, in reality an unlikely scenario.[45]

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Within the county Liberal Association there had emerged something of a rift between Hopkin Morris and his supporters, virulently hostile to the 'Green Book' reforms, and local Liberals led by the law Professor T. A. Levi who saw at least some virtue in the audacious proposals. Indeed Levi endorsed the idea of 'cultivating tenure' as essentially 'a fair and equitable scheme, without an atom of confiscation. … They need have no fear as to the result'.[46] But even the revised proposals did not in the least impress Hopkin Morris whose displeasure increased still further as he viewed the ever escalating activities of The Land and Nation League which, he knew full well, were being financed by the replete coffers of the Lloyd George Political Fund whose role he heartily despised: 'Accept the creed [of the Land and Nation League], and you get the money; your principles can be purchased for the price of your election expenses'.[47] Joseph Parry, one of the three delegates from Cardiganshire present at the February convention, did not mince his words in the least, 'The least said and done in the matter will be best for the Liberal cause in the county of Cardigan'.[48] As attitudes hardened, Hopkin Morris continued to assail the 'mercenary army' which, in his view, now constituted the Liberal Party's organisation, and the 'fancy policies' recently advocated.

There is evidence, too, of the impact of *The Land and the Nation* on the political life of Denbighshire where the sitting Liberal MP Ellis W. Davies, although estranged from Lloyd George, was himself a member of the rural land committee and, recorded his co-member H. A. L. Fisher, was clearly 'very keen on the LG policy and thinks we shall sweep

the country with it'.[49] When the next general election ensued in the autumn of 1924, Ellis Davies vocally sang the praises of the evolving radical land policies in relation to the tenant farmer and the farm labourer. But he made conspicuously little impression in the county as his majority fell drastically from 6,978 votes to just 1,411. Davies's predecessor as the Liberal MP for Denbighshire, J. C. Davies, wrote shortly afterwards of 'the intensity of the feeling' against Ellis Davies. In consequence, 'some of the most stalwart Liberals' at Llanrwst, traditionally staunchly Liberal, had 'worked hard and openly' for the Conservative candidate 'because of their dissatisfaction with Ellis Davies and his policy, especially his land policy'. Towns such as Colwyn Bay, Ruthin and Llangollen had recorded 'a decisive majority against him. … He is a dull personality, but what ruined him was his silly flirtation with Labour'.[50] Ellis Davies continued to display much greater interest in the land question than in any other political issue, constantly pointing up the problems faced by the relatively small size – less than fifty acres in many cases – of the majority of Welsh farmsteads, and the need for legislation to enable Welsh farmers to purchase and improve their holdings.[51] Throughout the county there was much interest in the 'Green Book' proposals which Ellis Davies tended to support, especially in their amended form.[52] But there were profound misgivings locally as the Liberal 'land van', the vehicle of the Land and Nation League, was seen regularly in the county proclaiming the message of *The Land and the Nation* and not infrequent political meetings were held in the towns and villages.[53]

Almost as soon as the radical proposals of the 'Green Book' had seen the light of day, the frenzied furore of opposition made it clear that substantial modifications were inevitable. There was genuine fear within the Liberal Party at the likely long-term electoral implications of adopting such a socialistic policy initiative and alarm that other Liberal MPs might well follow the example of Sir Alfred Mond and jump ship. 'Will others follow?' asked Walter Runciman, the Liberal MP for Swansea West and the chairman of the influential Radical Group of Liberal MPs, at a dinner of the Eighty Club held at the National Liberal Club on 26 January 1926. Runciman urged his fellow Liberals to press their views whilst remaining within the party's ranks, while politicians within the other political parties, gleefully viewing the intense internal disputes among the Liberals, hailed them as clear evidence of 'the crumbling condition of the Liberals' in the words of ILP activist J. R. Clynes. Clynes eagerly anticipated that defections to the Tories would soon be counterbalanced by 'the march of many Liberals to the ranks of Labour'.[54]

At the Kingsway Hall convention in mid-February the proposed amendments to *The Land and the Nation* were duly approved with but little ado. Fundamentally, the principle of the universality of application of the original proposals was now unceremoniously jettisoned. The proposed County Agricultural Authority was to remain, but it should assume control of the agricultural land only as it became vacant, and not always then. It should take control of land that was 'badly managed or badly farmed', was required for smallholdings, or was surrendered voluntarily, for instance in lieu of death duties. The highly inflammatory concept of 'cultivating tenure' should be adopted only as one means of landholding amongst many – 'Land should be held under a variety of tenures to meet different local conditions'.[55] The much vaunted Land Value Taxation (LVT) was accepted as a major policy in the urban policy adopted, but had no place in the rural policy. Lloyd George soon won the commendation of many of his fellow Liberals for his apparent readiness to compromise and his flexible approach, and his 'unvarying attitude of reason and conciliation' as the *Liberal Magazine* neatly put it.[56] LG was indeed most anxious to get his revised policy approved and then speedily adopted as Liberal Party official policy. In this aim he enjoyed complete success; both the revised 'Green Book' and the original 'Brown Book' proposals were approved, Asquith rejoicing in the introduction of the new elements of 'graduality and elasticity' considered essential by so many within the rural land proposals.[57]

There was genuine fear within the Liberal Party at the likely long-term electoral implications of adopting such a socialistic policy initiative and alarm that other Liberal MPs might well follow the example of Sir Alfred Mond and jump ship.

On the very day following the high-profile Kingsway Hall convention, a leader writer in the *Manchester Guardian* claimed, 'Mr Lloyd George has conceded much, very much, in the interest of party unity'.[58] To some extent the dissension which had wracked his party during recent months, focused mainly on the 'cultivating tenure' policy, generally subsided. It began increasingly to seem that no real electoral dividends were going to be reaped from an emphasis on radical land policies, urban or rural. Limited public interest was aroused by the high-profile activities and propaganda of the Land and Nation League and the thousands of public meetings held. Lloyd George, although heavily criticised for the 'Green Book' proposals, had gained some respect for his apparent readiness to compromise and revise his rural land policies, and for his evident aptitude to draft radical new policies so sorely needed by his party. But the role of the Land and Nation League, which Lloyd George had supported at its establishment to the tune of some £80,000 (so readily donated from his personal war chest the Lloyd George Political Fund), still rankled. Over the next few years it was estimated that no less than £240,000 was made freely available to support the activities of the League in this way. Many Liberals looked askance; they disliked the new policies and they firmly believed that the resources of the fund should be in the hands of the party as a whole.

The rift grew deeper still. Interest in the land question was stimulated throughout the summer by the ongoing propaganda of the Land and Nation League. Six 'land vans' toured many of the rural areas, including one which travelled through north Wales. Handbills and literature were distributed in abundance. In October 1926 the first number of *Land News*, the official monthly publication of the Land and Nation League, was circulated and proved highly popular, demand soon apparently exceeding supply by some 50,000. It was thus agreed to print 250,000 copies of the November issue. From the beginning of 1927 it was distributed in Cardiganshire attached to the

first number of the *Cambrian News*, widely read throughout the county, to be published each month. Soon a carefully prepared Welsh language version entitled *Ein Tir* was available too and, it would seem, avidly read. Local folk, much impressed, eagerly shared copies with their neighbours. Public meetings increased and were generally well attended.[59]

Welsh unity was the theme of the proceedings at the annual meetings of the Welsh National Liberal Foundation in July when Lloyd George spoke powerfully. By the end of the year no fewer than twenty-one 'land vans' under the auspices of the Land and Nation League were operational, and there were some 7,000 speakers being briefed to expound the new land proposals. The vans were often the vocal point of open-air meetings held in numerous villages and towns some of which had witnessed no major Liberal speech since before the Great War. Most of these vans were equipped with loudspeakers and magic lanterns. Indeed the propaganda activities of the burgeoning Land and Nation League appear to have played a key role in several crucial by-elections at this time: Southwark North (March 1927), Bosworth (May 1927), Lancaster (February 1928) and St Ives (March 1928) – all striking gains for the Liberal Party. *Land News*, it was claimed, now had a circulation in excess of 250,000 copies and was widely appreciated.

But successive issues of *Land News* clearly reflected the diminishing significance which Lloyd George attached to the land question as a political issue. From its first number, which was published in October 1926, its primary emphasis was firmly on the exposition of the new Liberal land policies. But from January 1928 onwards it appeared under the control of the Liberal Campaign Committee, and from the beginning of March it was printed in three separate editions, *Mining News*, *Industrial News* and *Land News*, with the last-named devoted solely to the rural divisions. By the autumn it was stated that the specific purpose even of *Land News* was to disseminate Liberal policies more generally rather than to publicise the rural land policies specifically. In its last issues, which saw the light of day during the spring of 1929 (as the general election fast approached), it gave pride of place to the new dramatic Liberal plans for unemployment and agricultural issues were sidelined.[60]

It was clear by the end of 1928 that the land campaigns of 1925–26 had very largely run out of steam, to be supplanted by the campaigns to stimulate industrial recovery and tackle the menacing scourge of unemployment. These achieved a newfound centrality through the publication of the so-called 'Yellow Book', *Britain's Industrial Future*, in February 1928.

