

## India

Martin Pugh discusses the challenges British rule in India posed to Liberals.

# The Liberals and India



FOR EARLY-NINETEENTH CENTURY Liberals, India presented both a challenge and an opportunity. A fundamentally optimistic creed, Liberalism started from the assumption that, as human nature was essentially the same everywhere, people's lives could be transformed by the application of enlightened ideas and strategies. By the 1830s, England was alive with campaigns for social and political improvement – symptomatic of the belief in progress that was to dominate the Victorian era. However, at home the obstacles to reform were formidably entrenched. By contrast, India offered a huge and tempting laboratory in which

Souvenir of British Empire Exhibition, 1924

the ideas of reformers might be tested and evaluated through the application of a skilled and paternalistic British elite. This confidence was famously reflected in *The History of British India* (1818) by James Mill (1773–1836) who served as an examiner of correspondence for the East India Company from 1819 and as head examiner until 1836.<sup>1</sup> He was especially critical of Hindu society for its backwardness and corruption. The influence of critics increased both through the company and in parliament through such key figures as Charles Grant, a

puritanical evangelical, who served as company director, chairman and as an MP. The result was that, in 1813 and 1833, when the company's charter had to be renewed by parliament, some of its rights were withdrawn and it was also obliged to open India up to missionary work; Liberals also regarded the company as symptomatic of the privilege and monopoly of an earlier era that operated against the public interest, and they therefore used parliament to expose India to free trade.

These trends remind us that their belief in progress made Liberals in a sense illiberal. In the short-to-medium term, they were inclined to be highly critical of what they saw as the stagnation and superstition of Indian society that must be freed from the influence of despots, landlords and priests. T. B. Macaulay expressed this scorn for Oriental culture when he commented, in 1835, that the entire literature of India was 'not worth a single shelf of a good European library'.<sup>2</sup> Also, although nineteenth-century Liberals strongly sympathised with the claims of Greeks and Italians to national self-determination, they believed that Indians' claim to freedom and independence lay far into the future, as they were presently dominated by what James Mill disparaged as 'the silly, sentimental admiration of oriental despotism'.<sup>3</sup> In short, Indians would need British guidance for a long time to come. As Macaulay put it on the renewal of the East India Company charter in 1833: 'by good government we may educate our subjects into a capacity for better government ... [and] they may in some future age demand European institutions'.<sup>4</sup> Increasingly, then, Liberals parted company with the Orientalists who, in the later eighteenth century, had learned Indian languages, taken Indian wives and adopted local food, clothing and other customs. They assumed that the English were in India for the long term but expected that the eventual outcome of English rule would be the development of an educated middle

class capable of releasing Indian talent and enterprise.

Consequently, the early agenda of Liberalism lay in promoting free trade, introducing the English language, land reform and law reform, allowing missionary activity and separating the state from native religious practice, rather than in political innovation. The major exception to this was a free press. Whereas Conservatives and Orientalists feared that a free press would undermine British rule, Liberals argued that, by discrediting Indian superstition, it would be an aid to improved government. 'If India could only be preserved as a part of the British Empire by keeping its inhabitants in a state of ignorance,' wrote Sir Thomas Metcalfe, 'our dominion would be a curse ... and ought to cease.'<sup>5</sup> In any case, one could not deny to British people living in India the rights they enjoyed in Britain. Herein lay the liberal flaw in the Raj, for India was never an *unqualified* autocracy; as Macaulay once observed, it was the only country in the world where the government was autocratic, but the press was free.<sup>6</sup>

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In this period, the most comprehensive attempt to apply the principles of Liberalism in India came under Lord William Bentinck whose governor-generalship (1828–35) is usually seen as a watershed in the evolution of modern India.<sup>7</sup> Yet there was an element of accident in his appointment. Despite previous experience as governor of Madras, Bentinck's appointment was blocked by Tory premiers Liverpool and Wellington who saw him as too high-minded, hostile to the East India Company, and influenced by utilitarianism and evangelicalism. However, they eventually ran out of willing candidates, as India was widely regarded as too unhealthy and too remote a place for an aspiring statesman.

