


GILBERT MURRAY

LIBERALISM'S DEBILITATING I

Students of early-twentieth-century British politics have for the most part been more comfortable with domestic-policy debates than with foreign-policy ones. They have been happier distinguishing New Liberal social policies from the Gladstonian variety than differentiating the thinking of the League of Nations movement from that of the Union of Democratic Control. In consequence, they have largely neglected the cleavage that came to the fore during the First World War between liberal-internationalist and radical-isolationist tendencies within the Liberal Party and the damage which that cleavage did to that party. By **Martin Ceadel**.



MURRAY v. E. D. MOREL

DIVIDE OVER FOREIGN POLICY



FROM 3 AUGUST 1914 these divergent approaches to foreign affairs were respectively personified by Gilbert Murray and E. D. Morel. Murray endorsed Grey's foreign policy from 3 August 1914; he soon became a leading campaigner for the League of Nations; and he always stayed loyal to the Liberal Party. By contrast, Morel opposed Grey; within days of British intervention he helped to found the Union of Democratic Control; and he ended up in the Labour Party. This article therefore asks: how significant was this foreign-policy split of August 1914 for the party's subsequent decline?

The Liberals had long seen themselves as the party of 'peace, retrenchment, and reform', the word order being a revealing one; but they had developed two rather different answers to the question of how peace was to be promoted, in which the origins of the Murray–Morel split of 1914 can be detected. The answer that I call radical, and which later became associated with E. D. Morel, stressed the need *within states* democratically to control the domestic elites and vested interests that benefited from war. It assumed that the people did not so benefit, and so were always a force for peace. It therefore advocated popular control of foreign

policy. The one that I call liberal, and which later became associated with Gilbert Murray, doubted that any section of the population was immune from the war-promoting cult of sovereign nationalism. It therefore promoted internationalism, and stressed the need to improve relations *among states* by promoting commercial links, by agreeing to arbitrate inter-state disputes, and by developing international law.

The way in which these radical and liberal approaches emerged in Britain had been somewhat haphazard. The radical approach was the first to articulate itself clearly, being a product of the French revolutionary era. In the 1790s the radical thinkers William Godwin and Thomas Paine had blamed war on monarchs and aristocrats, and had argued that republicanism – what would later be called democratic control – would achieve lasting peace.¹ But they had disagreed about how best to promote republicanism: Godwin abhorred war, except possibly in self-defence, so would promote republicanism only in a pacific way; yet Paine was a crusader who hoped that Revolutionary France would win its war against Britain, so as more quickly to bring about a republic here.

The liberal-internationalist approach did not fully set out its distinctive stall until the 1830s and 1840s, its emblematic figure being Richard Cobden, free-trade campaigner and spokesman for the Manchester School. His dismissal of much military spending as outdoor relief for the aristocracy harked back to Paine and Godwin. So too did his hostility to the Concert of Europe, whereby in the name of Christian legitimacy, as well as by the logic of realism, the great powers managed the international relations of their continent in the way that the UN Security Council was later supposed to manage those of a wider world. Cobden's suspicion of elitist diplomacy of this kind was expressed in his early cry of 'no foreign politics'. But his more constructive policies of creating economic interdependence through free trade and of inserting arbitration clauses into all interstate treaties heralded a new and more positive liberal internationalism.

Ironically, Cobden's principal political bugbear was the first

prime minister to espouse the Liberal label, Palmerston, a political magician who managed to present a chauvinistic foreign policy in such a way as to appeal to the increasingly influential radical artisans who wanted Britain to crusade for the liberties of Europe against the despots repressing the 1848 revolutions. The Peace Society, then close to Cobden, loathingly admitted that Palmerston was 'an adroit trickster, perfect in the art of moral legerdemain [whom] ... straight-away the English people fall down and worship'.² The major foreign-affairs feud of the mid-nineteenth century was thus within the emergent Liberal Party, as the non-interventionist Cobden clashed repeatedly with the ultra-interventionist Palmerston, not only over the Don Pacifico affair in 1850 and the Crimean War of 1854–6, but also over the bombardment of Canton in 1857, following which Cobden brought Palmerston down in the House of Commons, though the Cobdenites were trounced by the Palmerstonians at the ensuing general election.³

