

**Ian Hunter
examines the
Liberal leader's
role as a critic of
appeasement**

SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR THE LIBERAL

Sir Archibald Sinclair. Leader of the Liberal Party from 1935 to 1945, was the last Liberal MP to hold a Cabinet position at Westminster, serving as Churchill's Air Minister from May 1940 to May 1945. He was also one of the first parliamentarians to voice concerns about the National Government's policy of appeasement during the mid-1930s. Historians have consistently overlooked the key role played by the Liberal Party between 1936 and 1939.¹ This is mainly because of the focus on the internal dissent within the Conservative Party and on the particular role played by Winston Churchill, from the wilderness of the backbenches, in opposing his party's international policies.



Sinclair speaking against appeasement at the Central Hall, Tollcross, Edinburgh, late 1930s.

In the first volume of his war memoirs, *The Gathering Storm*, Churchill himself fails to mention the part played by the Liberal Party, painting instead a self-portrait of enormous vanity in which he casts himself as almost the sole prophet of vision and reason to have been warning of Hitler's threat to European peace. The reality was very different – and the Liberal Party, and Sinclair in particular, played a major role in developing and proposing clear alternatives to the Government's foreign policy.

Archibald Sinclair was born in 1890, and was educated at Eton.

Having then attended Sandhurst, he became a regular soldier in 1910, and served with distinction in the Great War as Churchill's second in command of the 6th Royal Scots Fusiliers in Flanders. He became Churchill's private secretary in 1919 when Lloyd George appointed Churchill to the combined War Office and Air Ministry role (1919–21) to oversee demobilisation and to deal with the anti-Bolshevik White Russians. Sinclair continued to support his mentor when Churchill moved to the Colonial Office (1921–22) for the last eighteen months of the Coalition Government.

BALD SINCLAIR ANTI-APPEASER

With Churchill's encouragement, Sinclair stood for election as a Liberal in his home constituency of Caithness and Sutherland, entering Parliament in 1922. He climbed rapidly through the Liberal Parliamentary Party ranks, becoming Chief Whip in 1930. He entered the National Government with Herbert Samuel, the Liberal leader, where he served in the Cabinet as Secretary of State for Scotland in 1931–32, prior to the resignation of the Liberals over the Ottawa Trade Tariff Agreements. When Samuel lost his seat at the 1935 general election Lloyd George nominated Sinclair for the parliamentary party leadership, to which he was elected unopposed.

Sinclair inherited a quarrelsome, demoralised and disparate group of twenty-one MPs. Between 1935 and 1939 he led an effective internal reorganisation, redefining the role and responsibilities of the Liberal Party's central organisation, and initiated a number of policy reviews. However, the issue on which he was to find a national voice was his early support for rearmament, often speaking in Parliament as one of the first opponents of the National Government's policy of appeasing Hitler's territorial ambitions in Central Europe.

Sinclair inherited from Herbert Samuel a policy position that opposed rearmament and was over-reliant on the supposition

that the League of Nations could be relied on to intervene and resolve international problems on Britain's behalf. The Liberals fought the November 1935 general election on a platform that claimed 'the national defences must be kept efficient and large enough for the needs of the times, but a colossal, panic expenditure upon arms is not the road to peace ... Through strengthening the League of Nations, and through international disarmament, and there alone, the true path to security lies.'² Although sympathetic to this position, Sinclair became increasingly dissatisfied with the viability of opposing rearmament in the face of the emergence of undemocratic regimes in continental Europe.

On 14 March 1935, eight months before the general election, a major debate on the naval supply estimates took place in the House of Commons; it marked the last time that Sinclair opposed increased spending on the armed services. Sinclair made a lengthy speech attacking the Government's policy of increasing naval spending, arguing that over £660 million had been spent during the preceding ten years, to little value. Concluding his attack, he argued that 'in the absence of any clear relation between this country's armament policy and a policy for a collective system, we on these benches will feel bound by speech and vote to do all in

our power to deflect the Government's policy from its present dangerous and wasteful course'.³ Sinclair was keen to see the Government move to a defence policy that was more reliant on the collective security offered by the League of Nations. The next day Churchill passed a note to Sinclair which, while calling his manner of delivery 'admirable', described his argument as 'false' and his purpose as 'morbid' and finished by attacking Sinclair's anti-rearmament stance as 'fatal'. Sinclair responded to Churchill, claiming that his former mentor had misjudged his purpose and that as regards his arguments Churchill should 'think it over – surely better than you admit and not wholly separated from your own'.⁴