By contrast with the usual governors-general who agreed to serve with a view to gaining

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a new title, extending British territory, fattening the Company's profits, or even making money for themselves, Bentinck espoused the ideals of the new century. His statue in Calcutta claimed, in Macaulay's words, that he 'infused into Oriental despotism the spirit of British freedom ... [and] gave liberty to the expression of public opinion'. But as he had previously been recalled from Madras after a mutiny there, Bentinck felt obliged to be cautious; nevertheless, he undertook a wide range of innovations. He declined to acquire new territory and imposed economies on the army which led some officers to refuse to attend dinners with him. He ended the government's role in religious ceremonies and the collection of a pilgrim tax, and famously abolished several Hindu practices including suttee and thuggee. Other humanitarian reforms included the abolition of slavery and flogging in the army. The young men trained in utilitarian thinking were allowed a free hand to favour the ryots (cultivators) rather than the zamindars and taluqdars (landlords and tax collectors) in the collection of land revenue. Bentinck also began the construction of the Ganges Canal, and he increased the number of Indians employed in the administration, a small step towards the principle adopted in the 1833 Government of India Act that all positions should be open to Indians. Finally, he started spending the 100,000 rupees on education which had been available to governments since 1813 but was unused. In 1829, he determined that English would be the medium of public business, effectively displacing Persian, with the broader object of promoting European science and literature, the assumption being that rational thought could be conveyed only through this means.<sup>8</sup>

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After Bentinck's departure, the pace of liberal reform was checked partly by the Afghan War in 1838–39 and by a return to territorial

expansion. This neglect of the domestic situation was not decisively broken until a second phase, marked by the appointment of James Ramsay, Marquess of Dalhousie (1848–56), who, alongside Bentinck, is widely credited with laying the foundations of modern India.<sup>9</sup> Only 35 years old, Dalhousie was one of the few leading statesmen to be sent to India. Like Gladstone, he was a Peelite who migrated to the Liberal Party via free trade. Industrious and religious, Dalhousie represented the more extreme end of Victorian Liberalism, being arrogant, anti-Oriental and impatient for improvement. In this, however, he reflected the trends in English society. For some years evangelicals had been gaining influence amid a wave of religious activism.<sup>10</sup> Convinced of the depravity of mankind, evangelicals felt an obligation to put their moral beliefs into practice rather than relapse into complacency as they felt their eighteenth-century predecessors had done. Many of the younger men, trained at Haileybury College before coming out as district officers, criticised their elders for being too lax about Indian religion and too ready to compromise with the corruption that held the country back.

On the economic front Dalhousie completed the 800 miles of the Ganges Canal, introduced a telegraph service, unified the postal services and accelerated railway building so that, by 1858, India had 400 miles of railways. He also reflected the bias of the utilitarians against the middlemen in agriculture who were thought to be unproductive and took too much from the peasant farmers. If the state deprived them of their role, they believed, the effect would be to release more productive elements in society.

Above all Dalhousie rejected the Orientalist view of the Indian princes who had traditionally been regarded as a means of mitigating the alien quality of British rule; many of the 600 princes enjoyed alliances with Britain and, at such centres as Delhi, Hyderabad

and Lucknow, they were encouraged to cultivate the culture of the Mughal empire. Yet, to reformers like Dalhousie, the princes merely sustained Indian corruption and obstructed British reform. He identified a series of excuses and motives – misgovernment, strategic advantage, the adoption of heirs, extra land revenue – to justify the annexation of Mysore, Sindh, Punjab, Berar, Lower Burma, Oudh, Satara, Jhansi, Nagpur and Gwalior, in the process increasing British territory by a third.<sup>11</sup>

In this way Dalhousie became, arguably, more responsible for provoking the revolt of 1857, known to the British as ‘the Indian Mutiny’, than any other individual. His most shocking takeover was Oudh (Lucknow), a large state in the Ganges valley, which displaced thousands of princely troops and retainers who relied on the Nawab for their livelihood. He also imposed a new revenue settlement at the expense of the local taluqdars; however, the revenue was set too high and was collected so quickly and systematically that it resulted in a social rebellion encompassing most levels of society.