By 1865, the year in which the polarising antagonists Cobden and Palmerston both died, artisan and other enthusiasm for crusading had somewhat subsided. Liberalism's new leader, the political moralist William Gladstone, now gave his party a clearer foreign-affairs identity.⁴ Ever since his days as a High Church Tory, before he became a Peelite and thereby migrated into the Liberal Party, Gladstone had approved of the Concert of Europe and its management of continental affairs, and was in consequence much more engaged with international politics than Cobden had been. But Gladstone now grounded this engagement, not upon great-power legitimacy and privilege, but upon the need to uphold what he called 'the public law of Europe'. This was an idealist and supranational idea, though like almost all his Liberal contemporaries Gladstone stopped short of proposing an international organisation to develop that public law and impose it upon states. Without repudiating Manchester School thinking, Gladstone thus moved liberalism away from the non-interventionist, little-England ethos that Cobden had imbued it with, and towards an internationalist engagement.

Previous pages:
left – Gilbert Murray (1866–1957); right – E.D. Morel (1873–1924)

But in promoting such an engagement Gladstone held back from the crusading enthusiasms to which some radicals had previously succumbed and which Palmerston had often found it useful to exploit. Gladstone presented Liberalism as a pacific tendency that above all repudiated, at least in the rhetorical sphere, the spirited foreign policy now claimed on behalf of the Tories, since Palmerston's demise, by the Earl of Beaconsfield, the former Benjamin Disraeli. Gladstone's condemnation in 1876 of Britain's traditional ally, the Ottoman Empire, for the 'horrors' it was inflicting upon its Bulgarian subjects, suggested that the Liberals would pursue morality in foreign policy rather than realpolitik. This was confirmed during the 1879–80 Midlothian campaign by Gladstone's sustained attack on 'Beaconsfieldism' – his short-hand for Tory jingoism, imperialism, and *raison d'état*.

Gladstone's intense yet pacific rhetoric enthused in particular some newly enfranchised artisans and helped to bring them into the Liberal fold. I stress that I am talking here of rhetoric, and recognise that it was belied in office by, in particular, the occupation of Egypt in 1882. Yet when this rhetoric was confronted by the Lord Salisbury's more judicious playing of the imperial defence card, it did not perform well electorally, as some Liberals soon realised. Indeed, as a generalisation, progressive rhetoric has fared less well in the international sphere than in the domestic one. Relatively orderly state structures can be expected to implement domestic reforms – or at least could be expected to do so prior to the post-cold-war period with its increasingly globalised economy and its many failed states. It was always less plausible to expect a relatively anarchic international structure to do the same, except in especially fortunate zones of peace such as western Europe during the last six decades. In late-nineteenth-century Britain, as mass opinion became more important because of suffrage extension, and moreover became so at a time of imperial competition and social-Darwinist thinking, an idealistic, pacific rhetoric could seem implausible. In the 1890s a 'Liberal Imperialist' faction therefore emerged within

Liberalism that regarded Gladstonian rhetoric as a political handicap. Indeed, the opposition of a radical section of the Liberals, soon dubbed 'pro-Boers', to the South African War helped to lose the party the 'khaki election' of 1900.