It is not clear whether further discussion took place and what, if any, greater role Churchill played in changing Sinclair's views, but it is apparent that from April 1935 onwards Sinclair shifted his stance and focused increasingly on the dangers that political extremism raised in continental Europe. Certainly this was the last occasion on which he was to attack any government proposal for rearmament. Instead, by May 1935, Sinclair was arguing in support of the Government's proposals to increase air defences as 'an emergency contribution to the collective system of peace under the League of Nations'. This position was to form one of

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SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR: THE LIBERAL ANTI-APPEASER

the central planks of party policy under Sinclair. At its simplest, Sinclair threw Liberal support behind the need for collective security through the Covenant of the League of Nations and pressed the Government to target expenditure on building a first-rate Royal Air Force and secure naval defences.⁵ In this policy the Liberals were offering a genuine alternative to Chamberlain's counsels of despair.

The Liberals were also able to offer a policy in distinct contrast to the refusal of Attlee and the Labour Party to face up to growing threats from abroad. Between 1931 and 1937 Labour adopted what can only be described as a policy of unilateral disarmament and isolation. The Labour Party Conference in 1932 unanimously passed a motion pledging the party to 'take no part in war and to resist it with the whole force of the Labour movement'. In the key defence spending votes of the mid-1930s (the March 1935 debate on the Defence White Paper, the 1935 and 1936 army, navy and air estimates, and the 1937 Defence Loans Bill) the Labour Party consistently voted against building up the country's military capabilities. As late as July 1937 the party abstained in the vote over the final appropriation for defence. This was not a proud record with which to face a Government increasingly committed to the policy of appeasement.⁶

When Sinclair took over the Liberal leadership in 1935, he accepted the position only after he had obtained a promise from his fellow MPs that the party would give priority to defence. There were five occasions in each parliamentary session when the Liberals, as the smaller opposition party, could choose the subject for debate.⁷ At each of these opportunities the Liberals raised the issues of defence and rearmament, especially in relation to the air force.

Throughout 1936 and 1937, in the face of a significant surge in German rearmament, Sinclair urged Chamberlain's government further to increase spending on

Britain's armed forces. In tandem, at every available opportunity, he criticised the Government for failing to demonstrate its commitment to the League of Nations as the route for curtail- ing the ambitions of aggressor nations. Sinclair's outrage at the announcement of the Hoare- Laval Pact, which overturned Britain's support for the League of Nations' policy of applying sanctions to persuade Mussolini to withdraw from Abyssinia, was trumpeted in the House of Com- mons on 19 December 1935. Sinclair claimed that the Govern- ment had failed in its obligations to give a lead to the League of Nations and had turned its back on its original proposals for deal- ing with Italian aggression. He asserted that, thanks to Baldwin, 'the British Empire is now neuter in the counsels of the League'.⁸ He urged that the Government should stand firm in support of sanctions or else be seen to have been party to rewarding aggres- sion.

The German reoccupation of the demilitarised Rhineland in March 1936 and the resulting concerns about the extent of Ger- man ambitions provided a further platform for Sinclair to expand on his thinking to the House of Commons. On 26 March 1936 he laid out Liberal policy for deal- ing with the perceived injustices that Germany claimed the Treaty of Versailles imposed on her. He urged that Britain should take the lead in organising a World Con- ference to reach a new settlement on colonial and economic issues and to provide the basis for a pol- icy of 'military and economic dis- armament, of collective security in which all countries, and not merely groups of allies, must partic- ipate, and of justice and equal- ity for all nations'.⁹ This became the basis for policy proposals from the Liberal benches until the Munich crisis in 1938, when the need to seek a defensive alliance with the Soviet Union would become a major concern.