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The revolt of 1857 provoked a reaction that slowed the pace of reform, reduced the role of missionaries, conciliated the princes and deepened the racial gulf. Contrary to earlier liberal assumptions, it now seemed that Indians were not really like Englishmen and that the Raj depended on maintaining an idea of the English as a super-race.<sup>12</sup> Yet Liberals still recognised that the Raj needed allies in Indian society who might gradually be incorporated into an official role. To this end they increasingly focused on the educated Indian middle class now emerging from the universities and schools created by British rule.

However, the revolt 1857 was by no means the only reason for the check to Liberal reform in India in the second half of the century. Indeed, during this era Liberalism

suffered what was in effect a crisis at several levels. Despite extensions of vote in 1867 and 1885, Liberals lost some of their earlier confidence in reform, recognising that the mass electorate was by no means the well-informed, thinking body of citizens they had hoped for; hence the resistance of some leading Liberals to extending the vote to women.<sup>13</sup> In any case, after the Irish home rule split of 1886, Liberals were largely out of office for twenty years which inevitably limited their capacity to reform India.

Moreover, the earlier Liberal view was confidently challenged by Lord Salisbury, who argued that India demonstrated that autocratic government was really superior to a parliamentary system in which effective administration was hindered by the paraphernalia of debates, elections, political parties and campaigns. Conservatives like Salisbury felt especially suspicious of western-educated Indians who, they believed, posed a threat to the Raj; in the absence of suitable employment, they often became lawyers and journalists and thus articulate critics of British rule. Conservatives favoured the maintenance of racial separation and reliance on the traditional elements in society, hence the award of titles to the princes and the elevation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India in 1876. In the process, India became a focus for a growing party-political divide; opponents of reform gathered in the increasingly anti-Liberal House of Lords, and conflicts between viceroys and secretaries of state became almost routine. For example, the Liberal viceroy, Lord Northbrook (1872–76), clashed with Salisbury when the Conservatives returned to office in 1874 and resigned. Similarly, the Conservative viceroy, Lord Lytton, resigned as soon as Gladstone’s victory in the 1880 general election was known.

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If these trends failed to stop liberalism altogether, they made it more controversial and

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
cautious in the late-Victorian era. Drawing the lesson from 1857 that India could not be held for ever, many Liberals judged it necessary for Britain to win the confidence of the educated class with a view to their participation in the administration. 'The existing connection between two such distant countries as England and India cannot, in the nature of things, be permanent', argued Charles Trevelyan, the governor of Madras. 'No effort of policy can prevent the natives from ultimately regaining their independence. But there are two ways of arriving at this point. One of these is through the medium of revolution, the other through that of reform.'<sup>14</sup> Some Indians themselves recognised that a model for this relationship now existed in the rise of Irish nationalism after 1874, which took the dual form of a respectable parliamentary party on the one hand and a popular grassroots movement on the other. The formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885, with its office in London and its support from several British MPs, seemed to point the way forward.

Some Liberals went further in fostering links between nationalists and the National Liberal Federation whose secretary, Francis Schnadhorst, was alive to the dangers of driving them into extremism and sedition. Henry Fawcett, who served as Gladstone's postmaster general, promoted the idea of direct Indian representation in parliament, and, in 1885, ten Liberal candidates, including John Bright, won endorsement from nationalist organisations in India; Lalmohar Ghosh was the first Indian to stand as a Liberal candidate – at Deptford in 1885.

One of the founders of Congress, Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917), stood unsuccessfully at Holborn in 1886 but won by five votes as a Liberal in Central Finsbury in 1892.<sup>15</sup> An articulate anti-imperialist, Naoroji aired Indian grievances in the Commons and developed the idea of a drain of wealth from India, arguing that Britain extracted annually £33 million

(a quarter of tax revenues). This he blamed for causing Indian poverty, contradicting the official version and challenging Liberal optimism.<sup>16</sup> Naoroji argued that the drain was not a problem in the princely states as opposed to British territory; he therefore campaigned to reduce it by curtailing the role of the British civil servants and opening the Indian Civil Service to Indians by holding simultaneous examinations in the two countries. However, he failed to persuade the Liberal government to adopt simultaneous examinations and gradually became disillusioned with Gladstone and the party generally. Out of parliament, after 1895, he became more radical in his demands for self-government.