When, largely as a result of Tory disarray, the Liberal Party returned to government in December 1905 under Campbell-Bannerman, domestic circumstances proved conducive to its 'New Liberal' reform programme, which revived the party's ideological confidence. But external circumstances, particularly the German threat, were ill suited to its traditional external-policy watchwords, peace and retrenchment. In this area of policy, the Liberal government inherited two commitments from its Tory precursor. The first was to out-build the expanding German fleet, which eventually forced it to abandon retrenchment. The second was to nurture an entente with France, which was eventually supplemented by one with Russia. Gladstonians worried about the abandonment of retrenchment and the confrontation with Germany. And the radicals on the left of the party, though no longer troubled by monarchical or aristocratic power, were suspicious of the behind-the-scenes influence of both the elitist Foreign Office (which they suspected of secretly practising an entangling diplomacy for its own professional satisfaction) and the arms trade (which obviously had a vested interest in war). Both Gladstonians and radicals feared that – given the dreadnought race, the ententes, Grey as foreign secretary, and Asquith as Campbell-Bannerman's successor – the Liberal Imperialist faction had captured foreign policy. For their part, of course, Grey and Asquith saw themselves as upholding the public law of Europe against a militarist threat in a fashion of which all Liberals should approve.

During these years both Gilbert Murray and E. D. Morel were among the many Liberal critics of Grey and Asquith, though it would have been possible to predict that Murray might be won over by the party leadership whereas Morel never would.

Gilbert Murray was an amiable man whose Liberalism was of the sensitive, well-connected and elitist

kind.⁵ Born in Australia in 1866, he was at a young age drawn to teetotalism and animal welfare in reaction to his father's alcoholism and his class-mates' cruelty. Arriving in England aged 11, just as Gladstone limbered up for his Midlothian campaign, and being sent for a classical education to public school and Oxford, he espoused both partisan Liberalism and cultural Hellenism, which fused in his mind as a single civilising mission. They were further entrenched when in his early twenties he both married into the Whig aristocracy and became a professor of Greek. A supporter of Irish home rule and female suffrage, he was in Liberalism's pro-Boer camp, though, revealingly, he disapproved of J. A. Hobson's *Imperialism: a study*, when he was sent it in draft, disputing its radical critique that the pandering of an elitist government to financial interests had caused the war. Thereafter Murray's political interests were mainly in domestic affairs, though he became senior member of the Oxford War and Peace Society, formed in February 1914 to support the work of Norman Angell, whose recent best-seller *The Great Illusion* had argued a neo-Cobdenite case; and after Austria-Hungary declared war against Serbia on 28 July Murray initially campaigned for British neutrality. He thus had good reason to claim, looking back a few months later: 'We Radicals had always worked for peace, for conciliation, for mutual understanding'.⁶

E. D. Morel was a difficult man whose Liberalism was of the strident, alienated, and populist kind.⁷ Born in 1873 to a French father, who had died when he was 4, and an English mother, who had quarrelled with her in-laws and returned to Britain, he became a shipping clerk in Liverpool, and later wrote trade-related articles for the local press. Learning through this work of the maltreatment of his Congolese subjects by the king of the Belgians, he in 1904 launched the Congo Reform Association, a one-man band which succeeded in having the Congo Free State removed from royal control – a remarkable campaigning achievement. While pulling this off, Morel developed an almost paranoid loathing of British and French policymakers,

whom he accused of deliberately obstructing him in order not to offend their Belgian ally. Given the fanaticism and self-obsession that troubled even his admirers, it is hard not to speculate about a psychological link between Morel's intense hatred of the entente cordiale and his unhappy Anglo-French background. He vented his anti-entente (and therefore inevitably pro-German) feelings in a well-researched book, *Morocco in Diplomacy*, which appeared in 1912, the year he also became prospective Liberal candidate for Birkenhead. And, unsurprisingly, he too favoured British neutrality when the European war broke out on 28 July 1914.

