

Lloyd George and the Partition of Ireland

Long before 1914, Irish attitudes to Home Rule had come to follow closely the divisions, not of social class or perceived economic interest, but of religion. Practically every Catholic was a Home Ruler, the vast majority of Protestants were Unionists. Ever since the 1880s, an off-and-on alliance had existed between Irish Nationalists and Liberals, in support of Irish Home Rule. 'Home Rule', like many expressions in politics, did not always mean the same thing, but it certainly included establishment of an Irish parliament and executive in Dublin. The only large part of Ireland which was overwhelmingly Protestant was north-east Ulster, and there the popular opposition to Home Rule was every bit as strong as was support in the rest of the country. But although, in theory, everybody in politics was either for or against setting up a new Home Rule authority for the whole of Ireland, in practice by 1914 many people on both sides of the great divide were groping towards a solution through which the Protestant areas of Ulster would receive different treatment from the rest of Ireland, at least in the short term.

As Jeremy Smith describes elsewhere in this issue, during the course of 1914 the Liberal government forced its Home Rule Bill – the Government of Ireland Bill – through parliament, against furious opposition from Conservatives (or, to give them their preferred name in this period, 'Unionists'). The Bill was awaiting the formal signature of the King. The new measure would set up an Irish Parliament with limited powers. The break from Great Britain would not be absolute, and some Irish MPs would continue to sit at Westminster. A concession had been made to the 'separateness' of the northern Protestant areas by a provision under which the six most Protestant Ulster counties would be excluded from the Home Rule authority for six years, but would then revert automatically to union with the rest of the country.

Neither side liked this compromise, and by the summer the country appeared to stand on the brink of civil war. As a last desperate effort to avert conflict, a Conference of leaders of the principal British and Irish parties was convened at Buckingham Palace.

On 24 July the Conference broke down, and the Cabinet met in an atmosphere of high crisis to debate Ireland. When the discussion had been proceeding for some time, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey reported the ultimatum which Austro-Hungary had just issued to Serbia, warning his colleagues that 'it may be the prelude to a war in which at least four of the great Powers might be involved'.¹ Three days later, the risk of international conflict had increased, but so deep was the general concern over Ireland that events in Dublin were still at the top of the Cabinet's agenda.²

When Britain went to war with Germany on 4 August, a few Liberal and Labour MPs wisely and courageously resisted the government's decision to fight. Irish MPs, by contrast, were unanimous in support: both the main body of Nationalists who followed John Redmond, and the 'Independent Nationalists' from Munster who looked to William O'Brien and the Unionists alike. As far as this could decently be done, the Home Rule question was swept under the carpet. On 18 September, the King signed the Home Rule Bill and also signed a new Suspensory Bill which delayed its operation until the end of the war. Yet – as one distinguished Irish historian has reflected – 'the Irish problem had been refrigerated, not liquidated. Nothing had been solved, and all was still to play for.'³

In May 1915, the first Coalition government was established. Asquith remained Prime Minister and the Liberals still provided a majority of the Ministers. Conservatives and Labour were brought into the government, and so was Sir Edward Carson – born and educated in Leinster, and MP for Dublin University,

yet acknowledged leader of the Ulster Unionists who had been such a thorn in the government's side before the war. Attempts were made to include John Redmond as well, but these failed.

In April 1916, the 'Easter Week Rising' took place in Dublin. The rebels, with no recognisable authority from anybody, proclaimed an 'Irish Republic', and seized control of various buildings. These rebels were often, though inaccurately, described as 'Sinn Fein', from the name of an extreme movement which sought to destroy all political links between Ireland and Great Britain. The military were able to re-establish control without too much difficulty. In the aftermath, the leaders of the rising were tried in secret by courts-martial, and no fewer than ninety people were condemned to death.