Victorian Liberals also enjoyed sympathetic links with Indian Muslims. Bentinck's social reforms had largely affected Hindu practices not Muslim; indeed, the Mughals had themselves attempted to abolish suttee. Moreover, since the eighteenth century, Anglo-Indians had recognised the extensive common ground between Islam and Christianity. Some Nonconformists fully endorsed the Islamic view that alien ideas such as the Holy Trinity had been imported into Christianity; they were initially known as Anti-Trinitarians, and as Unitarians by the nineteenth century. Many Nonconformists also appreciated the prophet, Mohammed, for his austere and disciplined lifestyle, especially those who had been alienated by the privilege and conservatism of the Anglican Church.<sup>17</sup> By the late-Victorian period, the 5,000 Muslims living in England included around 1,000 converts including some well-connected Nonconformists such as Henry Stanley (1827–1905), diplomatist and Orientalist, who, as a Liberal peer (Baron Stanley of Alderley), took up Indian grievances in the House of Lords.<sup>18</sup> In 1860, Stanley travelled to Mecca; he closed public houses on his Cheshire estates; and, when restoring churches, insisted on using the geometric designs as approved by Islamic



tradition. Stanley was buried at Alderley according to Islamic rites by an imam from the Turkish embassy.

However, despite his eminence Stanley was seen as too eccentric to be influential in Liberal circles. Much more central a figure was George Robinson, Marquess of Ripon (1827–1909), whose viceroyalty marked the start of a third phase of Liberal reform. Technically a Whig, Ripon was more of a Radical Liberal. Influenced by the 1848 revolutions in Europe he advocated complete democracy, became a Christian Socialist, supported Irish home rule, and was an ally of Gladstone.<sup>19</sup> On becoming viceroy in 1880, Ripon enjoyed the advantage of his earlier experience as secretary of state

Political subdivisions of the British Raj in 1909 (Edinburgh Geographical Institute)

for India in 1866. Disliking imperialism in the sense of territorial expansion, he was conciliatory towards nationalists and accepted Indian self-rule as the ultimate objective.

Ripon's appointment coincided with the disastrous second British invasion of Afghanistan. Like many Liberals, he argued that, as Afghanistan could not be controlled effectively simply by installing an amir in Kabul, it was best left to act as a natural obstacle to any future Russian advances. Ripon consolidated Gladstone's policy both by abandoning the forward movement in Afghanistan and by avoiding a new war in Upper Burma in the face of opposition from the India Office and

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his own council. He also persuaded Gladstone to pay £1/2 million towards the cost of Indian troops used in the occupation of Egypt in 1882 – an important recognition that this was primarily a British interest.

In 1882, against the advice of his officials, Ripon also revoked a reactionary measure of Lytton's, the Vernacular Press Act, which had banned the publication of anything deemed likely to cause disaffection and empowered district officers to see proofs and to confiscate printing machinery and copies – but only applied to the Indian press. However, more positive steps proved difficult. His proposal to include some Indians in the viceroy's legislative council was blocked at home. Assuming that local government would be less alarming, he proposed that the provinces elect a majority of members to local boards dealing with health, sanitation, education and public works. But Indians were not very interested, and the provincial authorities proved reluctant to implement his ideas. He also advocated, with Gladstone's support, giving the provinces a fixed proportion of the land revenues as a step towards local self-government, but the Council of India objected, and the provinces were slow to implement the suggestion. Ripon's most controversial idea, embodied in the Ilbert Bill, involved allowing Indian magistrates and district judges jurisdiction over Europeans. This, however, provoked enormous anger in the non-official British community, especially among the tea and indigo planters, and eventually Ripon compromised by allowing Europeans to be tried by jury.<sup>20</sup>

