For the study of Liberal, SDP and Liberal Democrat history

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Journal of Liberal HISTORY



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

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

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

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Liberal Democrat History Group

The Liberal Democrat History Group promotes the discussion and research of topics relating to the histories of the Liberal Democrats, Liberal Party, and SDP, and of Liberalism. The Group organises discussion meetings and produces the *Journal of Liberal History* and other occasional publications.

For more information, including historical commentaries, details of publications, back issues of the *Journal*, and archive and other research resources, see: **www.liberalhistory.org.uk**.

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Liberal History News
Summer 2019

Appreciation: Richard Moore

Few Liberal Democrat members today are aware how tenuous was the Liberal Party's hold on electoral survival in the early 1950s, and how indebted we are to Liberals such as Richard Moore, who has died aged 88. At the 1951 general election there were only 109 candidates, and 110 in 1955. At both elections the party returned just six MPs, five of whom had no Conservative opponent. It was the existence of a core of key individuals whose deep attachment to Liberalism, and whose awareness of its fundamental difference from both conservatism and socialism, fuelled their determination to maintain an independent party and to continue to fight elections.

Though a number of this mighty handful of Liberals were survivors of the golden age of Liberalism, there were some young activists, including Richard. Born in 1931, he fought his first election in 1955 at the age of 24. In total he contested eight parliamentary elections between 1955 and October 1974,[1] plus the 1984 European Parliament election in Somerset & Dorset West. Remarkably for the time, he lost his deposit just once and this in unusual circumstances. Being deeply concerned at the increasing polarisation of Northern Ireland he believed it was important for the Liberal Party to make a non-sectarian stance, and he contested the North Antrim constituency in 1966. Then, when in 1970 the Reverend Ian Paisley was nominated as a more extreme 'Protestant Unionist' candidate, Richard regarded this as a dangerous and highly illiberal development and told the Liberal Party National Executive Committee that it was vitally important that a Liberal candidate challenged him. There was a brief silence, whereupon Richard added that, if no one else was prepared to stand, he would do so himself. He packed a bag and went directly to Northern Ireland. He made powerful speeches condemning the bigotry of Paisley and his party, a stance which put him in physical danger from Paisley supporters. It was inevitably a quixotic fight, and Paisley was duly returned with Richard fifth – and a lost deposit.

Richard was the son of a baronet, and had a somewhat torrid early education. However, he won an Exhibition to Trinity College, Cambridge in 1949, where he became President of the Union and anchored the Liberal Club. He joined the Liberal Party in 1951 and went to his first Liberal Assembly in 1953, thereafter attending every year, including latterly Liberal Democrat conferences, until 2017. It is said that it was the existence of Jewish refugees from Hitler in the family home before the war that instilled a young awareness of the consequences of totalitarianism which imbued all his politics. It also gave him an affection for the state of Israel which remained with him, supporting it even when the idealistic principles that underpinned its origins were eroded by later more right-wing governments.

A modest legacy enabled Richard to take on a succession of relatively poorly paid jobs within the Liberal family. Soon after graduation he joined the Liberal daily, the *News Chronicle*, as a leader writer. When that folded in October 1960 he became secretary to the Liberal peers and, later, his internationalism found expression in becoming adviser to the Liberal Group in the European Parliament,[2] in between two terms as Secretary General of Liberal International. His key role, however, was as Political Secretary and speech writer to Jeremy Thorpe on his election as Liberal Party leader in 1967, a post he held for seven years. He was Thorpe's key aide throughout most of the turbulent years of the Norman Scott affair but he resolutely refused to comment on Thorpe's behaviour apart from the understatement that, 'he was not very wise in his choice of friends'. Even after Thorpe's death, when, over a recent lunch at the National Liberal Club, I gently tackled him about his papers from the Thorpe era he professed to have very few items still in his possession.

Richard's time with Thorpe began at the time of the Young Liberals' 'Red Guard' period when they were a thorn in the flesh of the party establishment; one of the first speeches he drafted was for Thorpe to denounce them as 'Marxists'. It was not a particularly diplomatic position for a party leader to take and I played a minor role in conciliating between the two sides. The episode led to the appointment of Stephen Terrell QC as chair of a commission to look into the situation. Inevitably its outcome was inconclusive, with majority and minority reports supporting the different sides.

Richard was a brilliant platform performer with some of the phrases from his perorations staying in the memory. I recall him enlivening the audience in London in the 1960s by telling them that the 'Conservative Party recently took over offices in Victoria Street for its research department. The name of the previous occupants is still on the office door: "Activated Sludge Limited". I can think of no better name for the Conservative Party.' Curiously, there is only one publication extant under his own name, *The Liberals in Europe*,[3] and his main literary endeavours appeared under others' names.

His dedication to the Liberal cause, combined with his oratory and his consistent presence at many party meetings, ensured his popularity, but a number of his political positions increasingly estranged him from the evolving radicalism of the party. His passionate internationalism and the consequent support for European unity was certainly popular with Liberals, as was his opposition to strict immigration controls, but his visceral hostility to authoritarian regimes led him to oppose the Liberals' acceptance of some rapprochement with countries behind the Iron Curtain. In 1961 he prepared a policy statement for Liberal International, 'Winning the Cold War', arguing that the ability to attack the Communist regimes was necessary

Moore in 2014 (photo reproduced by kind permission of Liberal International)

and proposed that there should be a set period of conscription in all NATO countries. In the same year, when the Liberal Party conference voted for de facto recognition of the East German regime, Richard told delegates that they were failing to show solidarity with oppressed people. The fraternal delegation from the party's German sister party, the Free Democrats, duly walked out and it fell to Richard to fly to Bonn to assuage them.

Much later, in 2003, Richard's consistency on opposing authoritarian regimes led him to disagree publicly with the Liberal Democrat MPs' united opposition to the invasion of Iraq. In essence Richard's political position had hardly changed throughout his career but, whereas he was on the radical wing of the party in his early days, the party had evolved into a generally more radical movement. None of his disagreements with the party ever troubled his loyalty to Liberalism, and neither did party members ever doubt his commitment. Ironically, it was a former Conservative cabinet minister and old friend, Sir Oliver Letwin, who summed up Richard best: 'Somehow the whole tolerant, civilised liberal disposition that is the greatest glory of our country seemed to have been distilled into its purest form and infused into him at birth.'

He married Ann Miles in 1955. She is a dedicated and active Liberal in her own right[4] and was a Liberal and then Liberal Democrat councillor on East Sussex County Council and Rother District Council for forty years. They had two sons, Charles, sometime editor of the *Daily Telegraph* and official biographer of Margaret Thatcher, and Rowan, and one daughter, Charlotte; both of the latter are also writers.

Michael Meadowcroft

1 Tavistock, 1955 and 1959; Cambridgeshire, 1961 (by-election) and 1964; North Antrim, 1966 and 1970; and North Norfolk, February and October 1974.
2 Officially called 'The Liberal and Democratic Group'.
3 Unservile State Paper 20, Liberal Publication Department, 1974 (with detailed appendix by Christine Morgan).
4 See her entry in *Why I am a Liberal Democrat*, ed. Duncan Brack, Liberal Democrat Publications, 1996.

On This Day . . .

Every day the History Group's website, Facebook page and Twitter feed carry an item of Liberal history news from the past. Below we reprint three. To see them regularly, look at **www.liberalhistory.org.uk** or **www.facebook.com/LibDemHistoryGroup** or follow us at: **LibHistoryToday**.

June

14 June 1901: At a dinner given for him and Sir William Harcourt at the Holborn Restaurant by the National Reform Union, Liberal leader Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman delivers his 'methods of barbarism' speech, on atrocities committed by the British army in the war against the Boers. 'What is that policy? That now that we had got the men we had been fighting against down, we should punish them as severely as possible, devastate their country, burn their homes, break up their very instruments of agriculture … It is that we should sweep … the women and children into camps … in some of which the death rate has risen so high as 430 in the thousand … A phrase is often used that "war is war", but when one comes to ask about it one is told that no war is going on, that it is not war. When is a war not a war? When it is carried out by methods of barbarism in South Africa.'

July

4 July 1985: Richard Livsey narrowly wins the Brecon & Radnor by-election for the Liberal–SDP Alliance. The by-election was caused by the death of the sitting Conservative MP Tom Hooson (a cousin of the former Liberal MP for Montgomery, Emlyn Hooson). The Conservatives had held the seat with a majority of over 10,000, but the by-election developed into a three-way contest, with Labour, which had held the seat before 1979, fighting hard to win it back. When the result was declared after a recount, Livsey emerged as the victor by 559 votes over Labour, with the Tories slipping to third place. The Conservatives recaptured the seat in 1992, but Livsey won it back in 1997. He retired as MP in 2001.

August

11 August 1873: Gladstone makes a radical choice for his new Chancellor of the Exchequer – himself, thus becoming one of the very few individuals to have held two substantial offices of state simultaneously. He continued in the role of Prime Minister and Chancellor until his government fell in February 1874. Gladstone repeated this trick in 1880 when he also combined the offices of Prime Minister and Chancellor for two years.

Liberal Democrat leadership election
Leadership candidates' historical heroes.

Old Heroes for

As we have in each of the Liberal Democrat leadership elections other than the first one (which took place in 1988, before the History Group had been formed), in June the Liberal Democrat History Group asked the two candidates for the Liberal Democrat leadership to write a short article on their favourite historical figure or figures – those that they felt had influenced their own political beliefs most, and why they had proved important and relevant. We placed no restrictions on their choices: they could choose anyone they wanted, whether a Liberal or not.

At the end of their two articles, we include a list of all previous leadership contenders' historical heroes.

Ed Davey – Paddy Ashdown

Liberals are not meant to have heroes, but I can't help it. I don't genuflect before grand or celebrity figures, but re-reading speeches or learning of the noble deeds of Liberals can move me the way opera or acts of military valour can have others dabbing a misty eye.

I love Gladstone for his insistence that: 'the sanctity of life in the hill villages of Afghanistan among the winter snows is as inviolable in the eye of Almighty God as can be your own'. Or Asquith for, in the midst of unimaginable wartime stress, ignoring press opprobrium to visit German prisoners of war to demand their good treatment. That instinctive determination to defend the vulnerable is what, I believe, makes us Liberals.

r a New Leader

Hard choice though this is, my Liberal hero is more recent: Paddy Ashdown, for whom I still grieve.

As a new member of staff in 1989, what surprised me was how wonderfully Paddy treated youngsters like me. He had a reputation for being brisk – even brusque – but I discovered that was a front.

I perched, as the party's chief economics adviser, in what felt like a tiny garret atop the old Whips' Office. Here I would receive handwritten notes thanking me for a piece of work, and I've kept them all. Whether eating, chatting or indeed drinking with junior staff at conference, Paddy was like the dedicated officer with his troops. He inspired loyalty and hard work in equal measure.

Paddy's stories only added to his mystique and magnetism. A young colleague was startled to find a note on his desk from Paddy one morning: 'Call me on my car phone at 5.57am.' It wasn't so much the earliness as the preciseness of the hour that startled. Another note, upon Paddy assuming the party's leadership, read simply: 'Please remove David Steel's dead animal from my office.' It was a buffalo skin presented by Chief Buthelezi.

Sure, Paddy could be a task master, but even then I found him immense fun. Many a Monday morning my phone would bark into life: 'Edward, come to my office now, please.' From Paddy's mouth 'please' became a command. Once before him I'd find he'd read some article over the weekend extolling a new economic policy that he wanted to adopt. And I'd spend a good thirty minutes dissuading him of some crazy, ill-thought-through fancy.

My biggest disagreement with him came after I'd been elected in 1997, when he was determined to cling on to his pre-election plan with Tony Blair for close working relations with Labour – despite that strategy having been devised for a balanced Parliament, not for a Labour majority of 167. Brilliant as he was, he couldn't persuade Parliamentary colleagues or the wider party that Lib-Labbery worked in this context, for it would have hitched us to policies we disagreed with without influence to change them.

Ironically, during the five days of coalition negotiations in 2010, it was Paddy and me who tried to convince Nick Clegg and co not to rule out coalition with Labour, despite the numbers being difficult to make work.

It had been Paddy who first drew me to the party. All politicians have their causes, and for me it was the environment and education. Paddy made the green agenda a core strand of our identity when most MPs thought this a peripheral, even cranky, cause. I was hooked, and would like to think that my recently announced plan to decarbonise capitalism is one Paddy would have embraced with vim and verve.

I'm an economist by training and so appreciated deeply that Paddy was, fundamentally, so economically literate. He took over a party that had been a little corporatist in its thinking but Paddy reconnected the party to its liberal roots, asking what a policy meant for the individual. He emphasised Mill's idea of the power of education to unlock human potential. Without Paddy I'm not sure we would have had such ground-breaking Lib Dem achievements in government as the pupil premium, a development of his policy of a penny on income tax to improve education.

Finally, though a Liberal to his core, he sought to bring others into the Liberal tent. I took inspiration from Paddy when I called for a national government to deliver a people's vote. How he made the Liberal Democrats a big enough tent for MPs of other parties to join us should be our inspiration.

If elected leader, I will build on his legacy; Paddy, I miss you terribly.

Finally, though a Liberal to his core, he sought to bring others into the Liberal tent. I took inspiration from Paddy when I called for a national government to deliver a people's vote.

Jo Swinson – Anita Roddick

It was through Anita Roddick that I first discovered what it was to be a campaigner.

The Body Shop in the 1980s was ahead of its time: sourcing their ingredients ethically; promoting recycling; taking on its own industry on issues like body image in advertising. As a girl, I would go to the Body Shop to buy my strawberry or banana-shaped soap and sign the petitions at the till. That was how I discovered a whole range of causes: fair trade, cosmetic testing on animals, or another worthy cause.

It fuelled my early environmentalism – something that has stayed with me ever since. I even tried to persuade my Dad – a *Focus*-delivering Lib Dem – to vote Green at the European elections in 1989. He didn't, as he rightly argued that the Lib Dems were better placed to deliver green policies. One of the best gifts he ever gave me was a signed copy of Anita Roddick's book, *Business as Unusual*, which I keep in my parliamentary office to this day. By that time I was 16 or 17, and the book reinforced in me a passion for how business can be a force for good.

Unfortunately, I never got to meet Anita Roddick before she died in 2007. I have been lucky enough to meet people who knew her and worked with her, and the picture they painted to me was of a remarkable woman. She was a different kind of businessperson running a different kind of business. At a time when modern business was being defined by the Big Bang and the 'greed is good' culture of the Thatcher years, she defined an approach that declared that there was more to running a company than simply generating profits for shareholders. Her company was profitable, but it was also about social justice, about making the world a better place one recycled plastic bottle or hemp bag at a time.

She was an activist who used her career and her business as a platform to make change happen. Her example taught me that it is not enough to simply believe things, or to criticise things, but to get out there and do things to make the world better.

In many ways, her approach had more in common with the socially conscious capitalists of the Victorian era – social reformers like Robert Owen and the pioneers of the Co-op movement, or the Quaker-run businesses, like Cadbury, who built homes for their workers. They may have taken a more paternalistic approach but they shared an understanding of capitalism as an agent for social justice.

And it wasn't just her business philosophy that stood out like a sore thumb in the 1980s, it was who she was and how she conducted herself. She said what she thought; she dressed the way she wanted; she stood up for things she believed in. She was a determined, uncompromising, outspoken woman in an era of testosterone-fuelled alpha-male machismo – a great role model for an ambitious young woman like me.

Her example has stayed with me throughout my life and has undoubtedly shaped many of my views on policy, both explicitly and implicitly. Not only have I remained an avid environmentalist, but her vision of responsible business has shaped my thinking on business and the economy too. As an MP and a minister I have championed many of the causes I first discovered through the Body Shop – from excess plastic packaging to taking on unrealistic body image depictions in advertising. And it's why I have put creating an economy that puts people and planet first at the heart of my leadership campaign. I want to reward dynamic, innovative companies

that focus on the long-term challenges our society faces – such as the climate emergency, health inequality and the challenges of an ageing population – and that empower individuals and prize the productivity that comes when workers are treated as human beings and not numbers on a spreadsheet.

But as important as policies and political philosophy are, Anita Roddick also ingrained in me something more practical. She was, first and foremost, a doer. She was an activist who used her career and her business as a platform to make change happen. Her example taught me that it is not enough to simply believe things, or to criticise things, but to get out there and do things to make the world better.

That spirit will be familiar to Liberal Democrats. We are a party of doers. We pound pavements in the rain. We campaign relentlessly for causes we believe in. We put in the hard work all year round because we are determined to make a difference. If I am fortunate enough to become Leader of the Liberal Democrats, above all else it is in that spirit that I want to lead.

Previous leadership candidates' heroes	
1999 (*Journal of Liberal History* 23)	
Jackie Ballard	David Penhaligon, Nancy Seear
Malcolm Bruce	David Lloyd George
Simon Hughes	David Lloyd George, Nelson Mandela
Charles Kennedy	Roy Jenkins
David Rendel	William Wilberforce, Nancy Seear
2006 (*Journal of Liberal History* 50)	
Menzies Campbell	Roy Jenkins, Jo Grimond
Simon Hughes	David Lloyd George, Nelson Mandela
Chris Huhne	David Lloyd George
2007 (*Journal of Liberal History* 57)	
Nick Clegg	Harry Willcock, Vaclav Havel
Chris Huhne	David Lloyd George
2015 (*Journal of Liberal History* 87)	
Tim Farron	William Beveridge, Simon Hughes
Norman Lamb	John Maynard Keynes
2017 (*Journal of Liberal History* 96)	
Vince Cable	Roy Jenkins

Welsh Liberals

Nicholas Alderton analyses Emlyn Hooson's efforts to revive Liberalism in Wales in the face of the chanllenge from Plaid Cymru.

Welsh Liberal

New Beginnings and the

Party 1966–70
Challenge of Plaid Cymru

By the start of the 1960s, the Liberal Party of Wales (LPW) stood in the shadows of its former glories. Tracing its roots to the formation of the Welsh National Council in 1887, the Liberal Party and Liberalism had, as the historian K.O. Morgan noted, 'permeated Welsh life at every point during this period. Every major transformation in Welsh life owed something to it.'[1] This might in many ways be an over-generalisation – especially given that Britain did not enjoy a full and equal franchise until 1928 – but, as Morgan further points out, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Wales was a Liberal country.[2] The dominance of the Liberal Party was unmistakeable and can be referenced in the 1906 general election landslide, when all but one of the thirty-four seats in Wales elected MPs who took the Liberal whip. In addition, the Liberals were once seen as the nationalist party within Wales, aligning itself with the chapel culture, fighting for home rule and the disestablishment of the Church in Wales.

By the 1950s, this status had been assigned to the history books. The Liberals in Wales, as in the rest of Britain, had been pushed to the margins and were barely hanging on. The decades from the First World War (coupled with the infighting and splits that had dominated the Liberals from 1916, when David Lloyd George took over as prime minister from Asquith) to the three-way split prior to the 1931 general election, where there were effectively three different Liberal Parties in existence, encompassed a period that saw the Labour Party oust the Liberals as a party of government and consolidate its own position as one of the two main political parties. In Wales, the industrial areas had also succumbed to Labour, eventually pushing the Liberals into rural constituencies and relegating them to third party status.