Some days before any executions were carried out, John Dillon, more or less Redmond's second-in-command, wrote from Dublin to his leader that 'so far feeling of the population of Dublin is *against* the Sinn Feiners. But a reaction might very easily be created'. Dillon went on to urge that 'the wisest course is to execute *no-one* for the present.'⁴ To anyone with a sense of Irish history, the wisdom of that advice was obvious, and Redmond did his best. In the end, however, fifteen of the rebels were shot. The contrast with the wise clemency with which DeWet's rebels in South Africa had been treated earlier in the war is sharp.

Asquith promptly visited Ireland to examine the situation on the spot. On his return, he entrusted to the ever-resourceful Lloyd George the task of engineering a political settlement that might somehow repair the damage. Like the rest of his party, Lloyd George was a Home Ruler; but, as has been noted, 'the cause of Irish home rule was never one that roused (his) enthusiasm or fighting spirit, nor was he particularly interested in Irish affairs.'⁵ This assessment is important in explaining Lloyd George's behaviour not only on this occasion but throughout his career. Unlike all Irish politicians in all parties, and many British politicians as well, his overriding concern was not to produce some particular constitutional result in Ireland, but to do other things. While

the war lasted, his concern was to ensure the most efficient prosecution of the war. Once the war was over he sought to produce a durable settlement in Ireland (whatever that settlement might happen to be), but he may have been even more anxious to keep his own government on an even keel.

When his investigations were complete, Lloyd George proposed immediate application of Home Rule legislation to the twenty-six Catholic southern counties, while the six Protestant northern counties would be excluded. Whether this exclusion was to be permanent or temporary was uncertain – Redmond was given to understand one thing, Carson was promised the other.⁶ Both men were prepared to accept the arrangement as they understood it, but both had great difficulty in selling it to their followers. Part of the difficulty with any arrangement of this kind was that no line could be drawn which did not leave many people on the 'wrong' side of the proposed border. Northern Catholics and southern Protestants alike were aggrieved. Unionists in the government, notably Walter Long and Lord Lansdowne, waged a bitter war against the settlement, while Lloyd George threatened resignation if it was not accepted. In the end, the contradictory nature of Lloyd George's promises was appreciated by the Irish, and the whole thing collapsed – without Lloyd George or anybody else resigning.

A few months later, in December 1916, Lloyd George became Prime Minister of a reconstituted Coalition government. The new Ministry, unlike its predecessor, did not include either Asquith or his closest followers, and the Prime Minister's dependence on Unionist support was obvious.

Meanwhile, the situation in Ireland was deteriorating rapidly. Irish people who would have rejoiced at Home Rule a couple of years earlier were now coming to demand complete separation from Britain. On 3 February 1917, a by-election in the apparently rock-solid Nationalist seat of North Roscommon resulted in a sensational victory for Count Plunkett, father of one of the executed Dublin rebels. Technically, Plunkett was an independent but the platform on which

he stood was similar to that of Sinn Fein. Thereafter Sinn Fein advanced rapidly, winning a further five by-elections in 1917 and 1918.

As Prime Minister, Lloyd George did not abandon his quest for an Irish settlement. In May 1917, he renewed his offer to Redmond for immediate Home Rule for the twenty-six counties, without success. In July, a Convention of Irishmen of various persuasions was set up, to try to evolve a solution. Sinn Fein refused to participate, which considerably weakened its authority. Then in March 1918, John Redmond died from an operation which nobody had expected to present serious risks. So the most experienced, and perhaps the most responsible, Irish politician was suddenly removed from the scene. He was succeeded as Nationalist leader by John Dillon.

In the same month, while the Convention was still sitting, the government faced a different and even graver problem. Russia had collapsed, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk gave the Central Powers huge swathes of Russian territory. In the west, the Germans launched their spring offensive, which at one moment seemed to threaten a similar result in France and Belgium. In desperate straits, Lloyd George's government began to plan a great extension of conscription in Britain, where it had already existed for a couple of years. The government also gave thought to the ideal of applying conscription to Ireland, which had escaped it thus far.