Certainly it was very clear by the end of 1928 that the land campaigns of 1925–26 had very largely run out of steam, to be supplanted by the campaigns to stimulate industrial recovery and tackle the menacing scourge of unemployment. These achieved a newfound centrality through the publication of the so-called 'Yellow Book', *Britain's Industrial Future*, in February 1928. Unemployment was by then the political issue which cried out to be tackled – if any electoral success, however modest, might ensue. Certainly, no such rewards were going to be reaped from the 'Green Book' proposals, amended and truncated or not. But it gave the candidates of the other political parties a barbed stick with which to beat the Liberal Party in their election addresses and campaign speeches. As one Conservative candidate in Wales put it, 'Your farm will be nationalized if you vote for a Liberal. Inspectors can turn you off your farm if Liberals get power. Under the Liberal Land Scheme you will be no longer a man, but a cog in a wheel. The Conservatives have given the farmer what he asked for – freedom to run his own farm and entire relief from rates.[61] His colleague for Monmouthshire, Sir Leoline Forestier-Walker, derided the new Liberal agricultural policies as 'simply Socialism decorated up a bit', while at Carmarthen John Coventry dismissed them as 'semi-nationalization'.[62] In some constituencies careful plans were laid for awkward questions to be asked at Liberal political meetings on their land policy – deliberately to embarrass the candidates.[63] The Liberal Party simply could not extricate itself from an unpopular policy statement which it had substantially amended and watered down more than three years earlier. As a result, as might be predicted after the tenor of the Carmarthenshire by-election of June 1928, it would seem likely that some Liberal candidates in the Welsh constituencies in April and May 1929 found their campaign hampered and harmed by the persistent stigma of 'the Green Book' proposals from which the party leadership was by then most anxious to extricate itself and move on to more promising territory and, it fervently hoped, more beneficial results.

Dr J. Graham Jones has recently retired from the post of Senior Archivist and Head of the Welsh Political Archive at the National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth.

1 See especially, Ian Packer, *Lloyd George, Liberalism and the Land: the Land Issue and Party Politics in England, 1906–14* (Boydell Press, 2001).

2 Ellis W. Davies, 'Cwestiwn y tir: agweddau gwahanol y Sais a'r Cymro: sicrwydd daliadaeth a phrynu', *Baner ac Amserau Cymru*, 26 Mawrth 1925.

3 Lloyd George to Frances Stevenson, 20 Aug. 1925, as cited in A. J. P. Taylor (ed.), *My Darling Pussy: the Letters of Lloyd George and Frances Stevenson, 1913–41* (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975), pp. 97–98.

4 Michael Kinnear, *The British Voter: an Atlas and Survey since 1885*, 2nd ed. (Batsford, 1981), pp. 119–20; Michael Dawson, 'The Liberal land policy, 1924–29: electoral strategy and internal division', *20th Century British History* 2, no. 3 (1991), pp. 273–74.

5 *Cambrian News*, 24 July 1925. John Hinds (1862–1928) was the former Liberal MP for Carmarthenshire West from 1910 until 1918 and for Carmarthen from 1918 to 1922. He was also the Lord Lieutenant for Carmarthenshire from 1917 until his death on 23 July 1928.

6 Trevor Wilson (ed.), *The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, 1911–1928* (Collins, 1970), p. 481, diary entry for 1 July 1925.

7 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Lord Oxford and Asquith Papers file 134/199–279.

8 See Roy Douglas, *Land, People & Politics: a History of the Land Question in the United Kingdom* (Allison & Busby, 1976), p. 190.

9 Ibid.

10 David Lloyd George, speech at Killerton Park, Devon, 17 Sept. 1925: *The Times*, 18 Sept. 1925, and the *Manchester Guardian*, 18 Sept. 1925.

11 See the report in *The Nation*, 26 Sept. 1925.

12 See the editorial column 'The Land Report', *Manchester Guardian*, 19 Oct. 1925.

13 *The Land and the Nation: Rural Report of the Liberal Land Committee, 1923–25* (London, 1925), p. 299.

14 Ibid., p. 460.
15 See the editorial column 'Life and land: the great problem: the new policy', *The Observer*, 11 Oct. 1925, published just two days after the appearance in print of *The Land and the Nation*.
16 John Campbell, *Lloyd George: the Goat in the Wilderness, 1922–1931* (Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1977), p. 123.
17 *The Times*, 18 Sept. 1925.
18 See Campbell, *Lloyd George*, p. 123.
19 National Library of Wales (hereafter NLW), E. Morgan Humphreys Papers A/513, R. Humphrey Davies to Humphreys, 8 Nov. 1925.
20 C. S. Orwin and W. R. Peel, *The Tenure of Agricultural Land* (Cambridge University Press, 1925), 3s 6d.
21 C. S. Orwin, 'A critic of the land scheme; objections stated; the farmer's new duties', *Manchester Guardian*, 14 Nov. 1925.
22 Ibid. For a contrary view, a spirited defence of the 'Green Book' proposals, see the article by F. S. Acland in the *Manchester Guardian*, 12 Nov. 1925. Acland's views were considered especially important as he was the representative of a famous Liberal county family, was himself the owner of the extensive Killerton Park estate in Devon, and was the chairman of the influential Agricultural Organisation Society. Moreover he had served throughout its existence as a key member of the Liberal Land Committee and had personally drafted several sections of the report. Another long-term member of the committee, C. F. G. Masterman, also readily weighed in to defend the 'Green Book' proposals – 'Here is at least a courageous and practicable scheme for the redemption of rural England with the assistance of the whole nation. In the lack of any more practical recommendations it holds the field'. (*Manchester Guardian*, 17 Nov. 1925). Interestingly, both Acland and Masterman were traditionally political enemies of Lloyd George, as indeed was Ellis W. Davies, the Liberal MP for Denbighshire since 1923. (See J. Graham Jones, 'Ellis W. Davies MP and Denbighshire politics, 1923–9', *Denbighshire Historical Society Transactions* 59 (2011), pp. 207–41). Lloyd George's conscious decision to include old political adversaries on his land committee is interesting. (See Campbell, *Lloyd George*, p. 99).
23 *Manchester Guardian*, 29 Nov. 1925.
24 British Museum, London, C. P. Scott Papers 50,907/171–82, diary entry for 13 Nov. 1925.
25 Asquith to Lloyd George, 21 Nov. 1925, cited in Trevor Wilson, *The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914–35* (Fontana paperback edition, 1966), pp. 351–52.
26 NLW, E. Morgan Humphreys Papers A/3022, J. Bryn Roberts to Humphreys, 27 Nov. 1925 ('Private'). There is also a draft of this letter, dated 26 Nov. 1925, in NLW, J. Bryn Roberts Papers 630.
27 NLW, E. Morgan Humphreys Papers A/514, R. Humphrey Davies to Humphreys, 1 Dec. 1925 ('Confidential').
28 Lloyd George, speech at the Drill Hall, Coventry, 5 Dec. 1925: *Manchester Guardian*, 7 Dec. 1925.
29 Lloyd George, speech at the Coliseum, Leeds, 12 Dec. 1925: *Manchester Guardian*, 14 Dec. 1925; Lloyd George, speech at the Capitol Theatre, Haymarket, London, 16 Dec. 1925: *Manchester Guardian*, 18 Dec. 1925.
30 *The Times*, 9 Dec. 1925, p. 8, col. g.
31 See Dawson, 'The Liberal land policy, 1924–29', p. 278.
32 Reform Club, London, W. Mc Eager Papers 5, note of meeting on negotiations, 2 Dec. 1925. Eager was the secretary to the Liberal Land Enquiry. A breakdown of the extended negotiations is also available in the Parliamentary Archive, House of Lords, London, Lloyd George Papers G/30/4/54, Harcourt Johnstone to Lloyd George, 1 Dec. 1925.
33 John Davies, 'The end of the great estates and the rise of freehold farming in Wales', *Welsh History Review*, vol. 7, no. 2 (Dec. 1974), pp. 193–94.
34 See the detailed statistics presented ibid., p. 212.
35 Bodleian Library, Oxford, H. A. L. Fisher Papers, Fisher's diary entry for 24 Aug. 1925.
36 Bodleian Library, Oxford, Asquith Papers, vol. 34, ff. 210–14, memorandum by Sir Alfred Mond, 8 Aug. 1925, 'Some notes on the proposed new land policy of Mr. Lloyd George'. See also Hector Bolitho, *Sir Alfred Mond: first Lord Melchett* (Secker, 1930), pp. 258–64.
37 *Carmarthen Journal*, 11 Jan. 1926.
38 *Daily Telegraph*, 26 Jan. 1926.
39 D. M. Harries, 'Carmarthen Politics: the struggle between Liberals and Labour, 1918–60', unpublished University of Wales M.A. thesis (1980), pp. 31–32.
40 NLW, Lord Davies of Llandinam Papers file A1/6, David Davies to Richard Jones, 14 July 1926 (copy).
41 Ibid., Davies to Jones, 15 Nov. 1926 (copy).
42 *Montgomeryshire Express*, 22 Nov. 1927.
43 *Manchester Guardian*, 29 May 1929.
44 *Cambrian News*, 2 Oct. 1925; *Cardigan and Tivy-side Advertiser*, 27 Nov. 1925.
45 Ibid., 29 Jan. 1925.
46 *Cambrian News*, 29 Jan. 1926.
47 Cited in R. Hopkin Morris's obituary in *The Times*, 23 Nov. 1956, p. 13, cols. c–d.
48 NLW, Cardiganshire Liberal Association Records, no. 1, minute book, 1923–50, AGM minutes, 10 June 1926; *Cambrian News*, 18 June 1926; *Welsh Gazette*, 17 June 1926.
49 Bodleian Library, Oxford, H. A. L. Fisher Papers, Fisher's diary entry for 26 Aug. 1924.
50 NLW, Henry Haydn Jones Papers 175, J. C. Davies to Jones, 12 Nov. 1924 ('Private & confidential').
51 *Baner ac Amserau Cymru*, 26 Mawrth 1925.
52 *North Wales Weekly News*, 28 Jan. 1926; *Liverpool Daily Post and Mercury*, 26 Feb. 1926.
53 Denbighshire County Record Office, Ruthin, Denbighshire Conservative Association Records, minute book, minutes of meetings, 30 Sept. and 20 Dec. 1927.
54 Walter Runciman, speech to the Eighty Club dinner at the National Liberal Club, London, 26 Jan. 1926, and J. R. Clynes, speech at York, 26 Jan. 1926: *The Times*, 27 Jan. 1926, p. 9, col. d.
55 *Liberal Magazine*, Jan. 1926.
56 *Liberal Magazine*, March 1926.
57 Newcastle-upon-Tyne University Library, Walter Runciman Papers 204, H. H. Asquith to Runciman, 20 Feb. 1926, as cited in Campbell, *Lloyd George*, p. 128.
58 *Manchester Guardian*, 20 Feb. 1926.
59 *Cambrian News*, 22 Oct. 1926.
60 See Dawson, 'The Liberal land policy, 1924–29', p. 280.
61 Election address of Captain Alan Graham, Conservative candidate for Denbighshire, May 1929.
62 L. Forestier-Walker, speech at Abergavenny, 29 May 1929: *Western Mail*, 30 May 1929; John Coventry, speech at Talley, Carmarthenshire, 14 May 1929: *Carmarthen Journal*, 17 May 1929.
63 See J. Graham Jones, *David Lloyd George and Welsh Liberalism* (National Library of Wales, 2010), p. 278.