These splits, along with the Second World War, would have a detrimental effect on the Liberal organisation in Wales; as it diverted the attention of the Liberal leadership away from matters such as reforming its organisation and focused on the war effort. During the war, party politics had largely been suspended and the lack of electoral activity probably hastened the decline of the local associations. The real test for the Liberal Party in Wales came after the war. The Liberal MP for Montgomeryshire, Clement Davies, who would lead the Liberal Party from 1945 until 1956, spent much of his leadership preoccupied with keeping Liberalism alive in England and Scotland, with little time to worry about the organisation in Wales.

The full blame cannot be laid entirely at the leadership's feet. Due to the general election results, Wales was probably a victim of its perceived success. In 1945, seven of the twelve Liberal MPs came from Wales; in 1950 Wales returned five of the nine Liberal MPs, in 1951 three out of the six Liberals came from Wales and this was repeated in 1955.[3] So, in some ways, it is understandable that the Liberals in Wales were left to their own devices whilst bigger issues were being tackled.

Yet the 1959 general election results should have shown how far Welsh Liberalism had fallen, when just two of the six MPs came from Wales.[4] Coupled with this, in 1959 just eight candidates contested Wales's thirty-six seats, compared to twenty-one in 1950. These numbers highlight that something fundamental had happened in Wales; something that, at a minimum, meant that organisational change was required. The two federations, Northern and Southern, had largely become autonomous of each other, providing no clear strategy, withholding funds and, particularly in the south, barely fielding candidates at

Emlyn Hooson, MP
for Montgomeryshire
1962–79

election time. There were also constituencies that had not been fought since the 1930s. Not only that, the declining influence of Nonconformism in Wales had robbed the Liberals of their Welsh nationalist identity. This allowed another party, Plaid Cymru, to occupy the nationalist space.

However, Liberalism in Wales was about to gain its champion, one that would look to revitalise the movement and challenge Labour's hegemony. Upon the 1962 death of Clement Davies, the QC Emlyn Hooson became the Liberal MP for Montgomeryshire and one of just two Liberal MPs in Wales, the other being Roderic Bowen. Hooson was also the only one of the two with the drive and desire to effectively change the party. He believed that a revival of the Liberal tradition within Wales could be achieved and that such a revival was needed to defeat the Labour Party. Part of Hooson's vision for this revival was to create a party that was truly 'Welsh' in its name, outlook and policies. The 1966 formation of the Welsh Liberal Party (WLP) was designed to repackage the Liberal Party of Wales into a modern political outfit. Hooson had to jettison the old structure and bring the North and South Wales Federations under a single organisational structure.

The main aim of this article will be to show that the initial few years of the WLP were, in many ways, quite disappointing for the Liberals. There was no electoral breakthrough in the 1960s and the infighting that had troubled the LPW continued into the new party. This infighting, coupled with resignations and a lack of electoral success and strategy, showed that Hooson's vision was in danger of being compromised.

The article will also draw parallels with Plaid Cymru. The reason for comparing these two parties is that, by the end of the 1960s, they were in the same electoral position, having just one MP. Both were also jostling for third place behind Labour and the Conservatives. Also, both had some similar and overlapping policies and were looking for a breakthrough that would allow them to consolidate their own position. Yet the wind would be behind Plaid Cymru's sails, as it scored some very impressive electoral results that rocked not only the Labour Party but, also, the WLP's hopes of a revival.

Hooson's election

Following the March 1962 death of the former Liberal leader, Clement Davies, Emlyn Hooson stood in the May by-election for the Montgomeryshire seat. This contest took place just a couple of months after the Liberals achieved a stunning by-election victory in Orpington. There, the candidate, Eric Lubbock, overturned a large Conservative majority which gave some momentum to a perceived mini-Liberal revival within Britain, one that it was hoped Hooson could benefit from.

However, success in Montgomeryshire was not guaranteed, as Hooson would face a strong opposition from the other parties. Also, there was a general belief that Clement Davies had benefitted from a personal vote and could not be unseated.[5] It is not hard to see how this belief arose because, out of the eight general elections that Davies fought in the seat between 1929 and 1959, he had only really come close to losing his seat in 1945. His record shows that he stood unopposed twice (1931 and 1935), faced one other opponent three times, (Conservative in 1945, Labour in 1951 and 1955), and had thrice faced two opponents, (Labour and Conservative candidates in 1929, 1950 and 1959.) However, when one looks more closely at this, in the 1930s Davies was a National Liberal, a break-off party from the Liberals that had aligned itself with the Conservatives. As such, the Conservatives did not place a candidate against him in this decade. This lack of opposition meant that Davies was able to establish himself in a seat that was mostly rural, small-'c' conservative and largely hostile towards socialism.

By 1942 Davies' political allegiance had seen him realign himself with the Liberal Party and, as already noted, the Conservatives did then place a candidate against him in 1945, taking 43.7 per cent of the vote. This showed just how precarious the seat could be for Davies and would later become for Hooson. Indeed, in 1959 the Conservative candidate was viewed as the primary threat to the seat. Davies's ill health may have been a reason for the entry of the Conservatives. In the event, they polled a respectable second with 31.3 per cent of the vote to Davies's 42.1 per cent, slashing his previous 1955 majority from 8,500 to just 2,794.[6]

Hooson must have known that he potentially faced an uphill battle to retain the seat for the Liberals. The 1950s had seen the LPW struggling to survive. For example, the 1951 general election saw the loss of Emrys Roberts' Merionethshire seat and Megan Lloyd George's Anglesey seat, leaving Wales with just three Liberal MPs. Megan Lloyd George's defection to Labour in 1955 (followed by her subsequent by-election win, in 1957, of the Liberal-held Carmarthenshire seat) seemed to confirm that the Liberals were standing on a precipice within Wales. If Hooson were to lose Montgomeryshire, it would mean the Liberals would have been left with just one representative in Wales, Ceredigion's Roderic Bowen.

To add to the difficulty, the by-election saw Hooson face a three-pronged attack for the seat from Labour, the Conservatives and, for the first time, Plaid Cymru. This was a daunting prospect because, as a general rule of thumb stretching back to the 1920s, whenever a Liberal candidate fought a seat against more than one opponent they would either lose the seat or see a dramatic drop in their share of the vote.[7] During the contest, the Conservatives threw all their backing behind their candidate, with some of the big hitters of the day heading to the constituency, but

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Table 1: 1959 general election results in Montgomeryshire			
Candidate	*Party*	*Votes*	*Vote %*
Clement Davies	Liberal Party	10,970	42.1
F. Leslie Morgan	Conservative	8,176	31.3
D. Caradog Jones	Labour	6,950	26.6
	Majority	2,794	10.8
Source: Beti Jones, *Welsh Elections 1885–1997* (Ceredigion, 1999), p. 106			

Table 1a: 1962 by-election results in Montgomeryshire, 15 May 1962			
Candidate	*Party*	*Votes*	*Vote %*
Emlyn Hooson	Liberal Party	13,181	51.3
R. H. Dawson	Conservative	5,632	21.9
T. Davies	Labour	5,299	20.6
Islwyn Ffowc Elis	Plaid Cymru	1,594	6.2
	Majority	7,549	29.4
Source: Beti Jones, *Welsh Elections 1885–1997* (Ceredigion, 1999), p. 106.			

to no avail. Hooson regained much of the ground that had been lost in 1959, obtaining a majority of 7,549 votes, on 51.3 per cent of votes cast.[8] The Conservative vote dropped by 10 per cent and, despite losing their deposit, Plaid Cymru's candidate appears to have eaten into the Labour Party's share of the vote. (See table 1 and 1a.) The retention of the seat gave a much-needed morale boost to the Liberals within Wales and showed that the party still had some signs of life.

Plaid Cymru and the Parliament for Wales campaign

Hooson's retention of Montgomeryshire coincided with an increased amount of electoral activity from Plaid Cymru. Plaid Cymru had been formed in 1925, with Saunders Lewis as its first president from 1926 to 1939. From its inception, Plaid built a reputation as a pressure group that fought for the Welsh language and culture. The party wanted to foster an independent nation and attracted people from across the political spectrum. In 1945 Gwynfor Evans was elected as Plaid's president and sought to engage with other political parties to further the aims of the party. Plaid's image of being a pressure group '… that just happened to put up candidates for election'[9] began to change in the 1950s.

Initially, Plaid's involvement in the Parliament for Wales campaign saw the party sharing a platform with leading Liberals and members of other political parties. The campaign began at a June 1950 meeting of Undeb Cymru Fydd (New Wales Union), where they had asked the then Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party, Megan Lloyd George, to be the campaign president.[10] Lloyd George had also grown increasingly frustrated at the lack of consideration afforded to Wales within parliament and saw this as an ideal opportunity to raise the status of Wales. The campaign's aim was to gather a million signatures in support of a Welsh parliament. The Liberal involvement in the campaign was down to Lloyd George and Emrys Roberts, two members who were seen to be the most radical within the Liberal Party.[11] Their radical credentials, coupled with sharing a platform with Labour and Plaid, meant their involvement was treated with suspicion in a party that had become quite conservative. Lloyd George and Roberts lost their seats in 1951. However, Lloyd George continued with her involvement in the campaign, but the Liberal commitment had all but ended. Equally, the Welsh Labour involvement was also small and many within that party were against it on the basis that such issues could divide the working class of Britain, rather than foster a sense of solidarity.[12] Plaid Cymru, including its president Gwynfor Evans, were avid supporters and provided much of the footwork for the campaign. Although it did not achieve its immediate objectives, gathering just 250,000 signatures and failing to pass a Parliament for Wales Bill in 1955, the campaign did place the issue of government representation for Wales on the political map. Crucially, it was also the first time that the LPW and Plaid Cymru had worked together on a major campaign.

Plaid Cymru and Tryweryn

The Parliament for Wales campaign was not the only issue in which Plaid was involved in the 1950s. Arguably, the greatest test for Plaid's claim to be a relevant political voice came with the proposed and subsequent flooding of the Tryweryn Valley to provide drinking water for Liverpool. The plan involved the flooding of a village within the valley, Capel Celyn, resulting in the relocation of its residents. There were fears that

Welsh was becoming a dying language, and the destruction of a Welsh-speaking community was viewed, by many, as akin to cultural homicide.

Plaid Cymru's leadership certainly viewed the Tryweryn issue in these terms, mounting a campaign that involved demonstrations and passive resistance against the building of a dam. For many within Wales, there was no bigger example of how Welsh voices could be silenced than the sight of thirty-five out of thirty-six Welsh MPs voting against the bill that would allow the flooding. All of whom were rendered impotent by the number of English MPs voting for the bill, which was passed in 1957. The single abstaining Welsh vote was the Conservative MP for Cardiff North, David Llewellyn, who called the Tryweryn scheme 'majestic.'[13] Despite further protests and a sabotage campaign by some fervent Welsh nationalists, the reservoir formally opened in 1965.

Politically, the Parliament for Wales campaign and the flooding of Tryweryn had begun to change the thinking within Plaid. Did they want to be a political party or a pressure group? These events had clear nationalistic implications and provided a higher profile for the party and, in the process, showed that it could tackle the bigger political issues. For Gwynfor Evans, these events showed that it was time to expand the party's electoral work.[14] Although it was not an instant success, Plaid Cymru's Dr Phil Williams pointed to this period as the turning point for Plaid.[15]

In addition, Saunders Lewis' famous 1962 radio lecture, entitled 'The Fate of the Language', was a rallying cry to save the Welsh language which, according to the 1961 census, had declined in usage. This inspired the formation of Cymdeithas yr Iaith (The Welsh Language Society). The society's formation allowed the language issue, which had become something of a millstone around Plaid's neck, to be hived off and gave space for the party to concentrate on its reorganisation.

Plaid Cymru's reorganisation

In terms of elections, Plaid had noticed some effect. The 1955 general election saw eleven candidates obtain a 3.1 per cent of the vote.[16] In 1959, at the height of the Tryweryn campaign, the party put forward twenty candidates and took 5.2 per cent of the vote.[17] In contrast to this, the Liberals fielded ten candidates in 1955, gaining 7.3 per cent[18] of the vote and, in 1959, just eight stood and they saw their vote share fall to 5.3 per cent.[19] Just over a thousand votes separated Plaid from the Liberals. The 1959 general election shows a clear change in Plaid Cymru's electoral strategy, giving the Liberals a sharp awakening. Nearly everywhere that a Liberal candidate stood in Wales, they faced a Plaid candidate. Despite this, the appeal of Plaid Cymru was still rather limited until the 1960s, even in areas that were traditionally Welsh speaking.[20] Part of this was down to its organisational structures and lack of credible policies.

The 1959 general election shows a clear change in Plaid Cymru's electoral strategy, giving the Liberals a sharp awakening. Nearly everywhere that a Liberal candidate stood in Wales, they faced a Plaid candidate.

From the start of the 1960s, with the influx of a new, modernising team at the top of the party, many of whom joined in the wake of the Tryweryn campaign, Plaid began to look at its organisational structures and realised that it was lacking in direction. The reorganisation that took place included encouraging the formation of youth groups and placing more of a focus on local politics, just as the Liberal Party in England had begun to do in this period.[21]

Plaid began to move towards a more centre-left position during the 1960s, focusing more on policy issues and the Welsh economy. They lent their support to issues such as a Welsh Transport Board, a Welsh Water Board and a Welsh Power Board. Perhaps the most significant policy formation was Plaid Cymru's *Economic Plan*, which was formulated in the 1960s and finally published in 1970. This report focused on the problems of depopulation, the decline of coal and slate mining, as well as the importance of tourism to the economy of Wales.[22] This was a standout piece of policy formation and has been credited with showing that Plaid could match the other parties in terms of policy. The plan reflected the political changes within Plaid and Wales. It also helped to provide the momentum for the political successes of 1974.[23]

Although funds were always an issue, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Plaid found contesting by-elections was a useful way of drumming up publicity and getting its message across.[24] Out of the twelve by-elections held in Wales between 1951 and 1968, Plaid contested every single one of them, whereas the Liberals contested just half of them.[25] Although an expensive strategy, Plaid could gain more exposure in some quite heated by-election contests than they could at a general election. In addition, Plaid would find its funds and manpower stretched when contesting general elections but, in this period, they could target a by-election seat with a concerted campaign.

The Liberal Party restates its Welsh nationalist credentials

On the surface, the historian Laura McAllister's belief that the decline of the Liberal Party allowed a political space for a new nationalist party[26] holds some water. Especially as the Liberals in Wales could lay claim to being the original nationalist party.

By the 1960s, the overtly nationalist aspect of the Liberal Party would appear to have become a relic of its past. After all, the Liberal Party of the nineteenth and early twentieth century had actively sought to reduce the influence of the English state on Wales, aligning itself with the chapel culture and advocating the disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Wales and its influence on education. By championing these causes, the Liberal Party was overtly expressing its Welshness. However, the emergence of

Plaid Cymru almost coincided with the beginning of the end of the Liberals hegemony in Wales. Although it would take over thirty years for Plaid to make electoral headway to match the LPW, there is no denying that nationalism within Wales was changing and they would take full advantage of it. The influence of nationalism on the Liberals began to wane as the chapel took on less importance in Welsh life and appeared to be a spent force by the time Lloyd George disestablished the Church in 1920. The nationalism portrayed by the Liberals had not evolved, at least not in the electorate's eyes. For nationalists, Plaid's focus on independence and the Welsh language and culture, held more sway than the Liberals' past glories.

However, there were instances where the Liberals still retained and looked to champion its own brand of Welsh nationalism. For example, one of its longer held policies, that could be seen to overlap somewhat with those of Plaid, was the Liberals' commitment to providing home rule to Wales, albeit within a federal UK. The LPW also remained a broader church than most would give it credit for, as there were influential elements that held on to the idea that to be a Liberal was also to be a nationalist. In this vein, Megan Lloyd George had championed an annual Wales Day in parliament and asserted during the Parliament for Wales campaign, that: 'I am not ashamed to be called a nationalist. I am first and foremost a Welshwoman'.[27]

In addition, the Liberals 1959 general election manifesto for Wales, entitled *A New Deal for Wales,* set out some quite radical and nationalist proposals. These included the establishment of a Welsh-language third television channel, a Welsh Water Board and the establishment of Welsh-language secondary and grammar schools. Co-authored by Hooson, Deacon notes that, except for the absence of calls for independence, this manifesto was as nationalist as anything produced by Plaid.[28] In effect, it can be seen as a mission statement for the direction in which Hooson would look to take the LPW.

Policy would further overlap in 1965, when Hooson commissioned and published a report, entitled *The Heartland: A Plan for Mid-Wales*, which enshrined three main proposals: to establish a Rural Development Corporation to encourage industry within the existing towns; an overhaul of rural transport, including the building of better roads and rail links between north and south Wales; the expansion of Aberystwyth to 60,000 people within thirty years. This last recommendation was based on Aberystwyth being easily accessible from the north and south, whilst being far enough away from Birmingham to stop it being a satellite of that city.[29] Although the content of the document would be updated and used in manifestos from the 1960s onwards, it did not have the transformative electoral effect Plaid's plan. Yet,

Liberal MPs:
Clement Davies, MP for Montgomeryshire, 1929–62
Emlyn Hooson, MP for Montgomeryshire, 1962–79
Roderic Bowen, MP for Cardiganshire, 1945–66

Hooson would have been aware that Plaid Cymru was the main rival to the Liberals and he realised that the party had to offer a distinctly Welsh vision to the voters. The Liberals had to offer a form of nationalism that was different to that of Plaid, and for Hooson, the most distinctive difference was that Plaid sought independence, albeit with dominion status, while the Liberals believed in a federal United Kingdom.

crucially, Hooson's plan was published first and he believed that it influenced the Labour government's own plan for Wales. Plaid's *Economic Plan* was published after Labour's and was framed as more of a response to that. Both of them rendered Hooson's plan redundant.

Despite this, the document showed that the Liberals were looking at solutions to problems that were Welsh-specific, and this was part of Hooson's plan to reassert the Liberal brand within Wales. He wanted the Liberals to be viewed as a Welsh party, tackling Welsh issues, and not a satellite of the English party. Hooson would have been aware that Plaid Cymru was the main rival to the Liberals and he realised that the party had to offer a distinctly Welsh vision to the voters. The Liberals had to offer a form of nationalism that was different to that of Plaid, and for Hooson, the most distinctive difference was that Plaid sought independence, albeit with dominion status, while the Liberals believed in a federal United Kingdom.