Sinclair built on his stance in a powerful speech delivered on 23

June 1936. Incensed by the Gov- ernment's refusal to stand up to Italy over its invasion of Abyssinia, he made one of the first parlia- mentary attacks on what was to become the policy of appease- ment. 'The Foreign Secretary [Eden] knows that aggression is an appetite that grows by what it feeds on. The Government's pol- icy puts a premium on successful aggression and makes the world safe for dictatorship.'¹⁰ Together with his colleague Geoffrey Mander, Liberal MP for Wolver- hampton East, Sinclair harassed the Government for shedding one potential ally after another and for refusing to use the powers of the League of Nations to resist aggression effectively.

During 1936 Sinclair came under pressure from his colleagues in the Parliamentary Liberal Party to consider forming a closer tie with the Popular Front organi- sation which had been set up to encourage non-Conservative parties to cooperate against the domestic policy of the National Government. There was much feeling that the Popular Front platform should be extended to international policy. Sinclair was very hesitant about this route to Liberal-Labour cooperation, as he feared that it would lead to the ultimate absorption of the inde- pendent Liberal Party by Labour. He did, however, cooperate informally with fellow opponents of the National Government and spoke at the December 1936 'Arms and the Covenant' rally at the Royal Albert Hall, sharing a platform with Churchill and a couple of Labour leaders (Citrine and Dalton) to urge the promo- tion of collective security through the League of Nations. This event was overshadowed by the same day's breaking news of the rela- tionship between the King and Mrs Simpson.

At the end of May 1937 Chamberlain replaced a weary and dispirited Baldwin as Prime Minister. Sinclair was certain that the autocratic and lofty style of Chamberlain, who was particu- larly ruthless with any dissent

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and dismissive of the slightest criticism from both the opposition parties and his own backbenches, would lead to a split within the Tory party that would provide a golden opportunity for the Liberals. He was right about the former but overly optimistic about the latter.

The first signs of open discontent over Chamberlain's premiership arose in February 1938 when the tensions between the Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, broke into public view over the policy to be pursued against Italy. Eden had become increasingly incensed by Chamberlain's dabbling in foreign affairs without proper consultation. In January 1938 Chamberlain initiated talks with Mussolini with a view to try to detach him from the German camp. Without agreeing the details with Eden, Chamberlain offered Mussolini a deal whereby Britain would recognise Italy's control over Abyssinia in return for a promise of withdrawal of Italian troops from the Spanish Civil War and the offer of access to a loan from Britain on preferential terms. This was an offer that Mussolini, already safely in control of the African country and comfortable that he had backed the winning side in Spain, found it easy to decline. Chamberlain was also reluctant to pursue an offer, favoured by Eden, from President Roosevelt to set up an international conference to deal with the Abyssinian crisis. Chamberlain did not believe that the Americans would be able to influence the Italians any more successfully than could Britain.¹¹ However, this proved to be the final break with Eden. Incensed by Chamberlain's unwarranted intervention in the responsibilities of his own office, Eden resigned from the government on 20 February.

Sinclair regarded Eden's resignation as a calamity for the chances of turning British policy away from appeasement, and was appalled by the terms that had been offered to Mussolini. Not only was the Italian invasion of an independent country being tacitly

approved, but the intervention in Spain was being ignored and, in a further humiliation to Britain, Mussolini was being offered access to loans and grants on a promise of future good behaviour. In the House of Commons Sinclair asked exactly what Britain was getting in return for this display of incredible largesse. The answer that nothing had been won by such an approach came all too quickly, as it became plain that, in addition to Italian expansion remaining uncurtailed, Germany was also moving to expand her control in Central Europe, encouraged by Britain's reluctance to confront aggression.

With the remilitarisation of the Rhineland and the March 1938 *Anschluss* with Austria, deep concerns were expressed in all British political parties regarding Germany's territorial ambitions in Central Europe. Sinclair, Attlee and Chamberlain met to see if any joint policy could be developed in response to Germany and Austria's union but failed to agree a united position. In the summer of 1938 Germany pressed its claims for the return of the Sudetenland, then part of Czechoslovakia, to the Reich. In Parliament Sinclair initially argued that the Czechoslovaks might have to make concessions to avoid conflict but swiftly realised that this would reduce Czechoslovakia's ability to defend itself from further aggression and by September had reversed his position to opposing vigorously any deal over the Sudetenland. In the Commons Sinclair argued that a general European settlement was necessary and that Britain had to prove to Germany that aggression would be resisted.