There were anguished debates in the Cabinet about the likely effects of Irish conscription, and various men who were not Cabinet members were invited to give their own views on the matter.⁷ Broadly, the military men advised in favour, while those who were concerned with preserving peace in Ireland advised against. Field Marshal Lord French thought that it could be worked 'with a slight augmentation of the existing troops in Ireland', and a somewhat similar view was taken by General Sir Bryan Mahon, the Commander in Chief in Ireland. By contrast, General Byrne, head of the Royal Irish Constabulary, 'had no doubt that (it) would be a mistake; that by passing and



The Kindest Cut of All

Welsh Wizard: 'I now proceed to cut this map into two parts and place them in the hat. After a suitable interval they will be found to have come together of their own accord – (aside) – at least let's hope so; I've never done this trick before.' (*Punch*, 10 March 1920)

enforcing such a measure... The Catholics and Nationalists of Ireland would be united against the British Empire'. H.E. Duke (later Lord Merrivale), Chief Secretary for Ireland and a Unionist, thought that 'we might as well recruit Germans'. He believed that the result would be 'the loss of Ireland'. The Lord Chief Justice of Ireland considered that application of conscription to his country would be 'at the cost of tremendous bloodshed', and Sir Edward Carson indicated 'that the number of reliable men that could be got would be very small, as at least two thirds would be anti-British'.

Faced with such opinions, the government might have been expected to drop the whole idea of applying con-

scription to Ireland. In fact they decided in favour, and Lloyd George himself gave the reason to his colleagues. His main concern does not appear to have been with the number of Irish men who might be enlisted, what degree of loyalty they might show, or what the immediate and long-term consequences might be in Ireland, but rather with the apparent necessity to be seen to apply conscription to Ireland, in order to make the new arrangements acceptable in Britain. As he told the Cabinet, 'I do not believe it possible in this country to tear industry apart, to take fathers of 45 and upwards for the forces... without deep resentment at the spectacle of sturdy young Catholics in Ireland... drilling... and compelling

us to keep troops in Ireland... I cannot think of any Liberal doctrine, and I do not think there is any Unionist doctrine, which would justify the application of conscription to this country and not to Ireland'.⁸

The legislation the Prime Minister was seeking would not by itself apply conscription to Ireland. That could only be done by later issuing Orders in Council which would be authorised under the legislation. In practice, the government might very well decide not to issue such an Order at all. Lloyd George had hoped that the Convention which had been established some months earlier would report in a way which would render it possible to make a package deal under which Ireland received Home Rule and also accepted conscription. The Convention's conclusions were published while the parliamentary debate was in progress. They were reached by a thoroughly unconvincing majority of forty-four to twenty-nine, and gave little hope for progress on those lines.

It was immediately obvious that conscription would raise strong opposition from all Irish parties except the Unionists – and, as has been seen, even Carson was profoundly doubtful about the wisdom of the measure. When the matter came before the House of Commons, Asquith warned that it would be 'an act of terrible short-sightedness'. On 12 April, there was an important debate on the proposal during the Committee stage of the government's Bill. The Conservative leader Bonar Law, speaking on behalf of the Coalition Ministry, had already made it clear that if the government did not get its way, it would resign. Asquith was put on the spot, declaring that 'if we were in conditions which even in time of war were normal or anything like normal, I should not hesitate for a moment to support and as far as I could give effect to the opinions which I expressed by appropriate parliamentary action'. In other words, he would have liked to vote against the proposal but felt bound to abstain because the war was at such a critical stage. The government's proposal was carried on the crucial division⁹ by 281 votes to 116, plus two tellers each way. The minority included

forty-two Liberals, sixty-four Nationalists, five Independent Nationalists, six Labour and one Unionist. Asquith and his leading supporters duly abstained. Inevitably, Parliament authorised the extension of conscription to Ireland. It was never possible to enforce Irish conscription; but the very threat of it alienated Irish opinion even further. By this time, no doubt many young Irishmen had decided that – if fight they must – they would rather fight to drive the British from Ireland than to drive the Germans from Belgium.