Richard Livsey died in September 2010. He was elected Liberal MP for Brecon & Radnor in the 1985 by-election, lost the seat in 1992 and then regained it in 1997. On standing down in 2001, he was ennobled as Baron Livsey of Talgarth. He led the Welsh Liberal Democrats from 1988 to 1992 and from 1997 to 2001. As well as being a central figure in Welsh Liberal politics, his main success was to build Brecon & Radnor into a Liberal Democrat stronghold; it is now represented by Kirsty Williams in the Welsh Assembly and by Roger Williams in Westminster. **Russell Deacon** interviewed him in March 2003.

RICHARD LIVSEY

What are your earliest political memories?

I can recall the 1945 general election when I was ten years old. My memories of the time are around the Brecon and Radnor constituency. In that wartime election, a former miner, Tudor Watkins, was the victorious Labour candidate. Oscar Guest was the Conservative candidate. He had previously been the Coalition Liberal MP for Loughborough and was a first cousin of Winston Churchill. To a ten year old he came across as very formal. The Liberal candidate, David Lewis, was a Breconshire county councillor and later chairman of the Education Committee. We came a distant third then with less than half of the vote of Tudor Watkins. Although the constituency party was sound at that time, mainly under Alderman Lewis's guidance, we wouldn't fight the seat there for another decade. Breconshire was very political but was always split three ways between the three political parties.

The big influence on the Liberals was T. O. Davies, Principal of Tregan College, an active Liberal by nature and family tradition, a Nonconformist. In rural Wales the Nonconformists were Liberal, in Glamorgan and Monmouthshire and industrial areas they were Labour. Politics at that time had polarised into Labour and Liberal areas depending on your religion.

What are your earliest campaigning memories?

I think they were the direct action campaigns in Brecon and Radnor. These were over reservoirs they were planning to build to supply water to England. I was inspired by the passion that those campaigning had to defend the countryside that they loved.

During this period (1945–60) I came across a number of the Liberal political legends of the post-war period. I got to know Professor Seaborne Davies, the Liberal MP who had taken over David Lloyd George's old Caernarvon Boroughs seat for a brief period in 1945. I met him as he was conducting a Commission on the establishment of an Agricultural College for Wales. Although we didn't speak much politics, I was impressed by him both as a speaker and listener.

Another Liberal I came a cross was Roderic Bowen MP (Cardiganshire 1945–1966). He was very good speaker at Liberal Party meetings, but his legal career interfered with his political life. He had established a good reputation for helping campaign on social issues. When he became a Deputy Speaker in the House of Commons he distanced himself from the party in Wales and elsewhere. We never saw him after he lost his seat in 1966. He didn't even contact Geraint Howells when he won his old seat back again in 1974.

Sir Rhys Hopkin Morris (Carmarthenshire 1945–1957) was a sound middle-of-the-road Liberal. He was greatly respected across Wales but was, on the whole, an independent-minded MP. Morris was the first MP to make a speech against the monoculture

of softwood trees when they were being planted in Wales in the 1950s. His concern for the countryside greatly impressed me. Both he and Roderic Bowen were mainly concerned with their own seats and legal careers and therefore we didn't see them much elsewhere in Wales.

The Montgomeryshire MP and Liberal Party leader Clement Davies had a huge influence on Brecon and Radnor. He was also keen on establishing a Welsh parliament, as was I. This appeal to the Welsh cause meant also that natural Plaid Cymru voters came over to him. Davies spoke a lot around Wales about the need for a Welsh parliament and many other Liberal causes. Although he wasn't always that good a speaker, he could draw a substantial crowd. I recall one meeting in 1959 in Builth Wells in which we had over 300 people in attendance. Davies was also a practical politician planning for the future. In this respect he selected Emlyn Hooson as his successor three years before his death. This helped Emlyn build up his profile in the seat and go on to win it in 1962. Our first post-war by-election win.

Your own involvement in politics up to 1979?

I was asked to be a candidate in 1960 for Brecon and Radnor but I couldn't get the money needed to fight the seat. This meant that there was no Liberal candidate in 1964, just as there hadn't been one in 1959. The campaigning I was involved in was therefore nearly always in other constituencies. The 1966 Carmarthen by-election which launched Plaid Cymru's Gwynfor Evans on the political scene was one us Welsh Liberals felt we could have won. Hywel Davies, our candidate, was a well-known ITV commentator (also Welsh speaking, and local). I had written a letter to Liberal News the week before the election stating that the Liberals had lost contact with the locals and therefore couldn't expect to win the seat. This was published on the same day as the election result showed us coming a distant third. I think as Welsh Liberals this was probably our lowest point.

After being a development officer for ICI between 1961 and 1967, I became a farm manager on Blairdrummond Estate in Perthshire for nearly four years. Whilst up in Scotland I fought the Perth and East Perthshire constituency in the 1970 general election. I came fourth but managed to get over 3,000 votes in a traditional Unionist seat.

Whereas Jo Grimond had caused something of a political revival in Scotland this wasn't occurring in Wales. I reflected hard on what was happening in Scotland. Here I found the organisation in many ways similar, but the constituencies were much further ahead in their planning. In the Welsh elections Geraint Howells fought Brecon and Radnor and was the first Liberal candidate there since 1955. After his experience in Brecon and Radnor, Geraint decided to reorganise the Welsh party. Policy formulation became more structured. Hooson was being asked to do too much. He was Defence spokesman, Welsh party leader and there were only six Liberal MPs at Westminster then.

A Welsh Office Liberal Party headquarters was established in Aberystwyth, an organiser was appointed called Emlyn Thomas. He organised the party well for the first year but following that it was done badly, the money dried up and bills weren't paid. Thomas later became a Conservative and stood against Geraint in 1979, coming second. It was Emlyn and Hooson's revival of the party that was crucial in Geraint's 1974 victory, retaking the Carmarthen seat. The political impetus came from Emyln and the practical from Geraint, although much of their campaigning only had an impact in rural Wales and we failed to progress into urban Wales.

In the autumn of 1973, I was interviewed by the Brecon and Radnor Liberal Association and I was approved as a candidate. In the end I had to decline their invitation because of my academic studies. I then went to Reading University to undertake an agricultural course there, an MSc; during this time the lecturer Dr Noel K. Thomas was selected to fight the Brecon and Radnor seat in 1974. In the first election that year he improved slightly on Geraint's 1970 result by getting nearly 20 per cent of the vote, but in the second election his vote fell back again. I wasn't in Brecon and Radnor for that election, however, as I had gone to Cardigan to help Geraint Howells win the seat. He defeated Elystan Morgan (Labour MP). He did this because Howells in the late 1960s and early 1970s gained a lot of support on Welsh issues in the seat. Elystan Morgan was at the time seen as the 'bright young hope of the Labour Party' in Wales. Morgan a decade before had left Plaid Cymru, which caused much bitterness amongst Plaid Cymru supporters and therefore Geraint was able to capitalise on the Plaid Cyrmu vote. Plaid Cymru never forgave Morgan for leaving the party. Geraint was a shrewd political operator, he knew exactly what was going on and drew the vote to him.

On the night of the 1 March 1979 at the referendum count, I was the only 'Yes' representative at the Tenby count. It was forty-five minutes before I saw a 'Yes' vote.