The split between Murray and Morel came on 3 August 1914 when Murray was present in the gallery of the House of Commons to hear the speech by Sir Edward Grey, a tour de force of halting anti-rhetoric that won over many Liberals to the cause of British intervention, which duly took place the following day. Murray felt sympathy for a fastidious Oxonian from an old Whig family struggling to do the right thing, and became Grey's apologist, making two contributions to OUP's *Oxford Pamphlets 1914* series, and publishing a short book, *The Foreign Policy of Sir Edward Grey*, in 1915. Even so, Murray still regarded himself as pro-peace. Despite supporting the war, he championed the cause of conscientious objectors. And he supported the movement for a League of Nations, the institutionalisation of Gladstone's public law of Europe. The League of Nations Society, established in May 1915 attracted loyal Asquithians like Murray who had reluctantly accepted British intervention but took seriously the justification for that intervention as a war that would end war. Many patriots regarded post-war projects like a League of Nations as 'pacifist' distractions from crushing Prussianism; and the mainstream Liberals who mainly comprised the League of Nations Society did not want to offend them. So the society kept its head down until American entry into the war under a pro-League president transformed the League project from liberal dream to prospective reality. After April 1917, therefore, realists sought to adapt it to their own purposes,

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some of them calling for the immediate formation of a League on the basis of the wartime alliance against Germany. When the League of Nations Society rejected this, a separate body, the League of Free Nations Association, was founded in the summer of 1918, to press for an immediate League, without Germany. The sudden ending of the war in the autumn rendered the disagreement between the two League associations moot, enabling them to merge in November 1918 as the famous League of Nations Union. Murray played a crucial role: he had been a vice-president of the League of Nations Society; he was chairman of the League of Free Nations Association; and he became chairman also of the merged League of Nations Union, which was within a decade to put down deeper roots in civil society than any other peace association, in Britain or elsewhere.⁸

By contrast, Grey's speech probably reinforced E. D. Morel's neutralism; and, within six days of Britain's declaration of war on 4 August, Morel helped to create the First World War's most influential peace association, the Union of Democratic Control (or UDC, as it soon became known). As its title indicated, the UDC was a radical organisation, which implicitly blamed British secret and elitist diplomacy, as much as German militarism, for the conflict.⁹ Professing not to be a stop-the-war organisation, it called for an eventual peace settlement that reflected democratic wishes and therefore avoided annexations and indemnities. Morel's three UDC co-founders were: Ramsay MacDonald, who stood down from the chairmanship of the Labour Party in opposition to British intervention; Charles Trevelyan, who resigned as a Liberal junior minister; and Norman Angell, whose Neutrality League had been the most dynamic element within the eight-day campaign to keep Britain out of the European conflict.¹⁰ Arthur Ponsonby, a Liberal MP, was also involved from the outset, but did not go public at this stage. The UDC was widely denounced as pacifist; but its radical members endured unpopularity much more stoically than the Asquitheans of the League of Nations Society; and the intransigent Morel positively relished

it, becoming the UDC's principal driving force.

Though one of the UDC's demands was for an international council, which has sometimes been equated with a League of Nations, Morel envisaged this merely as a public forum through which diplomacy could be made un-secret and therefore democratically accountable. He never wanted a collective security organisation of the kind favoured by the League of Nations Society, and even more so by the League of Free Nations Associations. Indeed, Morel came strongly to dismiss the international organisation eventually established at Geneva as another diplomatic device for entangling his country in conflicts that did not concern it.

During the first half of the war the UDC had been a controversial body. But it steadily gained acceptance as war-weariness developed, particularly after the tsar's abdication raised doubts as to Russia's perseverance with the military effort. It found the British labour movement increasingly fertile soil for its propaganda during 1917–18. Morel thereby became such a thorn in the British government's side that he was gaoled for a fairly technical breach of the Defence of the Realm Act. The UDC's historian, Marvin Swartz, rather cruelly observed that, parted from his UDC followers, Morel suffered 'malnutrition of the ego'; but, having been given the prison system's punitive 'second division' regime, he also suffered physically – indeed he suffered so palpably that when Bertrand Russell was similarly convicted he made sure of being placed in the first division.