The effect of the argument over Irish conscription on the Liberal Party was profound. Many Liberal MPs, even those who were not pacifists, had been feeling increasingly alienated from the Coalition for a long time, and the fact that so many of them were prepared to vote against the Lloyd George government on an issue of confidence, when Asquith advised abstention, was remarkable. It is possible – though it would be difficult to prove this – that Asquith and his principal supporters now realised that their own authority over the non-Lloyd Georgeite members of their Party would disappear unless they were prepared to come out unambiguously against the Coalition on some suitable issue. This may explain Asquith's decision to divide the House – and the Liberal Party – on the more famous, but much less clear-cut, Maurice issue, just four weeks after the Irish conscription vote. If that is so, then Irish conscription was of massive importance for the whole future of the Liberal Party.

On 11 November 1918 the Armistice was signed, and Lloyd George promptly called a new general election. The Prime Minister's original hope had been that the government which he headed would be an almost universal Coalition. Such hopes were dashed. Asquith had already been invited to join, and was offered the attractive prospect of nominating several Ministers, but he refused to lead his followers into government.¹⁰ When the election was announced, Labour decided to withdraw from the Coalition. Lloyd George's only substantial partners were therefore the Conservatives.

Electoral arrangements during the

period of the campaign were very complex¹¹, but the upshot was that the Coalition secured a huge majority, and over two-thirds of those Coalition MPs were Unionists. There were some astonishing casualties. Asquith and his principal followers had not been supported by the Coalition, and all were defeated. Of 162 new MPs, only thirty had been returned without Coalition support. A few even of that little band might be regarded as Coalitionists at heart. The Labour Party, with sixty MPs, made substantial advances; but most of its acknowledged leaders were defeated. In Ireland, the results were even more sensational. Sinn Fein won seventy-three seats, the Unionists twenty-three. The Nationalists were reduced to six (they held a seventh seat in a Liverpool constituency). Only two territorial constituencies in the three southern provinces of Ireland resisted the Sinn Fein tide; Waterford City, where John Redmond's son retained his father's seat by a small majority, and Rathmines, a wealthy constituency near Dublin, which returned a Unionist. Two Labour Unionists and an Independent completed the Irish tally.

The division between pro-Coalition and anti-Coalition Liberals became increasingly sharp as time went on. Early in 1919, the non-Coalition Liberals set up their own House of Commons organisation, with Sir Donald Maclean as Chairman. It is not clear how they should be labelled. They usually called themselves 'Independent Liberals' – independent, that is, of the Coalition. People often called them 'Asquithians', though some were by no means happy with Asquith's leadership. Contemporaries sometimes nicknamed them 'Wee Frees', after a small and exclusive Scottish sect. The Wee Frees regarded themselves as an Opposition party: indeed, for procedural purposes Maclean rather than the Labour Chairman was treated as de facto Leader of the opposition. Early in 1920 Asquith himself was returned to Parliament in a sensational by-election. Soon afterwards, Maclean declared that independent Liberals should be 'at complete liberty to run a candidate' wherever the Liberal candidate or Liberal Association had reached an arrangement with the Con-

servatives – in effect, against any Coalition Liberal – and promised Headquarters support.¹² The split was not a simple division between 'right' and 'left', between purists and trimmers, or even between admirers of Asquith and admirers of Lloyd George. Each group contained people who would eventually become Conservatives (actually or for practical purposes), people who would eventually join Labour and people who would remain Liberals. Each group also contained people who were quite prepared to give their putative leader a rough ride.

The 1914 compromise provided that the Government of Ireland Act would come automatically into effect as soon as the last Peace Treaty was signed. This was palpably out of the question. Sinn Fein, commanding nearly three-quarters of the Irish constituencies, was pledged not to attend Westminster at all. Instead the elected members constituted themselves the Dail Eireann, and met in Dublin on 21 January 1919. Some Sinn Feiners had been elected for more than one constituency, or were in prison, so in all only 27 people answered the call.¹³

On the very day that the Dail met, two policemen were shot dead in Co. Tipperary. Thereafter, violence escalated rapidly. The National Volunteers, who had been formed before the war in order to enforce Home Rule legislation against possible violent resistance from Unionists, transformed themselves into the Irish Republican Army, or IRA.