What did you do in the St David's Day Welsh Assembly referendum of 1979?

I did most of my campaigning in Pembrokeshire where I had also now been selected as the parliamentary candidate. Before the election I had spoken in a debate at Haverfordwest with both Dafydd Wigley MP and Denzil Davies MP. In the debate, because I wasn't an MP, I ended up being the sixth speaker. By the time I got to speak the others had said everything worth saying both for and against the referendum. I therefore just spoke about my rural upbringing and why I would have to leave Wales to get a decent job if the Assembly wasn't forthcoming. I went out campaigning most often with a teacher called Alan Evans. He would later on that year be the unsuccessful Labour candidate for Pembroke, the same seat I was standing in (he would later join the SDP). We went around every door in Mathry trying to draw up support and all said 'no'. Evans was disgusted and kept on saying 'Bloody No-voting Welsh speakers'. We thought at least the Welsh speakers would support an Assembly but we were wrong.

On the night of the 1 March 1979 at the referendum count, I was the only 'Yes' representative at the Tenby count. It was forty-five minutes before I saw a 'Yes' vote. Most Liberal voters and everyone else voted 'No'. Only the box from the village of Maenclochog was overwhelming 'Yes'. In hindsight I felt it was the wrong time for a referendum. It was simply used as a way of voting against an unpopular Labour government and Tories milked this fully.

In that year's election it soon became clear that the Lib–Lab pact, although it was now over, hadn't gone down at all well in Wales. We

Liberals were seen to prop them up. We were tarred with the same brush as Labour and as a result we went backwards in Wales electorally, with Emlyn losing his Montgomeryshire seat and Geraint being our sole MP.

What do you remember of the rise of Alliance?

Due to the poor leadership of Michael Foot (Bleanau Gwent) a lot people were attracted to the new politics of the Liberals. The SDP were a totally different type of people. Some were quite aggressive; others were quite friendly; many had absolutely no experience of politics at all. What they did give us was an important new impetus. This was because many were active in the world of business and they also had a large membership on the ground in the south-Wales urban constituencies which we hadn't been in for decades. They were also well up in publishing, printing and campaigning techniques, which the Liberals in Wales often lacked. The balance of membership in rural seats, however, still remained predominantly Liberal. In Brecon and Radnorshire, for example, I recall there were 150 Liberal members in and 1983 and twenty-seven SDP. In a 1981 I became Brecon and Radnor candidate.

In 1982 there was a by-election in the Gower constituency caused by the death of the Labour MP, Ifor Davies. It was the first trial of strength for the SDP in Wales. This was very much an SDP election; Mark Soady was probably the election agent. The campaign was run by the SDP, with the Liberals only helping to campaign. However, Gwynoro Jones, the SDP candidate, was still remembered as Labour defector and the Conservative candidate was able to split the vote between us and them. The fact that Gareth Wardell, the Labour candidate, was known in the seat beforehand (he had been agent there) helped Labour. He was also quite popular locally. Thatcher's post-Falklands-War popularity also helped split the vote to the Tories. Gwynoro came second with a quarter of the vote but he was still way behind Wardell.

How did you progress into Brecon and Radnor as the candidate?

In 1979, the constituency had been split as to whether to select a candidate at all. The subsequent bitterness between both sides took some time to heal, and I was instrumental in bringing the two sides back together. It was at this time that I was selected to be their next candidate and I started to build up the constituency there, with the help of Geraint. I was still, at this time, working in the Welsh College of Agriculture at Llanbadarn Fawr.

In 1982 there was a meeting of the Boundary Commission to review the boundaries of Montgomeryshire, and Brecon and Radnorshire. This was in Llandrindod Wells. Labour wanted the existing boundaries kept. This included the strong Labour supporting areas of Brynmawr and Cefn Coed (Merthyr Tydfil). There were about 10,000 Labour votes there. Tom Hooson, the sitting Conservative MP argued for Brecon to go in with Monmouth, which would have created an enormous Conservative stronghold. Radnorshire would go to Montgomery, which would make Montgomery a Conservative seat. Councillor Gareth Morgan and myself both submitted evidence saying 'this is ridiculous, there are five local authorities currently operating in Brecon and Radnorshire and the new constituency should follow the boundaries of the existing county'. This was what the Commission implemented and the result was that the political centre of gravity was changed away from the Labour urban areas to the rural ones. Then in the following year's election I came a close third to Labour's David Morris, yet Tom Hooson still had a massive majority of nearly 9,000 votes.

For the more famous 1985 by-election I had already been working the seat for some time. I was still working in Aberystwyth prior to the by-election. I was walking down The Parade when a car pulled up and the window rolled down. It was Geraint Howells. He told me that Tom Hooson was seriously ill and that I should prepare for a by-election. He was right, as Hooson died shortly afterwards.

At the end of May I was selected as the Liberal candidate for the seat once more. Geraint backed me from the very start of the campaign to its end, he always insisted that we could do it. Years later there was an assumption that Brecon and Radnor, like Montgomeryshire and Cardiganshire had always had a strong Liberal tradition but this was not the case. We hadn't held a seat there since before the war.

Years later there was an assumption that Brecon and Radnor, like Montgomeryshire and Cardiganshire had always had a strong Liberal tradition but this was not the case. We hadn't held a seat there since before the war.

I was helped in winning the by-election by a number of factors:

- I had strong family connections with the seat: my father had been born in Brecon and my mother had been a headmistress and a teacher in Talgarth, a town in the constituency.
- I had built up the constituency organisation and had spent the previous two years both getting to know the constituency and getting those in the constituency to be aware of me.
- I was able to get the full support of the Liberal-Alliance and able to get the help of one the most senior Liberals, Andrew Ellis, as my agent.
- The successful review of the boundaries had removed a lot of the Labour vote and made the seat far more vulnerable to the Liberal vote.
- The previous Labour candidate, David Morris, who had come second in the seat in 1983, had now been elected to the European Parliament. This meant that Labour's new candidate Dr Richard Willey would not have the time to develop the constituency. In addition Willey was closeted from the press through much of the campaign, as the Labour Party had become fearful of what it saw as a mainly Tory press. Perhaps this was something to with Peter Mandelson, as this was also his first election contest for Labour.
- The final piece of good news was the fact that although the Welsh Conservatives wanted the election in September or October in order to build up the chances for there candidate, Dr Chris Butler, the Conservative government actually moved the writ on 10 June for it to be on 4 July. Butler had no direct link with the constituency and would be unable to build much of a rapport with the voters in the few weeks he had left to campaign.

During the campaign we concentrated our campaigning against the Conservatives. Towards the end of the campaign the polls were

indicating that it was between us and Labour. We made sure that we visited every farm and house in the constituency. Something the others just didn't do. David Steel was really supportive in the campaign and attracted huge crows to listen to him speak. When the election occurred on 'Independence Day', 4 July 1985, we beat Labour by 554 votes. The Tories were more than 3,000 votes behind. This was a great election victory not only for me and the Welsh Liberals, but also for the Alliance across the UK.

What do you remember of the 1987 general election and the subsequent Liberal–SDP merger?

I think it would have been better in 1987 if there had been no independent SDP. The Alliance was no longer as strong as it had been, and standing as a Liberal candidate proved to be of a better advantage. We no longer had the money and resources we once had. Both Labour and the Conservatives heavily outspent us in this election in Wales and the results showed.

We had to merge because there was no longer any reason to be apart. The Liberals, however, retained the dominant position in Wales. The SDP weren't able to get any MPs and few councillors elected in Wales. Although most of the SDP merged in Wales easily, the continued existence of the Owenites mudded the waters. At the Richmond by-election in England, the SDP helped the Liberals lose and William Hague get in for the Conservatives. There was also a huge hostility to them across Wales. Many in the Labour Party hated what they saw as the 'SDP traitors'. Liberals were not treated with the same brush and we retained more cordial relations with Labour MPs.

Why did you become leader of the Welsh party in 1988?

I said that the leadership was too early for me at this time, but Geraint Howells insisted. I wanted the party to be a great deal more organised. I wanted it to cover the whole of Wales. I wanted to get MPs elected in Cardiff, Swansea and Wrexham to join the rural Liberal Democrats. The old division in Wales, which had occurred between the North and South Wales Liberals federations continued in practice, with a split between the north and south. I was keen to remove this barrier: I wanted to get rural and urban members in – and to get more women in. When I was leader more women contested elections for the Liberals than ever before. This helped them get valuable experience although it wasn't until 1999 and the Welsh Assembly elections that we got our first females elected.

Why were you the only Welsh MP in 1988 not to support Alan Beith in the federal leadership election over Paddy Ashdown?

I was a close friend of Alan Beith but I still believed that Ashdown had greater potential. He was a different kind of leader. Steel had got involved in Wales during election times; his helicopter tours to Ceredigion during election time were very useful. Ashdown was much more active within Wales, though. There was a large Liberal faction in favour of Beith in Wales, as he was seen as a traditional Liberal. Ashdown's disciplined lifestyle, however, had made him a greater political force. Therefore I got involved in Ashdown's campaign from the very start. During the campaign we met in his flat in London every morning. Thankfully, although the first few years were not that fruitful, Ashdown's leadership provided us with some of our greatest post-war successes.

In the 1989 Pontypridd by-election Tom Ellis lost his deposit; Frank Levers lost his in the 1989 Vale of Glamorgan by-election. Yet Frances David gained a quarter of the vote in the 1991 Monmouth by-election. Why was this?