However, in the desire to highlight how the LPW was different to Plaid, there was the odd embarrassing mishap along the way. Both the 1964 and 1966 general election manifestos called for a Council for Wales, rather than the parliament that had been called for in previous manifestos. Hooson viewed it as more of a matter of semantics, as the Council would enjoy the same powers as those of the Scottish Parliament, which the Scottish Liberals were calling for.[30] A call explicitly for a Welsh *Parliament* may have been too close to Plaid's position, so Hooson viewed the use of the term *Council* as a prudent way to distinguish between both parties. However, the stance was felt to have hampered the electoral chances of the Liberals in those areas where Plaid was deemed to be a threat, and that Plaid was able to make capital out of the Liberals' apparent retreat on a major policy.[31] Hooson, for his part, wanted the Liberals to emphasise the role of Wales within a federal United Kingdom.[32]

The reorganisation of the Liberal Party in Wales

If the 1959 general election proved anything, it was that Plaid Cymru had become an electoral threat to the Liberals. However, this was not all down to Plaid challenging the Liberals in their heartlands in the rural north, but also had a lot to do with the organisational issues within the Liberal Party.

Organisationally, the LPW had become unfit for purpose – an issue that had been ignored for decades. This neglect was due to the leadership focusing on the survival of the Liberal Party during the 1940s and 1950s, leaving very little time to focus on Wales. The true fault with the LPW lay in a structure that had largely been left unchanged since the late nineteenth century. The party in Wales had been split into two federations, one in the north and the other in the south, with the Liberal Party in Wales being an umbrella organisation for these federations. A lack of discipline from the centre categorised the workings of the organisation and it meant that the federations, as well as the local associations, saw themselves as autonomous entities.

When historians write about Wales, particularly in terms of politics, they tend to point out the concept of a north/south divide. This divide is based on different interpretations of what it means to be Welsh and generally runs along language and cultural lines. In simple terms, the south is more anglicised and generally opposes any cultural imposition from the north; and the Welsh-speaking north is against the Anglicisation of Wales. The North and South Federations were a microcosm of this cultural divide. The northern federation supported a Welsh Liberal Party distinct from the English party, while the southern federation viewed any move in this direction as a northern conspiracy, designed to impose on them a different brand of Welshness, one that focused on the language.[33] The mutual suspicion that existed between the federations, coupled with their relative autonomy, meant that they rarely had a coherent or collaborative electoral strategy. The south often refused to field candidates for local and parliamentary elections, usually citing the lack of finances or suitable candidates. Even at the constituency level, the local associations would choose their general election candidates at will and felt able to ignore any concerns from the Liberal Party Organisation.[34] Again, this was not specific to Wales, but these actions were not conducive to keeping the Liberal brand alive in Wales. Martin Thomas (now Lord Thomas of Gresford), from the North Federation, pointed out that the trouble that existed with the Federations was that:

> Internally, the North Wales Federation is practically functionless … The South Wales Federation is as remote to the North as the Timbuctoo Young Liberals. To the outsider, it resembles a loose scrum between the Lions and the All Blacks: a static heaving mass with most of the action taking place in the middle out of the referee's eye.[35]

It is also interesting to note that there was a reluctance to party-politicise local elections in Wales, a situation that had existed elsewhere but held on longer within Wales. This may have further hampered the Liberal brand. Those who had sympathy with the LPW often stood as independents.[36] This was not peculiar to the Liberals – it affected all the parties – but the LPW's rivals were seeking to influence a change by consciously placing party candidates in local elections. The fractious nature of the Liberal organisation in Wales meant it was unable to properly coordinate a local election campaign for a number of years.

When it came to fighting the general elections during the 1960s, the lack of organisation would be the main concern within the LPW. Hooson's by-election win was a morale boost to the LPW and there were strong expectations for the 1964 general election. These expectations would not be met and, although the LPW's overall share of the vote markedly increased, the party would retain just two MPs. Ironically, both MPs saw their share of the vote fall, with Bowen's seat, once a Liberal stronghold, becoming a Labour/Liberal marginal seat. Elsewhere in Wales, there was no coherent strategy behind the selection of candidates and where they stood.[37] To give one example, two of the former Liberal strongholds in north Wales, Caernarfon and Conwy, were not even contested by the party. In south Wales the executive members of the South Wales Liberal Federation stood in several of the key constituencies.[38] The federation would often claim that there were no suitable candidates; this may have either been a sign of the inadequacies of the southern federation to engage in an effective candidate selection process, or that the executives were engaging in a form of political nepotism. Either way, it highlighted the fact that there was a need for change.

The 1966 general election saw the LPW hit rock bottom. Bowen, so confident of the Liberal vote within Ceredigion, never truly believed that Labour had a chance of taking the seat. As such, he barely fought for the seat and lost it by a mere 523 votes.[39]

Bowen's loss was indicative of how far Liberalism in Wales had fallen. Hooson realised that time was not on the LPW's side and sought to reform the party. His ambition was to recreate it along the lines of the federated Scottish Liberal Party, as he had been impressed by the degree of autonomy it enjoyed, including its ability to raise funds. For Hooson, the name was also important and it highlighted its association with Scotland.

On 4 June 1966, in Aberystwyth, an Extraordinary Meeting of the Executive of the Liberal Party in Wales gathered to consider the proposals of Hooson's working group on reforming the party.[40] These proposals were that:

- The name of the party be changed to the Welsh Liberal Party (WLP);
- A constitution similar to that of the Scottish Liberal Party be adopted;
- The Welsh Liberal Party should become an independent Liberal Party and responsible for organised Liberalism in Wales;
- The North and South Wales Federations should be abolished.

The majority of delegates at this meeting voted to accept the proposed changes (with thirty-seven voting for the decision, fourteen against and one abstention)[41] and recommended them to be adopted at the annual meeting in September 1966. On 10 September 1966, the Welsh Liberal Party came into being.

Problems within the WLP

With fourteen votes against, though, it was evident that some members of the executive were not happy about the proposed changes. Even before this meeting and the formal adoption in September, there were elements within the South Wales Liberal Federation who did not want to accept Hooson's changes. Among them was John Gibbs, the secretary of the South Wales Federation. Gibbs had anonymously leaked a copy of a North Wales Federation resolution, which endorsed Hooson's plans, to the *Western Mail*. Gibbs alleged that the party had not been briefed about any proposed changes, intimating that it was a plan by the North Wales Federation to impose radical change on the rest of the party.[42] With the item also making the local BBC News, the party was forced to issue a statement that confirmed Hooson's plans.[43]

Linked to this, there was a degree of reluctance on the part of some constituencies in south Wales to affiliate with the WLP. Gibbs's own association in Maesteg did not affiliate with the party until March 1967.[44]

Another local association, this time in Cardiff, had been hit by a scandal precipitated by the resignation and defection of the only Liberal on the city council. The issue played out on the pages of the local press and attracted a fair bit of attention. As it had not affiliated with the WLP, Hooson advocated the disbandment of the City of Cardiff Liberal Party.[45] It would eventually be told to cease using the party name.

The bad press was serious enough, but the loss of some prominent members of the WLP would have had an effect on Hooson's morale. Notable amongst these was Bob Morgan, a member of the Policy Directorate, who left to join the Labour Party. He viewed the Labour Party as the best hope of opposing the nationalist upsurge in Wales.[46] This was a charge that Hooson opposed; stating his belief that Labour's monolithic hold on South Wales would be destroyed by the nationalists, although he did not believe that nationalism would last.[47] Hooson read about another prominent resignation via the pages of the *Western Mail* while on a train to London.[48]

Ill-defined roles

Following the founding of the WLP, Hooson had sought to be its president, rather than the general secretary, as he wanted to give the WLP its political direction rather than its organisational one.[49] In the event, neither role would be Hooson's. The general secretary role would, in January 1967, be awarded to Mary Murphy, who also held the chair of the Pontypridd Urban District Council.[50] Although her role has been described as the chair of the new party,[51] it is clear from Hooson's correspondence that the role she had been offered was that of general secretary. The role of president would eventually go to Lord Ogmore. Why Hooson did not take up one of the roles is not exactly

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clear, but Ogmore had the pedigree of having been president of the Liberal Party from 1963 to 1964.[52] However, as the founder of the WLP, as well as its only MP, many looked to Hooson as the de facto leader. Indeed, he was instrumental in setting up both the Steering Committee and the Policy Directive Committee. This led to confusion as to what his actual role was and, in turn, undermined Murphy's role. Not only was Murphy's role ill defined, so too were the roles within the committees and many of these roles were overlapping.

The overlap in roles caused a lot of confusion. Murphy became the victim of a gossip campaign, ostensibly about her contribution to the annual conference. Many believed she should have had a major hand in the organisation of the conference, despite not being the conference secretary. This animosity led to her resignation,[53] just seven months after accepting the role, although she would still be in post in June 1968 when Emlyn Thomas took over as general secretary.[54] This was preceded by the resignation of the actual conference secretary, Leslie Jones, who was quite scathing about Mary's role and her perceived lack of leadership.[55]

Perhaps the most ill-defined role belonged to Emlyn Thomas. The party had acquired significant funding for the post of general secretary, but Thomas appears to have been left to his own devices in the Liberals' Aberystwyth HQ. Many within the party did not understand or know what his role entailed and there is evidence to show that Thomas was finding it to be a struggle and beyond his capabilities.[56] By the time Thomas left his post in 1970, shortly prior to the general election, he left the party with a lot of debt that it only just managed to clear before the election.

Failing the electoral test

While the WLP was being formed, Plaid Cymru would shake the politics of Wales and the UK by its President, Gwynfor Evans, winning the July 1966 Carmarthen by-election. By winning the seat, Plaid showed that no Welsh Labour seat was safe. Plaid had come third behind the Liberals in the March 1966 general election (see table 2), so when the former Liberal, Megan Lloyd George, died and a by-election was called, the Liberals felt the seat was winnable. The Liberals lost their chance at gaining the seat, however, because the Liberal candidate personally attacked Evans,[57] angering many nationalists. The effect was shocking; it showed that Plaid were able to undermine Labour's hegemony within Wales, and at the expense of the Liberals. More importantly, by gaining an MP, Plaid was now on an equal footing with the Liberals.

By the time of the next by-election, held in the Rhondda West constituency during March 1967, the WLP had been formed and it would have been an ideal time to present the party to Wales and gain some much-needed exposure. However, the WLP did not contest the seat and Plaid Cymru put in another exceptional performance, reducing the Labour majority from 16,888 in the general election to just 2,306 in the by-election (see table 3).

The decision for the WLP not to stand was down to a few issues. The primary reason was that the Steering Committee were reluctant to put forward a candidate unless they were a well-known personality, for fear of losing in a constituency where the lack of a functioning local organisation could not support a candidate. Hooson was scornful of this decision, stating that: 'I think their decision was wrong and all I hope is that we have learnt our lesson.'[58] Despite Hooson's scorn, the Steering Committee were quite correct not to field a candidate. The Liberals had last fought the seat in 1929, whereas Plaid Cymru had been contesting it since the 1950 general election. Plaid had an electoral history in this seat, which the WLP simply did not have. The organisation was just not in place at this point and the committee decided to err on the side of caution.

However, Hooson's condemnation, as well as that of many members, had the desired effect and, in July 1968, the WLP decided to contest the Caerphilly by-election. Again, this constituency had not been contested by the Liberals since 1929 and was devoid of Liberal activity. This was reflected in the results. The WLP polled last place with just 3.6 per cent of the vote. Plaid's candidate, Dr Phil Williams, reduced the Labour majority from 21,148 to just 1,874 (see table 4).[59] Ironically, Hooson's attitude had changed in the period between the Rhondda West and Caerphilly by-elections, remarking:

> I live in dread of a by-election in the completely barren constituencies. One such is Merthyr Tydfil where S. O. Davies is the Member; he is over 80 … I have suggested to the Welsh Young Liberals that they should have a sustained campaign in Merthyr Tydfil as an exercise in reclaiming a derelict constituency.[60]

The problem for the WLP was that, since the 1950s, Plaid Cymru had become adept at fighting by-elections, putting resources into a constituency that it was unable to match at general elections. For example, Plaid had spent £600 on its Rhondda by-election campaign, but had only spent £70 on the constituency in the 1966 general election.[61] The WLP, having just fought two general elections in as many years, whilst also struggling to clear a £293 debt,[62] could not have hoped to match the spending needed to win or even properly contest these constituencies.

Political pacts

Despite the formation of the new party, the WLP was not making an electoral impact and was

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Table 2: The Carmarthen 1966 general election and by-election results				
	1966 general election		*1966 by-election*	
Party	*Votes*	*Vote %*	*Votes*	*Vote %*
Labour (Megan Lloyd George / G. Prys Davies)	21,221	46.2	13,743	33.1
Liberal Party (D. Hywel Davies)	11,988	26.1	8,650	20.8
Plaid Cymru (Gwynfor Evans)	7,416	16.1	16,179	39.0
Conservative (Simon Day)	5,338	11.6	2,934	7.1
Majority	9,233	20.1	2,436	5.9
Source: Beti Jones, *Welsh Elections 1885–1997* (Ceredigion, 1999), pp. 112, 114.				

Table 3: Rhondda West by-election results, 9 March 1967				
	1966 general election		*1967 by-election*	
Party	*Votes*	*Vote %*	*Votes*	*Vote %*
Labour (Iorwerth Thomas / Alec Jones)	19,060	76.1	12,373	49.0
Plaid Cymru (H. Victor Davies)	2,172	8.7	10,067	39.9
Conservative (Dr B. Sandford-Hill / Gareth Neale)	1,955	7.8	1,075	4.3
Communist (Arthur True)	1,853	7.4	1,723	6.8
Majority	16,888	67.4	2,306	9.1
Source: Beti Jones, *Welsh Elections 1885–1997* (Ceredigion, 1999), pp. 112–14.				

Table 4: Caerphilly by-election results, 18 July 1968				
	1966 general election		*1968 by-election*	
Party	*Votes*	*Vote %*	*Votes*	*Vote %*
Labour (Ness Edwards / Fred Evans)	26,330	74.3	16,148	45.6
Plaid Cymru (John D. Howell / Dr Philip Williams)	3,949	11.1	14,274	40.4
Conservative (Ronald Maddocks / Robert Williams)	5,182	14.6	3,687	10.4
Liberal Party (Peter Sadler)	Not contested		1,257	3.6
Majority	21,148	59.7	1,874	5.2
Source: Beti Jones, *Welsh Elections 1885–1997* (Ceredigion, 1999), pp. 112–14.				

playing second fiddle to Plaid in the polls and the media. The breakthrough was remaining elusive and there were calls to seek an alliance with Plaid, a point of view that Hooson, publicly at least, did not have time for.

This was a consistent line of Hooson's, as he had been very critical of Jo Grimond's plan of a 'realignment of the left', which had been mooted prior to the 1964 general election. It became apparent that what Grimond was ultimately advocating was not just a closer working relationship between the two parties. He had a more radical objective in which the moderate members (i.e. the more social democratic members not wedded to Clause IV) of the Labour Party left to join the Liberals. They could then form a progressive, non-socialist, political party to challenge the Tories.[63] Hooson opposed the plan on the basis that supporting one of the larger parties would not go down well with the traditional Liberal voter.[64] The conservative nature of both his and Bowen's seats would have been a prevailing factor.

Equally, Hooson was even more critical of a pact with the Conservatives – even at the local level. He described the Conservatives as vultures, with no real tradition in Wales who were waiting for the nationalists to destroy Labour, in order to pick apart the bones.[65]

However, his reluctance to work with the other parties did not totally preclude him from working with Plaid Cymru when it was politically expedient to do so. On St David's Day in 1967, Hooson, seconded by Gwynfor Evans, introduced the *Government for Wales Bill* proposing a Welsh parliament. Although unsuccessful, it was an example of both parties working together. By Hooson's account, he and Evans got '… on very well together personally …'.[66] However, when Laura Grimond, the wife of Jo, suggested

that Hooson should seek an alliance with Plaid Cymru, Hooson was scathing in reply:

> I am sure that any kind of deal with the Nats. would be a great mistake. We would be accused of having sought an agreement with Labour, then having failed to obtain it, then sought an agreement with the Nationalists.[67]

Welsh Democratic Party

Despite this, Hooson could not have been unaware of the growing calls from within the WLP to seek a deal with Plaid or that the WLP and Plaid were being viewed as two sides of the same coin. For example, after the Caerphilly by-election, an internal WLP report noted:

> … the danger that many people who are really Liberals will be inveigled into the Nationalist camp on the assumption that they and we are after the same thing.[68]

However, Hooson's belief that the role of the Liberal Party was to be the 'radical, non-Socialist party in Britain'[69] was coupled with the understanding that the WLP's main political rivals were Plaid Cymru and not the Labour Party. The Labour Party was too large a presence on the Welsh political scene and it would take a concerted effort to knock it off that perch. Labour could only be seriously challenged, in Hooson's view, by a radical non-socialist political party. However, the by-election successes that Plaid was experiencing seemed to show that they were the beneficiaries of any radical revival within Wales.

It has long been the assumption of historians of the Welsh Liberal Party that Hooson was being pushed into the direction of a political pact with Plaid, but he never pursued nor seriously considered the possibility of an alliance.[70] As the historian J. Graham Jones first noted,[71] Hooson, in correspondence with Geraint Jenkins, the research secretary for the WLP, went further than had previously been thought, stating that:

> I can see great advantages in having a form of alliance with Plaid Cymru, as far as the affairs of Wales are concerned. Lest it be said that I was the difficult man in these matters, I did make tentative approaches through Dewi Powell, with no response whatsoever. I also made a direct approach to Gwynfor Evans with a suggestion that we might put up a joint candidate and eventually form a kind of united front. This was flatly turned down, and the subject has not been raised by him since …
>
> … Personally, I have nothing against the formation of a truly radical Welsh party say, entitled the Welsh Democratic Party. Furthermore, I have nothing against a radical alliance with say Plaid Cymru, fighting 18 seats, and the Liberals fighting 18 seats in Wales.[72]

It is not overly clear as to why Hooson would make such an overture to Evans, but he does state in his letter that he was '… far from sanguine about our position, and I think a great deal of rethinking needs to be done.'[73] The WLP was less than a year old at this point and the aforementioned lack of political progress may well have been weighing on his mind.

Perhaps, Hooson's view that the nationalists would erode the influence of the Labour Party allowed him to overlook the WLP's differences with Plaid in some important areas. Not least of these was Plaid's apparent conversion to socialism and its desire for Welsh independence, with dominion status. However, if Hooson truly believed a Liberal revival was on the cards, then being able to neutralise the influence of Plaid would be a logical step. A political pact with Plaid could have allowed a more prominent Liberal voice to emerge and the nationalist debate could have been steered towards federalism rather than independence. Plaid, at this point, was still a broad church and its stated political creed did not reflect the whole of its membership. Also, Hooson would have recognised that there was an overlap in policies and what could be more natural than both of the Welsh nationalist parties working together?

Even as late as 1973, Hooson appears to have seen the benefits of a pact with Plaid. Although, in some correspondence at least, he states that he did not trust Plaid Cymru at all. But, he believed that any pact would have to see both parties fighting an equal number of seats in Wales.[74] This desire was not to be.

Evans's ambivalence was just as well because in 1974 the direction of the WLP began to change, as did that of Plaid. In the February election, Geraint Howells won Cardiganshire, which meant the party now had two MPs. Although at the October election Plaid would gain three MPs, the popular vote went to the Liberals: the WLP gained 15.5 per cent of the vote compared to Plaid's 10.8 per cent. The WLP had regained their third-place position, on votes at least, which they had lost to Plaid at the 1970 general election.