The Murray–Morel split thus reflected two longstanding cleavages within Liberalism. One was an ideological cleavage between internationalist engagement of a Gladstonian variety, represented by Murray, and little-England isolationism, represented by Morel. The other was a sociological cleavage between mainstream Liberal loyalty of a respectable kind, embodied by Murray, and anti-establishment radicalism of a 'trouble-making' kind (as A. J. P. Taylor lovingly described it),¹¹ embodied by Morel.

But what part did the split play in the Liberal Party's sidelining by Labour? This requires me to touch on the controversy between

'declinists', who see Liberalism as destined to lose working-class support even if the First World War had not taken place, and 'catastrophists', who believe that a going political concern was destroyed by the particular events of 1914–18. My instincts are declinist: I find it hard to interpret Britain's class-based partisanship, which seemed so deeply entrenched from the 1930s to the 1980s during which time a majority of the working class identified with Labour, as in a sense accidental.

Already by the First World War, the Liberals had alienated enough trade unionists and working-class would-be politicians for the Labour Party to become a significant force even on a limited suffrage. The Gladstonian party's preoccupation with home rule for Ireland and dislike of sectional legislation had held it back from helping the trade unions when important court judgements started going against them in the 1890s. In addition, particularly after Salisbury had astutely made single- rather than double-member constituencies the norm from 1885, the Liberals failed to adopt working-class candidates, except in the handful of wholly proletarian constituencies, such as mining districts, where 'Lib-Labs' were indeed chosen. Politically ambitious workingmen had mostly therefore been forced to look elsewhere. The consequence was the Labour Representation Committee of 1900, which, thanks in part to an electoral pact unwisely conceded by the Liberals, overtook the Lib-Labs to become *the* Labour Party following the 1906 election. Labour was thus entrenched in the Commons before New Liberal policies could signal to workingmen that the post-Gladstonian party was interested in social reform. And the industrial unrest of 1911–12 signalled to many workers that the Liberals were a party of bosses. The union ballots under the 1913 Trade Union Act all went in favour of paying a political levy to Labour. For declinists, therefore, the eventual shift from householder suffrage to male suffrage would have clinched Labour's supplanting of the Liberals even without the First World War. But of course declinists would have expected a slow death of Liberal

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England. They fully accept that the war dramatically speeded it up.

Catastrophists see the First World War as causing problems for the Liberals at the organisational, ideological, and leadership levels. Their organisation fell apart as Liberal agents joined the army and Nonconformist congregations declined, whereas trade unionism expanded and thereby provided Labour with a stronger institutional base. Entering a war, accepting the McKenna duties, and introducing conscription constituted ideological challenges to Liberalism, though Asquith skilfully kept the resultant resignations to a minimum. Meanwhile, the increased state control required by the war economy was helping Labour's ideological cause. The biggest catastrophe was obviously the leadership split between Asquith and Lloyd George in December 1916. The ousting of a leader who had been dominant during peacetime but could not provide inspiration and drive in wartime need not in itself have been fatal. The Tories survived the very similar split of 1940 between Chamberlain and Churchill, a comparison which shows that the behaviour of the ousted prime minister was the key factor. Chamberlain served under his successor, and, by dying promptly, enabled Churchill soon to become party leader as well. The Conservatives therefore went into the 1945 general election in one piece. Asquith performed neither of these services for Lloyd George. Instead, he went into semi-opposition on the backbenches, his division of the House of Commons in the Maurice debate brought about the 'coupon election' in which the split between Asquithians and coalitionists was entrenched. And Asquith stayed on as official Liberal leader for another decade. By 1922 the Liberals had ceased to be the official opposition to the Conservatives.

For declinists, the Murray–Morel split was merely another factor speeding an inexorable decline. But for catastrophists, every factor that caused Liberalism to lose its lustre and Labour to broaden its appeal was of importance. The Murray–Morel split did both. Despite hitching its star to the League of Nations and adapting well to the ideological challenges posed by the war effort, the party

mainstream's support for what proved to be a messy and protracted British intervention, which Murray represented, undoubtedly made it much harder than previously to identify Liberalism with progress. Support for the war undoubtedly tarnished the Liberal brand.