I went and campaigned in all three of these Welsh by-elections, on an almost daily basis. In Pontypridd, Labour's Dr Kim Howells was a seen as being a very good candidate and a hard act to defeat. Although the seat had a strong Liberal tradition, Tom Ellis was seen as an outsider from the SDP. Labour resented this former Labour MP standing in the seat and this made them campaign all the harder.

In the Vale of Glamorgan, Frank Levers' lost deposit was quite a shock. The SDP had done well in the seat in 1987 general election. But for this election there were not enough activists in the constituency and this was reflected in the poor vote.

I was a close friend of Alan Beith but I still believed that Ashdown had greater potential. He was a different kind of leader.

In the Monmouthshire by-election, Frances David was suitable for a largely rural seat like this. She was an excellent candidate and a seasoned campaigner. People were fed up with the Tories at this time and they came across to us in droves. This was a much more rural seat like those we held in Mid Wales and we felt at home here. Frances's vote reflected this fact.

In the 1992 general election you lost your seat and Geraint Howells lost his Ceredigion seat. Why was this?

In Brecon and Radnorshire our vote actually increased, but so did the Conservatives', which meant that Jonathan Evans won. I felt that the issue of hunting had been the decisive factor. The Tories campaigned on this issue strongly. I had always been pro-hunting but this didn't become evident enough in the campaign and it cost me the vital votes I needed to keep the seat. Also, during the campaign I put too much time in as the Welsh party leader in other constituencies. This was at the expense of my own constituency and my support there suffered.

In Ceredigion it was felt that Geraint had stood for one election too many. Plaid Cymru also targeted the constituency and the hunting issue was important there too, transferring some votes to the Tories. We also had no idea that there would be such a surge in the Plaid Cymru vote. It was one of the largest swings to Plaid Cymru up until that time.

How did you regain your Brecon and Radnorshire seat in 1997?

After my defeat I spent a lot of time unemployed before I was able to find some work with the Agricultural Training Board. Then in 1985 I left the board and spent the next two and a half years working in the constituency. Both the Welsh and the Federal party targeted the seat, which gave us a lot of resource there. We were also able to do a private opinion poll in the seat that meant we could target the messages we needed to win the seat. The three agents I had in my career at Brecon and Radnorshire – Willie Griffith in 1983, Celia Thomas in 1987 and 1992, and finally James Gibson Watt in 1997 – were also instrumental in winning back the seat. When [in 1997] the result was announced the following day, it was the last result

in Wales. My victory there ensured that Wales became 'Tory free' for the first time since 1906.

What was your role in the 1997 Welsh Assembly referendum?

This referendum and the resulting 'Yes' vote majority, which led to the establishment of the Welsh Assembly, was the height of my political career. During the campaign the political parties worked well together. The eastern part of Wales in this campaign was still largely hostile to the idea of a Welsh Assembly. We had to campaign therefore to try and get as much of the 'Yes' vote out as possible. The legacy of Tory rule in Wales helped the 'Yes' campaign. The organisation of the 'Yes' campaign was also much better than the 'No' campaign. All of this helped us get a narrow 'Yes' win.

Did you consider standing for the Welsh Assembly elections?

I had considered standing myself for the Assembly but I felt I would I would be too old to stand in the 2003 elections, which was the first opportunity I had to stand down from Westminster. There would have been no point in starting a political career then. For the 1999 Assembly elections I thought Roger Williams would be the candidate for Brecon and Radnorshire. In the event Kirsty Williams became the candidate because she had campaigned so effectively in winning the nomination in 1998.

In the 1999 Federal leadership election, why did you back Kennedy when the bulk of the Welsh party supported Hughes?

I was a good personal friend of Simon Hughes. He was also a good friend of the Welsh party. Charles Kennedy, however, was a better-known television performer and he presented himself as a good and popular leader. He had a good knowledge of the rural economy, which was import to both me and Brecon and Radnorshire. I felt he was 'the right man for the time'.

Professor Russell Deacon is lecturer in Politics and History at Coleg Gwent and an Honorary Research Fellow at Swansea University. He has written extensively on Welsh Liberal and Liberal Democrat history, including a full history of the party.

REPORT

Survival and Success: Twenty-Five Years of the Liberal Democrats

Conference fringe meeting, 15 September 2013, with Duncan Brack, John Curtice, Mark Pack and Julie Smith; chair: Lord Ashdown

Report by **Douglas Oliver**

On Sunday 15 September 2013, at the Liberal Democrat Conference in Glasgow, the History Group celebrated the party's first quarter-century with a discussion of its successes and failures, across a series of key criteria, in the years from its foundation on 3 March 1988.

Introducing the meeting from the chair, Paddy Ashdown – who was elected the party's first leader in July 1988 – spoke of the importance of history and of his admiration for the group's study of Liberal Democrat history: 'If we don't remember our past we are condemned to repeat it!' Ashdown reminded the 100-strong audience at the Campanile Hotel that the difficulties of the party's early years cast the party's current mid-term-government unpopularity into a relatively positive light; in the late 1980s, after the party's formation from the remnants of the Alliance, the position of the Social and Liberal Democrats in one opinion poll was above zero by a statistically insignificant amount, and in the spring of 1989, the party fell below the Green Party in elections to the European Parliament.

In order to cover the scope of the period, four themes were identified for discussion: party leadership; psephology; the nature of the Liberal Democrat voter; and the evolution in campaigning and the shape of policy. The four topics were introduced respectively by Duncan Brack, current vice-chair of the Liberal Democrat Federal Policy Committee; well-known psephologist Professor John Curtice, of the University of Strathclyde; Mark Pack, former editor of the Liberal Democrat Voice blog and head of digital campaigning in the 2005 election; and Julie Smith, Cambridge councillor and vice-chair of the Federal Policy Committee.

Duncan Brack outlined the scope of discussion. The seminar was designed to help build on topics discussed in the History Group's 2011 book *Peace, Reform and Liberation* and help ferment the thoughts of three of the speakers, in readiness for their contribution to a forthcoming special edition of the *Journal*.

In broad terms, Brack outlined six key reasons for the party's survival and improved circumstances from its unpropitious beginning in 1988. First, local government representation: the growing town hall base throughout the 1990s served as an important positive-conditioning factor affecting voters' attitudes to the party. Second, Westminster by-elections: victories in places like Eastbourne in 1990 and Brent East in 2006 were instrumental in developing the party's momentum and confidence. Third, targeting: a better focus on areas of political potential helped the party overcome its long-standing problem of vote dispersal. Fourth, leadership: the largely positive images held by Liberal Democrat leaders helped the party as a whole maintain a positive image. Fifth, policy: this provided a constructive foundation to back up and strengthen the public's favourable impression of the party. Finally, the decline of two-party politics: a broader factor affecting the party's status – and reinforced by the image of the party as seeking to rise above class politics – was the electorate's increasing eschewal of the Conservative and Labour parties, whose combined vote share fell to below two-thirds of the total in 2010.

Focusing on leadership, Brack argued that the media shadow cast by the Conservative and Labour

parties, and Britain's consequent 'two-and-a-half-party' system, meant that the role of Liberal Democrat leader was particularly crucial. Leading a 'liberal' party was, he noted, perhaps inevitably difficult to manage. As Ashdown had described upon his retirement from the role in 1999: '[Liberal Democrats are] inveterately sceptical of authority, often exasperating to the point of dementia, as difficult to lead where they don't want to go as a mule …'. In order to overcome these challenges, Brack outlined a series of key competencies for a potential job brief: internal and external communication skills, a distinct message, management skills, self-belief, and stamina. Finally, it was important that despite the party's occasional disdain, and as long as the membership could at least show respect for their leader, the critical factor in the party–leader relationship was that the leader loved their party and its principles, rather than necessarily the other way around.

With Paddy Ashdown sitting beside him, Brack praised the former Yeovil MP for the extent to which he matched this job description. His effective communication skills, and his immense energy and enthusiasm had served as a catalyst in pulling the party upward from its low post-merger base. Though reform in Westminster failed – the key goal of 'The Project', initiated by Ashdown and Tony Blair – following the Labour landslide in 1997, with hindsight his efforts could largely be considered, Brack felt, to be a worthwhile gamble.

Brack gave a more variable assessment of Charles Kennedy, who succeeded Ashdown in August 1999. Positing an 'iron law' of politics, he argued that parties tended to choose leaders as different as possible from their predecessors. Where Ashdown was driven and intense, Kennedy was relaxed and laid-back. He could, nevertheless, be a good communicator who came across as an 'ordinary guy'. While Brack felt that Kennedy demonstrated notably sound strategic judgement with his decision to abandon the Joint Consultative Committee with Labour after 2001, and to tackle the Tories successfully at the Romsey by-election in 2000, his leadership was – he believed – often 'unfocused and prone to drift'. While Kennedy was lucky with events, such as the other two parties' support for the unpopular Iraq War, and although he responded well to urgent political priorities, he was prone to extended periods of inertia during times of relative political quiet. In 2005 there was a feeling that although the general election had brought modest political progress, the party could have done better if the leader had shown greater drive. Whilst Kennedy was of course affected by his drinking problems, Brack felt that his difficulties as leader were not due to primarily to alcolho, but were inherent, particularly in the period after 2003. Ashdown contested certain aspects of Brack's analysis, stating his belief that Kennedy 'was a brilliant communicator, well suited to the times'.