On 14 September 1938 Sinclair and Lord Crewe¹² wrote to Chamberlain offering the Liberal Party's wholehearted support if the Government made it clear to Germany 'that an unprovoked attack upon Czechoslovakia cannot be regarded with indifference by Great Britain, and that if France were to be involved in hostilities consequent upon such

The Munich crisis allowed Sinclair and Churchill to cooperate more openly.

an attack this country would at once stand firm in arms by her side.'¹³ Sinclair did not deny that Germany had the right to argue for a better settlement than had been imposed at Versailles but he did not believe that concessions should be made to Germany under duress. When Chamberlain met Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Sinclair was quick to dismiss the outcome of the meetings as a further example of a 'hurried, disorderly, and humiliating rout'.¹⁴ Chamberlain had indeed betrayed the Czechoslovaks at his meeting in Munich with Hitler.

The Munich debate at Westminster took place on 3 October and Sinclair was one of the most damning commentators on the deal. Calling Chamberlain's foreign policy a 'policy of successive retreats in the face of aggressive dictatorships' he made clear that Munich had been a humiliating surrender in the face of threatened force. Sinclair also noted that there was a very reliable guide to Hitler's intentions available and that the Prime Minister would do well to read it: 'Two sources of enlightenment I enjoy about Herr Hitler's intentions. One is his public speeches and the expression of his opinions and intentions in public and in private, and the other is *Mein Kampf*. I prefer *Mein Kampf*, because it has never yet let me down, and I commend it to the Prime Minister.'

The Munich Agreement convinced Sinclair that Germany now had the upper hand in Europe and that Britain's traditional attitude of maintaining a balance of power to stop any one country becoming too dominant was being foolishly abandoned. It would now be a more difficult task to stop Germany from dominating Europe than it would have been before. Sinclair was becoming reluctantly convinced that war was unavoidable. Dingle Foot observed, in an unpublished short essay,¹⁵ that the Munich crisis allowed Sinclair and Churchill to cooperate more openly. For example, in November 1938, when Sinclair moved an amendment to set up

SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR: THE LIBERAL ANTI-APPEASER

an immediate Ministry of Supply in order to speed up rearmament, Churchill appealed in vain for fifty of his fellow Conservative MPs to support the amendment to make the Government act. Only two Tory MPs (Brendan Bracken and Harold Macmillan) joined him in the Liberal lobby. This incident provoked great resentment on the Conservative benches and Churchill was threatened with an official Conservative opponent in the Epping Division. Although the local party did not deselect Churchill he was told firmly that he was on probation. Sinclair and the local Liberal candidate (who in 1935 had polled 12,000 votes) assured Churchill that in the event of an early election there would be no Liberal opposition and that they would do their utmost to induce Liberal voters to give him their support.¹⁶

In the House of Commons, throughout the rest of 1938 and into the spring of 1939, Sinclair and Churchill continued to work closely together in condemning the Munich agreement, urging the formation of a Ministry of Supply (reflecting their experience of the Ministry of Munitions in 1918) and arguing that Britain's foreign policy must focus on isolating and encircling Germany by forging an understanding with the Russians in the face of a common threat. However, no matter how effective Sinclair's arguments were in the Commons, he failed to convince many outside the House and, indeed, some of his own backbenchers remained hostile to his policy of opposing appeasement. Even in the two votes at the end of the Munich agreement, four out of the small group of twenty Liberal MPs voted in support of Chamberlain.¹⁷

Outside the parliamentary party, Sinclair failed to win support from a small intellectual group centred around Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) and J. A. Spender, a devoted Asquithian Liberal and Chairman of the Liberal Council. Letters appeared in the press opposing Sinclair and

arguing for the Liberals to adhere to the 'traditional' values of isolationism, retrenchment and pacifism. Within parliament Sinclair was frequently attacked by Tory MPs as a warmonger. It was left to Sinclair, Mander and a handful of other Liberals such as Sir Percy Harris (Chief Whip) to oppose the Government and urge a new approach to dealing with Germany. The elder statesman of the party, David Lloyd George, though opposed to the Munich agreement, was compromised by his ill-judged comments proclaiming Hitler as a 'great man' after they had met in 1936. Lord Samuel, the former leader, was more concerned with finding a personal route back to office within the National Government and sent warm congratulations to Chamberlain after Munich, saying 'any fool can go to war but it often needs the highest qualities of statesmanship to keep the peace'¹⁸. Spender publicly referred to Sinclair's policy as being motivated by personal hatred of Chamberlain.