In addition, the Morel faction helped Labour in two ways. First, as was pointed out by Swartz as early as 1971, Labour's ability to recruit UDC members gave it a significant infusion of the workers 'by brain' which it aspired to enrol, as clause 4 of its new constitution indicated. In particular, the UDC supplied foreign-policy experts who assisted Labour in its rapid transition from a single-issue pressure group into a plausible party of government. Although UDC members fared disastrously in the December 1918 general election, thirty of them were elected as Labour MPs in November 1922, when MacDonald resumed the Labour leadership; and in due course the UDC's co-leaders – Morel, Trevelyan, Angell, and Ponsonby – all joined MacDonald in the Parliamentary Labour Party. The first Labour government contained fifteen UDC members, nine of them in the cabinet, including MacDonald not merely as prime minister but also – to the distress of the excluded Morel, who felt entitled to the post – as foreign secretary. Few, if any, of those transitioning from Liberal to Labour via the UDC would have done so over domestic issues.

Secondly, and less commonly noted, UDC thinking helped Labour heal its own divisions over the war, which at one time looked very serious. The party lost its dominant figure when MacDonald's opposition to British intervention prompted his resignation. He was no pacifist, as he showed when he allowed his name to be used at a recruitment meeting during the military crisis of late August and September 1914. MacDonald was instead a radical isolationist who, except during that military crisis, believed that British interests were not involved in the European quarrel. One of the party's most important affiliates, the ILP, also opposed the war, for a mixture of pacifist, radical, and socialist reasons. But most Labourites were pro-war, even if some – like Arthur Henderson, who replaced

During the early 1920s Morel seemed thus to have triumphed over Murray, as his foreign-affairs thinking enjoyed a period of hegemony whereas the form in which the League of Nations had been created in 1919 caused initial disillusion with Murray's alternative.

MacDonald as leader – had joined the UDC. There was a real prospect that this split over British intervention would become entrenched when Henderson was drawn first into the coalition government which Asquith formed in May 1915 and then into Lloyd George's small war cabinet. One important reason why it did not was the war cabinet's insensitive treatment of Henderson in the famous doormat incident of August 1917, which led to his resignation in order to reconstruct the Labour Party on a firmer ideological basis and with a broader popular appeal. Henderson even wanted to change its name to the People's Party.¹² In reconstructing Labour, Henderson received MacDonald's cooperation. But these old colleagues could not have come together as effectively as they did had the UDC not provided a policy which their pro- and anti-war followers could both enthusiastically support. Setting aside their previous disagreement about the merits of intervention, both factions now focused on the need for a peace without annexations and indemnities. As a result Labour ended the war more united and in a more positive frame of mind than could have been predicted eighteen months or so previously. And, although the public's patriotic, and therefore anti-UDC, mood in the 1918 election held Labour back for a parliament, by 1922 the party's UDC policies helped it cash in on the public reaction against the Treaty of Versailles, which had notoriously involved both annexations and indemnities.

During the early 1920s Morel seemed thus to have triumphed over Murray, as his foreign-affairs thinking enjoyed a period of hegemony whereas the form in which the League of Nations had been created in 1919 caused initial disillusion with Murray's alternative. But 1924 proved to be radical isolationism's last hurrah. Those joining the first Labour government had to resign their UDC membership. Needing as prime minister and foreign secretary constructively to resolve the Franco-German quarrel, MacDonald came to realise how negative and biased were the UDC's isolationism and hostility to France. And, within weeks of the government's fall, Morel, whose health had been