Howells' election may have had more to do with the unpopularity of the Conservative and Labour parties, but it seemed to be a just reward for the hard work of the preceding eight years. Despite the issues highlighted above, in these eight years, the party had done a lot of work in re-establishing the local associations, so much so that in the 1974 general elections, they were able to contest thirty-one seats in February and all thirty-six seats in October. Further to this, in 1976, with Hooson's instrumental role in forming the Lib–Lab Pact, the WLP found itself influencing the Liberal Party once again.

Hooson's belief that the role of the Liberal Party was to be the 'radical, non-Socialist party in Britain' was coupled with the understanding that the WLP's main political rivals were Plaid Cymru and not the Labour Party.

It is understandable that, in the early years of the WLP, Hooson would be nervous that the project was in danger of failing. However, reversing the years of neglect would take time … The 1974 general elections could, in some ways, be seen as the justifiable reward for such a big political gamble.

Conclusion

The formation of the Welsh Liberal Party was always going to be a political gamble. Its former incarnation had been allowed to rot through neglect and had no distinctive vision for Wales. It is no wonder that a revitalised Plaid Cymru were able to challenge the Liberals' position at the end of the 1950s.

Hooson's aim was to give the WLP a distinctive Welsh vision, which could facilitate a revival of Liberalism in Wales. His plan to update the nationalism of the Welsh Liberals and recapture some of the ground lost to Plaid was probably too late to succeed. By the time Hooson formed the WLP, Plaid had successfully challenged the Liberals position and were making inroads into Labour's industrial heartlands in the south. The chance to neutralise the nascent Plaid Cymru had long since passed. Although both parties were in the same electoral position in 1966, the tailwind was behind Plaid, both electorally and in terms of policy.

In some ways, it was fortuitous that Evans turned down Hooson's offer. If Hooson had succeeded in amalgamating Plaid Cymru and the WLP into the 'Welsh Democratic Party,' a major tradition of the Welsh political landscape would have been lost. During the Liberal Party's post-war barren years, it was Welsh Liberalism that kept the party afloat. The Liberal Party had maintained a presence on the Welsh political landscape since the nineteenth century and to lose that could have consigned the tradition to history.[75] On the other hand, if the Liberals had been able to influence Plaid internally, or to avoid facing them at election time, it could have benefitted the WLP. Hooson's main barrier to a Liberal revival in the 1960s was not the Labour Party, but Plaid Cymru and the similarity between the two parties.

It is understandable that, in the early years of the WLP, Hooson would be nervous that the project was in danger of failing. However, reversing the years of neglect would take time, certainly longer than the four years between the foundation of the WLP and the 1970 general election. The 1974 general elections could, in some ways, be seen as the justifiable reward for such a big political gamble.

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concluded on page 43

David Lloyd George

Ian Ivatt reviews Lloyd George's time at the Board of Trade, from 11 December 1905 to 8 April 1908

Lloyd George's Presiden

cy of the Board of Trade

> Lloyd George flung himself zestfully into his administrative duties at the Board of Trade, soon forcing even his severest critics to concede that he was the most exciting and effective – if not the most orthodox – head of this Ministry in decades.
>
> Don M. Cregier, *Bounder from Wales* (University of Missouri Press, 1976), p. 101

The thrust of this article is to demonstrate clearly the difference Lloyd George made, as compared with his predecessors, in his first ministerial position in the 1905–08 Liberal government as president of the Board of Trade. He approached the challenge of this ministry with no preconceived notions and without the supporting benefit of a classical or university education. He used his strength of character, his background as a solicitor to ascertain a full brief of the situations which he encountered, with due reference to those that were actually involved in the job or area of consideration.

In the latter part of 1905, David Lloyd George, the intriguing MP for the Carnarvon Boroughs found that even he had expended too much effort in his endeavours as a much travelled MP. Yet despite his boundless energy, his health needed some urgent attention. In particular, no doubt owing to his regular round of speeches, his throat was troubling him. After a medical examination he agreed to have his tonsils removed, squeezing the operation in between two separate visits to Scotland. Whilst the operation went well enough, there followed an unexpected yet severe throat haemorrhage. This medical problem was solved as Lloyd George, convalesced in the care of the renowned Mrs Timothy Davies, 'Mrs Tim'. The swift medical help had done the trick. Moreover, part of the advice given to Lloyd George was that he should give up all parliamentary and legal work completely for at least two months.

His brother, William, quickly suggested that the two of them, consequently, should have a prolonged joint holiday, and Italy was selected. In mid-November, therefore, the brothers started their overseas tour by way of the boat train sailing from Southampton to Genoa. The ever-admiring Mrs Tim, and not Maggie, waved them a fond farewell from the quayside. They arrived at Genoa and stayed there for a few days before moving firstly to Florence, where they stayed at the Grand Hotel Verdi. They then travelled on to Rapallo where they somewhat fortuitously met an elderly Liberal Party supporter on 27 November who had recently arrived there from England. He imparted the latest news that the Tory Prime Minister Arthur Balfour's resignation was imminent. Lloyd George remarked that, if the Tory government resigned, 'ministers would die with their drawn salaries in their hand'.[1] Upon hearing this latest turn of events, the brothers decided to return quickly to England. William volunteered to go first (although he undoubtedly wished to return to his legal work where fees could be earned!) to confirm or refute this information. They had agreed that if William thought his brother should return, he would send a coded word so that David too could swiftly get back. If there was no apparent crisis then David Lloyd George would continue with his visit to Italy for a week or so more, and then proceed to return to London by sea after that. William, arriving back at London on 2 December, soon established that the old Liberal gentleman's information was correct, and an especially charted message was swiftly sent by telegraph to Lloyd George. Upon receipt of this message, Lloyd George, in turn, sped back to London, arriving there within twenty-four hours of leaving Rapallo. This was not an opportunity to be missed – especially as, if he were selected for a ministerial office, a salary would be available. This being an immensely welcome addition to the cash-strapped Lloyd George family, who had, during Lloyd George's fifteen and a half years as an unpaid backbencher, relied upon solicitors' fees from the Lloyd George & George practice. There were also his occasional fees for articles published in newspapers and journals. Indeed, at an earlier stage, Lloyd George had even considered retiring from parliament to become a full-time solicitor or barrister so that he could earn a decent fee income. Equally Lloyd

David Lloyd George as President of the Board of Trade: halftone postcard print, circa 1905, published by James Valentine & Sons Ltd (© National Portrait Gallery, London).

George yearned to be free of dependence of the partnership profits effectively all earned by his brother.

The rumours of the Conservative government's weakness, essentially rooted in the tariff quarrel, now turned into reality with the resignation of Balfour and his government. The resignation was accepted by the King who immediately sent for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Liberal leader, to form an alternative administration. Would the prominent political outsider, Lloyd George, be in the running here – a man with a clear controversial if not radical background? Even the Unionist protectionist Chamberlain was heard to say Lloyd George is a very able man and will go far. It should also be remembered that Lloyd George was a man who had a thirst for power, after fifteen years on the back benches. His supreme idea, as he told his wife Maggie, was to get on in life. Campbell-Bannerman kissed hands with the king on 4 December 1905 to commence office as the new premier and immediately set forth to form his administration. Rumours abounded as to who might fill the great offices of state and Lloyd George himself even hoped that he would be offered the Home Office, or failing that, perhaps given the choice of either the Post Office or Board of Trade. There would be a clear association here with the Liberal policy of the defence of free trade.

John Wilson, in his *Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman* suggests that he was not favourably inclined to including Lloyd George at all. However after some further consideration, Campbell-Bannerman remarked to his parliamentary colleague, Reginald McKenna, 'I suppose we ought to include him'.[2] A more upbeat assessment of the new premier's intentions is contained in Bentley Brinkerhoff Gilbert's 1987 work, *David Lloyd George – A Political Life (Vol. 2)*, namely 'early invitation [for Cabinet office] provides clear evidence that Campbell-Bannerman intended to begin Cabinet building on the fringes, with leading radicals. Lloyd George evidently was his first choice'.[3] Lloyd George's earlier track record of campaigns for temperance, Welsh disestablishment and his anti-Boer War stance was self-evident. This could well explain some reluctance of a handful of leading Liberal figures to give him unqualified support. The new Secretary of State for War, Richard Burdon Haldane was one not so enamoured, referring to Lloyd George as 'an illiterate with an unbalanced mind'. Asquith too, was not favoured by Haldane either, being described as 'a man of no imagination'.[4] Haldane would be proved wrong on both counts.

Campbell-Bannerman, of course, needed to balance his selections for Cabinet between the Liberal imperialists and the more progressive Liberal radical groups. Peter Rowland, in his 1975 biography, suggests that Campbell-Bannerman's recruiting officer, the infamous Lewis [Lulu] Harcourt, asserted that 'Lloyd George would be quite satisfied with the Local Government Board'.[5] In the event, Lloyd George was given the choice of either the Post Office or the Board of Trade, and without hesitation Lloyd George chose the latter. This involved an annual salary of £2,000 – £500 lower than the less demanding Post Office position. Many congratulations, by letter and telegrams, were sent over his appointment as president of the Board of Trade, including from Sir Alfred Thomas, the chairman of the Welsh Parliamentary party.[6] Nevertheless, presidency of the Board of Trade (this government appointment dates back to the days of Charles I, in one form or another) was a Cabinet ranking appointment and even at this low starting point was a supreme honour. Especially so for a man who had begun life where he did – a signal personal triumph. Ironically, back in his trainee solicitor days with Messrs. Breese, Jones and Casson, Lloyd George, when writing a political article for the *North Wales Observer* in October 1884, reported with great enthusiasm on the abilities of the then president of the Board of Trade, Joseph Chamberlain, who happened to be visiting Wales at the time![7] After all, Lloyd George would be treading in the footsteps of such eminent politicians as Gladstone, John Bright, and Joseph Chamberlain, all holders of the president of the Board of Trade office in the past.

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His family, especially Uncle Richard Lloyd, were absolutely delighted as were the Liberal Party supporters of the Carnarvon Boroughs. His triumph was reflected in the ensuing 1906 general election when Lloyd George's majority increased from 296 in the year 1900 to 1,224 votes – admittedly aided by a weak Conservative opponent, the rich and successful R. A. Naylor, who had made his fortune in the timber trade. Moreover, at the time, Lloyd George was, effectively, a national figure and in view of his strong opposition to the Boer War and his role in the 1902 Education Act, his re-election was almost guaranteed – the constituency had previously been marginal.

Thus, on 11 December 1905 Lloyd George conventionally attired in a frock coat and pinstripe trousers, presented himself to the king, his status as a backbench MP being transformed into a minister of the Crown. He was salaried and a Privy Councillor – in short the new president of the Board of Trade. Lloyd George himself claimed that he had pressed the premier, Campbell-Bannerman into agreeing for certain pledges. These related to education and to the extension of self-government for Wales – and Lloyd George got them as part of his price for taking on the Board of Trade. There was also the added attraction that his new ministerial position ensured some regular contact with Wales and his own constituency.

Of the challenges ahead he was in some awe, yet he wrote to his brother a little earlier, on 8 December 1905, indicating that he was delighted with his new ministerial portfolio. This covered not just labour aspects, but supervision of

railways, bankruptcy, and a point of special interest to him, harbours and foreshores.[8] He was in charge of 1,000 men in ten separate departments, with a budget of £750,000. Nevertheless, his joy was tempered by a later comment to his fellow MP, Charles Masterman, 'when I came to the Board of Trade I was in a blue funk. I thought here I was with no business training and I shall have to deal with all these great businessmen. I found them all children.'[9]

His immediate thoughts were, 'What can I do for commerce?' His eagerness to get involved, especially with his supportive wholesale grocer (International Stores) parliamentary secretary colleague, H. E. Kearley, was undoubtedly equal to his newly emerging private interests of motoring and golf. It only took one week for Lloyd George to make progress as he tells us, 'I am gradually getting into my work, and liking it.'[10] On 14 December, government papers were placed before him, for a decision, relating to the Portmadoc Railway and Criccieth foreshore, to whet his appetite. His quick wit came into play when, at Question Time in the House of Commons, an exchange with Sir Howard Vincent, a senior Tory Protectionist, was as follows:

> Vincent: 'Has the Right Hon. Gentleman no list at the Board of Trade of the firms in this country who have established their works in Germany, France, Russia and other foreign countries in consequence of protective tariffs?'
>
> Lloyd George: 'Yes, I have one in my pocket right now and I will show it behind the Speaker's Chair to the Hon. Member after Questions.'
>
> Vincent: 'But why not give it to the House now? Why should I be preferentially treated or have preferential right of access?'
>
> Lloyd George: 'I thought that my Hon. Friend was a believer in preference![11]

Equally, in the House Lloyd George's opposite specialist for Trade was Andrew Bonar Law, and they had a great respect for each other. No doubt this is due, at least in part, to the fact that neither of them came from the ruling class, public school, or from the university intelligentsia. There was always a strong rapport between them despite differences of political persuasion.

From this point on he invariably sought the opinion and advice of his permanent secretary, Francis Hopwood (who later moved to the Colonial Office, and was replaced by the Welshman, Hubert Llewellyn Smith); Lloyd George had the irritating habit of not fully reading anything that was put in front of him, leaving Hopwood to provide a simple summary of any issue. It was from this purposeful start that Lloyd George came to admire the self-made commercial classes and held near contempt for most of the public school and Oxbridge educated civil service. The special advisers that haunt ministers today were essentially a Lloyd George invention.[12] With an eye to the near future, he lost no time in setting up a royal commission to consider the future of Britain's canals and waterways and was instrumental in getting newly appointed consular service personnel to include commercial intelligence in their briefs.

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Lloyd George next tackled the initial investigations into the question of registered patents. He discovered more than half the said patents were held by foreigners yet operated outside of Great Britain. Lloyd George's view was that this was an abuse of Britain's free economy. The Patent Law and Designs Amendment Bill (1907), as it became known, was designed to prevent foreign patents from being registered in this country at all. Both major political parties had no argument with this. The industry most benefiting from this legislation was the dye manufacturers businesses where 95 per cent of British patents were held by foreigners. In particular the chemical giants of Brunner Mond (the forerunner of ICI) welcomed this new approach. The partners of the business were Liberal MPs and equally were generous donors to Liberal Party funds. Not the least was the fact that Alfred Mond was a golfing friend of Lloyd George's.[13]

Lloyd George made his first main priority, in his new role as president of the Board of Trade, to review the existing arrangements regarding merchant shipping – and in particular the overloading of merchant vessels themselves. His enquiries, besides cargo aspects, also embraced safety provisions, seamen's welfare and accommodation. The key matter to be addressed was an updated approach to the Plimsoll line on merchant vessels to embrace further and to enforce the earlier 1876 legislation on this matter. In all, once completed, the draft bill measures amounted to eighty-six clauses. The idea here was to focus on these changes and general shipping business aspects, which turned out to be quite a complex bill. Even so, it was unlikely to cause major divisions on party lines in its passage through parliament. The bill then passed through the House of Commons and the House of Lords without a single division, although two peers of the realm wished to move two amendments but failed on the account of their drunkenness.[14] The thrust of this legislation was to protect British sailors (including the foreign 'Lascars'), and shipping in general against 'unfair' overseas competition by foreign vessel owners, and to upgrade the conditions of crews in general. Interestingly Lloyd George's method of discovering the background to all this new territory was to approach the ship owners themselves who had concerns over load lines and hence profit levels. Indeed Lloyd George gained their support, whilst equally maintaining and increasing good connections with the Seamen's Union, which in the early stages only gave qualified agreement to the bill's proposed terms, prior to the drafting of the actual final parliamentary bill. This was a clear indication of Lloyd George operating as

a consensual politician. In essence the proposals were to embody the load line question of all ships including foreign vessels that used British ports, with accompanying crew improvements and to similarly safeguard passenger steerage conditions. He writes to his wife, later on (30 October 1906), reflecting, in a speech at Rhyl, North Wales that, 'I have had a number of Bills this year and they [the House of Lords] have blessed them all. I think it was largely because they did not understand them.'[15]

In the summer of 1906 Lloyd George managed to ruffle the sovereign's feathers as King Edward VII heard rumours, via the House of Commons, that Lloyd George was proposing to appoint a separate Minister for Wales. King Edward approached the prime minister, Campbell-Bannerman to indicate that any such appointment, without the sovereign's sanction, was intolerable. The King's Memorandum, of 18 July 1906 is set out below:

> I am much astonished to read an account in newspapers of the debate in the H. of Commons when it was stated (yesterday) that it is proposed by the government to institute a Minister for Wales. I have heard nothing on the subject from the Prime Minister. This proceeding is unconstitutional and I cannot pass it over in silence. I wish my Private Secretary, Lord Knollys to call on the Prime Minister without delay and enquire in my name what is the cause of this most strange, and may I say unheard of proceeding. Edward R & I.[16]

Lloyd George, immediately responded, via the prime minister, to the effect that no new ministry was intended, merely that an existing member of the government, possibly a junior Treasury minister be made responsible, without any salary increase, to answer for Welsh matters. In this way there would be accountability to parliament. This would not be the only time that Lloyd George managed to attract the king's ire. With that minor episode behind him, Lloyd George, now being in receipt of a regular salary, took his entire family, Margaret, the children and brother, William on a summer cruise voyage to Lisbon. The tickets were upgraded to 'Upper Deck' status by courtesy of Owen Phillips, MP for Pembroke and Haverfordwest, who was also a director of the steam ship company. They would be back in time for the annual Eisteddfod, which was never missed.[17] He would have been well pleased with the comment in the *Evening Express* article describing that 'Lloyd George had proved himself to be the most admirable President of the Board of Trade since Mr. Joseph Chamberlain.'[18]

In early 1907, when the rumblings of Welsh (church) disestablishment had temporarily died down, another quite separate matter arose. This new challenge would indeed test Lloyd George's mettle – the make-or-break situation of a threatened national rail strike. The real possibility of a rail stoppage was fuelled by concerns over low wage structure (money wages had only increased by 5 per cent over the previous twenty years). This effectively left railway workers with less spendable net wages than those in similar skilled employment.[19] Additionally, disunity between the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (founded in 1872) and the Amalgamated Society of Locomotive Engineers Federation (1880) was a major stumbling block. Even though only 10 per cent of the railway workforce were actually trade union members – it was recognition of the unions by the railway bosses and owners that was the key underlying issue.

Now that trade union activity was lawful under the 1906 Trades Disputes Act, Richard Bell, the progressive secretary of the ASRS led negotiations for union recognition, including wages, working conditions and hours, with the various British railway companies (however this was not totally supported by Albert Fox of ASLEF).

In response, the employers, as usual, referred to the vital nationwide position of the railway sector, stability of employment for the men, and the free travel and uniforms that were privileges of working on the railway. Upon Lloyd George's return from a brief alpine holiday in the early autumn of 1907, these railway matters took his immediate attention. That autumn, Bell announced his next move was to ballot his now increasing membership on the vexed subject of union recognition, and put the result before the reluctant railway company employers.