Leading a 'liberal' party was, he noted, perhaps inevitably difficult to manage. As Ashdown had described upon his retirement from the role in 1999: '[Liberal Democrats are] inveterately sceptical of authority, often exasperating to the point of dementia, as difficult to lead where they don't want to go as a mule …'.

Brack was more positive about the leadership of Menzies Campbell, Kennedy's successor in 2006, despite his lack of luck with the political weather. Campbell was a much better party manager, implementing policy changes in areas such as taxation, climate change, energy and schooling, that went on to become key elements of government policy after the 2010 election. However, Brack felt that Campbell was ultimately hamstrung by communication failures in his early period as leader, and brutal treatment at the hands of the press, which meant that his successes were never sufficiently appreciated. Ashdown asserted at this point that leaders takes two forms: 'position-takers', including the likes of Margaret Thatcher, David Owen and himself – taking positions and sticking to them – and 'positioners', of whom Kennedy and David Steel were strong examples, carefully positioning the party to its best advantage in the political environment. Ultimately, Ashdown claimed, the party benefited from the sagacious choice of the party membership: 'they have always made an excellent choice of leader!'

Mark Pack contributed to *Peace, Reform and Liberation*, and is well known within the party for his political blogging and his expertise in political campaigns. In 2012 he released his book *101 Ways to Win an Election*, inspired in part by his years of experience working in campaigns at Liberal Democrat head office. In considering the Liberal Democrats' overall campaign strategy, Pack emphasised the importance of the party's neighbourhood brand of politics, citing it as a key reason for the party's development and electoral success since 1988. He also hailed the radical impact the Liberal Democrat approach has had on the way the other parties now fight campaigns: 'we may not have broken the mould of politics [as the Gang of Four hoped in 1981], but we have broken the mould of campaigning in this country'.

In the present period, the Liberal Democrats use 'micro-targeting' to focus on issues that affect people in a small area and are very local to people's lives. So-called 'pavement politics' has been spearheaded by the *Focus* leaflet, writing about issues such as local public transport and potholes in the roads. Pack acknowledged that the tone of such campaigning is often not as 'aspirational' as Liberal Democrats might like: 'We want to change the world'. However, the evolution in campaigning since 1988 had left a transformative legacy, and was, Pack felt, central to Liberal Democrat success in 2010. Pack explained that, until the 1970s, Liberals fighting in target seats would typically only deliver three leaflets during a whole campaign. Today, in such battleground constituencies, daily delivery rounds to each address are very common.

Another big change in campaign strategy over recent decades, accelerated since 1988, is the way that the Liberal Democrats now focus on seats where they might realistically win. Pack explained that 'targeting' had begun in the early 1970s under Jeremy Thorpe, but it was on a small scale compared to the strategy the Liberal Democrats developed in the 1990s. As a result of it, the party was able to overcome its problem of vote dispersal, achieving a 1997 breakthrough result which doubled its Westminster representation, despite actually losing over 1 per cent of its nationwide vote share.

Like Columbus' upright egg, such changes seem obvious with the benefit of hindsight, but required vision and foresight to secure their initial adoption. That said, Pack identified four factors that had changed in recent years, and which previously might have precluded the current Liberal Democrat campaign strategy. First, election

swings were more uniform in immediate post-war period: with voter allegiance to the other two parties based more tightly on class than it is today, it was harder to woo a more limited pool of floating voters. In contrast to much of the last century, voters are now more open to partisan heterogeneity and therefore more open to effective targeting. Second, defeat bred a defeatist attitude: where expectations were low, even running a candidate in a constituency was considered a form of success – as late as 1970, the Liberals only contested 322 Westminster seats. Finally, and perhaps counter-intuitively, the quirky nature of larger-than-life personalities like Clement Freud or Cyril Smith, had disadvantages, as it led to a false sense that without a stand-out personality, the party was unable to replicate success elsewhere.

Pack concluded that the catalysts involved in bringing about the revolution in the party's campaign strategy were the personal drive of Paddy Ashdown and chief executive Chris Rennard in the 1990s. Thanks to their focus on the campaign methods described above, the party was able to treble its ratio of seats to vote share in 1997. Pack lauded their commitment to providing support from the centre while balancing the need for local campaign groups to focus on issues flexibly and independently. Ultimately, the change of gear in campaigning over the quarter-century to 2013 altered British politics significantly: although a coalition might have occurred without it, Pack felt it was unlikely that the Liberal Democrats would have had so much leverage over Conservative policy in the absence of the Lib Dem MPs elected as a result of it. As testament to this change, the big campaign danger for the Liberal Democrats, Pack felt, looking to 2015 and beyond, is that the two other parties will learn from its success, and start utilising 'two-horse race' bar charts of their own.

Professor John Curtice is a nationally renowned psephologist, based at Strathclyde University. Ashdown introduced him by saying that he spoke with the kind of authority and sagacity that always made his 'ears prick up'. Curtice was an architect of the famously precise 2010 general election exit poll, which accurately predicted the party's loss of seats; he began his discussion by describing how he had followed the fortunes of the party and its rivals, from a disinterested vantage point, for much of his professional life. Curtice stated that he wished to use the discussion to delineate the evolution of the party's vote since the late 1980s.

Describing the typical perception of the party at its inception, Curtice argued that the Liberal Democrats saw themselves as anti-class, and consequently lacked a definite social constituency, hoping to be equally popular (or unpopular) throughout the country, and across its demographic groupings. Seeking to appeal to the entire population from a position in the political centre ground, the party was consequently prone to unique challenges and opportunities; one facet of this was that it accrued advantages in terms of public political sympathy, but disadvantages in terms of a lack of political distinctiveness. Thinly dispersed around the nation, the Liberal Democrat vote also appeared volatile and uncommitted: 'it was often a protest – a point of departure – with the result that most people had voted Lib Dem at some point in their lives; just not, unfortunately, all at the same time!'

Curtice sought to examine these perceptions and whether they had changed in recent years. Whilst stating that there was not much difference between Lib Dem support amongst ABC and DE voters in 1987 – 26 per cent to 20 per cent – he felt that the slight emphasis toward the former reflected the relative attachment of the party to the middle classes, and this had not changed during the last quarter-century. By 2010, however, 33 per cent of those who had been university educated voted Liberal Democrat, while amongst those with no educational qualifications at all the party received only 14 per cent. The connection between the party and the educated middle classes therefore remained close, at least until 2010. Another factor that remained unchanged, obviously, was the even geographical dispersal of the party's vote.

The biggest change that Curtice said he could identify in twenty-five years was the loss of alignment with the Nonconformist vote.

Pack concluded that the catalysts involved in bringing about the revolution in the party's campaign strategy were the personal drive of Paddy Ashdown and chief executive Chris Rennard in the 1990s. Thanks to their focus on the campaign methods described above, the party was able to treble its ratio of seats to vote share in 1997.

However, this was little more than incidental, as by the start of this decade, it was very unclear that there was any significant sense of Nonconformist identity left within the UK: 'it is not a reflection of Liberalism – in truth there are few Nonconformists left!'

Curtice argued that the evolution of the party on the left–right and big state–small state spectrum was one of the most interesting dynamics since 1987. In that year's election, polling evidence indicated that the typical Alliance voter was to the left of the Conservatives and to the right of Labour, near the middle of the political compass, but still slightly closer to the latter than the former. Nonetheless Curtice stated that it was a myth that the Tory success in the 1980s was caused by the Alliance splitting the vote. The conception from the 1950s and 1960s, that the Old Liberals were allied to Toryism, retained some salience in the public mind: 52 per cent of Liberal and SDP voters in 1983 said their second choice would have been Conservative, compared to a figure 20 per cent lower for the Labour Party.

However, things changed throughout the 1990s, and the party's previous aim of equidistance was abandoned progressively during the leadership of Paddy Ashdown. In 1992 the party decided to focus on raising income tax to fund education; in the run-up to the 1997 election, Ashdown talked openly about a new form of progressive politics to usurp Conservatism. The growing focus on anti-Conservatism and social liberalism was reflected, Curtice argued, in the voting patterns shown at the 1997 election: 64 per cent of Liberal Democrat voters stated that their second alternative would be Labour. This trend developed further once Tony Blair's government took office, and in the years surrounding the Iraq War and Charles Kennedy's leadership, the party faced the 2001 and 2005 elections aiming at a similar centre-left voter 'market' to Labour.

Curtice determined that this perceived movement to the centre-left and statism, intentional or otherwise, made the party extremely vulnerable when it came to sharing power with Britain's main party of the centre-right. Despite the slight rightward evolution of the party's

political platform under Menzies Campbell and Nick Clegg – which saw social democratic policies like the 50p tax rate on earnings over £100,000 dropped – the party's 'market' in the electorate was still seen as being much more similar to Labour's and the left. This meant, in Curtice's view, that adapting economic policy in the late summer of 2010 in line with the plans of the deficit-focused Tories was always likely to be difficult.