As a result of these controversies, some contemporaries saw Ripon's viceroyalty as a disappointment, even a failure. But it was a very positive failure. Indians had noticed that all the major policies of Lytton had been attacked by Liberals and subsequently revoked. Now they saw Ripon, despite support from the prime minister, become the object of

attack by the British community, which generated public meetings, petitions, agitations and speeches, especially over the Ilbert Bill. In this pattern of events Indians recognised that British rule, however autocratic, operated on several different levels and that one level could be used against another. Official policy could be changed through organisation and campaigning; in effect, Indians must copy British political methods. As a result, between the 1880s and the 1930s, Indian nationalists developed what today is known as a culture of democratic politics even though as yet most of them had no formal political role. This process represented a vital complement to the long-term implementation of institutional reform, and was, arguably, the most significant Liberal contribution to the evolution of modern India.

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After the controversies associated with Ripon his successors, Lords Dufferin, Lansdowne and Elgin, took care to calm the British community by promising an end to reform but they went some way to conciliating the nationalists. The Indian Councils Act (1892) allowed the provincial legislatures to be enlarged by the election of non-officials and to hold discussions of the annual budget. But Indian hopes were not significantly raised until the end of 1905 by the appointment of John Morley as secretary of state in the new Liberal government. A Radical Liberal the new minister enjoyed a reputation as a supporter of Irish home rule, though he was in fact much less sympathetic towards Indian aspirations. Moreover, he felt it wise to mitigate opposition at home by presenting any reforms as non-partisan compromises between himself and Lord Minto, the Tory viceroy. Now approaching the end of his career, Morley was determined to score a success in India. To this end he appointed two Indians to the viceroy's executive council in 1907. Under the Indian Councils Act (1909) he also doubled the Indian

representation at provincial level, effectively ending the official majorities. But, to reassure the British, the reforms created separate constituencies for groups such as Muslims and landowners, reflecting Minto's desire to weaken the claims of Congress to represent Indian opinion, and restricted voting to those paying 3,000 rupees income or land tax. As a result of these compromises, Morley's aim of conciliating moderate nationalist opinion was not fulfilled and Congress regarded them as a disappointment.<sup>21</sup>

To some extent, however, Morley's weakness was compensated by the next viceroy, Lord Hardinge (1910–1916).<sup>22</sup> A lesser known but principled Liberal, Hardinge conspicuously offered public support to M. K. Gandhi's campaign of passive resistance in protest against the treatment of Indians in South Africa. Moreover, in 1911, he shrewdly abandoned the highly unpopular policy of partitioning Bengal into two provinces, introduced by Lord Curzon in 1904, and he transferred the capital from Calcutta to Delhi. These moves had the effect of pleasing Hindus without rewarding them for the agitation, conciliating Muslim sentiment as Delhi was the historic Muslim capital, and separating British government from the centre of controversy in Calcutta. The shift to Delhi had long-term implications. In future it would be easier to devolve power to the provinces, and thus to Indians, while leaving the imperial government intact. Though criticised in the House of Lords, Hardinge's strategy proved popular with nationalists and pointed the way forward for Liberal reform.

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During the First World War, the nationalist pressure on the British was greatly accelerated by rapid inflation in India, by the campaigns of the Home Rule Leagues, by Hindu–Muslim collaboration under the 1916 Lucknow Pact, and by the inauguration of Gandhi's

agitations which led to a huge expansion of the Congress. The cumulative effect of these activities was to raise Indian aspirations and to complicate the British aim of diverting moderate nationalists into cooperating with the official reforms. Against this background the last Liberal secretary of state, Edwin Montagu, assumed office in 1917.<sup>23</sup> Montagu enjoyed experience as under-secretary of state for India and through his tour of India in 1912, which was unusual for a minister. Frustrated by the conservatism of the bureaucracy, Montagu handled the situation boldly. He effectively settled British policy in August 1917 with a famous declaration that Britain's aim for India was to develop self-governing institutions 'with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire'. After a second visit to India in which he consulted nationalist opinion, Montagu drew up detailed reforms in April 1918 which left the central administration intact but created a system of 'dyarchy', or a division of powers, in the provinces; while the provincial governments retained control of revenue, other subjects including agriculture, education, health and public works were transferred to Indian control. Seventy per cent of the provincial legislatures were to be elected by 5.5 million voters.