The Munich agreement was hugely popular with the general public and it took great political courage for Sinclair to be so outspoken in his condemnation. He was certainly quicker than the official Labour opposition to realise that Hitler must be stopped. However, it is only in retrospect that it is clear that Sinclair was right. At the time many people in Parliament and in the country believed that Chamberlain had saved Britain from an unnecessary conflict. It was not until the last year of the 1930s that Sinclair's views began to chime with those of the wider public.

By April 1939 the European situation was darkening to such an extent that Sinclair now won widespread support for a scathing attack on Chamberlain and other members of the Cabinet. German demands that Danzig, since 1919 a free city under the mandate of the League of Nations, be returned to German control, together with other lands of the old East Prussia initiated another



Sir Archibald Sinclair (1890–1970)

European diplomatic crisis. In a debate on the international situation on 3 April Sinclair declared that peace would only be possible 'if we are to convince Herr Hitler of our inflexible determination to resist aggression henceforward, there must be no hedging in the policy of His Majesty's Government and no whittling down of their pronouncements'. Sinclair went on to be scathing about the Government's record in maintaining its purpose in the face of the action of the dictators. He reminded the House of every retreat that the National Government had presided over.

Let us be quite clear about this matter. Peace will depend on the ability of His Majesty's Government to convince Herr Hitler that this time they really will be firm. It will not be easy to convince him. He will remember the Government's pledges at the last election about steady and collective resistance to unprovoked aggression and, four or five weeks later, the Hoare-Laval negotiations. He will remember that the independence of Austria was proclaimed by this Government to be an object of British policy. He will remember the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer at Lanark last August which was universally interpreted as meaning that we should, in the last resort, support Czecho-Slovakia against unprovoked aggression ... Tremendous exertions are called for from the Government and this country if we are to live down that record and convince Herr Hitler that in future we will be steadfast.

Churchill, speaking next, declared that 'this is a fine hour in the life of the Liberal Party, because from the moment when they realised that rearmament was necessary, they have seemed to seek to bring forward together both the material and moral strength of this country, and I believe that at the moment they represent what is the heart and soul of the British nation'.¹⁹

It was, of course, too late by this date to deter Hitler. Although Britain and France gave guarantees that they would protect Polish independence, Hitler was ready to risk war to further his eastern empire. Hitler and Stalin's deal over Poland and their non-aggression pact sealed the fate of Poland and made war certain. By the summer of 1939 there were few policy options available to Britain other than to prepare to stand with France and oppose Germany militarily.

Sinclair built a high profile in both Parliament and the country as a leading opponent of the Government's international policy. His anti-appeasement policy centred on a policy of strong national defence combined with resistance to aggression through collective agreements and the resolution of grievances through international conferences. Sinclair urged the development of a new foreign policy that would show that aggression would be resisted and that just grievances would be settled through international conference, rather than secret diplomacy. He also argued that there must be cooperation across the parties by those opposed to appeasement, and he lent the support of the Liberal Party to anti-appeasement candidates at two by-elections (Oxford and Bridgewater). He also supported the Conservative MP, the Duchess of Athol, when she resigned her seat to fight an unsuccessful by-election in protest at Chamberlain's handling of appeasement.

However, the campaign against Munich failed because Munich itself enjoyed enormous support throughout the country. The bulk of the British people were overjoyed to have avoided another war; Sinclair's message was not one they wanted to hear. Irrespective of this, Sinclair should be given credit for fashioning Liberal foreign policy into a coherent body that offered a clear alternative to the dangerous policy of appeasement. There were signs that Sinclair's policy stance was turning into a vote-winner and that had the 1940 general

election gone ahead as planned (that is, if war had broken out twelve months later than it did) then the Liberal Party might have seen a significant improvement in its electoral position. In July 1939 the Liberals fought and won their first by-election since 1934 when Tom Horabin held North Cornwall with an increased majority in a straight fight with a Conservative. Horabin stood as a Liberal candidate with the support of the Popular Front and his nomination papers were signed by both Labour and dissident Conservatives.