A Liberal, Ian Macpherson (later Lord Strathcarron) became Chief Secretary for Ireland in January 1919, at almost the very moment when the Dail first met and a new wave of violence began. Dealing with violence was not MacPherson's forte at all, but he was actively employed in working out a political solution for 'the troubles'. In December 1919, the government considered three possible long-term solutions to the Irish problem¹⁴. The simplest was that a parliament should be set up for Ireland, but that the six most Protestant counties of Ulster should be allowed to vote themselves out of the arrangements, and remain part of the United Kingdom. The second was to set up two Irish

parliaments, one for all the nine counties of Ulster, the other for the remaining three provinces of Ireland. The third was a variant of this, under which only the six most Protestant counties would be represented in the northern parliament. The Cabinet inclined towards a two parliament solution, without committing itself strongly to either variant. To please those people, Irish or British, who hated the idea of partitioning Ireland and leaving substantial disaffected minorities on both sides of the border, a Council of Ireland would also be established, to deal with common problems, and in the hope of ultimately reuniting the country. Some MPs from both parts of the country would continue to be elected to Westminster. Macpherson took charge of the early stages of the government's Bill.

Nationalists and Sinn Feiners were uniformly hostile. Ulster Unionists at first reserved judgement, but then swung in favour. This support, however, was something of an embarrassment to the government, for the Ulstermen made it abundantly clear that they proposed to make partition permanent, which vitiated any remote chance of selling the idea to the other side. Asquith, who had by this time returned to the House of Commons, came out against the partition proposals in March 1920¹⁵. He drew attention to the attitude of the Ulster Unionists, whose principal spokesman had very recently made it plain that he could not envisage Irish unification taking place 'within the lifetime of any man in the House'. Asquith also raised a great issue which would attract growing interest as time went on, proposing that Ireland should be granted the status of a self-governing Dominion, like Canada or Australia. This plan would allow provision to be made for Ulster – comparable, one might say, with the considerable autonomy enjoyed by the Canadian Provinces or the Australian States.

Progress of the Bill through parliament was protracted, but public interest concentrated much more on the violent episodes which were taking place. MacPherson retired from the post of Chief Secretary in April 1920, becoming Minister of Pensions instead. His

successor, the last man to occupy that 'graveyard of political reputations', was another Liberal, Sir Hamar Greenwood, who moved into the Conservative Party a few years later.

Greenwood did not find the task of dealing with a violent Irish campaign particularly uncongenial. The Royal Irish Constabulary was seriously depleted in numbers, and Greenwood filled the vacant places with men recruited in Britain – mostly ex-soldiers, and sometimes ex-convicts. They constituted the notorious 'Black-and-Tans', who were linked to another body, the Auxiliaries ('Auxies'), composed mainly of ex-officers. The Dail had little control over the IRA, and the British government did not have much over the Black-and-Tans. So atrocities and counter-atrocities became the rule. In November 1920, Asquith charged Greenwood with pursuing a policy of 'reprisals'. One writer sagely observed that Greenwood's 'stonewalling statements (in Parliament) were not unfairly caricatured as 'there is no such thing as reprisals, but they have done a great deal of good''.¹⁶

It is not difficult to visualise the effect which all this was having on the Liberals, whether Coalitionist ('Coalie') or Wee Free. They were sickened by the atrocities on both sides, and memories of the old Home Rule battles were revived. The division between the two Liberal groups was no longer a somewhat abstract argument over whether the best interests of Liberalism would be served by a tactical Coalition or by total independence. More and more issues of policy were appearing on which Wee Frees took one view and Coalies a different one; but disputes over the Irish question stirred the Liberal Party to its depths. When the National Liberal Federation met at Bradford later in November, this proved the occasion for an anti-Coalition demonstration. A small number of Coalie MPs and a few other Coalitionist delegates were heavily defeated when they sought to amend a resolution condemning the Irish reprisals.