Unfortunately, these innovations were partly undermined by the Rowlatt Acts (1919), which introduced trial without jury for crimes of sedition, and by the Amritsar Massacre of 1919 in which nearly 400 Indians were killed by British troops under General Dyer. Montagu, who condemned Dyer's conduct, was attacked in the Commons by Sir William Jonson-Hicks for 'the criminal betrayal of every white man and woman in India'. These events led to Gandhi's first national satyagraha, then to the Khilafat Campaign on behalf of Muslims, and to the Non-Cooperation campaigns from 1920 to 1924. As a result, Montagu's reforms failed



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to detach the moderate nationalists. On the other hand, with the end of Non-Cooperation in 1924 and Gandhi's imprisonment, Congress did agree to participate in national elections capitalising on its grassroots machine and the two million members it had recruited.

Moreover, Montagu's Liberalism was complemented by Lord Reading (Rufus Isaacs), the Liberal viceroy from 1921–26, who believed in self-government and disliked racial discrimination.<sup>24</sup> He and Lady Read-

### **The Second World War helped determine the timing of independence, but the issue had effectively been settled by 1939.**

ing became popular figures who invariably invited Indians to their functions. Hoping to reconcile the two communities, Reading visited Amritsar and he received Gandhi, their first meeting lasting four-and-a-half hours. Reading also pressed the London government to offer more places to Indians at Sandhurst, a policy that began in 1917 with just ten places for Indians each year, and he promoted an annual increase in the number of Indian officers in the Indian Civil Service as an essential preparation for self-government; thus, by 1929, the ICS included 241 Indians to 881 British and, by 1939, 540 to 759.<sup>25</sup>

Moreover, although Montagu's career was destroyed when Lloyd George sacked him in 1922, his reforms proved significant because they included a provision that, after ten years, a committee would be appointed to review their operation with a view to further instalments; reform was now a process not an event. Indeed, the government anticipated this by instituting a committee early in 1927. Admittedly, with the Liberal Party in headlong decline during the inter-war period, the direct influence of Liberals on India appears increasingly modest. Yet it continued

indirectly via Liberals like Sir John Simon, who had moved to the right as a National Liberal in 1931, and ex-Liberals, notably William Wedgwood Benn who had joined the Labour Party in 1927.

Yet the choice of Simon to prepare the 1927 Report on the next instalment of reform was unwise. Only nominally a Liberal by this time, he was prejudiced against the Indian nationalists, was reportedly baffled by the Indian question, and was congenitally reluctant to confront awkward issues.<sup>26</sup> His 1930 report was a 400-page-long document that simply avoided the key ques-

tion of dominion status, though to be fair it had already been outflanked by the declaration by the Conservative viceroy, Viscount Irwin, in favour of granting dominion status in 1929. Meanwhile, the National Government proceeded to enact the 1935 Government of India Act, which created thirty million voters, granted self-government in the provinces and would have implemented full self-government had the princes not failed to ratify the provisions for central government.

A more Liberal influence was that of William Wedgwood Benn who served as secretary of state in the 1929–31 Labour government and briefly again in 1945. In particular, he authorised Irwin to make his declaration on dominion status in October 1929, which was opposed by Simon and Lloyd George in parliament.<sup>27</sup> The eventual result was the 1935 Government of India Act which represented a bi-partisan policy backed by London and Delhi though resolutely opposed by right-wing Conservatives, led by Churchill, during the 1930s. The 1935 reforms in effect represented the final triumph of Liberalism in India. In the subsequent 1937 elections, Congress won majorities in six provinces and became the largest party in another three, leaving Indians quite close to self-rule during the

closing years of peace. The Second World War helped determine the timing of independence, but the issue had effectively been settled by 1939. ■