In his maiden speech Horabin spoke of the 'infirmity of purpose that many people in this country and many people in neutral and allied countries, and certainly I believe, the leaders of the Axis powers saw in the British Government'.²⁰ He argued that Chamberlain had done more harm to the world than Hitler, on the grounds that the man who lets the mad bull out of the field to run amok is more responsible than the bull for the damage done. What is particularly interesting is the evidence that this by-election suggests that had Sinclair chosen to cooperate more with cross-party organisations, such as the Popular Front, rather than remain aloof in fear of jeopardising Liberal independence, his anti-appeasement stance might have been more effective. Certainly, high-profile Liberal MPs such as Dingle Foot, Richard Acland and Megan Lloyd George felt that Sinclair could have positioned the Liberal Party as the pivot around which could have gathered both Labour and Conservative dissenters from the National Government's foreign policy. But it would have been a risky initiative, requiring, at the very least, electoral cooperation with the Labour Party – a risk that Sinclair did not feel able to take.

The frustration that the Liberal Party felt at having been correct in its policy but powerless to enact its beliefs was articulated by Violet Bonham Carter in a speech given to a Liberal Action Group dinner: 'For twenty-five years we have been right on almost every great

issue of public policy – Manchuria, Abyssinia, Spain, Munich, Ministry of Supply – dead right all the time and all along the line – in those crucial, those disastrous pre-war years. Yet our rightness availed us nothing – and it availed the country nothing either. We were right but we were impotent – utterly impotent to avert the cataclysm we saw approaching and which has engulfed us all. We've got to make sure that the Liberal Party is not only right but great and formidable as well.'²¹

Ian Hunter has edited the collected correspondence between Archibald Sinclair and Winston Churchill 1915–1960 (Politico's Publishing, forthcoming).

Further reading:

- Gerard De Groot, *Liberal Crusader – The life of Sir Archibald Sinclair* (Hurst, 1993)
- Richard S. Grayson, *Liberals, International Relations and Appeasement: The Liberal Party, 1919–39* (Frank Cass, 2001)
- R. A. C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement* (Macmillan, 1994)

Sinclair should be given credit for fashioning Liberal foreign policy into a coherent body that offered a clear alternative to the dangerous policy of appeasement.

1 There are exceptions to this rule, and Richard Grayson's excellent book *Liberals, International Relations and Appeasement: The Liberal Party, 1919–39* (Frank Cass, 2001), is a very clear overview of the development of various strands of Liberal thinking, both in and out of Parliament, during the interwar years.

2 www.libdemmanifesto.com/1935/1935-liberal-manifesto.shtml

3 *Hansard*, 14 March 1935, p. 612.

4 *Thurso Papers*, THRS II 25/3, Churchill College, Cambridge.

5 Interestingly, considering that Sinclair is frequently viewed as having been too much in Churchill's pocket, Sinclair's anti-appeasement stance, with its emphasis on collective security, was significantly different from the line that Churchill developed. Churchill had little time for the niceties of collective security. He wanted a strong independent Britain with armed forces, especially the air force, capable of resisting any continental threat. In short, Churchill's policy was to make sure Britain was strong enough to ignore the League of Nations and rely on French power, backed by British naval and air support, to keep Europe quiet.

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LIBERALS IN LIVERPOOL: THEIR LEGACY

Liverpool has long been a Liberal Democrat success story – but why? Leading figures from the history of Liberalism in Liverpool outline the pioneering campaigning that took the city from Labour, and its continuing legacy.

Speakers: **Sir Trevor Jones** and **Cllr Mike Storey** (Leader of Liverpool City Council). Chair: **Lord Rennard**.