lastingly damaged in prison, died suddenly. Without his fanatical commitment the UDC faded fast; and an attempt to commit it to blanket opposition to League of Nations sanctions caused a damaging split in 1928. By then, public hopes for peace had come to be focused on Geneva; and, with Gilbert Murray still chairing its executive committee, the League of Nations Union rapidly supplanted the UDC as the country's principal peace association, collecting more than 400,000 annual subscriptions at its organisational peak in 1931 and even more remarkably persuading 38 per cent of the adult population to take part in its pro-League pseudo-referendum, the Peace Ballot, in 1934–5.¹³ Liberal internationalism thus became intellectually hegemonic: even Tories such as Baldwin had to pay lip service to the League; and Churchill linked his rearmament campaign to the internationalist cause rather than to that of go-it-alone patriotism. Labour had to stop dismissing Geneva as a league of capitalist victors, and – despite a wobble in 1933 – were steered towards collective security by Arthur Henderson.¹⁴ The declining Liberal Party saw the League as its own special cause. As Richard Grayson has noted of

From the mid-1920s, therefore, Murray's mainstream-Liberal foreign-policy approach triumphed definitively over Morel's radical alternative.

the inter-war period: 'if a Liberal knocked on your front door to canvass, then there was a fairly high probability that when asked what the Liberal Party stood for, this earnest man or woman would talk about "Peace" and the League of Nations prior to anything else.'¹⁵

From the mid-1920s, therefore, Murray's mainstream-Liberal foreign-policy approach triumphed definitively over Morel's radical alternative. But the Liberal Party was by then too far gone institutionally to benefit from this final triumph. And Morel's foreign-policy-led defection had contributed significantly to the speed of this institutional failure.

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- 1 Martin Ceadel, *The Origins of War Prevention: the British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1730–1854* (Clarendon Press, 1996), pp. 36–40.
- 2 *Herald of Peace*, August 1862, p. 86.
- 3 Martin Ceadel, 'Cobden and Peace', in Anthony Howe and Simon Morgan (eds.), *Rethinking Nineteenth-Century Liberalism: Richard Cobden Bicentenary Essays* (Ashgate, 2006), pp. 189–207.
- 4 Martin Ceadel, 'Gladstone and a Liberal Theory of International

Relations', in Peter Ghosh and Lawrence Goldman (eds.), *Politics and Culture in Victorian Britain: Essays in Memory of Colin Matthew* (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 74–94.

- 5 For Murray, see Duncan Wilson, *Gilbert Murray OM, 1866–1957* (Oxford University Press, 1987); and Francis West, *Gilbert Murray: A Life* (Croom Helm, 1987).
- 6 Cited in Martin Ceadel, 'Gilbert Murray and International Politics', in Christopher Stray (ed.), *Gilbert Murray Reassessed: Hellenism, Theatre and International Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 223.
- 7 The authoritative source for Morel's life is Catherine Cline, *E. D. Morel 1873–1924: Strategies of Protest* (Blackstaff Press, 1980).
- 8 The foundational work on this subject is Henry Winkler, *The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, 1914–1919* (Rutgers UP, 1952). See also Donald Birn, *The League of Nations Union 1918–1945* (Clarendon Press, 1981); Martin Ceadel, *Semi-Detached Idealists: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1854–1945* (Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 7; and Helen McCarthy, *The British People and the League of Nations: Democracy, citizenship, and internationalism, c.1918–45* (Manchester University Press, 2011).

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LETTERS

Emlyn Hooson and the Falklands war

J. Graham Jones' article on 'Emlyn Hooson, Voice of Montgomeryshire' (*Journal of Liberal History* 86, spring 2015), continues his excellent work on Welsh Liberal history.

He mentions Emlyn's remarkable speech against the Falklands war, made in the House of Lords when the conflict was at its height and when there was considerable pressure on politicians to close ranks and to support the British forces. It was all the more impressive because it came from a distinguished Liberal lawyer rather than from a kneejerk left-wing Labour speaker.

Graham should have mentioned the comment of Labour peer, Hugh Jenkins – Lord Jenkins of Putney – who spoke immediately after Emlyn: 'My Lords, your Lordships have just listened to what was to me perhaps the most remarkable speech that I have listened to since I had the privilege of joining your Lordships' House.'