This led to cries for mediation and then ascended to become a Board of Trade matter. In fact the Board was in an ideal position to intervene effectively; a recommendation in any case by parliamentary secretary, Hudson Kearley. Moreover, Sidney Buxton, the Postmaster General had recently recognised the Post Office Clerks Union, so, on a larger and different scale, perhaps, Lloyd George was faced with the same situation. After obtaining Prime Minister Campbell Bannerman's authority to proceed, Lloyd George made it clear that, if the joint negotiations failed, then government-authorised compulsory arbitration would need to follow. Lloyd George wrote to his brother William in euphoric mood on 21 October 1907, to say, 'The railway strike is demanding all my attention. Things are all going well so far. Whatever happens I am coming out on top of this business. I can see my way clear to the station. Conciliation at first but failing that, the steamroller [compulsory arbitration] the railway companies must give way at that point, I am definite.'[20] And again, on the next day, 22 October 1907: 'Very busy. No further news of railway trouble. It will be a tough job – that is all I know'. This reflected a marked sympathy for the trade union standpoint.[21]

Lloyd George arranged, firstly, to talk to the employers who were obstinate, if not hostile

Lloyd George wrote to his brother William in euphoric mood on 21 October 1907, to say, 'The railway strike is demanding all my attention. Things are all going well so far. Whatever happens I am coming out on top of this business. I can see my way clear to the station. Conciliation at first but failing that, the steamroller [compulsory arbitration] the railway companies must give way at that point, I am definite.'

over the question of union recognition. Lloyd George's opening stance was to show a conciliatory spirit and using carefully chosen words (emphasising the national loss of trade, key position of railways, etc.) saw the employers' stance weaken. It was made abundantly clear by Lloyd George that any possible rail strike must not happen, especially as this would affect all important industries. Lloyd George won them round and a further meeting was proposed with a more manageable six railway company directors only to represent all rail employers' interests. A few days later the *Daily Mail* helpfully printed an article, clearly supporting government intervention in the matter and if need be, to end in government arbitration. Another meeting with the nominated six railway proprietors occurred on 31 October with the objective of finalising their position. The company representatives were well reminded, again, of what the disastrous effects would be on trade for the entire country, and not just on the railways, if a strike were to ensue. What Lloyd George did not decide to pass on to the employers was the fact that there were divisions in the union members' views, and was aware that the union membership rank and file did not really want to press the matter to a strike.

Nevertheless, in the meantime, the campaign for union recognition moved forward with the separate main railway unions. Matters were put to the entire union membership by ballot on the issue of whether to strike or not. In this ballot 77 per cent of the 100,000 ballot papers issued surprisingly reflected the need for strike action unless conditions were met during 1907. Lloyd George continued his discussions with both side of the dispute, albeit separately, but never with both sides being present at the same time. Lloyd George's idea was to negotiate pledges on the basis that employers would adopt union recognition, with a system of conciliation and arbitration. There was also the question of the differences over wage levels, hours and working conditions. Similarly, Lloyd George talked to the railway union representatives to pass on the news that the employers would back down and accept the union requirements and conditions. This tactic proved successful and a damaging strike would not happen. When the news was passed to the prime minister, compliments came forward regarding Lloyd George's role in the matter and this, to a point, completely overwhelmed Lloyd George. Even the king wrote of his delight that the strike had been averted. A note of praise from the German Kaiser Wilhelm II also arrived at Lloyd George's doorstep. The nation, too, breathed more easily now with particular relief being expressed amongst the upper classes – the outsider and Welsh rebel had worked wonders. The newspaper, *The Weekly Press*, with a large centre page photograph of him and a three column summary of his qualities, commented, 'the nation that only a few years ago was ready to stone him now realises that it possesses in the Board of Trade an asset of the first value'.[22] Many writers and historians have held this achievement as Lloyd George's finest and most important Board of Trade agreement.

Whilst Lloyd George was basking in this well-earned glory a quite sudden personal tragedy was to befall the entire family. Mair Eluned, the eldest of the three daughters, unexpectedly died after an unsuccessful appendix operation. Mair was the 'apple of Lloyd George's eye' and he had a special tenderness for this clever, talented and beautiful child. She was only 17 years of age when she passed away on 30 November 1907 – only a matter of days after the failed peritonitis surgery. Lloyd George was totally grief stricken, almost tortured, and was not easily comforted by his wife Maggie, nor brother William who swiftly arrived in London from Criccieth. It was a personal blow from which Lloyd George never really recovered. Even, quite unnecessarily, taking Maggie to task for arranging for the appendectomy operation to be, in view of the urgency, performed at their London home, without the benefit of skilled surgeons and with insufficient antiseptic hospital type conditions. Lloyd George would never return to this family home (Routh Road, Wandsworth) and would always partly blame himself for Mair's very early demise. This event marked the occasion of Lloyd George's marriage to Maggie coming under serious stress and also the point at which they began to slowly drift apart, even though there was never any meaningful question of a formal divorce. Yet in the immediate aftermath of Mair's unexpected passing, there was no sign of estrangement or recrimination.[23]

The funeral and interment were on 3 December 1907 at the Criccieth Public Cemetery which was within sight of Mair's own birthplace seventeen years before at Mynydd Ednyfed Fawr. Lloyd George hastily travelled from London in a special carriage of the Great Western Railway Company. He drew comfort by leaning on the shoulder of his elderly uncle, Richard Lloyd, throughout the simple funeral service itself.[24] After the funeral, Lloyd George despite his total sorrow was obliged to proceed to Manchester to play a part in a dispute in the cotton trade, where his involvement was successful. Lloyd George then promptly departed, with his good friend Stuart Rendel, to southern France via Boulogne, and Lyon, where he remained as a guest of a former Hull ship owner's widow, until mid-January 1908, accompanied by his two sons, Dick and Gwilym, Hudson Kealey and his two boys.

Feeling somewhat refreshed, although still in mourning for Mair, Lloyd George then turned his attention to one of his main Board of Trade responsibilities, namely shipping and the attendant port facilities. This involved, at the outset, an exploratory trip to other overseas harbours such as Hamburg and Antwerp to see how the dock arrangements were in being there. Also included in this research was the organisation of

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the dock workings, and swiftly Lloyd George saw for himself that Britain's major port, London, was really inefficient and hopelessly outdated. This suggested, at the very least, some serious in-depth review and changes. It was clear, as a result, that the various port operating companies in London had achieved in the past, some excellent trade expansion, but had now descended, over the last few decades, to petty quarrels. There were also differences between the companies (such as disputes over dredging) to the extent that trade was being actively harmed, even lost to foreign ports, permanently. Certainly, over the last fifteen years, London's share alone, of the UK shipping trade had been declining.[25] Previously, in 1902, a royal commission had concluded a detailed study of the London docks and proposed a government Port Authority to take control, instead of the numerous bickering parties, but nothing transpired. At the time, the Conservative Cabinet thought such a task would be an increasingly considerable project and simply deferred any decision until 1907. In the meantime, any suggestions of reconstruction and improvements were stalled by the dockland companies refusing to consider joint action with the vessel owners. Undoubtedly this was essentially due to likely capital money costs and approach channel considerations with the ongoing associated expenditure. In summary it was effectively an economic impasse which needed to be resolved, perhaps even ruthlessly.

It was Asquith, shortly to become prime minister, who encountered a number of issues regarding the docks, invariably as an Elder Brother of Trinity House but equally due to his legal involvement as counsel in court actions relating to the docks. Consequently, Asquith had a sizeable insight into port management as, indeed, to a similar extent had Lloyd George, by way of his earlier Portmadoc days.[26]

Lloyd George now followed in Asquith's footsteps by using his usual enthusiasm, thoroughness and study – the North Sea ports were visited. He was ably assisted by Hudson Kearley and Sir Edwin Cornwall (a Fulham coal dealer). The initial examination of the entire position was underpinned by the eminent accountant, Sir William Plender, who was asked to audit the dock companies' management records and books and it was immediately apparent these were badly kept (if at all) and in a poor state. Bargaining for improvements began with a selection of vested interests, strengthened by Asquith's support as an eminent legal authority on port matters. The Lloyd George solution on which many hopes were pinned was to invest full control into one central authority, aptly named the Port of London Authority (PLA). Such a new body, as the 1907 commission proposed, would have its own access to capital, with a clear objective to own and expand the present dock facilities – indeed, anything to reverse the reducing trade situation.

The dock companies involved were the London and India Docks, the Surrey Commercial Dock and the Millwall Dock Company. The main financial provisions affected directors and shareholders alike. Additionally the directors of each concern were compensated for the loss of their office by the allocation of stock in the new PLA authority. Apportionments of the former dock companies' debenture and preference shares were exchanged into new PLA A and B stocks. Moreover, in addition the existing undertakings, assets and work in progress were effectively transferred and vested in the new PLA stock.[27]

Separate arrangements were made for existing shareholders to be compensated accordingly. A good question, bearing in mind his aptitude, even appetite, for share ownership and profit was did Lloyd George involve himself and his family in these arrangements to ensure some capital reward?

A bill was accordingly laid before parliament on 2 April 1908, which was endorsed on behalf of the Conservative opposition by Bonar Law and separately, for the House of Lords, by Lord Milner. The measures to bring in this new authority were heartily welcomed by both houses in swift succession. The bill itself subsequently passed into law and yet, as it would transpire in the longer term, the legislation proved to fall short of the fullest possible benefits. The PLA legislation included a number of smaller measures, all relating to business and commerce and covering such diverse subjects as employers' liability, the lighterman and wharfingers situation and other watermen. There were further measures relating to changes in patent procedures, totalling eight in all, although only four eventually became law.[28]

A further almost unexpected event now occurred with the ailing prime minister, Campbell-Bannerman firstly resigning on 4 April 1908 and then shortly passing away on 22 April following a severe heart attack. Accordingly, a new, or at least partially different Cabinet would now need consideration. With Asquith now swiftly moving into the prime minister's position, senior Cabinet ministers such as John Morley or Reginald McKenna appeared likely successors to Asquith. Yet as Roy Hattersley observes, 'in retrospect, it seems that Lloyd George's claim to the Treasury was irresistible'.[29] It was more than evident that Lloyd George had certainly made his mark at the Board of Trade, especially his adroit handling of the railway dispute. Similarly, his endeavours regarding shipping interests, the new arrangements for patents, with the expanded concept of new commercial intelligence connections, had seriously pleased British manufacturers, together with his business-like hand on the tiller at the Board. Moreover the PLA creation had endeared him to the entire Liberal host despite such rivals as Haldane, Morley and McKenna, who grudgingly, if at all, acknowledged his achievements.[30] Asquith,

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nevertheless, clearly recognised Lloyd George's merits and whilst balancing his new Cabinet positions, to counter any old Liberal League suggestions and claims, gave the Chancellor of the Exchequer portfolio, without further hesitation, to Lloyd George. Prior to his demise Campbell-Bannerman had written to the king saying 'The Country was largely indebted for so blessed a conclusion to the knowledge, skill, astuteness and tact of the President of the Board of Trade'.[31] What he brought to his work at the Board of Trade was a refreshing aura of understanding in financial, employer and employee relations with his straightforward logical ideas and methods – a significant change from earlier presidents. Richard Lloyd George in his 1961 book was equally generous in his praise, 'It is generally accepted that in his term of office at the Board of Trade, Lloyd George effected more progressive change than in the Ministry's entire history, and laid the foundations of the modern Board.'[32]

When he left the Trade ministry in the spring of 1908, he did so with the significant regard of the business community. This was despite mutterings from the Unionist Balfour and separately McKenna that Lloyd George's principles were not understood. Yet his consultation techniques were praised equally by industrialists and the press – even coming from his old enemies of *The Times* and *Daily Mail*. Businessmen and workforce unions alike felt he outshone any of his earlier Board of Trade office holders' achievements. Indeed plaudits and much acclaim came from overseas leaders too. It should also be borne in mind that by 1908 exports of goods to the main commonwealth countries accounted for 25 per cent of the total (America only amounted to 10 per cent). Since 1906, the balance of trade (exports minus imports) had been moving towards parity and by 1907 and 1908 had reached virtual parity, only to become wider apart by 1914 and the onset of war. [33] It would not be beyond reason to suggest that Lloyd George's influence at the Board of Trade had been at work here by promoting trade in the way he did. Indeed, the *Welshman* newspaper (edition 3 January 1908) underlined that the 'Signal services and cause of industrial peace have made the status of the Board of Trade a more urgent matter than it ever was before' … and then goes on to state: 'it would seem desirous to retain the services, for as long as possible, of a man [Lloyd George] who has shown such an aptitude for the work of conciliation.' Certainly, as was proved, his time spent at the Board of Trade provided a vital base upon which he could lay a legitimate claim to even higher party and government ambitions.

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Fourth Viv Bingham Lecture

Edited version of the lecture given by Lord Tony Greaves at the Conference of the North West Region Liberal Democrats at Lancaster on 21 October 2017; with a postscript from June 2019.

A Lifetime in Liberalism



Tony Greaves, the author of the lecture; Viv Bingham (1932–2012), President of the Liberal Party, 1981–82, after whom the lecture series is named

When I joined the Liberal Party in 1960, it had just six MPs of which two (including Arthur Holt in Bolton West) owed their seats to an electoral pact with the local Conservatives. It had little influence at a national level and just a scattering of councillors concentrated in places and wards where the old Liberal tradition had lingered on, again many of them in the North West and Yorkshire where survival had involved electoral deals with other parties. In spite of a personally and intellectually charismatic leader in Jo Grimond, the party was a pale shadow of what it had been fifty years previously when it had won two general elections in a year, or even in 1929 when many of its policies if not its election appeal were years ahead of the rest.

Yet there was never any doubt that the party would survive. The members in the early 1960s were a striking mixture of older Liberals, who had come through the storms as the party split in the 1930s and leading figures peeled off to left and right in that decade and in the 1940s and earlier 1950s, and a wave of younger people, many of them students and graduates, who were attracted by Grimond's progressive alternative to the tired Conservative government and a paint-peeled Labour opposition feeling ever more dated. With a goodly generation missing in the middle!

But both groups had a pretty good idea of why they were Liberals and of what the party stood for. Many of the oldies looked back to the days of Liberal government and the battles between Liberal free trade and the tariff reformers, while the newbies (not a word in use back then I should say) cared about things like abolishing the death penalty, homosexual law reform, or indeed votes at 18, the first big Young Liberal campaign of that era. But most members knew why they were

n: Where do we go now?

Liberals, and not just because 'Grandad was a big Liberal', and there was more than enough overlap between the old and the young for them to respect and learn from each other. Grimond's genius was in involving academics and others who could develop a new set of progressive policies, left of centre but certainly not socialist in the senses that were then understood, that were in many ways both genuinely new and firmly rooted in Liberal values.

It took time for Liberal Party strategy and tactics to change very much, but there was a real feeling that the party was on the up, which crystallised when Eric Lubbock, a man with both deep Liberal beliefs and experience as housing chairman on the local council, won the Orpington parliamentary by-election in March 1962. (That by-election, incidentally, was the first time I 'knocked on a door in anger' as a Liberal!) When I joined the Lords in 2000, Eric (by then Lord Avebury) said to me: 'I tend to take on the refugee and human rights issues and cases in the House' and he was still doing so, campaigning for fundamentally Liberal causes all round the world, up to his death in February last year. Eric's election marked a high point in a wave of Liberal victories in council elections, many in suburban areas that had not seen Liberals elected for many years.

While this electoral success faded in the face of Labour's victories under Harold Wilson in the 1964 and 1966 general elections, the Grimond era left many constituencies fortified with young members and a local organisation, and a generation of young recruits who took on many of the ideas that Jo had been promoting and developed them into the radical programme of the so-called Red Guard era in the Young Liberals. There were quite dramatic clashes over policy within the party, peaking at the 1966 Brighton Liberal Assembly, but even there only a few people on either side questioned the basic Liberalism of the other side. The arguments were about the nature of a *Liberal* approach in the modern world.

For a while the 'sexy' growing political youth movements, full of energy and enthusiasm, were the Young Liberals and the Young Communists, who really occupied much the same ground in youth politics though promoting fundamentally different underlying philosophies. YLs also provided electioneering dynamism, not always well directed or successful, as in the by-elections at Brierley Hill and Manchester Gorton! YLs were very much part of the late 1968s 'student and youth uprisings' though by then becoming outflanked by more radical groups. But by 1970 a new wave of YL activism and recruitment grew around the issue of South African sporting contacts and particularly the planned 1970 cricket tour of England. Led by Peter Hain (who at least back then was a dynamic and charismatic figure!) the year was a triumph for both the STST group he led and the YLs.

The 1970 general election was nail-biting with only six MPs returned in the end and some by small margins. But no one thought the existence of the party was in danger. The lasting activity of 1970, however, took place at the Eastbourne Liberal Assembly when an amendment moved by the Young Liberals committed the Liberal Party to a strategy of Liberal community politics, 'working with people to take and use power' at a local level, developing a 'dual approach to politics at all levels' by working both within and outside established institutions such as parliament and local councils and (notably in the light of subsequent history) building a power base in the major regional centres. (It also included an industrial strategy that, as Viv Bingham would ruefully point out, never happened). It would be quite wrong to suggest that this resulted in an immediate change of approach by the powers that be in the party – in fact the main reaction to the YLs of party bosses that year (Jeremy Thorpe, Frank Byers and the like) was to set up a commission of investigation under Stephen Terrell QC (candidate for Eastbourne) to investigate the YLs and allegations from a small number of influential people in and around the party that we were a set of Marxist infiltrators dedicated to destroying the party, and along with it the British parliament and the state of Israel. Or something like that. In the event the outcome of the Terrell Commission was

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to waste a lot of time and energy with just one minor and irrelevant change to the party constitution resulting from it.

In fact there was no significant change of approach by the party nationally other than actions that were forced upon the party by a persistent campaign by the community politicians themselves. It was done by a dual approach to the party itself – getting people elected to party decision-making committees, and going out in to the community to practise what we were preaching and make it happen on the ground. (Which is how I came to be an elected councillor in the most deprived part of Colne in 1971.) The main agent of change in the party – and for a few years the main standard-bearer for community campaigning – was the monthly newsletter *Radical Bulletin* – produced by John Smithson – which amongst its regular features covered local campaigning work by Liberals. It also brought together radical activists, local campaigners, and national and regional party officers (groups which increasingly overlapped as time went on) in RB conferences, Liberal Assemblies and regional party meetings.

This whole campaigning approach had been given a boost by the actions of Liverpool's Trevor Jones who had developed a more in-your-face populist style of community-based election campaigning in his home city, notably using ward newsletters called *Focus*. His arrival at the by-elections in Sutton and Cheam, and later at Ripon and Ely, in 1972–73, and big gains in the elections for new English local authorities in 1973, played a major part in persuading many party members, at both local and national levels, that this new-fangled community campaigning might have something to be said for it after all. Some of the more forward-looking national party officers such as Geoff Tordoff and Philip Watkins had by now realised that this source of energy and commitment was vital for the party and began to work closely with the RB vanguard.