The government's proposal for two Irish parliaments eventually passed into law at the end of 1920, as a new Gov-

ernment of Ireland Act. Elections were held in May 1921. In the South, Sinn Fein was returned unopposed everywhere except for the four Dublin University seats. They refused to participate in the Southern parliament, just as it had refused to attend Westminster. The southern parliament was dead in the water, but the elected candidates were treated as members of a new Dail.

In the northern parliament, 'the Stormont', the Unionists had, predictably, a huge majority. For the fifty-two seats, forty Ulster Unionists, six Nationalists and six Sinn Feiners were returned. As Berkley Farr describes in the article which follows, a pattern was set for Northern Ireland politics which would persist for half a century, and which applied not only to people elected to the Stormont, but to those elected to Westminster as well. Party allegiance was defined essentially on sectarian lines. In practice, Ulster Unionists cooperated closely with Conservatives.

The King was set to open the new Northern Ireland parliament on 22 June 1921. Shortly before he did so, he had discussions with the great South African statesman Jan Smuts, who urged him to make a ringing appeal for reconciliation. After the draft of the

Lloyd George and Lord Derby (Secretary of State for War, 1916–18)



speech had been vetted by others, including Lloyd George, it was duly delivered, and received an eager positive response almost everywhere.

But what was to happen in the South, where the proposed parliament was obviously not going to function? Lloyd George acted over Greenwood's head and on 11 July 1921 a truce was concluded between the British authorities and Sinn Féin. Thereafter there were innumerable discussions involving Irish leaders and members of the British government. By this time Lloyd George himself was veering towards the idea of some sort of 'Dominion' model for the whole of Ireland. Bonar Law, the Conservative leader, ruled it out, and the idea was dropped. In the end, the Prime Minister fell back on a second line. The division between North and South would be accepted as permanent, but the South would be established as a Dominion, with the exception of certain naval bases considered vital for British defence. Eventually, representatives of the Dail were faced with an ultimatum. Accept a treaty on those lines, or face war in three days. The Irish delegates decided to recommend acceptance.

The necessary legislation passed the House of Commons by 403 votes to sixty. One hundred Coalies and twenty-four Wee Frees supported the Bill; just two Coalies opposed it. The Unionists were more split: 208 supporting it and fifty-three voting against. Of the minority, seventeen sat for Ulster seats and two for Irish University seats. In the House of Lords, the critical vote was on a hostile amendment, which was defeated by 166 to forty-seven. Ratification by the Dail was more difficult, and a bitter debate took place. Not until 8 January 1922 did the Dail accept the Treaty, and then by the unconvincing majority of sixty-four to fifty-seven. On these terms, the new Irish Free State was set up.

The Coalitionists, and particularly the Coalition Liberals, rejoiced at the Irish agreement. 'As for the Prime Minister', wrote an author in *The English Review*,¹⁷

He has won to fame. The settlement is the greatest achievement of his life,

by far the most liberal enactment in modern history Where Parnell struck against granite, where Gladstone failed, where Asquith as party leader never had a chance, this Coalition achieves success ...

If success it was, the credit certainly goes overwhelmingly to the Prime Minister himself. Like Gladstone with the Irish Land Act of 1881, Lloyd George secured his Irish achievement through by-passing his Chief Secretary. The *Lloyd George Liberal Magazine*, dealing with the critical period of the settlement, did not consider Greenwood worthy even of a reference in its index.

Asquith approved of the settlement. 'No one has more reason than we have to rejoice over that agreement', he told a Liberal demonstration January 1922¹⁸. He could hardly resist going on to point out that the agreement was remarkably similar to what he had been proposing for a couple of years. Nor could he resist commenting on the failure of Liberal Coalitionists to condemn Greenwood for 'letting loose his auxiliaries and his Black and Tans in their retaliatory campaign of arson and outrage'.