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- 1 *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, vol. 38 (OUP, 2004), pp. 148–53; Thomas R. Metcalf, *Ideologies of the Raj* (CUP, 1994), pp. 30–1.
- 2 A Whig-Liberal by the 1830s, Macaulay supported free trade and parliamentary reform but was anti-Chartist. In 1833, he had been appointed the law member of the Governor-General's Council and in 1835 wrote a famous minute arguing for the use of English as the medium of instruction in India.
- 3 Quoted in Eric Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* (OUP, 1959), p. 56.
- 4 Quoted in Metcalf, *Ideologies*, p. 34.
- 5 Quoted in Edward Thompson, *The Life of Lord Metcalfe* (Faber and Faber, 1937), pp. 316–21.
- 6 Although Bentinck supported a free press, it was Sir Thomas Metcalfe (1785–1841) who introduced it in 1835, not an easy decision as the East India Company directors used this as an excuse for not ratifying his appointment as governor-general – a position he occupied for one year: ODNB, vol. 37, pp. 948–52.
- 7 See John Rosselli, *Lord William Bentinck* (Chatto and Windus, 1974); ODNB, vol. 5, pp. 269–74.
- 8 Rosselli, *Bentinck*, pp. 78–86.
- 9 See S. C. Ghosh, *Dalhousie in India 1848–1856* (Allen and Unwin, 1975); S. C. Ghosh, 'The utilitarianism of Dalhousie and the material improvement of modern India', *Modern Asian Studies*, Feb. 1978; ODNB, vol. 45, pp. 937–43.
- 10 Ainslie Embree, *Charles Grant and British Rule in India* (Allen and Unwin, 1962), pp. 271–4.
- 11 See John Pemble, *The Raj, The Indian Mutiny and the Kingdom of Oudh 1801–1858* (Harvester Press, 1977).
- 12 See T. R. Metcalf, *The Aftermath of Revolt: India 1857–70* (Princeton University Press, 1964); Christine Bolt, *Victorian Attitudes to Race* (Routledge, 1971); K. Ballhatchet, *Race, Sex and Class Under the Raj* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980).
- 13 The racial bias even among reformers was evident in the reluctance of some suffragists to extend the vote to the women of Spain, Italy and other Mediterranean societies as opposed to those of the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries: Martin Pugh, *The March of the Women* (OUP, 2000), pp. 53–4.
- 14 'The Education of the People of India', p. 192, quoted in Stokes, *English Utilitarians*, p. 46.
- 15 Dinyar Patel, *Naoroji: Pioneer of Indian Nationalism* (Harvard University Press, 2020), pp. 96–9, 102, 106.
- 16 Patel, Naoroji, pp. 51–5, 62; ODNB, vol. 40, pp. 42–3.
- 17 Martin Pugh, *Britain and Islam: From 622 to the present day* (Yale University Press, 2019), pp. 123–4.
- 18 ODNB, vol. 52, pp. 213–14.
- 19 See A. Denholm, *Lord Ripon 1827–1909* (Chatto and Windus, 1982); S. Gopal, *The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon 1880–84* (CUP, 1953); ODNB, vol. 47, pp. 332–8.
- 20 R. J. Moore, *Liberalism and Indian Politics 1872–1922* (Edward Arnold, 1966), pp. 36–40.
- 21 For assessments, see S. E. Koss, *John Morley at the India Office* (Yale University Press, 1969); S. A. Wolpert, *Morley and India 1906–19* (University of California Press, 1967).
- 22 Viscount Hardinge of Penshurst (1858–1944) was a diplomat and civil servant. His entry in the ODNB, vol. 25., pp. 177–81, does not do justice to his Liberalism.
- 23 See S. D. Waley, *Edwin Montagu* (Asia Publishing House, 1964); K. O. Morgan, *Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government 1916–1922* (OUP, 1979); ODNB, vol. 38, pp. 716–20.
- 24 ODNB, vol. 29, pp. 404–11.
- 25 Denis Judd, *Lord Reading* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992), pp. 213, 219.
- 26 David Dutton, *Simon: A biography of Sir John Simon* (Aurum Press, 1992), pp. 85–7, 91–3; ODNB, vol. 50, pp. 663–6.
- 27 Wedgwood Benn, became a Liberal MP in 1906 but joined Labour in 1927 and was elevated as Lord Stansgate in 1942, gaining a reputation as a 'happy warrior' for liberalism in the Lords: ODNB, vol. 5, pp. 94–6.