It was still all very patchy and it was all dragged down again later in the 1970s after Harold Wilson again won two general elections, by a whisker, in 1974, after the Tory Prime Minister Edward Heath unnecessarily went to the country during the big miners' strike. (A mistake that sounds familiar perhaps?) By 1977 the Tories were electorally rampant and the county council elections that year were a disaster (Lancashire for instance elected eighty-six Tories, twelve Labour, and one Liberal – me!) But again there was no feeling of any existential crisis for the party. We knew what we stood for, we knew what we had to do, and we knew we were going to do it. And that was the year when the Association of Liberal Councillors, under new officer management following their latest internal elections, set up office in the Birchcliffe Centre at Hebden Bridge with the help of a direct grant from the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust. Thus began a dedicated and deliberate programme to turn the Liberal Party across the country into a local campaigning force, and on the back of that to contest and win elections on a previously unimagined scale.

I set out a history of the first ten years at Birchcliffe in a speech I made at a fringe meeting at the Liberal Democrat conference at Bournemouth this September, organised jointly by the Association of Liberal Democrat Councillors and the Liberal Democrat History Group (you start to wonder when you find you are now part of history!) The numbers of Liberal councillors rose to around 5,000 during the electoral boost created by the Liberal–SDP Alliance in the 1980s (some of them were actually SDP) and continued at a high though sagging level during the first twenty years of the Liberal Democrats. The new merged party created in 1988 did indeed have a serious and possibly existential crisis in its first two or three years as the SDP split and there were substantial defections from the Liberal side (a few to the newly created 'Liberal Party' in 1989 but most to retirement from active politics). The new party's opinion polls never did reach a level that was within the statistical margin of zero as the then new party leader Paddy Ashdown claims, but they were in quite low single figures and it was indeed the local government base of the party that saved the day, as he also asserts!

It was this base that lay behind much of the localised growth in support for the Liberal Democrats which led up to the relative breakthroughs at the general elections in 1997, 2001 and 2005. But by then, as Michael Meadowcroft pointed out in the first of these Viv Bingham lectures four years ago, things were starting to go wrong. He said, comparing it with the 1950s: 'Now we have hyper activity, candidates everywhere, a keen understanding of modern campaigning, but little understanding of the liberal society that all this effort is in theory working towards.' He went on to say: 'My case is not merely for better policies, nor for more campaigning activity … I am arguing … for a values-based politics and for the enthusiasm and commitment that the vision of a Liberal Society engenders'. He later said: 'You cannot build strategy and tactics on sand.' I have much sympathy with Michael's views here, though the problem today in my view is that while we may be trying to build on sand, there is no coherent strategy either. Just short-term tactics based on focus groups, individual whims and the dictates of supposed whizz-kids who know everything and deliver disaster – remember Ryan Coetzee?

I do not agree with Michael's apparent dismissal of almost all campaigning activity. His repeated attacks on 'mindless activism and extra millions of Focus leaflets' are a classic exercise in setting up Aunt Sallies. His concerns about content are much more valid. If we are not, in some way, in what we do, promoting the principles and

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aims of Liberalism, what is it all about? And his strictures about the follies of extreme targeting are, in my view, to be taken very seriously indeed. Large areas of the country are again effectively derelict at constituency level, and there is even more derelict territory within supposedly active constituencies. Even within the orbit of targeting, we will not be able to persuade anyone to go and help in a target seat or even a by-election (when it is essential) if there is no one left to be persuaded. But these are tactical details, and in any case I hold my hand up as one of the small group of people who set out to persuade local activists of the need to target – our mantra back in the late 1970s was 'Campaign, Communicate, Concentrate' – worth reviving in my view. But the real question is in so many areas: Where have all the Liberals gone, and why?

Let's go back to the 1980s. The Liberal–SDP Alliance was a stimulating development in many places, and it brought a lot more council seats – I remember announcing council by-election results on the Friday morning at the Liberal Assembly in (I think) 1981 with twelve straight victories. But the unintended consequences of two parties, each with their own organisations at every level, seeking to work together and present a common platform to the public, was debilitating. Even running a joint jumble sale required an evening set aside to negotiate the details! On policy it resulted in the intellectual energies on the Liberal side being devoted to promoting Liberal policy to the SDP and defending it (often against what we thought was a more right-wing or more centralising view from our SDP oppos). We had just been through an amazingly thorough process across three Assemblies, moving from ideological statements or values, to what could be called policy pillars or principles, to a detailed policy statement, all approved by the Assembly. This process was all the brainchild of Michael Meadowcroft. Then, for a decade, we seemed to be mainly using the results as the basis for discussions with the SDP, first in the formulation of joint Alliance policy statements and election manifestos; then in 1987 in the negotiations for the merger of the two parties into the Social and Liberal Democrats, as we were at first called.

Worse was to follow. The existential crisis that really did follow the merger, combined with a widespread view that the new party should not be plagued by the 'old' Liberal versus SDP arguments which had wasted so much energy for too long, meant that discussing policy in the new party was like treading on eggshells. The previously agreed, the non-controversial, and the blandest non-value-laden stuff was the order of the day. The worst aspects of detailed Green and White Paper policy-making meant that our policies were both too boring to read, and gave little expression to any underlying beliefs. It took years to come out of this, leavened only by the occasional initiative from Paddy as leader, notably on the question of Hong Kong citizens. It was really only when Charles Kennedy became leader that we started once again to use the word Liberal, with a capital letter L, to describe our philosophy and belief system. It was a party activist, Donnachadh McCarthy, with the support of the Youth and Students, who dragged the leadership into not only opposing the catastrophic Bush–Blair invasion of Iraq, but leading the party out on to the streets to show the world where we stood.

By 2010, the party was rather stagnating from a campaigning point of view, with a new leader, Nick Clegg, who did not well understand the party below national level; nor did he understand campaigning. He also reverted to promoting a small 'l' version of liberalism which too often seemed to drift towards an acceptance of the whole thesis of so-called neoliberalism against which, in the Blair/Brown days, this party had been a bulwark (and which anyway after 2008 was seen by more and more people to be fraught with problems). In any case there was a continuing drift towards technical and indeed technocratic solutions to policy questions which was (and still is) compounded by the party's policy-making process which is ever more unfit for purpose. Ad hoc working groups of people who think they are experts before they start, many hours spent taking evidence from more 'experts' from all over the political spectrum (and nowhere), long detailed and utterly boring reports which will enthuse no one, and unbelievably long motions to conference that few people ever read… Is it any wonder that few people nowadays really know 'what we stand for'? Of course political parties can also be defined by the people who vote for them. For a few brief years up to 2010 the Liberal Democrats were beginning to build a genuine core vote. But then came the coalition when the Liberal Democrats in government systematically pissed off almost every element of that emerging core vote. Students, public-sector white-collar workers, environmentalists, small farmers, 'middle-class liberals' – people passionate about human rights, international aid etc. And lots of the people who vote for us locally found that in government we were trashing their benefits and their local schools, closing libraries, stopping bus services – all the dreadful austerity stuff which directly impacts on local services and personal security – all the stuff that we had been fighting for and defending. It's no surprise that our core vote in so many places is now around 2 per cent.

So what to do? Yes, we are in an existential crisis. The recent general election in England was no worse than 2015. Scotland, surprisingly, saved the day just a bit. So yes, given the position we are in, the party needs to do everything possible to win (next time, whenever it is) the seats we now

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And second, we need to go back to the kind of policy-making that leads people to understand why we are all capital L Liberals. We need to work out from first principles some of the enormous issues of the day, not just for this country but for the whole world.

hold and the shockingly small number that can still be regarded as targets. But this is short-term survival. Medium-term survival and longer-term success requires two things.

First it needs a massive rekindling of the campaigning zeitgeist within the party, of the instinctive culture that if something is needed, something needs saving, something is wrong, you go out and campaign for it. Since the Three Cs of the late 1970s, the world has changed in many ways, and the means of campaigning and communicating have expanded. (I say expanded not changed.) Focus leaflets are still crucial. But so is Facebook. And so, even more now, is going out and meeting people face to face, in real life. Plenty of people still campaign in their local areas, or even more widely. But taking the party as a whole, the culture has gone. We need it back. If Momentum and the Labour Party can do it, how much better can we.

And second, we need to go back to the kind of policy-making that leads people to understand why we are all capital L Liberals. We need to work out from first principles some of the enormous issues of the day, not just for this country but for the whole world. Inequality. A world economy run by multinational corporate companies bigger than many states, and with no allegiance to any. Control of the modern means of communication by GAFA [Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon] and their associates, paying hardly any taxes and ever more controlling our lives. Climate change and all the linked problems such as food, migration and water supply. Public services and the way we are allowing them to atrophy in the great name of Austerity. The fragmentation of work – as it affects people now and through people's lives – and how to apply the old Viv Bingham Liberal policies of cooperation, mutualisation, co-ownership, co-partnership between workers and shareholders in this modern world. Robotisation of work – and everything else we do? The re-establishment of a community politics that is about Liberalism and Liberal values, not just populist local campaigning.

And – meanwhile – how the hell do we stop the Tories dragging us out of Europe and turning this country into a race-to-the-bottom Brave New World kleptocracy of the richest 1 per cent who are now reported to own half the wealth of the world?

Postscript, June 2019

Almost two years later, little has changed and the last sentence is still (as I write) unresolved. The tasks to be faced remain, though some such as the global reach and power of the GAFA-type corporations seem even greater, and the changing climate is not only increasingly seen as a crisis or emergency but one that encompasses the whole of global life and its environment and systems. Meanwhile the British democratic and political structures and our assumptions of how they operate are under a level of stress that even two years ago would have seemed unlikely – and surely this is an area where Liberal Democrats have much to contribute. Unexpected short-term political events have suddenly thrust us back into the centre stage. Let's not waste this opportunity.

Tony Greaves joined the Liberal Party in 1961. He chaired the Union of Liberal Students in 1965 and the Young Liberals in 1970. He was elected as a councillor in Pendle in 1971 and has served on councils for all but six years since then. Organising Secretary of the Association of Liberal Councillors 1977–85, then ran the Liberal Party's publishing operation up to 1990. He was a member of the Liberal team that negotiated the merger with the SDP in 1987/88 (and co-wrote Merger: The Inside Story *with Rachael Pitchford). He was appointed to the House of Lords as Baron Greaves in 2000.*

Reports

Gladstone's First Government 1868–74

Meeting following the AGM, 28 January 2019, with Professor Jon Parry and Dr David Brooks; chair Tony Little

Report by **Tony Little**

Describing Gladstone's first ministry as one of the great reforming progressive governments standing comparison with the Whig ministries of the 1830s, the Liberal government of 1906 and the Atlee Labour government, David Brooks went on to suggest that such progressive governments faced two key problems – sustaining the momentum of their reforms and managing the expectations of their supporters. He argued that progressive governments have been shadowed by two important elements – money and religion. This applied in spades to Gladstone's administration, as he outlined by taking the audience through its major achievements, particularly his Irish reforms which represented both his most notable accomplishments and his nemesis.

Sustaining momentum and managing expectations

The priority given to the disestablishment of the Irish Church derived from a combination of internal Liberal divisions, which Gladstone needed to heal, and the 'mission to pacify' Ireland after a series of violent Fenian outrages. The Liberal Party had been split by Disraeli's tactics in securing the passage of the Second Reform Act, while the Conservatives remained united despite disagreement over Disraeli's objectives. Whigs were suspicious of Gladstone, whose background had been as a disciple of Peel, and who, they felt, was too intensely religious. The Fenians had recently caused two explosions on the British mainland and had attempted an invasion of Canada using Irish US civil war veterans. Security measures against the Fenians required compensating action to remove Irish grievances.

Disestablishment met all of these objectives. It reunited the party, enabling Gladstone to win the 1868 election with majorities in all four constituent parts of the United Kingdom, the only time this was achieved. Taking power from the Church of Ireland pleased both the Liberal-voting Nonconformist Radicals, who anticipated similar action in England and Wales, and the Erastian Whigs who preferred a more modest role for a Church long associated with the Tories, and involved no cost to the taxpayer. Indeed the accompanying abolition of the grant to the Catholic Maynooth Seminary saved money. Disestablishment was tailored to Gladstone's strengths as a master of ecclesiastical detail and finance.

The accompanying disendowment of the Irish Church began Irish disenchantment with Gladstone. The funds from the church could have been used for a social transformation or for land purchase to assist the broad mass of the Irish people, but this was not Gladstone's way. He believed it would have set class against class and encouraged dependence on the state. Instead a charitable fund was created assisting the deaf, dumb and blind: worthy objectives, but disappointing against the expectations that had been aroused. In turn the disenchantment led to the creation of the Home Rule Party, which drew initial support from both Catholics and Protestants.

Similarly, the follow-up Irish Land Reform Act of 1870, while giving some security for tenants and providing compensation for improvements, disappointed by not conceding the 3Fs – Freedom of Sale, Fair Rents and Fixity of Tenure – which Gladstone conceded under duress in 1881. Although Gladstone had won 65 of the 105 Irish seats in 1868, the Home Rulers began to beat Liberals in subsequent by-elections. By-elections were also going against the Liberals in Britain. Gladstone, who was fascinated by psephology, noted the way in which these contests, for the first time, had become a bellwether of government popularity.

A Liberal measure by illiberal means

Dr Brooks suggested that the 1870 Education Act disappointed British expectations particularly among Nonconformists, who felt that Gladstone should have loosened the Anglican hold over primary education. Rather, Gladstone greatly expanded education by creating non-religious schools, where no religious school existed, but allowed Anglicans to remain entrenched, particularly in rural areas.

Even after the government had been in office for some years, Gladstone remained energetic and restless, but this ceaseless activity created a reaction and an unease about Gladstone's style – he had a tendency to be arbitrary and dictatorial. Dr Brooks illustrated this with the Army Act, an important piece of legislation from 1871, which gave Britain a professional army and did away with the purchase of promotion. But to pass this bill Gladstone had to battle the House of Lords and utilised the power of the Crown to sidestep the obstruction. Eliminating purchase of commissions by a royal warrant was seen as authoritarian – a Liberal measure by illiberal means.

Gladstone's third Irish reform, the University Bill of 1873, never became law. He tried to appease Catholic opinion, by providing for the first time non-denominational universities which they could attend. But Catholics wanted money spent on a university of their own and Gladstone opposed expenditure. Rather, he offered a drastically reorganised curriculum banning certain subjects, including history, as too controversial in religiously mixed institutions. This illiberal approach was opposed by the left wing in his own party and the bill failed. This lost the Catholic vote and Ireland would never be electorally Liberal again. Gladstone tried to bounce back with a snap general election in early 1874. But as Mrs May discovered, snap general elections are not always a good idea. Disraeli, who didn't often score heavily off Gladstone, suggested that Gladstone's promise to repeal the income tax, paid by only the richest 10 per cent of earners, had not been thought through. What would fill the gap in the public finance, a tax on the poor? Disraeli implied that this effort to shore up Gladstone's authority was a 'bit French' – a bit like a referendum, a tactic employed by Louis Napoleon. After the electoral defeat Gladstone gave up the

Liberal leadership, and, as he thought, his political career, but there was of course a rebound at the end of the decade.

Defending the liberty of the people?

Jonathan Parry set his remarks in the context of three concepts which are of current interest and which were of interest to Gladstone: the rights of parliament, laissez faire and internationalism. Gladstone respected and defended these ideas but their relationship to his first government is more complex and qualified than many have believed.

Upholding the rights of the Commons was seen by Victorian politicians as defending the liberty and property of the people. Gladstone took it seriously. Like Lord Palmerston before him, he sat listening on the front bench eight hours a day, four days a week to show that he was attuned to the opinions of MPs. But the more important factor in his approach was the boldness with which he filled the parliamentary agenda with government rather than back bench business: Irish Church, Irish land, education, secret ballot, licensing reforms etc. This was fundamental to the nature of the government and its initial success but fundamental also to its eventual failure. It represented a break with the style of the previous leader, Palmerston.

In 1856 Gladstone had published an article on the 'declining efficiency of parliament' criticising the lack of legislative purpose of both Palmerston and the minority Conservative governments of the 1850s. Their failure to use power allowed social tensions to fester and the ruling class needed to demonstrate to the expanded electorate that they 'were working for them'. Gladstone also believed that passing lots of legislation would prevent MPs from doing mischief, from making the Commons factious, contentious and difficult to control. His belief in a strong executive was part of his Peelite inheritance. Palmerston had been more relaxed, happy to accept defeats in the House and, like Theresa May, happy to make deals with this group or that to muddle through; a stance that did Palmerston's reputation no harm, he died a national hero.

Nevertheless, Gladstone was not seeking to impose his own ideology but rather to harness the pressures for a variety of reforms from different groups. For example, the education reforms derived from a backlog of three different Royal Commissions which Palmerston had ignored. Similarly he responded to lobbying from backbenchers such as Jacob Bright on women's municipal franchise and Tom Hughes on trade union rights. Gladstone's approach shadowed the 1830s Liberal government, which had been active in the abolition of slavery, the new poor law, Irish church reform, police and prison legislation after the 1832 extension of the franchise as Gladstone's government followed the Reform Act of 1867. Meeting the needs of the new electorate legitimated the enhanced legislative activity against the naturally obstructive culture of parliament.

Echoing David Brooks, Professor Parry argued that the energy that delivered these great reforms was also the key to its failure. The government lost control of the Commons in 1871 and never really recovered, it exhausted its own backbenchers and public opinion as was evidenced by the by-election losses and Disraeli's jibe about the government as exhausted volcanos. Questions were posed about the government's mandate. In the election Gladstone had spoken only about the Irish Church and economy of government spending. Irish university reform had been opposed by most Irish MPs; Abolition of Purchase had been opposed by most army MPs; trade union reform alienated both supporters and opponents of trade unions, while licensing legislation was opposed by supporters and opponents of temperance; Radicals were upset by the strengthening of state interventionism. These are the roots of the reaction and defeat in 1874

Was there a Gladstonian ideology in economic policy?

If there was not an overarching Gladstonian ideology, was there a dogma of laissez faire – tax cuts and retrenchment in government spending (later called neo-liberalism)? Gladstone was strongly concerned with economy in government spending and he did cut income tax to 2d in the pound. But this was a political rather than an economic strategy. He attacked powerful but minority, often Conservative, lobby groups such as the military establishment promoting higher defence expenditure, to prove that the state provided a level playing field. He used the power of the state to demonstrate its disinterestedness. Famously Gladstone ascribed his 1874 defeat to the torrent of 'gin and beer' used to promote the vested interest of the brewers against Gladstone's Licensing Act. His policy was a continuation of the Radical condemnation of what was called Old Corruption and a case can be made that his government was the culmination of a movement, going back to the 1780s, to cleanse the state of corrupt patronage. The focus on Ireland may be perceived as securing fairness and equality in religion by removing state funding from both Catholic and Protestant churches.