8.00pm Friday 19th March 2004

Stanley Room, Prince of Wales Hotel, Southport

the end, the party was willing to accept the arguments of its leaders that free trade was not part of the modern world, but that support for Europe was – and since then the party has not really questioned the protectionist approach at the heart of the European Community in any public way. In part this may have been helped by the number of new recruits brought into the party under Grimond's leadership. In that sense, the change from free-trade party to European party was significant and indicative of a broader change in personnel and attitude that marked a major shift in what it meant to be a Liberal.

After reading history at Selwyn College, Cambridge and studying for a MA at Lancaster University, Malcolm Baines completed a D.Phil. at Exeter College, Oxford, on The Survival of the British Liberal Party, 1932–1959 in 1989. He has also published a number of articles on related topics and helped re-found the Liberal Democrat History Group.

- 1 J. Pinder, *The Federal Idea: A British Contribution*
- 2 M. Pottle (ed.), *Daring to Hope: Diaries and letters of Violet Bonham-Carter, 1946–1969*
- 3 R. Rhodes James, *Anthony Eden*
- 4 A. Butt Philip, 'The Liberals and Europe', in V. Bogdanor (ed.), *Liberal Party Politics*
- 5 *Manchester Guardian*, 11 April 1953
- 6 J.S. Rasmussen, *The Liberal Party*
- 7 *Liberal News*, 1 February 1957
- 8 NLYL/UULS Joint Political Committee Minutes 1957–1968, Draft Policy Pamphlet 1 November 1957
- 9 *Liberal News*, 1 February 1957
- 10 Roy Douglas, *History of the Liberal Party, 1895–1970*
- 11 *Liberal News*, 12 February 1959
- 12 Jeremy Thorpe, *In My Own Time*
- 13 Roy Douglas, *The History of the Liberal Party, 1895–1970*
- 14 J.S. Rasmussen, *The Liberal Party*
- 15 Roy Douglas, *The History of the Liberal Party, 1985–1970*
- 16 Iain Dale (ed.), *Liberal Party General Election Manifestos, 1900–1997*

Sir Archibald Sinclair: The Liberal Anti- Appeaser

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- 6 R.A.C. Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement* (Macmillan, 1993) provides an excellent record of the alternative policy positions adopted by the Labour and Liberal parties to the National Government's foreign policy as regards Nazi Germany.
- 7 The five occasions were moving an amendment to the Address at the start of Parliament and the three and a half supply (debating) days they were allocated in the parliamentary calendar.
- 8 House of Commons, 19 December 1935.
- 9 House of Commons, 26 March 1936.
- 10 Quoted in Geoffrey Mander, *We Were Not All Wrong* (Victor Gollancz, 1941), p. 66.
- 11 For a full account of the various factors prompting Eden's resignation see D.R. Thorpe, *Eden* (Chatto & Windus, 2003), pp. 200–06.
- 12 Liberal Leader in the House of Lords.
- 13 Quoted in the *Liberal Magazine*, October 1938.
- 14 Quoted in the *Manchester Guardian*, 22 September 1938.
- 15 See the file DGFT 7/14 at Churchill College, Cambridge.
- 16 See Dingle Foot's description

- of this period in DGFT 7/11, Churchill College.
- 17 Although twenty-one MPs had been elected in 1935, Herbert Holdsworth defected to the Liberal Nationals in 1936.
- 18 Although a man of principle, Samuel was increasingly desperate to return to Government. In September 1939 when Sinclair declined the offer of a cabinet seat from Chamberlain, Samuel broke ranks and offered his personal services to the Government. Chamberlain declined the offer, saying that he had 'no suitable post' for Samuel. A full account of this incident is given by Professor John Vincent in 'Chamberlain, the Liberals and the outbreak of war, 1939', *English Historical Review*, April 1998.
- 19 *Hansard*, 3 April 1939, col. 2497. It should also be noted that earlier in the speech Sinclair had called for the restoration of Churchill to the Cabinet, which may in part explain Churchill's warm reception of Sinclair's performance.
- 20 Quoted in Parker, *Chamberlain and Appeasement*, p. 269.
- 21 Speech to Liberal Action, 5 October 1943, Lady Violet Bonham Carter papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford. Unfortunately the author is unable to provide a file reference as he consulted these papers prior to their formal cataloguing by the Library.