And yet few people really liked the arrangement. The Southern Catholics, who wanted a sovereign republic for the whole of Ireland, abhorred both partition and the continued link with the Crown. The Northern Protestants would probably have preferred to remain fully integrated in the United Kingdom, and had never sought a separate parliament for themselves. Protestants in the south, and Catholics in the north, were particularly aggrieved, for they were now powerless minorities in their respective areas. British Conservatives, whose traditional cry had been 'Union', were the dominant members of a government which had thrust upon the unwilling north a measure of Home Rule roughly the same as Redmond and his followers had sought for the whole of Ireland, while the south was receiving much more self-government than the old Nationalists had demanded. British Liberals, who had fought shoulder to shoulder for Home Rule eight years

earlier, had witnessed a bloody war conducted ruthlessly by a Liberal Chief Secretary against a much more intransigent Irish nationalism.

Very soon, the viability of the compromise was called into question. The split in the Dail led to a new kind of shooting war in Ireland, this time between Catholic 'Free Staters' who reluctantly accepted the new arrangements and Catholic Republicans who repudiated it. The Free Staters won; but it had not been a foregone conclusion that they would. Not until 1927 did the intransigents consent to enter the Dail, and ten years after that the Treaty was for practical purposes abrogated under the new Eire constitution.

What a tragedy for all concerned that Gladstone's original Home Rule proposals had been rejected in 1886.

Roy Douglas is an Emeritus Reader of the University of Surrey and author of A History of the Liberal Party 1895 – 1970

- 1 Asquith to King (draft) 24.vii. 14, *Asquith papers* 7, Bodleian Library, Oxford, pp. 147 – 48.
- 2 *Ibid.*, 27.vii, 149-50.
- 3 F.S.L.Lyons, in *A New History of Ireland*, VI, W.E. Vaughan (ed), Oxford, 1996, p. 144
- 4 F.S.L.Lyons: *John Dillon: a biography*, London, 1968, p. 373.
- 5 George Boyce, in *Lloyd George: twelve essays*, ed. A.J.P.Taylor, London, 1971, p. 137.
- 6 F.S.L.Lyons, in *A New History of Ireland*, VI, W.E. Vaughan (ed), Oxford, 1996, p. 221.
- 7 See, in particular, War Cabinets 372 (25.iii.18), 373 (26.iii.18), 374 and 375 (both 27.iii.18), 376 (28.iii.18) and 377 (29.iii.18). CAB 23/5, P.R.O. Lloyd George's *War Memoirs*, London, 1936, vol 2, pp. 1597-1601, gives a remarkably objective account of the problems involved.
- 8 War Cabinet 385, 6.iv. CAB 23/6.
- 9 104 H.C.Deb. 53, 2001-6. Division No 16, 12.iv.18.
- 10 Memorandum of meeting with Lloyd George 24.ix.18. Elibank papers 8,804, fo. 193-6. National Library of Scotland.
- 11 See discussions by the present author in *The Background to the 'Coupon' election arrangements*, Eng. Hist. Rev. vol. LXXXVI, No. 339 (April 1971), pp. 318 – 36, and *A classification of the Members of Parliament elected in 1918*, Bull. Inst. Hist. Res. Vol. XLVII No. 115 (May 1974), pp. 74 – 9.
- 12 *Liberal Magazine* 1920, p. 167.
- 13 F.S.L.Lyons, in *A New History of Ireland*, VI, W.E. Vaughan (ed), Oxford, 1996, p. 240.
- 14 C 10(19).3.xii.19. CAB 23/18
- 15 See *Liberal Magazine*, 1920, pp. 233 – 37.
- 16 *Dictionary of National Biography*, 1941 – 45, p. 325.
- 17 Cited in *Lloyd George Liberal Magazine* 1922, p. 356.
- 18 *Liberal Magazine* 1922, p. 48.