As an economic doctrine, laissez faire always had supporters in the Liberal Party, such as Robert Lowe and George Goschen. However, they were not typical Liberals, as both were anti-democratic, fearing that the people could not be trusted. Professor Parry argued that a misunderstanding of nineteenth-century laissez- faire may be contributing to today's Conservative Party problems following its adoption of neo-liberalism.

Liberals saw no clash between internationalism and nationalism

Professor Parry went on to explore some of the complexities of Gladstone's position as an internationalist. Most Liberals saw no clash between internationalism and nationalism. Their patriotic Liberalism was inherently internationalist, viewing Britain as a virtuous power for which peace reinforced its economic lead, sustaining the margin in naval forces which allowed it to exercise benevolent domination. This he illustrated by relations with the US, where Britain maintained friendly relations, did not wish to station a fleet in its vicinity and had a record of resolving border disputes, such as over Canada, by conversations between two governments that believed in the rule of law. The US Civil War period was exceptional, and saw the Gladstone government's innovative acceptance of international adjudication to resolve the *Alabama* dispute. Britain compensated the US for the damage to Union shipping caused by the British-built Confederate vessel *Alabama*. However Gladstone saw arbitration as a 'one off' and believed international law was incapable of resolving most international disputes.

Britain's diplomatic difficulties were with Russia, Germany and Austria, which opposed the British world vision. Actions by these nations challenged the optimistic British outlook and provoked

a negative reaction at home. This challenge was evident in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. The defeat of France and rise of Germany created a panic over British military preparedness and destroyed Gladstone's budget plans. The reason he called the 1874 election was to circumvent the demands of the defence ministers for higher expenditure but public opinion had moved against him. The war was followed by the raising of tariffs on the Continent undermining free trade and the Eastern Crisis, which further polarised public thinking. The right-wing press exploited the development of a consciously anti-Gladstonian feeling, backing the military demands and accusing Gladstone of lacking patriotism. This beginning of a new attitude to empire and its expansion is what makes Gladstone look unusual as an internationalist.

An early question from the audience asked about the attitude of Gladstone's government to the Franco-Prussian war. Professor Parry responded that the government was anxious to be neutral and it would be hard to see which side they could have taken. The prime British objectives were to preserve Belgian neutrality and to arbitrate between the two powers, though this was declined.

The Great Energiser

Other questions ranged between aspects of the first government not developed in the speeches, electoral issues and Gladstone's personality.

Asked why Gladstone failed to secure re-election at the end of his periods as premier, the speakers pointed out that this was not unusual in the Victorian period, rather that Palmerston's 1865 victory was exceptional. David Brooks added that Disraeli was wise in not taking office in 1873 after the defeat of the Irish University Bill, as he would have needed to propose a programme for government and given the Liberals a chance to recover. Instead, at the 1874 election he needed only to attack Gladstone's failings to win.

In response to a question about the lack of welfare reforms, it was argued that Gladstone believed more in individual responsibility and the role of charity rather than public expenditure. Indeed Conservatives were earlier than Liberals in taking up housing policy. Paraphrasing Gladstone's words, David Brooks suggested that he believed the Conservatives were 'all socialists at heart'. Most welfare was provided through the Poor Law operating at a local level, which Gladstone supported. Despite its poor reputation, the Poor Law was the nursery of the welfare state. Jon Parry added that education was the exception promoted by Gladstone despite the controversy aroused among Liberals suspicious of state interference in most areas.

Asked if Gladstone changed his mind in a 'constructivist' direction by endorsing the Newcastle Programme in 1892, David Brooks suggested that the programme was less collectivist than might be thought. There were around twenty-five proposals with home rule very much at the top followed by Welsh Church disestablishment. What it did not contain was old-age pensions, which Joe Chamberlain proposed the same year in alliance with the Conservatives. Nevertheless Gladstone's final government did restrict the hours of railway workers. Jon Parry added that Gladstone, reflecting on the problems of the 1868–74 government, was determined to avoid the destructive effects of factionalism within Liberalism. He focused on the single-issue crusade, as defined by himself, such as Bulgaria or home rule and resisted the tendency among Liberal MPs to promote competing social interests.

Jon Parry believed that the adoption of the secret ballot was not consequent on the example of other nations but a response to the expansion of the electorate. It became a key Radical demand in the 1830s in reaction to the pressure put on electors by landlords and employers, and a consensus developed after 1867 when the Radicals were joined by the Right who feared pressure on workers from organised trade unions.

Asked how essential Gladstone was to the government, David Brooks mused about whether one of the Whigs, Clarendon (died in 1870), Granville (too emollient) or Hartington (too laid back), might have stepped up to the position, without convincing himself, before concluding that Gladstone was the government's great energiser who dominated the House of Commons. Jon Parry added that it would be difficult to imagine anyone else leading while Gladstone was around. He was obsessed, in a positive way, with the process of government, fascinated by drafting, shaping and driving legislation through parliament. His very hands-on style reflected his religious belief that he had to account before God for every hour and therefore that parliament had to account for every hour, a style that others found completely exhausting.

Tony Little *is chair of the Liberal Democrat History Group and guest-edited the special issue of the* Journal *marking the 150th anniversary of Gladstone's first government. He was joint editor and contributor to the History Group's* British Liberal Leaders*, published in 2015.*

Reviews

Liberal lives

Trevor Smith, *Workhouse to Westminster* (Caper Press, 2018)
Review by **Seth Alexander Thévoz**

Trevor Smith has written an exceptionally enjoyable memoir, which may suffer from the lack of any obvious single audience. This should be a tribute to the man; and particularly, to the range of worlds his life has stridden, as a political scientist, as head of one of the largest political funding bodies in British history, as head of the University of Ulster, and latterly as a member of the House of Lords. I fear that this means that the book is doomed to be 'raided' by future scholars looking for pithy quips focused on just one of



Smith's lives, while all too easily overlooking the others. That is a pity, because the patient reader is rewarded with a rollickingly indiscreet, well-observed, self-mocking autobiography.

Most political memoirs have an eminently skippable set of opening 'childhood' chapters, full of mawkish sentimentality. Smith eschews this approach, and instead gives us a rather riveting social history of London, with his early life from Hanwell to Fitzrovia serving as an introduction to this, and setting up some intriguing arguments on geography and power – themes which recur throughout the book.

Having been active in 1950s Union of Liberal Students politics when the party was barely past its nadir, and having stood for election in 1959, Smith largely abandoned electoral politics thereafter, in favour of exercising Liberal ideas in other spheres. This was a decade before 'community politics' gained traction, but Smith chose to pursue outlets that weren't rooted in just one physical place. There has yet to be a really good account of how a range of active Liberals did this in the Liberal Party's gloomiest years, for instance finding print and broadcast media as well as academia as outlets for Liberal ideas – and the life Smith presents here is an example of this. As a political scientist analysing corporate and political power, and later, as vice-chancellor of the University of Ulster, he was able to put Liberal ideas into practice, proving that one did not need to have held ministerial seals of office to get things done. In the latter case, the book argues that far from being the 'backwater' appointment that many of his fellow academics regarded it as, the post was unique in giving him 'top table' influence in the Northern Ireland peace process of the 1990s – something no other vice-chancellorship would have done.

His time at the Joseph Rowntree Social Services Trust is of particular interest. It (and its rebranded successor, the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust) has long been seen as a Lib Dem 'sugar daddy', but this was far from being the case when Smith took over as chair, and the book tantalisingly touches on some of the fascinating politics *behind* funding British politics. He was also instrumental in funding the first 'Chocolate Soldiers' (researchers for opposition MPs) in the early 1970s, a flurry of constitutional reform initiatives such as Charter 88 in the 1980s, and a string of progressive causes abroad, such as Zimbabwean opposition groups. Once Mugabe turned into a despot in office, the Trust (which had supported him) transferred its support to the Movement for Democratic Change.

Readers will also be surprised by some of the book's pithy judgements on Liberal leaders, several of which challenge conventional wisdom – the widely lauded Jo Grimond, for instance, emerges as a dilettante snob, closer to David Cameron than to John Stuart Mill. Smith is particularly scathing about Jeremy Thorpe, and the book is worth reading alone for the light it sheds on the Thorpe scandal, and the hitherto untold role of how the Rowntree Trusts were involved in persuading former Liberal MP Peter Bessell to testify against his former parliamentary colleague.

Throughout the book, Smith's impish and often risqué sense of humour is evident – from his description of Tim Farron as 'The Lib Dems' answer to Cliff Richard', to a distinctly X-rated anecdote about the choice of lubricants in Northern Ireland, which had me roaring with laughter.

The reader leaves this book realising that Trevor Smith was, in the eighties and nineties, probably one of the most powerful people you'd never heard of. Such an anonymous exercising of power rarely lends itself to the public good, and such people are usually notoriously publicity shy. We are therefore all the richer for this impressive, illuminating and amusing memoir.

Dr Seth Alexander Thévoz is an Associate Member of Nuffield College, Oxford, and Honorary Librarian at the National Liberal Club, London. His book, Club Government: How the Early Victorian World Was Ruled from London Clubs *was published by I.B. Tauris in 2018.*

Restoring Herbert Gladstone

Kenneth D. Brown, *The Unknown Gladstone: The Life of Herbert Gladstone, 1854–1930* (I.B.Tauris, 2018)

Review by **Roger Swift**

Herbert Gladstone, the youngest son of the eminent Victorian prime minister, William Ewart Gladstone, remains one of the forgotten men of the late-Victorian and Edwardian political world, despite a productive career in the Liberal Party within which he exercised considerable political influence on the question of Irish home rule, served as a most effective chief whip in helping to secure the great Liberal victory of 1906, attained cabinet office under Campbell Bannerman and Asquith as home secretary, and became the first governor general of the Union of South Africa. Yet Herbert Gladstone has defied serious biographical study, the exception being Sir Charles Mallet's modest work of 1932, *Herbert Gladstone: A Memoir*, and his achievements have been largely understated in the historiography of the Liberal Party, not least because throughout his life he lived in the shadow of his illustrious father, with whom he shared an intense emotional and psychological empathy. In this excellent and much-needed biography, Professor Kenneth Brown seeks to rescue Herbert Gladstone from obscurity



and restore him to his rightful place in the history of the Liberal Party.

The various chapters examine Herbert's journey from Hawarden to Westminster; his personal experience of the Irish question; his years in the wilderness as an opposition MP; his development as a Liberal chief whip; his years as home secretary; his experiences as governor general of South Africa; and his later work within the Liberal Party, largely behind the scenes, until his death in 1930. This is followed by a short but succinct epilogue, which provides an effective conclusion to the biography. This said, the underlying theme that runs throughout the book is Herbert Gladstone's consistent loyalty throughout his career to his father's principles and his desire to protect the name, principles and achievements of William Gladstone.

Educated at Eton and University College, Oxford, where he received a first-class degree in History, Gladstone obtained a lectureship at Keble College, due largely to family connections. His initial interest in politics was provoked by the Bulgarian atrocities of 1876 and his father's staunch defence of the rights of minorities, whose cause Herbert was to champion throughout his life. In 1880 he was returned as the Liberal MP for Leeds (the seat having been previously won and then vacated by William Gladstone in favour of Midlothian) and, in 1885, for Leeds West, subsequently serving the constituency until he was raised to the peerage as Viscount Gladstone in 1910.

In 1881, during his second administration, and despite warnings from his cabinet colleagues that he could be open to charges of nepotism, William Gladstone appointed Herbert a Civil Lord of the Admiralty, or junior whip, and later in the year he accompanied W. E. Forster, the Irish secretary, to Ireland. While he deplored the violence of the Land League, Herbert concluded that the Irish people were deserving of self-government on both moral and practical grounds and that the root of the Irish problem lay in English autocracy and the culpability of the landlords. Indeed, Professor Brown argues not only that Herbert Gladstone's views on the principle of home rule were at this stage both independent of, and more advanced than those of his father but also that, in flying the 'Hawarden Kite' in December 1885, Herbert was acting entirely of his own volition rather than as a mere cipher for his father, who he regarded as the only Liberal with sufficient political clout to deliver home rule. Herbert's subsequent appointment by his father as financial secretary to the Treasury during William Gladstone's short-lived third ministry was in some respects a recognition of the value placed by Gladstone on his son's important role as a link between himself, the Irish and Liberals in both the country and parliament.

With the failure of the first Home Rule Bill and the formation of Salisbury's second Tory ministry, Herbert Gladstone was one of the leading critics in parliament of both Balfour's Irish policy and Joseph Chamberlain and the Liberal Unionists, whom he described as 'illiberal disunionists', and his growing reputation within the Liberal Party was subsequently reflected in his appointment in 1892 as under-secretary for the Home Office under Herbert Henry Asquith during Gladstone's fourth ministry. Here, he conducted important work behind the scenes in the preparation of the Building Societies Act, the Employer's Liability Act and the Factory Acts, and in the amelioration of the harsh prison conditions promoted by the reactionary Du Cane regime. In 1894, after his father's resignation following the defeat of the third Home Rule Bill, Herbert Gladstone was promoted to cabinet rank by Lord Rosebery as First Commissioner of the Board of Works, a post he held until the fall of the government in 1895.

Following William Gladstone's death in 1898, Herbert Gladstone was preoccupied with family matters but in 1899 he accepted the post of chief whip offered by Campbell-Bannerman, who was anxious to appoint someone whose politics were, like his own, faithful to William Gladstone's, and with whom he developed a strong working relationship. This was a difficult task, given the deep divisions and personal rivalries within the Liberal Party, not least during the Boer War, and given a dysfunctional party machine. Nevertheless, as Professor Brown shows, Herbert Gladstone achieved considerable success in meeting these challenges, and the Liberal landslide of 1905 owed much to his reorganisation of the party machine by finding and placing suitable candidates in every seat and raising the necessary finances to support them. Most notably, he also negotiated a pact with the Labour Representation Committee in 1903, which ensured that Liberal and Labour candidates did not split the vote in two-member constituencies.

Appointed home secretary in the new Liberal administration, Gladstone inherited a large department with a wide remit which generated a huge workload; yet he was able to sponsor significant legal reforms in 1906–7, including the further amelioration of prison conditions, the promotion of the Borstal idea for adolescent offenders, the foundation of the probation system, and the establishment of the Court of Appeal. Other measures he promoted, with the able assistance of his under-secretary, Herbert Samuel, included the Workmen's Compensation Act (1906), the Deceased Wife's Sister's Marriage Act (1907), the Advertisements Regulation Act (1907), the Factory and Workshops Act (1907) and the Coal Mines (Eight Hours) Act (1908). In implementing the Aliens Act, introduced by the Conservatives in 1905, Gladstone sought to humanise the measure by giving the Home Office greater discretion over migrants fleeing from religious or political persecution, despite claims from the Tory gutter press that he was being too soft on French anarchists, Russian Jews and German gypsies. By contrast, however, Professor Brown shows that Gladstone found difficulty in addressing the challenge to public order presented by the activities of the Women's Social and Political Union. Whilst disapproving of WSPU disorders, Gladstone supported the enfranchisement of women, unlike the prime minister, Herbert Asquith, and most of his cabinet colleagues who disapproved (as indeed did King Edward VII) of his

attempts to meliorate the treatment of suffragettes in prison, including forcible feeding (which he sanctioned with great reluctance). Nevertheless, by 1909 Gladstone had shown himself to be a quietly effective minister and a force for unity within the Liberal Party and, when the 1910 inauguration date for the recently formed Union of South Africa was announced, Asquith regarded Gladstone, with a proven ability to bring together individuals of differing outlooks and abilities, as the best candidate to serve as the inaugural governor general of South Africa and high commissioner of the adjacent British protectorates, a decision which Edward VII sanctioned, albeit reluctantly. Gladstone was duly raised to the peerage as Viscount Gladstone of the County of Lanark.

During his four years in South Africa, Gladstone faced major challenges. These included the tensions arising from Indian immigration and settlement, not least during Mohandas Ghandi's campaign of passive resistance in 1912, and reports of police ill-treatment of striking Indian workers in Natal and Transvaal, which Herbert sought to diffuse by decisively forcing a full commission of inquiry. He also sanctioned the deployment of Imperial troops to police the disorders associated with the strikes on the Rand in the summer of 1913 (although he had some sympathy with the strikers' cause) and his actions were vindicated both within the British parliament and by the official Witwatersrand Disturbances Report. Indeed, Professor Brown refutes the charge that Gladstone's governor-generalship paved the way for apartheid in South Africa by showing that in avoiding open racial conflict, in assisting the development of an infrastructure for future social and economic development, and in maintaining the Union within the sphere of British influence, Gladstone played a pivotal role in the development of the new Union. This was acknowledged by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts (who both wished him to continue beyond 1914) and who admired his tact, wisdom and impartiality.

Throughout the First World War, Gladstone played a leading role within the War Refugees Committee and contributed to several charitable and philanthropic initiatives. He regarded Lloyd George's accession to the premiership in 1916 as more the product of Asquith's inadequacies rather than Lloyd George's ambitions but his antipathy towards the latter (whom he described as 'The Welsh Goat'), especially after the Coupon Election and the return of the Liberal–Unionist coalition government, rested largely on Lloyd George's policies and behaviour, including the shameless use of the honours system, which he regarded as the antithesis of William Ewart Gladstone's principles and integrity. This antipathy was mutual, Lloyd George describing Herbert as 'a man without adequate gifts … the best living embodiment of the Liberal doctrine that quality is not hereditary'.

Herbert Gladstone held that Liberalism needed to be revitalised from within during the post-war years and agreed to oversee the organisation of the Independent Liberal Party but his efforts were hampered by party disagreements over the leadership, the development of a distinct policy framework, and the replenishing of party funds. As Professor Brown shows, the fall of Lloyd George in 1922 posed further problems, for while most rank and file Liberals hoped for a reunited party and compromises between Lloyd George's National Liberals (who were well-financed) and the ILP, this proved difficult to achieve and, under Asquith's leadership, the Liberals were annihilated at the 1924 general election, securing only forty-three seats. This left Lloyd George, still Liberalism's most dynamic and charismatic politician, in the party's driving seat. Deflated by these developments, Herbert Gladstone's efforts were largely directed towards containing Lloyd George's influence within Liberalism by highlighting the contrast between the characters of its most eminent leader (William Gladstone) and the most plausible claimant to his succession (Lloyd George) and by protecting and sustaining his father's legacy. Indeed, Professor Brown argues that during his final years Herbert Gladstone's concept of Liberalism, which was essentially Victorian, was increasingly out of step with the international and domestic challenges arising in the post-First World War world.

This is a fine book, characterised by meticulous and wide-ranging research, which presents a sympathetic yet critical biography in which Herbert Gladstone emerges as a Christian gentleman, a modest, unassuming and compassionate man who never sought office for its own sake but as a matter of public duty and one who remained loyal to his father's principles throughout his life. He was also intensely devoted to his parents, siblings and wife (Dolly Paget, twenty years his junior, whom he married late in life in 1901) and loyal to his political friends, especially Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith. Unlike the 'Grand Old Man', however, Herbert was socially gregarious, with a wide circle of friends and a range of interests, including cricket, tennis, golf, music, field sports and country life in general. Again, unlike his father, he was not an intellectual and his parliamentary performances – he was a good speaker but never a great orator – and reserved manner in cabinet meetings were indicative of self-doubt and a certain lack of confidence. Yet, he was an efficient administrator who achieved much, often working at his best quietly in the background. Professor Brown is to be congratulated for his efforts in restoring Herbert Gladstone to his rightful place in the historiography of the Liberal Party.