In this context, Curtice delivered a conclusion almost totally lacking in political sanguinity for the Liberal Democrats. In his view, over the twenty-five-year period the party had made virtually no progress in terms of reducing its electoral volatility, and in relying too much on the politics of protest, the party had become extremely vulnerable to the challenges of incumbency once it entered government. Acknowledging the importance of local government power, as described by Brack and Pack, Curtice pointed out that most of the party's progress since the 1970s at town hall level had been all but removed by midterm hammerings in 2011, 2012 and 2013. One third of the whole Liberal Democrat voter base from 2010 was now inclined to vote Labour. Curtice accepted that the party was performing better in areas with incumbent MPs and an associated favourable political 'microclimate', but the difference was, so far, very small: in seats with MPs the Lib Dem vote has declined by 10.5 per cent, compared to an average national drop of 12 per cent. The only thin lining of silver that Curtice claimed to be able to offer was the fact that the Tory boundary review had been stopped, thus preserving the existing constituency boundaries in which local Liberal Democrat MPs can foster their community's affection.

Paddy Ashdown (who is leading the party's 2015 election campaign) accepted the difficult situation Curtice described, but challenged the degree of his pessimism. Whilst incumbency can lead to the charge of culpability in a nation's difficulty, it also provides the potential boon of enhanced credibility – a particular asset for the Liberal Democrats who had often been tarred with the accusation of being a 'wasted vote'. Ashdown declared that 'for the first time in ninety years, Liberals will have the chance to talk about the positive policies we have implemented in government; as the election gets closer it is our job to make that message clearer'.

Cambridge councillor and academic Julie Smith offered concluding remarks about the party's policy-making process, and the degree to which the party's various stances intersect with the imagination and awareness of the wider public. Smith pointed out that each member of the panel, with the exception of Curtice, had at one point served on the party's Federal Policy Committee. She felt that from that position of relative political enthusiasm, it was possible to lose empathy with a public that is sometimes apparently apathetic to party politics. Indeed, she even found that the abstruse nature of policy-making was occasionally off-putting to regular party delegates: when discussing her policy specialism – international affairs – at federal conference, she would often speak to a largely empty hall. In that context, it was vital that the party made policy that was clear and accessible to the wider public. Related to that, Smith felt, it was vital that policy was not only clearly enunciated and expressed, but that the party's policy-making process needed to maintain its uniquely democratic foundation – an unusual feature, compared to the other two parties.

Within her own field of personal interest, Smith highlighted the role of the 2003 Iraq War in demonstrating the values and principles of the party, pointing out that her constituency of Cambridge, gained from Labour in 2005, in part due to the Liberal Democrat stance on that issue, was one of several examples around the country where the party's policy had intersected with the public mood to achieve tangible political success. She contrasted this with examples of policy that the party had failed on, such as the infamous pledge to block tuition fee rises in 2010.

In conclusion, Smith argued that the party had to retain its opposition to the curtailment of individual liberty 'by poverty, ignorance, or conformity', as stated in the preamble to its constitution. She felt that supporting this framework of liberal philosophy with strong policy was particularly relevant now, when in government, as the Conservative element of the coalition sought to exercise its own tendencies towards reaction, particularly in policy areas such as crime and immigration.

The broad discussion was followed by a brief question and answer session, which could have lasted longer if the conference schedule had allowed. Looking ahead to 2015, Paddy Ashdown concluded on a bullish note. According to Lord Ashcroft, polling in the seats in which the party is second to the Tories show the Liberal Democrat vote remaining apparently robust, with only 1 per cent of the vote lost compared to 2010. Looking to the next quarter-century, Ashdown was bullish too. Where the party works hard it tends to win: 'our [political] market is strong, because our principles are'.

Douglas Oliver is Secretary of the Liberal Democrat History Group.

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REVIEWS

Of Liberals and Liberalism

Duncan Brack (ed.), *The Dictionary of Liberal Quotations* (Biteback Publishing, 2013)
Reviewed by **Sam Barratt**

Published by Biteback in paperback, this second edition of *The Dictionary of Liberal Quotations* has seen a sizeable overhaul from the original (1999) volume, with around a fifth of the book being new material. The volume itself stands at some just over 400 pages and is part of Biteback's trilogy of political dictionaries which also encompasses a *Dictionary of Conservative Quotations* and a *Dictionary of Labour Quotations*.

Since the 1999 offering, the Liberal Democrats have entered government and amongst more recent examples of quotations from party figures such as Paddy Ashdown, Shirley Williams and an expanded selection for Menzies Campbell, new additions include Nick Clegg, Kirsty Williams and Tim Farron. There are also new additions beyond the Liberal Democrats: Barack Obama has been included, Nelson Mandela's section extended and there is also a nice selection from Aung San Suu Kyi.

Looking back at Tony Greaves' review of the 1999 edition (*Journal of Liberal History* 26, spring 2000), he will be pleased to see the removal of a quotation from *Mein Kampf*, along with several others. As Duncan Brack notes in his introduction, the new edition has sought to remove quotations which he describes as 'generic references and vaguely relevant concepts' in favour of more from liberals, Liberals and Liberal Democrats – though there are a number of offerings from Social Democrats too. Sections of the book feel richer for this approach.

Brack also notes the dual aim of the book: to provide quotes from significant figures and to include interesting quotes about liberalism and its associated themes. It is a balance that is struck reasonably well, though at times one does wonder whether a companion thematic chapter may convey this latter aim more effectively – though this would break with the form of a dictionary!

This is, it should be conceded, nit-picking. Most sections in the book feel well balanced, and while some sections are noticeably substantial, the quality of quotes included seldom wanes. Whilst I suspect personal preference would see some readers happily abridge some areas, the editors have afforded similar space to comparable figures for the most part, something I imagine to be a difficult task.

What is especially striking about this collection is the breadth of figures quoted, from the thirteenth-century Persian poet Sa'di – 'The hand of liberality is stronger than the arm of power' – through to Voltaire – 'I disapprove of what you say but I will defend to the death your right to say it – and on to twentieth-century British Liberals such as Jo Grimond – 'You must have some touch of idealism in politics' – the collection, though more focussed than the previous edition, still draws from a wide pool of literature and speakers.

Some quotes have, as with many things, aged especially well; Paddy Ashdown's comments to the Liberal Democrats' 1999 conference being one such example: 'In Jo Grimond's time we used to have a slogan: "We hate the Tories. But we distrust the state." It's not a bad one for the years ahead.'

In terms of utility, the index, as Greaves noted with the first edition, could be improved with individual authors and themes being included in one list; however, with a book of this style this is unlikely to trouble many.

This does very much feels like a book that is to be used as much as it is enjoyed. While the content will of course appeal to those with a interest in liberalism, the scope of authors means that those who wish to craft speeches should be able to find suitable quotations to pepper their prose, whatever their style may be. Equally, those looking for suitably spiked retorts could do a lot worse than to dwell around the pages dedicated to Violet Bonham-Carter.

I suspect that some copies will have inevitably have some sections more thumbed than others – which is probably unavoidable in a book that includes Adam Smith and Karl Marx, which is in part the enjoyment in reading. Alongside quotations that some readers will find themselves reciting before they have got beyond the first word are more unusual examples from authors whose identification relies on the accompanying biographical summary.

Whether it is something that is dipped in and out of, or heavily annotated and 'borrowed from' when someone else has encapsulated an idea in words that just resonate that little bit more, it is a book that anyone with an interest in liberalism and liberal history will find value in.

Sam Barratt is Treasurer of the Liberal Democrat History Group and is studying for a PhD at the University of Leeds, focusing on Liberal Democrat leadership and policy development.



Morley and the Liberal Party

Patrick Jackson, *Morley of Blackburn* (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2012)

Reviewed by **Dr Luke Blaxill**

John Morley (1838–1923) was an important if occasionally overlooked figure in late-Victorian Liberal politics. He was a genuine intellectual who achieved high repute in both the literary and political spheres without quite attaining the first rank in either. Morley was editor of the influential progressive journal, *The Fortnightly Review* for fifteen years, between 1867 and 1882, as well as *The Pall Mall Gazette* in the early 1880s. He was also a prolific writer of articles and books, of which the best remembered is undoubtedly his epic biography of his political mentor, friend, and hero, William Ewart Gladstone. Despite his reputation as an intellectual (especially as a Millite classical liberal and anti-imperialist, with controversial agnostic and even anti-religious views), Morley was also a strong party man. He used his positions in the literary world to help advance the interests of the Liberal Party, especially its radical wing where his sympathies firmly lay.

Much of Morley's parliamentary career, which began when he was returned for Newcastle in 1883 (at the comparatively mature age of forty-five), coincided with that unhappy two-decade period in Liberal Party history between the great home rule split of 1886 and the party's re-ascent from 1906 under New Liberalism. The Liberals – shorn of Hartington, Goschen, Chamberlain, Forster, and others – were in opposition for seventeen of these twenty years. From 1886, Morley was one of the few heavyweight Liberals on a sparsely populated deck and, like his contemporary Harcourt, devoted his best years to dogged opposition. He was Gladstone's first lieutenant in the doomed crusade to enact Irish home rule, and was also notable for advocacy of temperance reform, and his strong attack on what he saw as the pig-headed militaristic jingoism of Salisbury and Chamberlain, especially during the Boer War.