Michael Meadowcroft

Emlyn Hooson and the law

I read with interest the article on Emlyn Hooson. I think Graham Jones has not understood him prior to his taking silk and becoming a serious politician. When he was

defending as a junior he showed a charm when addressing a jury which was accompanied by a twinkle in his eye.

On one such occasion I was sent by my principal to 'instruct' him at a trial at Denbighshire Quarter Sessions. I saw at first hand all these qualities. While the jury was out, his instructions to me were to go to his car (a beautiful Rover 90) many times to see from his car radio if the Torrington by-election result was yet declared. This was in 1958. The fortunes of the party came a very close second.

Quentin Dodd


New from the Liberal Democrat History Group

British Liberal Leaders

Leaders of the Liberal Party, SDP and Liberal Democrats since the Great Reform Act

Edited by Duncan Brack, Robert Ingham and Tony Little

The British Liberal Party, and its successor, the Liberal Democrats, has a good claim to be the oldest political party in the world. From the Whigs of 1679 to the formation of the Liberal Party in 1859, and then to 1988 and the merger with the Social Democratic Party to form today's Liberal Democrats, politicians of all these labels held to a core of liberal principles: the belief in individual liberty; the quest for an equitable society at home and abroad; and the pursuit of reform, in the economic and social spheres as well as the political, with the aim of enlarging freedom for all.



This book is the story of those parties' leaders, from Earl Grey, who led the Whigs through the Great Reform Act of 1832, to Nick Clegg, the first Liberal leader to enter government for more than sixty years. Chapters written by experts in Liberal history cover such towering political figures as Palmerston, Gladstone, Asquith and Lloyd George; those, such as Sinclair, Clement Davies and Grimond, who led the party during its darkest hours; and those who led its revival, including David Steel, Roy Jenkins and Paddy Ashdown. Interviews with recent leaders are included, along with an analysis of the characteristics required to be an effective Liberal leader.

Liberal Leaders will be available in September, as part of a series of three books, published by Biteback, examining the leaders of the three major British political parties.

British Liberal Leaders will be launched at the Liberal Democrat History Group's fringe meeting at the Liberal Democrats' autumn conference in Bournemouth, on Sunday 20 September (time and venue to be confirmed in the autumn issue of the *Journal*).

The book will be available at a special discounted price to subscribers to the *Journal of Liberal History*: £20.00 instead of the normal £25.00. Copies will be available at the History Group's stand in the conference exhibition at Bournemouth or ordered via our website, www.liberalhistory.org.uk.

- 9 Harry Hanak, 'The Union of Democratic Control during the First World War', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 36 (1963), pp. 167–80; Marvin Swartz, *The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War* (Clarendon Press, 1971); Sally Harris, *Out of Control: British Foreign Policy and the Union of Democratic Control* (Hull Academic Press, 1996).
- 10 Martin Ceadel, *Living the Great Illusion: Sir Norman Angell, 1972–1967* (Oxford University Press, 2009), ch. 5.
- 11 Morel was one of the heroes of Taylor's *The Trouble Makers: Dissent over British Foreign Policy 1792–1939* (Hamish Hamilton, 1957).
- 12 I owe this information to Ross McKibbin.
- 13 Martin Ceadel, 'The First British Referendum: The Peace Ballot, 1934–5', *English Historical Review*, 95 (1980), pp. 810–39.
- 14 Martin Ceadel, 'Arthur Henderson: An Evolving Liberal Internationalist among Labour Little-Englanders', in C. Clare V. Griffiths, James J. Knott, and William Whyte (eds.), *Classes, Cultures, and Politics: Essays on British History for Ross McKibbin* (Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 247–62.
- 15 Richard S. Grayson, *Liberals, International Relations and Appeasement: The Liberal Party, 1919–1939* (Frank Cass, 2001), p. 139.