Roger Swift is Emeritus Professor of Victorian Studies at the University of Chester and a Fellow of Gladstone's Library. His latest work is Charles Pelham Villiers: Aristocratic Victorian Radical *(Routledge, 2017).*

Aristocratic Radical

Roger Swift, *Charles Pelham Villiers: Aristocratic Victorian Radical* (Routledge, 2017)

Review by **Ian Cawood**

Roger Swift's biography of Charles Pelham Villiers is the first modern study of the man who still holds the record for the longest unbroken period as an MP for a constituency. Villiers was elected to parliament for the constituency of Wolverhampton in 1835 in the aftermath of the Reform



crisis and remained one of the town's MPs for sixty-three years until his death in 1898 amidst the height of Imperial expansion. A radical in his early days, he played a significant role in the Anti-Corn Law League. Anthony Howe describes him as 'the most single-minded opponent of the Corn Laws in Parliament' – though his aristocratic connections at Westminster were probably as significant a contribution to the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 – however his role has been overshadowed by that of Richard Cobden and John Bright. His political career was undistinguished thereafter, but he supported the extension of the franchise in 1867 and the introduction of the secret ballot in 1872. He also became a symbol for Wolverhampton's ongoing independent identity and so was commemorated by a 3.5 metre tall marble statue, which now stands in the city's West Park. Although Villiers failed to attend the statue's unveiling in 1879 and never set foot in the city in the last twenty years of his life, Swift convincingly explains that his connections with Wolverhampton were still strong. He split with Gladstone over the issue of Irish home rule in 1886, as he considered the potential break-up of the United Kingdom to be as serious as the Confederacy which caused the US Civil War. Villiers ended his life and career as a Liberal Unionist, but with no great regard for either Lord Hartington or Joseph Chamberlain which, in light of how they treated those who had sacrificed office for their principles, probably supports Queen Victoria's description of him in her diary as 'a very clever man'.

The book is a fascinating account of the development of Victorian political Liberalism, from the harsh political economy of the Poor Law Amendment Act (for the preparation of which Villiers acted as an assistant commissioner), through the triumphant achievement of Free Trade and the defeat of Chartism, to the meritocratic reforms of the Gladstone ministries and finally to the argument over which faction, Liberal Unionist or 'separatist' Liberal, embodied the party's true heritage. The only real problem with Swift's otherwise excellent book is his rather poorly drawn definition of contemporary political philosophy. He lists 'democracy' as one of the 'essential causes of nineteenth century liberalism' (p. 229), when, as he must surely know, the term was largely avoided by the Gladstonian Liberals as it denoted the menace of an uneducated electorate, susceptible to bribery, intimidation and careless political choices. If any party was the advocate of democracy in the 1890s, it was the Conservative Party, which was flirting with the idea of extending the franchise to women as well as working-class men by this point in history. If the Liberals listened to any form of mass support, it took the form of 'public opinion' frequently invoked by Gladstone and his party, which, as James Thompson has recently demonstrated, was in fact *middle-class* opinion as marshalled and directed by powerful newspaper editors, such as W. T. Stead at the *Pall Mall Gazette*. Roland Quinault has shown in his 2011 study of British prime ministers' relationship with the concept of democracy that Gladstone's objective in introducing a Reform Bill in 1866 and then passing a Reform Act in 1884, was to create a system of popular consent, not universal suffrage. As a result of these measures the male head of the household was now able to represent the other members of his household in the same fashion that parliament represented the regions and interests of the nation. This could only be described as 'democratic' in the vaguest sense of the word.

Chapter 8 is a detailed account of the home rule debate in 1886 and, in many ways, it is representative of the strengths and weaknesses of the whole book. Although it contains the most accurate, succinct and precise summary of the causes of the Home Rule crisis yet published and it explores the thoroughly *liberal* reasons for which the 'dissentient' Liberal Unionist MPs opposed it, it loses its focus as the chapter progresses. Villiers was absent for the climactic parliamentary vote which defeated Gladstone's Irish Government Bill on 8 June 1886 but he chose to join the nascent Liberal Unionist party, established after Gladstone refused to retire, and was then subjected to an intense local smear campaign led by the *Express and Star* newspaper, funded by Andrew Carnegie. The fascinating archival material justifies the inclusion of what is a fairly minor affair in Villiers career, but not the detail in which the chapter describes the ultimate fruitless attempt to unseat Villiers between 1886 and 1892. Ten pages are devoted to this incident, while the significance of the local Liberal icon's support for the new political party in the same period (an issue that I myself ignored in favour of greater attention to John Bright's similar role in my own study of the period) is barely acknowledged. Although he cites Jon Lawrence's pioneering study of the politics of the town in this period, he does not challenge some of Lawrence's less convincing interpretations which Villiers' career should have enabled him to contest. One wishes, for example, that Swift had recognised that, as Villiers failed to speak and rarely voted in this period, his local career after 1886 is largely of interest for the evidence it provides of a political crisis of liberalism, with its greatest energy directed towards the rival wings of the party, instead of towards the rising challenge of the Labour movement.

This is, nevertheless, a vital text for anyone interested in or studying Victorian liberalism. Any slight faults in its delineation of political Liberalism arise from the contradictory and evolving nature of that ideology as the nineteenth century wore on. It may sometimes detour into less engaging material, but it sheds a light on a career that has been shamefully neglected by modern historians and Professor Swift's achievement in reconstructing such an epic life story with such a rigorous attention to archival detail ought to be applauded unconditionally.

Dr Ian Cawood is Reviews Editor of the Journal of Liberal History *and Reader in Modern History and Head of History at Newman University in Birmingham. His books include* The Liberal Unionist Party, 1886–1912: A History *(I.B. Tauris, 2012).*

Whig, Liberal or Tory?

Simon Kerry, *Lansdowne: the Last Great Whig* (Unicorn, 2017)

Review by **Iain Sharpe**

Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, Fifth Marquess of Lansdowne, was born into a distinguished Whig family. His great-grandfather, the second Earl of Shelburne and first Marquess of Lansdowne, was prime minister in 1783, leading the administration that negotiated peace with the United States after the American War of Independence. His grandfather served in successive Whig and Liberal governments, including the great reforming administrations of Grey and Melbourne during the 1830s. He might have become prime minister; both men offered to stand aside in his favour. His father, too, was a Liberal politician, serving as Lord Palmerston's under-secretary at the Foreign Office.

So a career in Whig and Liberal politics was virtually a hereditary duty. He became a Marquess and a member of the House of Lords at the age of 21, following his father's sudden death in 1866, while still a student at Balliol. Political advancement came early: in 1868 he became a junior whip in Gladstone's first administration and in 1870 was appointed under-secretary at the War Office under Edward Cardwell.

Yet Lansdowne's long-term future was to be outside the Gladstonian Liberal Party. He was one of many moderate Liberals who became Liberal Unionists in wake of the Grand Old Man's decision to support Irish home rule in 1886. Yet even before the home rule schism, his disillusionment with the Liberal Party was apparent. Although in 1880 he was appointed under-secretary of state for India in Gladstone's second administration, he resigned within two months over the government's proposed Irish land reform legislation which he, as an Irish landowner, considered an unacceptable attack on property rights.



Although he became a vocal critic of the Liberal government, this worked in his favour. Possibly in order to get a prominent Liberal critic out of the way, Gladstone appointed him governor general of Canada in 1883. After five years in Canada, he was appointed by Unionist Prime Minister Lord Salisbury as viceroy of India, perhaps as a way of wooing the Liberal Unionists. He returned to Britain and thus to frontline politics at the end of 1894. When the Liberal Unionists entered coalition with the Conservatives in July 1895, he was appointed war secretary. Although he was criticised for the lack of military preparation for the Boer War, which broke out in 1899, this did not stop him being promoted to foreign secretary after the Unionist landslide at the 'khaki' election of 1900.

As foreign secretary, he negotiated an alliance with Japan in 1902, and more famously the entente cordiale with France in 1904, bringing to an end a long period of imperial tension between the two countries, and of course Britain's period of so-called 'splendid isolation'. Lansdowne's foreign policy received bipartisan support, with the Liberal government that took office in 1905 stressing its commitment to continuing his diplomatic approach. By contrast, as leader of the Unionist opposition in the House of Lords Lansdowne's role was strongly partisan. He led the overwhelming Unionist majority in the upper house in thwarting Liberal legislation, ultimately rejecting the 'People's Budget' of 1909, a decision which ultimately backfired as it triggered the constitutional crisis which was resolved by the Liberals' 1911 Parliament Act that curtailed the powers of the House of Lords.

The episode for which Lansdowne is best remembered today, however, arose not during his time in high office nor as an opposition leader, but after he had retired as a frontbencher. In late 1917 his so-called 'Peace Letter', advocating a negotiated settlement with Germany, was published in the *Daily Telegraph*. At once this apparent display of defeatism destroyed his political credibility and was denounced equally by the prime minister Lloyd George, by his own erstwhile Unionist front bench colleagues and by the Northcliffe Press. The allied victory in 1918 disproved his fear that the war was unlikely to come to a swift conclusion. Yet his intervention found an echo in Woodrow Wilson's 'fourteen points' and even in the League of Nations movement in Britain after the First World War.

By any standards Lansdowne's was a substantial career, yet he has been neglected by historians. Until the appearance of this volume, he had not been the subject of a scholarly biography (a hastily written volume by Lord Newton appeared in 1929, two years after his death). Although the author is Lansdowne's great-great grandson, this book is not just an exercise in family piety. Simon Kerry previously completed a PhD thesis on Lansdowne's career as war secretary and has carried out extensive research on Lansdowne's archives, including those still held at the family's Wiltshire seat of Bowood, which have not been extensively used by historians. So the appearance of this volume is welcome.

Yet it is worth adding a note of caution to readers of this journal: although Lansdowne spent most of his career as a Liberal or Liberal Unionist, there is not much Liberal (or even Liberal Unionist) politics in these pages. There are understandable reasons for this. Inheriting his seat in the House of Lords at such an early age, Lansdowne never fought a parliamentary election. And since, by convention, peers did not engage in election campaigning, he appears to have avoided engaging in platform oratory. He was out of the country during the great Liberal schism of 1886 and if he did feel any regrets over leaving the Liberal Party, as many other Liberal Unionists certainly did, this is not discussed here. Despite the book's title, and the author's frequent references to Lansdowne's Whig background, the reality appears to be that, once estranged from the Liberals, he easily fitted in to Tory politics. In that respect, therefore, the book's title is something of a misnomer, and the epithet 'last great Whig' would

perhaps be more appropriately applied to the Eighth Duke of Devonshire who, as Marquess of Hartington, was the leading Whig in Gladstone's second administration and never entirely shed his Liberal sensibilities.

Yet, having offered that caveat, it is fair to conclude by saying that Dr Kerry has made a useful addition to scholarship on late nineteenth and early twentieth-century British politics and colonial administration.

Dr Iain Sharpe is an administrator at the University of London and a Liberal Democrat councillor in Watford.

Letters to the Editor

Elections in Glasgow

May I add two important footnotes to David Hanson's research on the curious 1874 Liberal election leaflet ('Vote for Mr Crum and one other Liberal', *Journal of Liberal History* 102 (spring 2019))?

First, Hanson concludes that if the Glasgow Liberals had sorted out agreement on candidates earlier, the outcome could have been different – 'divided parties lose elections'. He is wrong, as he is imposing the logic of uninominal first-past-the-post elections on this three-member constituency.

Glasgow then (1868–85) voted by a crude form of proportional representation, whereby each voter had two votes for three seats, so offering one seat to a minority party with at least a third of the total vote. At the 1868 and 1880 elections, the Liberals had more than two-thirds of the vote and took all three Glasgow seats. But in 1874, the Liberal share dropped below 65 per cent, so a Tory won one seat. It made no actual difference to the outcome that the Liberal vote was spread over five candidates.

Secondly, the 1874 election was a transitional one for the interplay between candidate choice and party choice. Before the 1872 Ballot Act, as the votes cast were added up in public during polling day(s), it was easy to distinguish between front-runners and also-rans. Hence people voting later in the day could choose between candidates with a real chance and not cast a wasted vote – a crude form of what we now call tactical voting.

This meant that a contest between candidates of the same party could go to the poll, with the weaker candidate withdrawing in favour of the stronger after the first hour or two of voting. That reduced the need for parties to fix agreement in advance, especially in strongly Liberal urban constituencies, where the party would win anyway.

All that changed when, with the secret ballot, there was no longer a certain way of knowing how the votes were piling up. However, old habits died hard, so in 1874 there were still several cases of rival Liberal candidates fighting it out on polling day. By 1880 there were few such cases and from 1885, with general use of the uninominal constituency, they became extremely rare.

Thus among the ten London constituencies, no less than four had Liberal candidates in excess of the two places available in 1868 (that did not cost the party any seats at all); three still had excess Liberal candidates in 1874 (which arguably helped the Tories to win a seat in each of Southwark and Tower Hamlets) but – perhaps after that warning – there was only one such case in 1880.

A final thought: did the introduction of the secret ballot reduce effective democracy in Britain by giving the political parties this incentive to restrict choice? In many other European countries, the right of voters to choose between candidates of the same political hue was retained via the two-ballot system (and later, when list systems appeared, by the right to alter the list). The second ballot was a Radical demand in Britain in the 1880s, but support for it faded as party dominance grew.

Michael Steed

Welsh Liberal Party 1966–70

Continued from page 21

40 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Elfyn Morris to John Gibbs, dated 21 June 1966. Just to note, Deacon states that the meeting was held on the 11 June 1966.
41 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Elfyn Morris Jones to Gruffydd Evans (chairman of the Liberal Party Executive), 26 July 1966.
42 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Hooson to Major Parry Brown, 10 June 1966.
43 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Elfyn Morris to John Gibbs, 21 June 1966.
44 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Michael Meadowcroft to Hooson, 22 Mar. 1967.
45 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter to Mary Murphy from Hooson, 10 Feb. 1967.
46 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Bob Morgan to Hooson, 1 Nov. 1967.
47 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter to Bob Morgan from Hooson, 9 Nov. 1967.
48 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter to Peter Jacobs from Hooson, 24 Nov. 1967.
49 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Hooson to Elfyn Morris, 1 July 1966.
50 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Hooson to Mary Murphy, 13 Oct. 1966.
51 Steve Belzak, 'Swinging in the '60s to the Liberals: Mary Murphy and the Pontypridd Urban District Council', *Journal of Liberal History*, 68 (Autumn 2010), p. 30.
52 Deacon, *Welsh Liberals*, p. 150; in 1959, Lord Ogmore defected from Labour to the Liberal Party as he was disillusioned with the party's stance on nationalisation and felt the Conservatives could only be beaten by an anti-socialist alternative.
53 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Murphy to Hooson, 12 July 1967.
54 Deacon, *Welsh Liberals*, p. 177.
55 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Jones to Hooson, 2 July 1967.
56 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, Box 45, letter from Rhys Gerran Lloyd to Emlyn Thomas, 11 Feb. 1969. The initial letter, from Thomas, does not appear to be in the archive.
57 Deacon, *Welsh Liberals*, p. 167.
58 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Hooson to Mr Watson of Basingstoke, 22 Feb. 1967.
59 Jones, *Welsh Elections* , p. 114.
60 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Hooson to Pratap Chitnis, 24 Oct. 1967.
61 Edwards, 'Political Change in North West Wales', p. 242.
62 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Hooson to Lloyd Morris, 5 Jan. 1967.
63 Peter Joyce, *Realignment of the Left? A History of the Relationship between the Liberal Democrat and Labour Parties* (Basingstoke, 1999), p. 129.
64 David Roberts, 'The Strange Death of Liberal Wales' in John Osmond, *The National*

A Liberal Democrat History Group evening meeting

The Peterloo Massacre and Nineteenth-Century Popular Radicalism

On 16 August 1819, 60,000 peaceful protesters gathered on St Peter's Fields in Manchester to demand the right to elect their own MPs. The demonstration ended when local militia on horseback charged the protesters and cut them down with sabres, leaving at least eleven dead and hundreds injured. The episode became known as 'The Peterloo Massacre'. Lord Liverpool's ministry then cracked down on protests and dissent through the 'Six Acts', which stifled calls for reform.

Join **Dr Robert Poole** (University of Central Lancashire) and **Dr Jacqueline Riding** (Birkbeck, University of London) to discuss the importance and legacy of the Peterloo Massacre, particularly for the Whigs and their aspirations for parliamentary reform. Chair: Baroness Liz Barker.

6.30pm, Tuesday 16 July
Committee Room 4A, House of Lords, London SW1A 0PW

A Liberal Democrat History Group fringe meeting

The Liberal Party, Health Policy and the Origins of the NHS

The familiar story of the NHS has it that the health service is a Labour achievement, dating from the Attlee administration of 1945–51. But in reality the Liberal governments of the early twentieth century helped to lay the foundations of the NHS, and the welfare state as a whole.

Join **Dr Chris Renwick** (University of York) and **Lord Kenneth O. Morgan** to discuss the Liberal contribution to health policy and the origins of the NHS. Chair: Baroness Judith Jolly.

7.45pm, Sunday 15 September
Purbeck Suite, Marriott Highcliff Hotel, Bournemouth (no conference pass necessary)

Question Again: Welsh Political Identity in the 1980s (Dyfed, 1985), p. 88.

65 NLW, Mervyn Jones Papers, File 34, memo from Hooson prior to the Caerphilly by-election, undated but 1968.

66 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Hooson to Geraint Jenkins, 22 Nov. 1967.

67 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Hooson to Laura Grimond, 27 Sep. 1967.

68 J. Graham Jones, *David Lloyd George and Welsh Liberalism* (Llandysul, 2010), p. 504.

69 Hugh Emlyn Hooson in the Dictionary of Welsh Biography, http://wbo.llgc.org.uk/en/s8-HOOS-EML-1925.html, accessed 15 Nov. 2014.

70 Jones, *David Lloyd George and Welsh Liberalism*, p. 503; and Russell Deacon, 'The Slow Death of Liberal Wales 1906–1979', *Journal of Liberal History*, 49 (Winter 2005–6), p. 20.

71 J. Graham Jones, 'Emlyn Hooson and Montgomeryshire Politics, 1962–79', *Montgomeryshire Collections* 97 (2009), p. 189.

72 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Hooson to Geraint Jenkins, 22 Nov. 1967.

73 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Hooson to Geraint Jenkins, 22 Nov. 1967.

74 NLW, Lord Hooson Papers, letter from Hooson to Paul Brighton, 24 Nov. 1973.

75 As I write, this has come to pass with the loss of all the Welsh Liberal Democrat MPs at the 2017 general election.