Under Campbell-Bannerman's government formed in 1905, Morley became Secretary of State for India and played a central role alongside viceroy Lord Minto in establishing a fledgling democratic government. In his final years in frontbench politics, before resigning over the declaration of war with Germany in 1914, Morley expressed concern over some of the socialistic aspects of the emerging New Liberalism, especially Lloyd George's People's Budget, and was critical of the early Labour Party. Philosophically, Morley remained to the end very much a mid-Victorian radical inspired by the legacy of Cobden, Mill, and Bright, and was never quite at ease with the statist direction that progressive politics was increasingly taking. Morley's private life was a troubled one. Fragile physical and mental health, a challenging marriage, and prolonged quarrels with family members and political peers (especially Chamberlain and Harcourt) certainly did his career no favours.

Overall, it might be said that Morley was not a man of new ideas, but excelled in adapting and expressing those of others. He was a politician of the moment who was a central engine in progressive politics of his era, achieving fame and high repute as a statesman, writer, platform orator, and parliamentary debater. But somehow his life and deeds did not linger in popular memory. His books (with the exception of his *Life of Gladstone*) were seldom read or reprinted after his death, and he inspired precious few statues, busts, and paintings. In *Morley of Blackburn*, Patrick Jackson has continued his commendable mission of breathing new life into under-studied and passed-over Victorian statesmen like Morley. This is book is the latest in his series of biographies (the others being on Lord Hartington, W. E. Forster, and William and Lewis Harcourt).

Morley of Blackburn is the first biography of Morley for more than 40 years – the last being D. A. Hamer's *Liberal Intellectual in Politics* (Oxford, 1968). It is a dense and thoroughly evidenced volume of nearly 600 pages and some 1,500 footnotes; Jackson draws upon Morley's private papers, correspondence, and diaries, many of which have only recently become available at the Bodleian Library. The book's other major claim to originality is the detailed consideration it gives to three aspects of Morley's life which are dealt with unsatisfactorily in other accounts – namely his literary career, his involvement with the Irish home rule campaign, and his close relationship with Gladstone.

There is much to commend in *Morley of Blackburn*. Its treatment of Morley and Irish home rule (to which three chapters and over 100 pages are devoted) is thorough and authoritative, as is its analysis of the impact of the writing of the *Life of Gladstone* on Morley himself, and on Liberal politics more generally when it was published in 1903. It also deserves credit for its close attention to Morley's relationship with his Newcastle constituency between 1883 and 1895, and his role in electoral politics at the grassroots and nationally. This is unusual in biographies of British statesmen, which routinely neglect or even entirely ignore elections

and electioneering in favour of a narrow focus on high-level political manoeuvre, doctrine, and the relationships between elites at Westminster (the so-called 'high political' approach).

Most substantially, *Morley of Blackburn* challenges Hamer's rather critical interpretation, recasting Morley as a more principled and less self-interested figure. His legacy, Jackson argues, was as an influencer and moulder of Liberal opinion, especially during the barren years of opposition, whose impact was greater than his seemingly meagre record of public achievements seem to suggest. Morley's suspicion of government intervention to seek rapid fixes to social problems also emerges more favourably today than it did in works written in the more statist and sociologically influenced 1960s. When Hamer was writing, it was easy to see Morley as a classical throwback and an obstruction to the march of progressivism. While Jackson doesn't do enough to conclusively reclaim Morley's reputation, he has certainly reopened the debate.

The book, however, is certainly not without its shortcomings. The most major is that it contains little that is especially new. The impact of Morley's newly released diaries and papers is a little disappointing. Given that the book (like most biographies from this era) is overwhelmingly evidenced by politician's private papers and correspondence, the 120 footnotes that Morley's papers generate throughout is greatly outweighed by references to several other established collections which have already been heavily mined by historians. The result is that, while an occasional interesting insight and quotation adds the odd jewel to the prose, the Morley that emerges is mostly a very familiar figure. Indeed, some recent biographies (such as Jenkins' work on Gladstone and Kuhn's on Disraeli) have explored the personality and character of the public men who shaped the political landscape of Britain and the empire in this definitive and fascinating age. Despite access to the private papers, and writing that they 'tell us a good deal about their subject's human weakness' Jackson does relatively little to bring the human side of Morley to life. The personality, character, and emotions of a clearly complex and fragile man very much take a back seat to a traditional examination of his public acts and political writings.

Overall, *Morley of Blackburn* is an authoritative and mature work of scholarship, and can reasonably claim to be the most complete and satisfactory biography currently available.

Partly because of this, many will find *Morley of Blackburn* a heavy read. It is largely a traditional work of 'high politics'. There is nothing wrong with that in itself (indeed, high political works are subjected to much unfair criticism) but the book also relies on a strong pre-existing knowledge of the era, doing relatively little to illuminate and explain the issues and controversies that Morley wrestled with, or the wider political world that he operated in.

Overall, *Morley of Blackburn* is an authoritative and mature work of scholarship, and can reasonably claim to be the most complete and satisfactory biography currently available. However, it is a dense and occasionally over-focused study that will (especially at this price) be of most interest to professional historians and postgraduate students. Jackson certainly deserves considerable credit for writing an ambitious and thorough book that has helped reclaim Morley's reputation. But a lighter touch and a broader focus would have helped both contextualise and bring to life this important but rather forgotten statesmen for a wider audience.

Luke Blaxill is Visiting Research Fellow in History at King's College London. From late 2013, he will also be the Drapers' Company Junior Research Fellow in History at Herford College, Oxford. He completed his doctorate, on the language of British Electoral politics, 1880–1914, at King's College London in 2012.

Don't buy this book!

Jesse Russell and Ronald Cohn, *Wallace Lawler* (Bookvika Publishing, 2012)

Reviewed by **Graham Lippiatt**

Do not buy this book. You may think you are getting a proper biography of Wallace Lawler, the Liberal MP who won the Birmingham Ladywood by-election in 1969. You are not. What you do get is the information about Lawler which appears on Wikipedia, the free online encyclopaedia. This amounts to the first six pages of this publication and there are a further two pages about the Ladywood by-election itself. The rest of the book consists of other Wikipedia material about Birmingham, parliament, Lawler's predecessor and successor as Ladywood MP and finally, making up most of the content, the Wikipedia pages about the United Kingdom – all with pages and pages of printed notes and sources. To repeat, under no circumstances pay money for this book. Everything it offers has been cloned from Wikipedia, which is of course free online.

To be fair, the book does advertise itself as 'high quality content by Wikipedia articles' and this can usually be seen on the image of the front cover viewable on the sites of online booksellers, or if you happen across one on a bookshelf. Cloning like this is not illegal. Indeed, Wikipedia cautions its contributors that their work can and will be reproduced. Now, I have nothing against Wikipedia. I have contributed to it and I also wrote an article for the *Journal of Liberal History*, published in issue 65, exploring the possibilities and limitations of using Wikipedia to find out about Liberal history. My conclusion at that time, and I would not change it today, was to agree with those academics and teachers who advise that, while Wikipedia cannot be accepted or cited as an authoritative source, it remains a useful starting point from which to gain contextual information about your subject matter and can point the way to more reliable and fuller source material.

Of course, while there may be lots of good, factual information free on Wikipedia, its content is distributed under open licence and there is nothing to stop anyone reusing or redistributing it at no charge. You can find such 'mirror sites' on the internet

A Liberal Democrat History Group evening meeting

DECLINE AND FALL

THE LIBERAL PARTY AND THE ELECTIONS OF 1922, 1923 AND 1924

For the Liberal Party, the three general elections of 1922, 1923 and 1924 represented a terrible journey from post-war disunity to reunion, and near-return to government to dramatic and prolonged decline. Arguably, this was the key period which relegated the Liberals to the third-party status from which they have never escaped.

The Liberal Democrat History Group winter meeting will look in detail at these elections and what they meant for the Liberal Party and the changes they brought about in British politics.

Speakers: **Michael Steed** (Honorary Lecturer in Politics, University of Kent, and noted psephologist); **Professor Pat Thane** (Professor of Contemporary History, King's College, London). Chair: **Dr Julie Smith** (Cambridge University).

7.00pm, Monday 10 February (following the History Group AGM at 6.30pm)
Lady Violet Room, National Liberal Club, 1 Whitehall Place, SW1A 2HE

A Liberal Democrat History Group fringe meeting

SOCIAL REFORMERS AND LIBERALS: THE ROWNTREES AND THEIR LEGACY

Joseph and Seebohm Rowntree were successful businessmen, pioneers of social investigation – and committed Liberals.

Discuss their careers and political legacy at the History Group's meeting at the Liberal Democrat spring conference, with **Ian Packer** (Lincoln University), and **Tina Walker** and **Lord Shutt** (Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust). Chair: **Lord Kirkwood**.

8.00pm, Friday 7 March
Riverside Room, Novotel Hotel, Fishergate, York YO10 4FD (*no conference pass necessary*)

and increasingly in print-on-demand (POD) or print-to-order (PTO) book format. That is what the publishers Bookvika have done with this Lawler publication and dozens more like it. There are other publishers, such as the US firm Books LLC and the German publisher VDM and its subsidiaries which have done the same.

So, if you see an advert for a book about a figure from Liberal history (or any topic which interests you, really) and you do not recognise the author as being an established academic or subject matter expert, do look closely at the cover image or publisher's information. Before you part with your money always check the author's name or publishing house to see if there is a connection to Wikipedia cloning.

Oh, and did I mention already? Do not buy this book.

Graham Lippiatt is a Contributing Editor to the Journal of Liberal History